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Loggers, donors and resource owners
Papua New Guinea is well endowed with tropical forest, almost all of which is held by local people
under customary title. But the forest sector is in a mess. Over the last ten years a major national process
of policy and institutional reform has sought to sort out the sector, but some key features of PNG society
continue to frustrate this process. The ‘ideology of resource ownership’ is the core of national identity,
yet it undermines the potential for diversified economic development based on the use or value of land
and forests. Also, a widespread obsession with the pursuit of personal political power grows alongside
an equally widespread loss of faith in the ability of government to deliver social and economic devel-
opment. These contradictions help to explain why the national policy process centres on a struggle
between the logging industry and donor agencies for the hearts and minds of the resource owners.
Whilst this struggle throws up many problems, it also presents opportunities for establishing a new
approach to policy for forests and people. This would establish the common ground upon which a
wider coalition of interests - a new ‘policy community’ - could be built. Opportunities include: developing
mechanisms for testing and publicising claims to productive innovation; combining different scales of
enterprise; generating a vision of the public interest through dialogue; and installing a brokering
mechanism to connect needs with existing capacities.
Policy that works for forests and people series
Forest issues often concern large amounts of money, long timeframes, huge areas of land, and diverse
livelihoods. The issues are complex and vary from place to place. However, a pattern of forest
problems is common to many countries: continuing loss of natural forests; over-concentrated control
and inequitable access to forests; an ill-informed public; and poorly-resourced, inflexible forestry
institutions. Policy is the root cause of many of these forest problems.
This series consists of six country studies - from Costa Rica, Ghana, India, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea and Zimbabwe - and an overview report. The series aims at a better understanding of the
forces at play in contests over policy, the winners and losers, and the factors that affect policy outcomes.
It also describes the processes that make and manage good policies and the policy instruments that
work in different contexts. By dealing with policy in practice - in the ‘real world’ of people and their
institutions - the series aims to go beyond the frequently heard complaint that there is a lack of ‘political
will’ to change, by showing how policy can change for the better.
This report was financed by the UK Department for International development (DFID) and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands Development Assistance (NEDA)
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Papua New Guinea’s forest industry has been developed on the basis of
forest policy which encourages large scale projects which are intended to be
conducted on a sustainable basis to produce a continuous flow of wood.
The logical result of this policy is that projects cover large areas of forest so
as to be economically viable for the foreign logging companies while
securing a revenue source for the government.  Large projects such as these
discourage the participation of customary landowning groups whose title is
recognised by law, but who are not always related by custom or language to
the other landowners residing within one forestry project area.
Herein lies PNG’s greatest challenge:  the equitable participation of
customary landowning communities in the exploitation of their forest
resources.  It is clear that, at the moment, customary landowning
communities are at the mercy of the agenda set by aspiring politicians, local
big men, the foreign logger and the government.  Unless provided with
some meaningful ways to participate, they will continue to be rent
collectors and bystanders waiting for the delivery of essential services to
their rural area, hoping somehow that if the government does not deliver,
the logging company may do so, bringing infrastructure and cash into the
local economies.  Whilst this happens on a piecemeal basis, the community
has no sustainable investment in the forest resource and its harvesting.
In relation to downstream processing, PNG also continues to pursue a
policy based on low-value, high volume output.  This policy compounds
the trend in favour of large scale logging.  New projects negotiated on a
similar basis are continuing to lock more communities into becoming
disenfranchised bystanders.
The long term future of the people’s forests can only be maintained if there
is a clear and definite shift to small and medium scale forestry, involving the
direct participation of local communities.  It will require rethinking the
export component of our forest industry, looking for markets that pay the
added value for our produce.  This resource belongs to the people of PNG
Foreword
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and should be used for the benefit of current and future generations.
However, the forest industry will not achieve these aims while the greed of
Asian markets continues to be the dominating force for present policy.
Loggers, Donors and Resource Owners tells the story, for the first time in PNG,
of where policy has come from, who is fighting over it, and what effect this
has. It describes the futility of trying to impose policy prescriptions on
reluctant people, and analyses the motivation and power of different groups,
and the potential they have to make positive changes. The report concludes
by proposing a transparent process of testing claims for productive and
equitable forest developoment. Through such processes a whole new policy
community might be established, of those who can ensure that policy works
for both forests and people. I recommend this book wholeheartedly.
Meg Taylor
Commissioner, World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development,
and formerly Papua New Guinea’s Ambassador to the USA
12 February 1998
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Executive summary
Introducing the play and the cast of characters
Over the last ten years, Papua New Guinea has been engaged with a major
process of policy and institutional reform in response to a perceived crisis in
the forest sector. This study examines the successes and failures in this
process, and assesses the feasibility of achieving a form of policy that works
for the forests and people of PNG.
In this story, the forest policy process is seen as a social drama. The
characters in the play are politicians, public servants, industry, NGOs, donors
and local resource owners. However, some characters make more noise than
others, and the national policy process is centred on a struggle between the
logging industry and a donor lobby for the hearts and minds of the resource
owners. The former two characters have the most concerted voices, while the
latter own the scenery. The weakness of the other three characters reflects the
fact that nearly all Papua New Guineans are resource owners, and represent
themselves in this light when flirting with the characters of politician, public
servant and NGO. The theme of the play is “sustainable forest management”
but the plot revolves around the relationship between the politics of the
Melanesian village and the divergent interests of assorted foreigners.
Setting the scene: forests and people
PNG is well endowed with tropical forest - it covers 280,000 km2, or just over
60 per cent of national land area - and is renowned for its rich biological
diversity. PNG also has relatively few people - about 4.4 million, with an
average density of 9.5 people per km2, and a growth rate of approximately 2.3
per cent per annum. Basic facts which underpin the relationship between
PNG’s forests and people include:
• about 97 per cent of all land in PNG, and more than 99 per cent of all
forested land, is held under customary title - by “resource owners”
• only 3 per cent of current subsistence farming in PNG takes place on land
cleared of forest that was not previously cleared for agricultural purposes
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over the last 20 years. PNG’s farmers are responding to population
growth through forms of agricultural intensification rather than clearance
of primary forest
• establishment of agricultural plantations has been the most important
single direct cause of deforestation this century (until the 1997/98 drought
brought forest fires to highland areas)
• plantation forests cover between 350 and 400 km2 of land
• less than 4 per cent of PNG land area has formal protected area status
• very little commercial logging occured prior to Independence (1975), but
by 1994 raw log exports reached a peak of nearly 3 million m3, with a
value of about US$410 million, representing just over 18 per cent of
domestic export values, from which the national government collected
about US$111 million in log export taxes
• up to 7,000 people are directly employed in PNG’s industrial forestry
sector
• about 50 per cent of log exports are under the control of a single
Malaysian company, Rimbunan Hijau, and another 30-35 per cent are
under the control of other Malaysian companies.
• Japanese general trading companies dominate the log trade - by
controlling distribution chains, financiers and wholesalers. They
effectively control the regional market for logs through the sheer volume
of their purchases.
Resource dependency and unequal development
Standard economic indicators show PNG to be a middle-income country, yet
social indicators reveal a picture more characteristic of a typical low-income
country. The economy is highly dependent on the export of raw materials,
and is vulnerable to external price shocks. Many factors conspire against
industrial development in PNG: high operating costs; high wage costs;
dearth of skills; small domestic market; “law and order problems”; and
cumbersome approval processes.
The decline of agricultural export prices has encouraged the search for
alternative sources of cash income, and enclave economies have evolved
around extractive industry - mining, petroleum and logging - which create
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very unequal patterns of development. This is exacerbated by the
government’s habit of passing resource rent to only a few “lucky strike”
communities. It also creates a psychological and cultural form of “resource
dependency”. However, such dependency may also lead to inflated
demands from resource owners whose expectations of “development” may
exceed what can feasibly be realised, sometimes rendering resource
exploitation uneconomic. Yet if communities do not like their experience of
development, it does not seem to stop them wanting more of the same.
Populist politics and civil society
The much-vaunted populist view of Melanesian communities living in
harmony with each other and the environment is a myth. In reality,
Melanesian communities have always been on the verge of disintegration
and it has taken special qualities of leadership in each succeeding
generation to hold them together. An egalitarian ethos may, however,
explain why some communities are willing to degrade their land in an effort
to keep up with their neighbours.
PNG politics are characterised by a form of populism which breathes life
into a wide range of public institutions. The judiciary has maintained its
independence, and there is an uncensored national press. Together, these
institutions punish the practice of political corruption. The Westminster
political system continues to thrive, and no ethnic group has the size or
solidarity required to gain exclusive control of the political system.
However, there are some major problems of governance at the national
level:
• National government policy-making is still an activity which tends to be
dominated by foreign consultants.
• Political parties are little more than parliamentary factions. Governments
have been formed by an unstable succession of coalitions of national
politicians whose own electoral survival commonly depends on their
ability to reward a very small local constituency with the maximum
possible share of government resources.
• The fluctuating personal interests of ministers, and their own patrons and
clients, undermine the capacity of public servants to maintain the
coherence of sectoral development policies.
• Politicians are rarely called upon to demonstrate the consistency of their
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actions with policy, and are therefore free to treat their portfolios as
personal fiefdoms.
• Popular distrust of elected politicians is widespread.
• The public service is also characterised by intense rivalries, low levels of
financial accountability, and a tendency to treat policy statements as “state
secrets”.
At the local level, the legitimacy and efficiency of local government has been
at a low ebb for many years. After protracted national debate, new legislation
on provincial and local government represents a significant change in the
form of decentralisation, but it is too early to say whether this will restore
confidence in government in rural areas.
Public policy domains affecting forests
Constitutionally-guaranteed customary land ownership is the key policy
domain influencing forest use. PNG citizens think of themselves as landlords
and staunchly defend their territorial right to claim “compensation” from the
process of resource development which takes place on their land. The notion
of “landownership” as the foundation of national identity leads, for example,
to denials that there is such a thing as poverty in PNG, and to widespread
hostility to sporadic World Bank attempts to initiate measures for the use of
customary land as security for commercial credit.
Mineral policy is primarily concerned with the ownership and control of
large-scale mineral export ventures and the distribution of resource rents
between national stakeholders. The forest policy process has come to
resemble the mineral policy process in that large-scale logging has become
the dominant economic activity in the sector. However, unlike the forest
sector, Western donors have kept a low profile in the mining and petroleum
sector, perhaps reflecting their belief that Western mining and petroleum
companies, unlike Asian logging companies, already act as responsible
corporate citizens in PNG.
Agricultural policy aims to promote development of small-scale production
on customary land. But its impact is constrained by the sheer size of the target
population, and most farmers therefore remain detached from the policy
process.
Structural adjustment policy continues to have a major influence on the forest
sector. After much opposition from sections of government from 1995 to 1997,
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the World Bank was able to use its economic muscle to push through
government commitments to forestry reforms in return for a major economic
rescue package (see below). While structural adjustment and the recent
legislation on local government are subject to intense national debate, the
effort by donor-funded experts to develop a National Sustainable
Development Strategy has fallen, unsung, between the cracks of government
institutional responsibility.
The number of individuals from any stakeholder group who are actively
engaged in more than one of these policy domains at any one time is small, so
there are few opportunities for learning across sectors.
Industrial forestry appears on the scene  - in crisis
Surveys of timber potential began early in the century, but the Forest Service
was not established until 1938. By 1953 it had established timber as the second
most important export commodity after copra, but out-turn was still
relatively low. There was very little public debate over forest policy until the
late 1980s.
By 1987, the forest sector had grown to the point of harvesting 2 million cubic
metres of logs annually. But allegations of impropriety in the timber industry
and government were flying. Two months before a national election, the
Prime Minister appointed an Australian member of the PNG judiciary,
Thomas Barnett to lead an inquiry into these allegations. After two years, and
in 20 volumes, Barnett described a “forest industry out of control” -
dominated by foreign investors in questionable “partnership” with PNG
leaders - in which the volume of logs exported was maximised with no regard
for environmental damage and to the detriment of local processing capacity.
He called for a slow down in timber harvesting, and advocated the
reformulation of national policy, establishment of a nationally integrated
forestry service, consultation procedures in allocation of permits, and
formalisation of detailed requirements for sustained-yield forestry.
Barnett’s findings were premised on the assumption that national technocrats
and landowners could make common cause against the corruption of their
state and society by an unholy alliance of foreign loggers, domestic politicians
and wayward public servants. The next section begins to illustrate that, with
hindsight, this can be seen as a flawed assumption.
Reform of industrial forestry policy 1989-1997
Following Barnett’s findings, a small number of politicians and public
servants lost their jobs, and a new government sought international assistance
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under the global Tropical Forest Action Plan. Eventually, PNG’s National
Forestry and Conservation Action Programme (NFCAP) took shape as a
collection of projects which ran from 1991 to 1995. The NFCAP had a major
emphasis on restructuring the forestry institutions, developing
conservation objectives and working with NGOs to form a bridge with
resource owners. A succession of policy changes was set in motion by the
discussions of 1989 onwards. The following table highlights these changes,
and their impacts in terms of actual practice.
New National Forest Policy, approved by Cabinet in April
1990 and published in September 1991, lays the founda-
tions for detailed reform of forestry legislation
New Forest Policy proposes various fiscal measures to
encourage ‘downstream processing’, and subsequent
policy statements constantly repeat the need for such
measures
New Forest Policy and subsequent policy statements pro-
pose various measures to promote reforestation by both
government agencies and private investors
In 1990, Cabinet agrees to impose national moratorium on
the issue of new Timber Permits for raw log export opera-
tions until the new Forestry Act comes into effect
In 1991, Department of Environment and Conservation
produces new guidelines for production of Environ-
mental Plans for large-scale forestry projects
New Forestry Act (gazetted June 1992) replaces old
Department of Forests with a National Forest Authority
under the direction of a board representing a range of
stakeholders - including NGOs - in the forestry sector,
with a view to reducing the exercise of arbitrary pow-
ers by the Minister for Forests
New Forestry Act requires production of a National Forest
Plan as precondition for the development of new forestry
projects The required form of the Plan is essentially that of
a land-use map (rather than a land use strategy)
New Forestry Act includes a commitment to establish a
new forest revenue system designed to encourage
sustainable forest management
The new Policy does not contain any targets or guidelines
specific enough to influence the course of subsequent
public debate on forest management issues
Government unable to devise any system of incentives
which can satisfy the World Bank and encourage new
investment in the domestic processing sector
National Forest Authority unwilling or unable to make effec-
tive use of reforestation levies charged on logging compa-
nies, while developers make few additional contributions to
this objective
More than 20 Timber Permits issued during the period of
the ‘moratorium’, while gazettal of the new Forestry Act is
delayed by the Minister and his Departmental Secretary
No marked improvement in the Department’s capacity to
evaluate such plans, monitor compliance, or prosecute
offenders
Minister continues to influence the decisions of the National
Forest Board and National Forest Service through control
over the appointment of the Managing Director.  Forest
Authority divides into factions supporting and opposing
the policies of successive Ministers
Cabinet approves some development proposals before the
Plan is developed. A Plan appears in 1996 but can never be
more than a statement of government intent because it cov-
ers wide stretches of customary land, whose multiple own-
ers have not yet made their own land use decisions
Government raises log export taxes in 1993 and 1994, but
comprehensive reform of the old system not implemented
until 1996, and then only under intense pressure from the
World Bank
 Changes in formal policy    Changes in actual practice
National level
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Radical set of National Forestry Development Guidelines
produced by Ministry of Forests in 1993, as one of the
statutory requirements of the National Forest Plan
New Forestry Act and subsequent Guidelines provide for
review of all agreements made under previous forestry
legislation
In 1994, the government engages a private contractor to
monitor log exports in order to control the incidence of
transfer pricing by logging companies
In 1996, government endorses new Logging Code of Prac-
tice under pressure from World Bank
Guidelines widely attacked by forest industry representa-
tives, and largely ignored by subsequent Ministers and
senior bureaucrats in the National Forest Service
Determined opposition by the logging industry, and lack
of capacity in the National Forest Service, combine to
halt the review process
Widespread agreement that this system has proven
effective, though still substantially dependent on donor
support
Logging industry complains about lack of consultation,
and Bank still doubts capacity of National Forest
Service to ensure that companies follow the code
Provincial level
New Forestry Act requires production of Provincial Forest
Plans by Provincial Forest Management Committees, in
all 19 Provinces, as the building blocks of the National
Forest Plan
New Forestry Act returns provincial forestry offices to
national government control, under an integrated
National Forest Service
New Organic Law of 1995 appears to grant new powers to
provincial authorities to determine their own forest
policies
Provincial planning process envisaged by the Act turns
out to be unworkable because PFMCs do not have the
information or capacity to produce integrated land use
plans for their provinces, and officers of the National
Forest Service take over the process in order to meet
the Minister’s demand for a National Plan
Some improvement in morale and efficiency of provincial
officers, and greater immunity to political interference at
provincial level
Production of National Forest Plan delayed by confusion
arising from apparent inconsistencies between the new
Organic Law and the new Forestry Act
Local level
New Forestry Act strongly recommends that local land-
owning groups be incorporated under the Land Groups
Incorporation Act as a precondition of new Forest Man-
agement Agreements between themselves and the State
New Forestry Act requires forestry officials to conduct a
Development Options Study in consultation with local land-
owners as a precondition of new Forest Management
Agreements
New forest revenue system intended to increase the land-
owner’s share of resource rent from large-scale logging
operations
Task of land group incorporation exceeds the capacity of
government officials, to the point where it either functions
as an obstacle to state acquisition of additional forest
resources, or else has to be completed with assist-
ance from the logging companies
Development Options Studies consist of little more than
proposals for large-scale logging
Industry opposition, bureaucratic obstruction, and local
disorganisation delay the transfer of additional financial
and material benefits to landowning communities
 Changes in formal policy    Changes in actual practice
National level (contd.)
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For a brief period from 1991 to 1994, the forest sector reform process
contained a real sense of national ownership and unity of purpose.
However, of the two major policy instruments introduced, it is now clear
that the Forestry Act grossly overestimated the capacity of the state to
regulate the use of customary land, whilst the new forest revenue system is
yet to find a way to deal with the variation in the quality of timber
resources, the relative costs and efficiency of different concession operators,
and their differential willingness to honour the agreements made with other
stakeholders.
So far, the most successful experiment in encouraging better practice in the
forest industry is the log export surveillance system, initiated in 1994,
which was “outsourced” to a private contractor. Log exporters welcomed
the opportunity to prove that they were no longer guilty of the transfer
pricing documented by the Barnett Inquiry. This raises the question of
which other elements of the reform process might have been better
expedited by a less heavy-handed approach to industrial regulation, and a
more concerted effort to build a wider policy consensus.
Reforming forest conservation policy, 1989-1997
PNG’s official conservation policies are constructed around the
establishment of a representative system of protected areas. But the legal
and institutional mechanisms established to pursue this goal have proven
to be unwieldy and ineffective. Terrestrial biodiversity values are almost
entirely confined to customary land, and there is no prospect of this land
being alienated by the state for purposes of conservation.
Various experiments with “integrated conservation and development” have
attempted to foster a form of multiple land use planning in which local
stakeholders agree to conserve part of the forest in exchange for the
development of another part. Where the protected area embraces the
territories of several adjoining landowning groups, this agreement has to
make allowance for the people in conservation zones to participate in the
development of other people’s land. Such agreements have so far proven
elusive. Other projects, in which conservation proponents have tried to
compete directly with logging companies, have met with limited success.
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Minister for Environment and Conservation informs 1990
NFCAP Round Table that his government intends to
create a system of protected areas covering 20
percent of the country
PNG government signs Convention on Biological
Diversity in 1993
PNG signs Global Convention on Climate Change in 1993
In 1994, AusAID-funded Department of Environment and
Conservation Strengthening Project initiates a process of
streamlining environmental planning legislation to support
a new Environmental Regulatory Framework
New Organic Law of 1995 gives provincial governments
greater responsibility for conservation area management
New Organic Law of 1995 gives local-level governments
greater responsibility for land use planning
Multinational oil company secures government approval
for addition of one large area to the list of protected areas,
but total coverage still less than 4 percent of the country
Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management
Programme, funded by the Global Environment Facility
makes more progress with scientific appraisal of
biodiversity than with experiments in an “integrated
conservation and development” process designed to
extend the protected area system
Department of Environment and Conservation unable to
produce baseline data required by Convention
New Environment Bill still awaiting Cabinet approval in
1998
Little evidence that provincial governments are willing or
able to take over these responsibilities, or that the
Department of Environment and Conservation is willing to
abandon them
No evidence of new relationships between local-level
governments and major stakeholders in the conservation
policy domain
 Changes in formal policy    Changes in actual practice
National level
Provincial level
Local level
Reform of policy for community participation
Since 1992, donors and NGOs have opened up a substantial “popular front”
through a variety of relationships with specific rural communities which are
directed towards the goal of forest conservation or sustainable forest
management. A range of NGOs currently claim to have some stake in the
forest policy process through activities such as: environmental advocacy,
applied research, legal aid, conservation area management, promotion of
non-timber forest products, and provision of business development advice.
Government has given vague endorsement rather than formal policy
backing to these moves.
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The forest policy reform process aimed to foster new forms of community
organisation, stressing accountability and democracy in the forest resource
acquisition process. However, rural communities have a long history of
resistance to imposed values, and the National Forest Authority’s failure to
negotiate with the forest industry or landowner groups in developing these
measures has resulted in limited uptake. The Forest Industries Association
believes that the whole reform process was designed to drive a bureaucratic
wedge between the logging industry and the resource owners.
Like proposed protected areas, large timber concessions contain many
customary land groups. New systems of representation through
associations of “incorporated land groups” have yet to prove themselves
workable, and the Forest Authority has little capacity or resources to try
them out. Meanwhile, little attention has been paid to the actual or
potential role of local-level governments as vehicles for community
participation.
Villagers often do not see logging of primary forest as a direct threat to their
subsistence lifestyles. Most of the trees which supply food, fuel, or raw
materials for buildings or other local artefacts are either deliberately
cultivated within the secondary forest zone, where shifting cultivation is
practiced, or harvested from garden fallows. Thus, efforts to develop and
commercialise small-scale forestry or non-timber forest products may not
be seen as alternatives to logging. Of the “alternatives” that have received
much attention:
• Portable sawmills have become widespread since the mid-1980s.
However, they are often seen by villagers as a complement rather than an
alternative to large-scale logging projects. Some of the most successful
small sawmill operators are found in existing log export concessions
where they can utilise reject logs and get technical help or equipment.
• Ecotourism has captured the imagination of many local groups. But the
lack of infrastructure, PNG’s high-cost economy, the high cost of air
travel, and the perception within key tourist markets that law and order
problems make it a high risk destination, restrict the potential of
ecotourism.
• Proof of carbon sequestration is seen by the World Bank as the best bet
for PNG to secure substantial finances from conservation or sustainable
management of forest resources. However, one experiment has already
shown that, unless there is confidence that the carbon storage service can
be guaranteed, investors are likely to shy away from such schemes.
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A recent survey of anthropologists and other social scientists suggests that
the rural constituency for more sustainable development only forms through
the process of “resource development”, as people learn from experience. It
appears that resource owners are beginning to learn that other stakeholders
are not going to present them with “free” solutions, and are thus moving
further down the road to self-reliance.
Powers over policy
Taking stock of the current powers of our six characters to influence the
forest policy process, we can see a sort of stalemate developing. But we can
also see why the balance of power is constantly changing:
• Resource owners possess much bargaining power based on the simple fact
of ownership of the resource. If need be, this can be converted into  acts of
sabotage, intimidation of company personnel or production stoppages.
However, communities are commonly internally divided, and the
numbers of highly educated members of local communities who might
favour sustainable development are often smallest in those rural
communities with the most forest of interest to other stakeholders.
• The private sector derives most power from its capacity to use “divide-and-
rule” tactics with other stakeholders. However, politicians and NGOs
derive much political capital from attacking resource developers, and the
demonisation of the log export industry thrives on a mood of public
disquiet about the “Asianisation” of the national economy. Uncertainties
about the physical and political environment constrain private sector
players from manipulating the “system” to their lasting advantage, but
also reduce the potential for sustainable forest management to be pursued
through corporate self-interest.
• Donor agency leverage over the national policy process revolves around a
double act between AusAID and the World Bank, where each relies on the
other for specific actions, while other donor agencies play walk-on parts
and keep their exit options open. The World Bank sells the prescriptions of
a “global” donor community, while AusAID gravitates towards the
implementation of “institutional strengthening” projects. Ultimately, the
power which donors exercise over the forest policy process, through the
Structural Adjustment Programme, depends on the continued fiscal and
governance crisis which the donors are supposedly attempting to resolve.
• Politicians count themselves as resource owners, and many are, or have
been, employed by government, NGOs and the private sector. So no clear
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distinction can be drawn between the country’s political, bureaucratic and
business elites. There is a vicious circle through which politicians justify
the exercise of greater personal executive power by reference to the
failings of a bureaucratic system whose own powers are diminished by
the same exercise.
• Public servants compete to obtain the maximum benefit from each
rearrangement of the institutional furniture, and keep their distance from
each other by constantly mending the fences which the politicians like to
break in their own search for additional executive power. Bureaucratic
reforms in the National Forest Service encountered resistance from public
servants as soon as they could no longer rely on the support of a
reforming minister and an elite squad of donor-funded technical advisers.
• NGOs do not form a natural cartel and have very different degrees of
leverage on forest policy. The relationship between NGOs and donors is a
marriage of convenience which is forced upon both parties by their
common disaffection with the powers of bureaucrats and politicians. The
acid test for the power of many NGOs lies in their ability to
simultaneously meet the needs of rural resource owners and satisfy the
donors.
The next act in the play?
In 1998, forest policy is not the hot topic which it was five years ago. Yet a
number of recent events conspire to suggest that the heat may return:
• Massive forest fires have done far more damage to PNG’s forest resources
in a matter of weeks than the logging companies have managed in ten or
twenty years. Food and export crops have been hit by drought and some
mining companies have been obliged to interrupt their operations. Faced
with a drastic decline in its projected revenues and the additional cost of
emergency drought relief programmes, will the national government
speed up the allocation of new timber permits in a desperate attempt to
balance its own books?
• The financial crisis in the national economies of Southeast Asia has
contributed to the problems faced by log exporters. Loggers complain that
they are being driven out of business by the combination of high costs,
high taxes, and low market prices.
• The new Government formed in 1997 is not thought to be as well-
disposed towards the log export industry as its predecessor.
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• The Structural Adjustment Programme includes commitments to the
new forest revenue system, the adoption of a logging code of practice,
the provision of additional funding to the National Forest Authority, and
improvements in the supervision of PNG’s log exports. However, the
programme is also beginning to bite on “bread and butter” issues for
public servants and wage-earners. Resource owners may join the protest
if the programme has a negative impact on rural living standards. If the
programme enables the national government to balance its books, it may
then give politicians room to escape the straitjacket which has been put
on their relationships with logging companies. The programme, with its
forestry conditions, may then disintegrate.
• In the forest sector, the World Bank is putting together a major new
Forestry and Conservation Project whose total value is currently
estimated at US$ 59 million. This will centre on the founding of a
Conservation Trust Fund as a means to pave the way for PNG to take
advantage of the growing market for carbon offset schemes. It also aims
to transform the Department of Environment and Conservation into an
Environmental Protection Authority and found an independent “forestry
inspectorate” to monitor the “front-line” dealings between officers of the
National Forest Service and other stakeholders.
Over the next ten years we expect commercial exploitation of natural
resources to account for a constantly increasing share of the country’s
economic output - based primarily on a significant expansion of the oil and
gas industry. This will maintain current patterns of resource dependency
and uneven development which continually open up new divisions
between different parts of the country. Millenarian fears are rife in PNG but,
if the world has not come to an end by January 2000, present trends indicate
that resource owners are more likely to lose faith in the political process
than to abandon their hopes of salvation from the sale of their logs and
other natural resources.
If the World Bank is able to ensure the maintenance of the current fiscal
regime, the local log export industry will almost certainly contract. Those
companies which make some environmental effort and make a serious
effort to bring returns to other stakeholders may be the first to feel the
pinch. The conservationists may gain more opportunities to ply their wares,
and the new market for carbon offset schemes may assume greater
importance. But PNG’s ability to profit from such schemes is not only
dependent on the managerial capacities of the national government, which
are slender enough, but on a wholesale transformation of indigenous
property relations.
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There are no quick-fix solutions in the search for methods of determining
the use of customary land. Popular resistance to anything which smacks of
customary land registration is strong, despite the fact that landowners in
many parts of the country recognise the need to formalise their titles and
their land use options in some systematic way. The challenge is to start
making the right connections between the concept of “land reform”, the
development of new forms of community organisation, and a basic shift in
the moral basis of “landowner politics”.
Ways forward - common ground
Specific policy recommendations to be taken forward by a group of
national “decision-makers” are not presented here. Three broad
contradictions conspire to undermine any such group’s effectiveness:
• the pursuit of economic growth based on the use or value of land
continues to be frustrated by the belief in “landownership” as the
inviolate core of Papua New Guinean identity
• a widespread obsession with the pursuit of personal political power
grows together with an equally widespread loss of faith in the power of
government to deliver social and economic development
• the production of increasingly elaborate plans for reconstruction of the
whole political economy is undermined by the perversity of actual
policy outcomes
Each of our characters speaks loudly in their declarations of the others’
villainy, and none is willing to admit that others act on any principle except
self-interest. Backstage however, most actors concede that there are some
good people in the other camps. This suggests that there is an opportunity
to establish the common ground upon which to develop a wider coalition
of interests - to build a new “policy community”.
Building policy communities - creating stakeholders
Neither the donors, nor the logging companies, nor any other foreign
stakeholders have any proven capacity to close the gap between village
politics and the public interest. The best hope lies in those institutions of
civil society which derive their strength from both sides of the fence: to
build new constituencies from the building blocks of Melanesian society,
with participatory structures, technical expertise and young leadership.
Policy communities will not simply arise from the invention of new
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committees, boards, trusts, or other structures for the maintenance of
dialogue between our six main characters. The substance of the conversation
and the action has to be the focus of the effort. It requires developing the
quality and variety of negotiations between existing stakeholders, both
national and expatriate, in their official and private capacities, in a way that
creates new partnerships and new stakeholders.
Developing mechanisms for testing claims
As Papua New Guineans would say, the problem is to “find the road”, by
subjecting policy positions to a set of trials or experiments which will reveal
who speaks the truth, whose actions speak louder than their words, and
what those actions actually mean. As Americans would say, the problem is
to build more reality checks and feedback loops into the policy process, so
that it becomes an iterative, incremental and adaptive learning process.
For example, official representatives of the log export industry may claim
that a specific large-scale logging operation should be regarded as a model
of best practice under local conditions, or that a specific form of
organisation exemplifies the best way for landowners to deal with logging
contractors in the pursuit of sustainable development. Mechanisms are
needed to simultaneously publicise and adjudicate claims of this sort, by
producing evidence rather than recycling assumptions. A “route map” is
needed which enables competing claims to be evaluated - to travel from the
office to the village or a patch of forest and back to the public media for all
to see.
Only through negotiation can resource owners hope to achieve the capacity
to protect their interests in the long term. Similarly, “public interest”
objectives such as environmental protection should be balanced against
conflicting interests through location-specific negotiation. State agencies
will have to take the lead, but will also need new partners, to:
• scrutinise the development plans of developers
• publish model contract provisions
• legislate for court review of manifestly unfair contracts
• create finance arrangements where landowners can borrow against future
income to pay for preliminary investigations and professional advice
• enable non-government negotiation services for landowners
Route maps will also need to show the links between decision-making
institutions in forest and other sectoral policy domains. This requires
progressive integration of negotiations between landowners, developers,
and other stakeholders in specific sectors and specific areas.
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Combining different scales of enterprise
Bulldozers and portable sawmills are often thought of as alternative
weapons in a battle to exploit the same physical resource. However, there is
no shortage of avenues for combining different scales of enterprise.
Similarly, the establishment of small-scale woodlots or tree plantations by
local landowners might prove to be a viable form of economic activity if it
is undertaken as one of the conditions imposed on a large-scale logging
operation. The strategies of mixing large scale agriculture with small scale
forestry, small scale agriculture with large scale forestry, large or small scale
forestry with small or large scale conservation projects, are largely
unexplored as yet.
Generating public interest and private initiative
To generate interest in a “public interest”, government needs to start
policing a reasonable set of rules for the development of land and natural
resources. But technocrats will also have to give away the pretence to
executive powers which they do not possess. Policies should provide a
clear mandate for “outsourcing” a wide variety of executive functions to an
equally wide variety of ‘non-government’ organisations, in a manner which
encourages these organisations to develop a common vision of their mutual
responsibilities and separate specialities. Where government departments
and resource developers agree to an arrangement by which the latter
develop integrated land use strategies within an area of influence which is
protected by the former, the work of integration should then be relayed to a
mixture of consulting companies and NGOs who share a common interest
in breaking down the barriers between sectoral policy domains.  The net
result is to enlarge the size and influence of the “non-government” policy
community in each of these domains.
Working with interface institutions
There is no shortage of new institutional structures; the problem is a lack of
executive and managerial capacity in the lower reaches of the state
apparatus. What is required is a fundamentally flexible method of working
in the interface between the village and the state, between resource owners
and “policy makers”, which uses and empowers those groups of actors
who specialise in adapting public policy to the variable needs of rural
communities, or in articulating these needs in ways which can transform
policy. The network needs widening beyond NGOs, to include church
workers and social scientists, some of the staff and consultants employed
by resource developers and donor agencies, as well as those government
employees, such as primary school teachers, who still work in immediate
proximity to the “grassroots”.
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Finding the capacity for the job
If basic services are not delivered to rural communities in a manner which
fosters their own self-reliance, then formal policy will become increasingly
irrelevant to local practice. The much-derided “wantok system” is the most
effective general-purpose mechanism for transferring goods, services, skills
and information between members of the national elite and their “country
cousins”. The system is also evolving. Perhaps the Melanesian principle of
reciprocity can be refined to strike an appropriate balance between
commercial credit arrangements and the grants or “handouts” which are
currently constraining genuine community development.
New contractual relationships or working partnerships between existing
organisations are needed, which can match the specific needs of different
landowning communities with the specific capacities which different
service-providers can bring to bear on particular development issues in
different parts of the country. There is no shortage of previous experiments.
For example, there are lessons to be learnt from the experience of mining
and oil companies in promoting local business development. They have
their successes and failures, yet few lessons are learnt even within a specific
sector, because there are no institutional mechanisms through which the
feedback circuits could be closed. There is a need to conduct separate
reviews of projects or activities which have been directed towards each
particular need which is under consideration.
In summary, we advocate a policy pathway along which the dialogue
develops through the making and testing of claims to productive
innovation, and the continual reinforcement of feedback loops between
local, national and global levels of debate.  It may take a long time for this
process to transform the relationship between forests and people, but PNG
does have some time on its side, because the forests are still present, and
the people cannot make rapid changes to large portions of the landscape,
even if they wish to do so.
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Introduction
Over the course of the last decade, Papua New Guinea (PNG) has been
engaged in a process of institutional innovation and reform which is
directed towards the achievement of sustainable forest management, the
conservation of biodiversity values, and a more equitable distribution of
material benefits from the utilisation of forest resources.  The long-term
results of this process are still uncertain.  Our aim in this study is:
• to review the issues which have arisen from the process of policy reform
over the last ten years in order to assess the feasibility of achieving a
form of policy that works for the forests and people of PNG.
To this end, we shall:
• review the many factors and values which contribute to the way that
people make decisions about the use of the country’s forest resources;
and,
• tell the story of past decisions in a way that leads us to a better
understanding of those decisions which have still to be taken.
In this study, we shall not treat ‘policy’ in the narrow, formal sense, as a set
of activities which are (or ought to be) undertaken by various agencies of
government, but in the broader sense, as a process in which political
decisions on a particular set of issues are the result of negotiations between
a wide range of stakeholders (see section 1.3), inside and outside of
government, whose interest in these issues may be said to constitute a
‘policy community’ or ‘policy network’.  Some stakeholders may think of
themselves as ‘policy makers’; others may not.  Some stakeholders may
have clear goals and concerted strategies; others may not.  Some
stakeholders may be able to secure the outcomes they desire; others may
1.1 The policy process: a social drama
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find that their actions have consequences which they neither intended nor
wanted.  So long as this particular set of issues continues to engage a wide
range of stakeholder interests, the policy process is unlikely to arrive at any
general agreement about what should be done, or even what has been done,
in the development of their mutual relationships.  But we may still try to
describe the shape and direction of their dialogue and behaviour, as if it
might lead to various conclusions.
In order to underscore this vision of the policy process, we propose to treat
it as a form of social drama, in which a variety of actors take on public roles,
representing themselves as stakeholders with a particular kind of interest in
the issues which constitute the theme of the play, and thus enter into the
public dialogue through which the plot is revealed to the audience.  Each
act and each scene in the play is a distinct stage in the policy process, in
which one group of characters engages with a single issue for a certain
period of time, within specific institutional settings, but the action does not
necessarily unfold in a strict temporal sequence.  Insofar as the action takes
place at local, national or global ‘levels’, the definition of these levels is not
fixed in advance, but is partly dependent on the way that characters in each
act or scene define their own spheres of activity.  And if ‘policy analysts’
like ourselves can claim to be members of the audience, our programme
notes do not tell us anything about the author, and having only seen part of
the play, we cannot be sure how it will end.  Like a Melanesian ritual or
masquerade, it may only be one of a cycle of theatrical performances which
is potentially endless, precisely because the actors can always find new
plots in the overall theme of their drama.
In our case, the theme can be described as ‘politics in Papua New Guinea’,
and the play which we are watching now is called ‘the social construction
of forest policy’.  Some members of the audience would like to know what
we can learn from this play.  But, from what we have seen so far, it would
be hard to say that the characters on stage have reached any kind of
agreement on this subject, so we shall have to make some allowance for
their separate needs and desires, and then try to work out how the actions
of each character may affect the needs and desires of the others, and what
impact they may have on the forested scenery on stage, as the drama
continues to unfold.
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1.2 Sustainable forest management:
a thickening plot
Policy that works for forests is commonly described as ‘sustainable forest
management’.  But since policies that work for some people do not
necessarily work for others, we find that different characters in our play
have different ideas (if they have any ideas) about the meaning of this
phrase.  And while some of them may say that they like the sound of it, and
use it from time to time in their own speeches, their actions may not always
be consistent with their words.
The Fourth Goal of PNG’s 1975 National Constitution calls ‘for Papua New
Guinea’s natural resources and environment to be conserved and used for
the collective benefit of us all, and to be replenished for the benefit of future
generations’.  This charter for ‘sustainable development’ has been
constantly reiterated as the foundation stone of the national government’s
own statements on forest policy for the past twenty years.  However, the
relationship between ‘conservation’, ‘utilisation’ and ‘replenishment’has
been the subject of persistent debate between the stakeholders with an
interest in this policy process.  The intensity of this debate has grown
substantially since 1989, when a Commission of Inquiry found that the
actions of government ministers and officials were certainly not consistent
with the spirit of the Constitution, and the government’s various statements
on forest policy were often inconsistent with each other.  These findings
gave rise to a policy reform process which may be seen as the second or
third act in our drama, and on which this particular study will focus the
bulk of its attention.
The reform process has underlined the tensions and contradictions between
two different species of forest policy:
• industrial forestry policy, which is concerned with the business of
transforming forests into commodities, and which therefore tends to
equate sustainable forest management with sustained yield management,
whose goal is to replenish the current commercial values of the forest;
and
• forest conservation policy, whose goal is to replenish the ‘natural’ values
of the forest, and which therefore tends to adopt a much broader
definition of ‘sustainability’.
Some stakeholders have argued that these are not really two species of
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policy, because they should be capable of breeding with each other.  For
example, one consultant to the newly established PNG Forest Authority
thought it most unfortunate that the word ‘forestry’ made some people
have visions of ‘destructive forest logging’ or of ‘forests as a ready source of
government revenue’, and wanted to counter these visions with a definition
of ‘forestry’ as ‘the management of the PNG national forest estate for the
production of the entire range of possible forest benefits’ (PNGFA 1994a:2-
3).  But definitions alone do not make happy marriages, and there is still
much room for argument about the compatibility of timber harvesting
policy and biodiversity conservation policy as integral components of an
overarching ‘forest policy’.
Instead of producing our own definition of ‘sustainable management’, we
shall look at the way that different stakeholders have produced and
contested a range of definitions within the policy reform process.  Part of
their argument relates to the differential mandate of two government
departments - the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) and
the Department of Forests (DOF) which has now been reborn as the PNG (ie
National) Forest Authority (NFA).  But the unhappy marriage between
forest conservation policy and industrial forestry policy is not just a
relationship between two government agencies and their various allies.
Life could hardly be so simple when 99 per cent of all forested land is
owned and controlled by communities of customary landowners whose
attitudes and behaviour are not amenable to any form of centralised
control.  Most of these resource owners have never heard of ‘sustainable
forest management’, and many of those who have been introduced to this
concept by other stakeholders in the policy process are inclined to believe
that it may represent an excuse for the government to persist in its failure to
deliver the fruits of ‘development’.  Some type of social forestry (or social
conservation) policy, with its own distinctive vision of ‘sustainability’,
might therefore be required to act as a sort of marriage counsellor1.
Participants in a planning workshop, conducted by this study in January
1996 (see section 1.4), agreed that there were six main groups of
1
 In many other countries ‘social forestry’ represents a distinct third ‘species’ of forestry, alongside industrial forestry and forest
conservation.  Usually focused on ‘local’ or  ‘community’ levels, social forestry has generally emerged within the last twenty-five
years.
1.3 Stakeholders in PNG:
the actors and their masks
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stakeholders in the national forest policy process - politicians, public
servants, industry, NGOs, donors, and local landowners (or resource
owners).  The present act of our drama might thus be said to deserve the
title of Pirandello’s play - ‘Six Characters in Search of an Author’.  This title
is also appropriate because ‘the government’ does not possess the solidarity
or authority to be regarded either as a character in its own right or as the
sole author of national forest policy.
If we proceed to ask how these six characters have either contributed to, or
been affected by, the decisions made about ‘sustainable forest management’
over the last decade, or what can be said about their respective interests,
policies, plans, strategies or motives, then we are soon obliged to recognise
that each of them is internally divided in several ways, and none therefore
speaks with a single voice.  Perhaps we should think of these ‘characters’ as
costumes or masks which are worn, in particular scenes of the play, by a
considerably larger number of stakeholders or a variety of individual or
collective actors whose words and actions do possess some logical
consistency over time.  But PNG’s characteristic ‘politics of diversity’ make
it difficult for the audience to decide just how many of these more specific
interests are represented on stage.  In this sense, our six main ‘characters’
are indeed more like ceremonial masks than costumes worn by recognisable
actors.
The title of this study reflects our own belief that three of these six masks,
or the actors who wear them, are somehow more prominent or powerful
than the others.  In essence, we suggest that the national forest policy
process since 1989 has revolved around a struggle between the logging
industry and a donor lobby for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the resource
owners.  The loggers and the donors are the stakeholders who have the
most concerted interests, policies, plans, strategies and motives.  The
resource owners do not have this appearance, but they do have possession
of the scenery on which the loggers and the donors have alternative
designs.  The lesser roles assigned to politicians, bureaucrats and (local)
NGOs reflect the simple fact that nearly all the indigenous citizens of PNG
retain their membership of specific landowning communities, and
frequently represent themselves in this light.  The ‘weakness of the state’ is
therefore due to the fact that, in some parts of our play, it looks more like
part of the scenery than a separate group of actors, while in other parts of
the play, we find that local-level negotiations over the conservation or
development of the ‘national forest estate’ take place with little or no regard
for decisions made in the corridors of government.  At national and local
levels alike, inside and outside of the State, the plot centres on the
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Figure 1.1  Forest policy as a tug of war
relationship between the politics of the Melanesian village and the
divergent interests of assorted foreigners.
This does not mean that we can or should ignore the role of ‘government’ in
the formation and implementation of forest policy.  Much of the action still
consists in a struggle for control of state institutions.  On the other hand, we
need to recognise the potential weakness of approaches to forest policy
which go no further than making efforts to strengthen or reconstruct those
institutions in which a group of ‘enlightened donors’ have contrived to
establish the priority of their own policy perspectives.
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‘The Companies’
• Rimbunan Hijau is the dominant player in the log export industry, but faces competition from other Asian
business interests.
• The domestic wood-processing industry has little financial or political muscle.
• The Forest Industries Association represents the combined interests of all companies operating in the forestry
sector.
• The major mining and petroleum companies have an interest in greening their own image by making some
investments in forest conservation initiatives.
‘The Donors’
• The World Bank is the dominant player in the donor community by virtue of its role in coordinating the National
Forestry and Conservation Action Programme and the latest Structural Adjustment Programme.
• Other UN agencies and the European Union are the main sources of multilateral aid for conservation activities.
• Australia is the main source of bilateral aid to PNG (both tied and untied), but its position in the forestry and
conservation sectors is shared with New Zealand and Germany.
• A number of international NGOs, mostly based in the United States, and funded from a variety of sources, also
act as ‘donors’ to the conservation sector.
‘The Politicians’
• National MPs are divided into factions which are grouped around individual leaders, and whose membership is
as unstable as their policy platforms.
• The policy positions of most individual MPs reflect the fluctuating balance between their need to secure mate-
rial resources from powerful patrons in the national arena and their need to fend off challenges from a host of
political competitors in their own electorates.
• Recent provincial and local government reforms have increased the power of national MPs relative to that of
elected representatives at lower levels of government.
‘The Bureaucrats’
• The NFA and the DEC are the two line agencies with immediate responsibility for implementing public policies
on forest management, but their actions are influenced by decisions taken in the Prime Minister’s Department,
the Department of Finance, and the Department of Personnel Management.
• Appointments to the most senior positions in the public service and on the boards of statutory bodies are
subject to political interference by relevant Ministers.
• Expatriate contract officers still occupy some influential positions in the bureaucracy, and their influence is
supplemented by the rotation of donor-funded consultants attached to particular projects.
• There are enduring problems of communication between senior government officials in the national capital and
field officers responsible for dealing with resource owners at provincial and local levels.
‘The NGOs’
• There is a somewhat fuzzy distinction between national NGOs (which may or may not have international
support) and international NGOs (which may or may not have resident representatives).
Box 1.1  The actors behind the masks
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This study originates from the engagement of its authors and sponsors in
various aspects of PNG’s National Forestry and Conservation Action
Programme (NFCAP).  The International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED) participated in the Tropical Forestry Action Plan
Review which took place in 1989, and later became the supporting agency
for the NGO component of the NFCAP Technical Support Project which
was funded by the UNDP and ODA, UK (now DFID).  Active collaboration
between the IIED and the National Research Institute2 began in 1995.
Preparation of the present study was initially undertaken by a ‘Core
Group’, comprising:
• Colin Filer, an anthropologist who formerly taught at the University of
Papua New Guinea, and who is now Head of NRI’s Social and Cultural
Studies Division;
• Nikhil Sekhran, Resource Economist with the PNG Biodiversity
Conservation and Resource Management Programme in PNG’s
Department of Environment and Conservation;
• Brian Brunton, a lawyer and legal consultant who was formerly the NGO
representative on the National Forest Board and is presently engaged as
Greenpeace representative in PNG; and
• Basil Peutalo, who had previously worked as the NGO Specialist in the
2
 The National Research Institute, formerly the Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, is a statutory body which is
currently located within the Ministry of National Planning and Implementation.
1.4 Study background: one scene from the play
• There is an equally fuzzy (but sometimes acrimonious) distinction between radical national NGOs (which agi-
tate against big business and bad government) and pragmatic national NGOs (which seek to promote environ-
mentally friendly forms of development).
• The Christian churches have enormous influence in many walks of life, but generally do not make a distinctive
contribution to the forest policy process.
‘The Resource Owners’
• Anyone can play this part, but most people in PNG have no other part to play.
• Landowning communities are divided from each other by geographical location, cultural affiliation, and level of
‘development’.
• Community members are divided by their place of residence, market situation, political influence, educational
attainments, gender and generation.
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NFCAP Technical Support Team, and was then employed by the World
Wide Fund for Nature.
Our Planning Workshop, brought several other stakeholders together to
produce a clear focus on the primary aims of this study (see opening of
section 1), and sought to devise a strategy for this exercise in policy
analysis to do more than simply add to the small mountain of documents
which the NFCAP had already deposited in the middle of the policy
process.  Having identified the six main stakeholder groups in the policy
process, the participants went on to design a strategy for conducting
interviews with representative members of each group, partly to search out
the ideas and attitudes of stakeholders who have not had the time or
inclination to write them down, and partly to promote further dialogue
between them.  In the case of politicians, public servants, private industry,
the NGOs, and donor organisations, the participants made a provisional
listing of approximately one dozen ‘key players’, in each stakeholder
group, whose perceptions and opinions would represent the diversity of
experience and influence within that group.  It was recognised that a
different approach would have to be adopted in order to canvass the
diverse range of ‘grassroots’ community or landowner opinion in PNG.
The participants therefore decided that this latter task would need to be
undertaken indirectly, by designing a survey instrument which would be
distributed to a stratified sample of social scientists and university students
who should be able to describe the views held in those rural communities
with which they are especially familiar.
As it stands, the present study may be read as the latest in a series of
publications and reports on PNG which have arisen from the policy reform
process that began in 1989, with the findings of Judge Barnett’s Commission
of Inquiry (Barnett 1989).  Its other major predecessors have been:
• the Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review (World Bank 1989);
• the Conservation Needs Assessment (Alcorn and Beehler (eds) 1993);
• a review of the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme
(Taylor et al. 1994);
• the Country Study on Biological Diversity (Sekhran and Miller (eds) 1994);
and
• a monograph on The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New
Guinea (Filer (ed.) 1997).
The last of these works may be regarded as a collection of background
papers for the present study, and includes a more detailed account of the
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planning process which has led to its production. The organisation and
transcription of personal interviews with individual stakeholders, and the
distribution and analysis of ‘rural community survey forms’ also developed
for this study, have both proved to be difficult and time-consuming tasks.
Findings are drawn on in a preliminary way in this country study, and the
organisers are planning to produce one or two additional publications for a
full assessment of results.
Although the authors of the present study have already staked a claim to
the detachment of an audience observing the drama played out by other
stakeholders in the national policy process, it should be evident that we are
also players.  As a contract officer with the National Research Institute, and
an erstwhile consultant to the Department of Environment and
Conservation, jointly engaged upon a study commissioned by an
international NGO, and funded by two foreign governments, we obviously
find it hard to put down the masks of the donor, the bureaucrat or the NGO,
and to get behind those of the logger, the politician or the resource owner.
In our efforts to reclaim a place in the front stalls, we shall try to remove
our act of ‘participant observation’ from the action in which we have
sometimes participated, and on which this study may yet have some
influence.
This study is divided into fourteen sections which constitute three main
parts:
• In the first part (sections 2 to 5), we provide a summary portrait of those
features of PNG’s national landscape which are most obviously relevant
to the analysis of forest policy.  We first present a summary account of
the PNG’s natural environment, especially its forest landscape, and the
human population which occupies and interacts with that environment.
We shall then go on to discuss relevant aspects of social and economic
development over the course of the last few decades, and follow this
with a more detailed account of economic activities in the national
forestry sector.  Our discussion concludes with an attempt to show how
national stakeholders make their appearance in the national policy
process.  In this way, we attempt to describe the scenery and the sets
against which our policy drama will later unfold, and to introduce some
of the main characters who will be seen to participate in that drama.
1.5 The structure of this report
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• In the second part (sections 6 to 10), we enter into a detailed account of
the way that different stakeholders have staked their claims to the
determination of forest policy in recent years. In the five years which
elapsed between the national election of June 1987 and the next national
election in June 1992, forest management came to be defined as a major
policy problem for the State of Papua New Guinea, and a number of
steps were taken to institute a process of institutional reform which
would address this problem.  We begin by considering the way that
different stakeholders were identified and engaged in the process of
debating this policy problem, defining their mutual interests, and
presenting their respective solutions, during that five-year period.
Having sought to establish the relationship between the conduct or
construction of this argument and the parallel conduct or construction of
other major policy debates in PNG, we then go on to review the activities
and achievements of different stakeholders in more recent attempts to
pursue, control, divert or obstruct the reform of forest policy, whether in
the field of industrial forestry or in the neighbouring field of forest
conservation.  This discussion charts the ‘progress’ of debate on specific
instruments and initiatives of public policy in the ‘forestry and
conservation’ sector, and thus presents a picture of ‘formal policy’ as the
outcome of stakeholder conflict and negotiation over these specific bones
of contention.
• In the third and final part (sections 11 to 14), we try to determine the
direction in which forest policy is now travelling, and the opportunities
which exist for an improvement in the relationship between forests and
people.
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study12
PNG’s ‘gross forest area’ is now said to cover 279,932 km
2
, or just over 60 per cent of the
country’s total land area
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In this chapter, we shall outline some of the most obvious features of the
scenery which surrounds the actors in the forest policy process.  We show
why the forests of PNG hold great attractions for those actors with a stake
in sustainable forest management, but we also reveal the fundamental
problem which the fact of customary tenure poses for the imposition of any
management regime by stakeholders who are not customary resource
owners.
PNG has a land area of about 464,000 square kilometres.  The country
comprises that part of the island of New Guinea (the world’s second largest
island) which lies east of the 141st meridian, together with the Bismarck
Archipelago, the island of Bougainville, and over 600 smaller islands and
atolls.  The northernmost extremity lies just south of the equator, and the
most southerly point is located at 120 S latitude.  The islands lie at the point
of intersection of the Oceanic-Pacific and Australian tectonic plates, which
have been pushing against each other for the last 130 million years.  As a
result, they feature mountain ranges with extreme degrees of folding and
faulting, with peaks rising to more than 4,000 metres above sea level, many
active and dormant volcanoes, and extensive swampy lowlands subject to
annual inundation.  The physical landscape of the main island of New
Guinea is dominated by a high central cordillera with outlying mountain
massifs, to the north and south of which large flood plains have been
created by the Sepik-Ramu and Fly-Strickland river systems respectively.
Many of the large outlying islands also have rugged contours, comprising
extensions of the uplands on the main island, with narrow coastal fringes
(see Figure 2.1).
Most of the country is subject to high levels of rainfall and humidity, while
temperatures vary primarily with altitude.  The southern slopes of the
Forests and people
2.1 Physical geography
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central cordillera and the southern coast of the island of New Britain
experience annual rainfall in excess of 5,000mm, while the coastal strip
around the national capital, Port Moresby, is one of the few parts of the
country to record less than 1,000mm.  There is some seasonal variation in
levels of rainfall in most parts of the country, and some parts experience a
distinctive ‘dry season’ in which there is little or no rain for several months.
PNG possesses ‘an extremely rich flora which is influenced in its
composition by the position of the islands midway between Asia and
Australia, and in its structure and distribution by altitude, climate and the
activities of man’ (Allen 1983:10).  PNG’s forests are remarkably diverse,
ranging from mangroves in the coastal zone to swamp forests, eucalypt
savannah, lowland rainforests, and various forms of montane forest.
PNG’s lowland rainforests have a botanical affinity to the Malayan realm,
while Gondwanan elements are found at higher altitudes - the occurrence of
southern beech forest (Nothofagus spp.) and Podocarps in upland areas being
the most notable examples.  Alpine grasslands replace forests above an
altitude of about 3,000 metres.  Large areas of the central highlands, and
some parts of the Sepik River catchment, have been permanently converted
to grasslands as a result of human activity.  Figure 2.2 shows the
distribution of broad forest types distinguished in the PNG Resource
Information System (PNGRIS), and Figure 2.3 shows the physical extent of
forested land above and below the altitude of 1000 metres.
The most recent assessment of PNG’s forest resources is contained in the
Forest Inventory Mapping System (FIMS), which has been produced at the
expense of the Australian government and installed as a database in the
NFA’s computers early in 1997.  This apparently supersedes all previous
assessments (including the PNGRIS data summarised in Figure 2.2).  The
system is based on a mapping and description of the nation’s forest
resources and other vegetation, at a scale of 1:100,000 in the years 1975 and
1996 (Hammermaster and Saunders 1995)3.  From the 1975 data, the whole
country has been divided into a very large number of individual ‘Forest
Mapping Units’ (FMUs), each of which has then been allocated to one of
fifty-nine ‘vegetation types’, of which thirty-six have been classified as
‘forest types’.  A further distinction has been made between forty-two
3
 1975 was chosen as the baseline year because there had been very little commercial logging activity before that date.
2.2 Forest landscape
Figure 2.2  Distribution of PNG forest types
Source: Saunders 1993
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‘forest zones’, each of which contains those FMUs of the same forest type
which also contain the same combination of merchantable tree species.  The
authors of the present study have not yet had access to the details of this
classification.
As in the case of the earlier Rapid Resource Appraisal (McAlpine 1993), the
definition and measurement of what is now called ‘potential production
forest’ has been based on the progressive exclusion of other categories from
the ‘gross forest area’, which is now said to cover 279,932 km2, or just over
60 per cent of PNG’s total land area4.
• First, the ‘gross forest area’, which is defined as the total area of forest
identified in all vegetation types, has been reduced to an ‘adjusted forest
area’ (currently 266,050 km2) by the exclusion of small patches of natural
or human disturbance.
• Second, those areas of land (including mangrove swamps) which ought
to be excluded from logging because of the existence of extreme or
serious physical limitations of altitude, slope, terrain, or inundation have
been classified as ‘non-potential production forest’ within this ‘adjusted
forest area’.
The ‘adjusted forest area’ which existed in 1975 (296,583 km2), including
both ‘potential’ and ‘non-potential’ production forest, has been divided into
four parts by reference to the change which has (or has not) occurred
between 1975 and 1996:
• 23,742 km2 has been logged and left to regenerate;
• 4,210 km2 has been logged and then cleared for conversion to permanent
land use;
• 11,332 km2 has been cleared for conversion to permanent land use
without being logged beforehand; and
• the remainder has neither been logged nor cleared for conversion to
permanent land use.
Figure 2.5 shows the total areas of ‘potential’ and ‘non-potential’
production forest, respectively, which existed in each province in 1975 and
1996, and the areas which have either been logged (with or without being
cleared) or cleared without being logged in the intervening period.  The
summary data available to us do not provide separate measurements of the
4
 This represents a considerable reduction of previous estimates, which have commonly maintained that 70-80 per cent of
PNG’s land area is covered with forests.  The reduction is partly due to the progress of deforestation, and partly due to changes
in the definition of  ‘forest’.
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Figure 2.5  Transformation of PNG’s ‘potential production forest’ and ‘non-potential
production forest’ 1975-96
(a) Transformation of PNG’s ‘potential production forest’
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(b) Transformation of PNG’s ‘non-potential production forest’
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areas of ‘potential’ and ‘non-potential’ production forest which have been
logged and cleared.  Observant readers may note that the measured decline
in the aggregate area of both ‘potential’ and ‘non-potential’ production
forest between 1975 and 1996 (a total of 3,053,416 hectares) is considerably
greater than the sum of the areas which have been ‘converted to permanent
land use’ (a total of 1,554,218 hectares).  We have not yet been able to obtain
a satisfactory explanation of this anomaly, but it may be due to the
existence of substantial areas of logged-over forest which have been ‘left to
regenerate’, but have not (yet) done so5.
On average, logging coupes yield harvest volumes of between 18 and 30
cubic metres per hectare, contrasting with yields as high as 110 cubic metres
per hectare in peninsular Malaysia (UNFAO 1993)6.  Some 400 species of
trees have economic value, but only 30-50 species tend, in practice, to be
harvested (Cameron and Vigus 1993; Saulei 1993).  The total national timber
harvest currently averages something over 3 million cubic metres, although
the ‘allowable cut’ in current logging concessions is over 6 million cubic
metres.  Allowable cut exceeds actual harvest levels because of the
haphazard nature of resource allocation, the inefficiency of logging
companies, and the obstacles which local landowners often present to their
operations (see sections 5 and 6).  Logging practices in PNG have also been
criticised for their destructive environmental impact.  There is a notable
absence of forward planning, with 1:100,000 scale maps used to guide field
operations, snig tracks and feeder roads being constructed on a trial-and-
error basis, little use of directional felling techniques, and excessive use of
bulldozers and dozer blades.  A failure to cut the vines which bind the
forest canopy before felling means that undersize trees, which should
ordinarily form the future harvest, are toppled when merchantable trees are
cut (Frans Arentz, 1995, personal communication).  Additionally, there is a
lack of adherence to environmental regulations, including restrictions on
logging on slopes of over 30 degrees and along water courses and other
sensitive environments.  The net result of these practices is that soils are
compacted to a greater degree than is necessary, and excessive gaps tend to
be formed in the canopy.  Soil compaction prevents seedlings from finding
purchase on the forest floor, and canopy gaps alter micro-climates.  Such
gaps tend to be colonised by fast-growing climbers and pioneer tree species
which suppress the re-growth of many valuable commercial species.
Between 30 and 70 per cent of residual trees suffer mortality as a
consequence of logging or the physiological stress following harvest (Tom
Vigus, 1993, personal communication).
5
 It should also be noted that the statistics presented here are still regarded as provisional outputs of the database (John
McAlpine, 1997, personal communication)
6
 The UNFAO report estimates harvest levels of 30 cubic metres per hectare, but forest industry sources claim lower yields
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The UNFAO (1993) has estimated a deforestation rate of 0.2 per cent per
annum for PNG, compared to 1 per cent in Indonesia, 1.4 per cent in Sri
Lanka, and 2.9 per cent in Brazil.  The data contained in the FIMS suggest
an 11.4 per cent decline in the ‘gross forest area’, and a 10.3 per cent decline
in the ‘adjusted forest area’, over the period from 1975 to 1996.  In 1989, the
World Bank assumed that the overall rate of deforestation was roughly
equal to the rate of reforestation, given that the area under forest
plantations had grown from 23,580 hectares in 1979 to 35,896 hectares in
1988 (World Bank 1989:23), and that a good deal of government land was
still theoretically available for this purpose (ibid:26), even if the DOF’s own
target of 100,000 hectares by the year 2000 was clearly unrealistic (ibid:27).
However, the World Bank’s own assumption may have been too optimistic.
In 1988, roughly 70 per cent of the area devoted to forest plantations was
under government control.  The government was attempting to enlarge the
area of plantations on customary land through the New Zealand-funded
Demonstration Reforestation Project (see Filer 1989), but the problems
encountered by this project were cited by the World Bank as evidence of the
implausibility of the official target.  This helps to explain a continued
reduction in the rate at which new plantations are being established, while
the FIMS shows that the rate of deforestation has been increasing.
PNG is renowned for its rich biological diversity.  The presence of large
mountains and islands have served to create and to isolate habitats and
climatic zones, providing a supportive environment for species radiation.
PNG’s biodiversity values have been extensively reviewed in the
Conservation Needs Assessment (Alcorn and Beehler (eds) 1993) and the
Biodiversity Country Study (Sekhran and Miller (eds) 1994).  This section
provides a very brief summary of the information contained in these works.
According to Miller et al. (1994), the biodiversity heritage of the New
Guinea region, including Irian Jaya and outlying islands, includes the
following:
• Some 20,000 species of ferns and flowering plants (perhaps 7.5 per cent
of the world’s total species count);
• About 190 species of mammals (of which 81 per cent are endemic);
• More than 750 species of birds (approximately 53 per cent endemic);
• 300 species of reptiles and 197 species of amphibians (46 per cent of all
cold-blooded vertebrates being endemic);
2.3 Biodiversity values
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• 3,000 species of fish, including 300 freshwater species; and
• 200,000 to 400,000 insect species, many of which have not yet been
classified.
The dependence of these species on particular types of forest habitat, and
their vulnerability to particular types of forest clearance or degradation, is
hugely variable.
Although the present status of many species is simply unknown, some
species are extremely rare, with limited bio-geographical distributions.  The
IUCN Red List of Threatened Animals includes 38 species of mammals, 22
species of birds, 8 species of reptiles and 26 species of invertebrates in PNG.
Of these, 14 species are listed as endangered and 40 as vulnerable (IUCN
1994).  However, given that so many of New Guinea’s species are as yet
unknown to science, the precise status of the area’s biodiversity is still a
matter for conjecture.  Certainly large gaps exists in terms of scientific
understanding of forest biology.  Currently, the rate of discovery of taxa
new to science among forest trees runs at some 5 per cent of collections in
areas that have been relatively well surveyed, and perhaps double that for
other areas (John Pipoly, 1996, personal communication).
PNG is renowned for its rich biodiversity, including some 20,000 species of ferns and flowering
plants (perhaps 7.5 per cent of the world’s total species count)
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The biodiversity values of PNG’s natural forests are under threat from
various quarters (see Filer 1994), but it is difficult to measure the relative
significance of different types of impact.  Industrial logging operations are
very likely to have a negative effect on the populations of some species, but
there is little empirical data on this subject.  None of the existing logging
operations applies species management measures (see Louman 1997).
Given the uncertainty over the survival needs of particular species, and
ecological linkages within and between species in the forest environment,
we can only point to the danger that timber harvesting is contributing to
species loss.  Though populations of some species may increase as a result
of logging, especially those adapted to forest-edge habitats and secondary
re-growth, populations of species that inhabit the interior of primary forests
may be seriously diminished or entirely extirpated, as micro-climates and
stand composition change in the aftermath of logging.  On the other hand,
the presence of habitat refuges that are inaccessible to loggers for
topographical reasons may provide a sanctuary for these species, in which
case the extent and quality of such refuges in areas contiguous to logging
coupes may determine the fate of some species.
Several species of birds and mammals are threatened by hunting pressures,
compounded by the growing use of firearms by hunters in some parts of
the country.  These include some species of tree kangaroos, the two species
of the Niugini Crowned Pigeon, and some populations of cassowaries.
Other species are threatened by the introduction of exotic animals,
including the domestic cat, Timor deer, cane toad and several species of
rats.
Less than 2 per cent of PNG has formal conservation status, and three sites
comprise 80 per cent of this area.  Protected areas include sites on both state
land and customary land.  The existing protected area network is certainly
not representative of PNG’s bio-geographical diversity.  All of the current
sites face a variety of threats, and there is little guarantee that conservation
objectives will be achieved in the long term (see section 9).
Archaeological evidence from the Huon Peninsula (in Morobe Province)
shows that human settlement of the main island of New Guinea dates back
at least 40,000 years.  The Bismarck Archipelago and the Solomon Islands
seem to have been occupied for at least 30,000 years.  The central highlands
2.4 Human population
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of New Guinea have probably been occupied for at least 20,000 years, and
this is where prehistorians have found evidence of an agricultural tradition
which dates back 9,000 years or more.  Within the last 4,000 years, the
aboriginal population has apparently been joined by an influx of
Austronesian-speaking peoples who introduced a variety of new
manufacturing techniques and some new species of domesticated plants
and animals.  Nearly all the country’s present inhabitants are descendants
of the indigenous Melanesian population.
The current (1997) population of PNG is estimated to be 4.4 million, with an
average crude density of 9.5 persons per square kilometre.  Comparison of
national census data from 1980 and 1990 indicates an annual population
growth rate of 2.3 per cent.  If this rate of growth persists, the population
will double over the next thirty years.  Almost 85 per cent of the population
is still located in rural areas, and most of these people still obtain a large
proportion of their domestic food requirements from the use of their own
customary land.  The urban population is growing more rapidly than the
rural population, but there is a high level of circular migration between
rural and urban areas.
There is also a very high range of variation in rural population densities
between different parts of the country (see Figure 2.6).  Some of the central
highland valleys, parts of the Torricelli/Prince Alexander Range, and parts
of the Gazelle Peninsula on New Britain support populations in excess of
50, or even 100, people per square kilometre, while the vast expanse of
Western Province has only one person per square kilometre (PNGNSO
1993).  There is no simple environmental explanation for this uneven
pattern of distribution.  High population densities seem, in many cases, to
have been the result of fairly recent migration from areas which now have
much lower densities, while some of these latter areas appear to have
supported much higher populations in the past (Allen 1983).  Traditional
settlement patterns comprise a mixture of nucleated villages, with
populations of 100-500 people, and scattered family homesteads, with much
smaller numbers in each one.  In this case also, there is no simple
correlation between the overall density of population and the average size
of settlements.
The demographic structure of the country is shifting dramatically, with the
population becoming more youthful as it grows.  On average, a Papua New
Guinean woman is likely to bear 5.1 live children during her life time given
current age-specific fertility rates (UNDP 1996).  There is a relatively poor
understanding of the determinants of population growth, including
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demand and supply side factors that influence individual decisions
regarding target family size.  Government policy has tended to emphasise
the provision of contraceptives and family planning counselling without
reference to these factors.
The environmental impact of population growth - past, present and future -
has been a subject of considerable debate.  In the period before substantial
contact with Europeans, environmental impacts were generally limited by
low population densities and simple subsistence technologies.  However,
substantial areas of forest were converted to grassland by repeated burning
and subsistence pressure (Robbins 1960), and paleontological evidence
suggests that ten species of mammals may have been rendered extinct by
human activity (Flannery 1994).  In the high valleys of the main island,
where we find most of the anthropogenic grasslands and almost half of the
current rural population at altitudes above 1,200 metres, the introduction of
the sweet potato some 400 years ago facilitated a process of demographic
and economic expansion which was still underway when Europeans first
arrived.  This involved a substantial increase in the rate of forest clearance
Burning vegetation for farming in Gulf Province. Population growth amongst subsistence
farmers is commonly blamed for deforestation in some parts of the world, but the PNG evidence
suggests that farmers are generally responding to this situation through the intensification of
subsistence agriculture
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and, in some cases, a vicious circle of environmental degradation (Allen
1984; Wood 1984).  At lower altitudes, there is much less evidence of
‘traditional’ practices which could reasonably be described as
‘unsustainable forest management’, and these lowland and coastal areas
suffered a more significant decline in population as a result of diseases
introduced during the early colonial period, from which they have often
taken some time to recover.  In these areas, it is more plausible to argue that
pockets of unsustainable population density result from the colonial
destruction of various customary mechanisms for maintaining some state
of ecological equilibrium.
In pre-colonial times, the institutions of tribal warfare and spontaneous
migration provided some sort of safety valve for excessive rates of
population growth.  The colonial regime removed this safety valve by
fixing and policing the territorial boundaries between rural communities,
but then created another by initiating a series of agricultural resettlement
schemes which were partly intended to shift numbers of people from high-
density to low-density areas (see Valentine and Valentine 1979; Hulme
1984).  In the period since Independence in 1975, there has been a rapid
growth of parochial resistance to the idea of state-sponsored transfers of
rural settlers across provincial boundaries, especially when this entails
their movement from the less developed to the more developed provinces.
The function of the safety valve has thus been transferred to the process of
urban migration, which was tightly controlled during the colonial period,
and which some provincial authorities are now seeking to resist in their
own way by the forced ‘repatriation’ of urban ‘squatters’ from other
provinces.  However, the scarcity of land in some rural areas is only one of
the many factors which explain the overall growth of the urban population
over the last three decades, and there is as yet no evidence that current
moves to reverse this general trend will add to the existing problem of
population in those particular areas.
Evidence from other parts of the world has sometimes been taken to show
that rapid rates of population growth amongst swidden cultivators is the
most important single cause of tropical deforestation (see Poore 1989).  But
the evidence from PNG does not appear to warrant this conclusion.  A
comprehensive survey of current subsistence farming practices indicates
that only 3 per cent of the land cleared for agricultural purposes over the
last twenty years is land which has not previously been used for
agriculture, and most of this clearance has taken place in the vicinity of
large-scale agricultural projects originally sponsored by the colonial
administration (Bryant Allen, 1997, personal communication).  It seems that
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PNG’s subsistence farmers, including those who live in the densely
populated high valleys, are responding to population growth by various
forms of agricultural intensification, rather than clearance of primary forest.
About 97 per cent of all land in PNG, and more than 99 per cent of all
forested land, is still held under customary title.  Most of the land which
has been alienated from customary tenure was either ‘purchased’ for the
development of coastal plantations under European management during
the early colonial period (especially in what was then German New
Guinea) or leased by the colonial administration for the development of
towns, outstations, and economic infrastructure, or for resource
development.  In the period following the First World War, the Australian
administration of Papua and (formerly German) New Guinea took a fairly
conservative approach to the question of land tenure, largely preventing
any further alienation of customary land except through the acquisition and
subsequent transfer of government leasehold for specific uses.  The
temporary acquisition of mining leases and timber harvesting rights was
part of this general pattern.
It was only towards the end of the colonial period that the Australian
administration began to consider that the maintenance of customary tenure
might constitute a serious impediment to economic growth in an
independent state, because the uncertainties of customary title would
prevent the indigenous population from using their land as security for
commercial credit.  These considerations prompted passage of a Land Tenure
(Conversion) Act in 1963, which provided an opportunity for members of
landowning communities to secure individual title by mutual agreement
with their fellow members, and a brief for the Land Titles Commission to
demarcate and register the title of customary landowning groups.  Neither
of these measures had the intended effect of ‘liberating’ large areas of
customary land from the constraints of custom.  In some parts of the
country, they only served to aggravate local disputes over customary title
(see Hide 1973).  At the same time, many of the traditional owners of land
which had been alienated for agricultural purposes during the early
colonial period began to agitate for its return to traditional ownership.  In
1972, the Administration washed its hands of the land tenure question by
setting up a Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters whose membership
was entirely indigenous, even though the support staff were all expatriates
2.5   Customary tenure
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(Fingleton 1981).  The Commission’s re-assertion of the primacy of
customary title (PNGDOL 1973) was confirmed by several provisions of
the National Constitution, by the Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1974 (see
section 10), which was intended to facilitate the resumption of alienated
land, and by the Land Disputes Settlement Act of 1975, which established a
system of Local and District Land Courts to resolve disputes over
customary title.
The failure or refusal of the State to record or transform the nature of
customary land ownership in any systematic way reflects the huge variety
and complexity of land rights in different parts of the country.  Colonial
and independent government officials have tended to assume, for the sake
of argument, that such rights are normally vested in ‘clans’, but this has
simply meant that ‘clans’ have come to be defined as landowning groups,
whose internal constitution varies as much as the rights which are ascribed
to them (Holzknecht 1994; Filer 1997a).  Anthropologists have documented
many specific instances of such variation, but have not made much
progress in formulating general rules which can explain and predict the
customs to be found in particular places (see Crocombe and Hide 1987).
The acquisition of new lease areas for mineral resource development over
the last ten years has occasioned a new round of investigations into
different forms of customary ownership, which have added to the overall
complexity of the picture.
Use of the phrase ‘land tenure’ is itself responsible for some of this
confusion.  Rather than say that ‘land’ is an object over which individuals
and groups exercise various rights, it would be more appropriate to say
that social relationships within and between local communities are
normally grounded in the landscape.  This means that ‘customary tenure’ is
not merely concerned with the use of physical resources, but also with
forms of cultural property and social organisation which may not seem, to
Western eyes at least, to be part of the same equation.  At the same time
‘local custom’ is not an immutable set of rules and principles, handed
down from generation to generation, but a combination of attitudes and
practices which are constantly being adjusted to fit new circumstances and
demands - including those which accompany the commercial development
of natural resources.  This means, amongst other things, that the arguments
over the ownership of such resources may not be any easier to resolve by
appealing to local custom than by recourse to the legal apparatus of the
State (see section 7.2).
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Village elder making sago, East Sepik Province. Sago is a mainstay of the diet in many lowland areas
of PNG. Sago palms grow wild in lowland swamps, but are deliberately cultivated in some areas
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Development
and dependency
PNG’s economy is dominated by the natural resource sectors, including the
minerals, crude oil, forestry, agriculture and fisheries industries.  These
sectors are largely isolated from each other and from domestic
manufacturing industry.  Most raw materials are extracted with the use of
imported technologies and then exported for processing overseas.
Inadequate economic infrastructure, poor distribution and marketing
networks, the high cost of utilities (including energy and communications),
and the limited skill composition and productivity of the national
workforce all contribute to high production costs which reduce the capacity
to compete with neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific region.  At the
same time, PNG has a large and resilient subsistence sector, which exists in
an uneasy state of symbiosis with its resource-dependent formal economy.
The relative stability of this relationship in the early years of national
independence has recently been tested by a series of political and economic
crises which have obliged the government to accept the conditions of a
structural adjustment programme coordinated by the World Bank (see
sections 3.5 and 13.2).
In the period since Independence, standard economic indicators show that
PNG has gradually developed to the point where it ranks as a fairly typical
‘middle-income country’, but standard social indicators record a stagnant
or declining level of development which is more characteristic of a typical
‘low-income country’.
Since 1993, PNG’s per capita GNP has been hovering between US$1,100
and US$1,200, but the distribution of national income is highly skewed.
The World Bank estimates that 80 per cent of the population has an average
3.1 Social and economic indicators
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per capita income of less than US$350 - similar to the mean level for ‘low
income countries’ (Hamidian-Rad 1997).  In some rural areas, this figure
falls below US$100.
The formal sector of the national economy is dominated by the export of raw
materials.  Figure 3.1 shows the relative significance of the main export
commodities and the increase in the relative value of mineral, petroleum
and timber exports.
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Figure 3.1  Commodity export values, 1987, 1995 and 1997
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1997
The high level of dependence on world commodity markets means that the
economy is especially vulnerable to external shocks induced by fluctuating
market prices.  This is accentuated by a high level of import-dependence.
Even excluding the mining and petroleum sector, where nearly all capital
inputs are imported, imports have accounted for roughly 30 per cent of
GDP over the last ten years.
Other indicators point to a general pattern of economic stagnation.  Figure
3.2 shows that the sectoral distribution of GDP has remained constant since
1987, once allowance is made for the recent growth of the petroleum
industry.
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Figure 3.2  Sectoral share of real GDP, 1987 and 1997
Source: AusAID 1997
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Gross domestic investment fell from more than 27 per cent of GDP in 1991 to
less than 18 per cent in 1995 (AusAID 1997:152).  Gross private investment
(both foreign and domestic) in the non-mineral economy has been running at
less than 10 per cent of GDP over the same period.  There is a notable lack of
coordination between public and private sector investment.  By comparison
with other developing countries, the capital-output ratio is very high, and the
output-labour ratio is very low.
Some 13 per cent of the total workforce is estimated to be employed in the
formal sector (SRI 1992), and the public service accounts for some 25 per cent
of total wage employment (McGavin 1997).  The 1990 census showed that only
11 per cent of citizens earning a cash income had more than 10 years of
schooling.  Approximately 60,000 new entrants enter the work force annually,
though the growth in new jobs has stagnated.  Wage employment has only
been growing at an average rate of 1 per cent per annum (compared with the
population growth rate of 2.3 per cent) since 1980.  There is, as a consequence,
considerable urban unemployment, which is only partly alleviated by the
growth of an ‘informal’ urban economy, and which contributes to a pervasive
‘law and order problem’.
Formal sector development has been spatially uneven.  PNG’s economic
landscape is dominated by a set of centre-periphery relationships.  Social and
economic infrastructure, government services, and formal sector work
opportunities tend to be concentrated in a few urban areas and resource
development enclaves.  The relative quality and quantity of infrastructure and
services tends to be much lower in areas which do not have ready access to
these centres, reducing opportunities for rural communities to participate in
the formal economy, and providing additional incentives for some of them to
opt for extractive industrial development (including logging) on their
customary land.  The perceived affluence of urban and resource development
‘centres’ has a major impact on the development expectations of these
communities, and also serves as a catalyst for further rural-urban migration.
PNG’s current social indicators present a stark contrast with the condition of
relative affluence measured in nominal per capita income terms.  Some of the
indicators shown in Table 3.1 may actually overstate the average level of
social development - some analysts consider that the functional literacy rate is
still below 50 per cent.  These indicators also conceal wide discrepancies
between the welfare status of ‘central’ populations and that of villagers in the
more remote rural areas, including many forest-edge communities.  In this
case also, village people’s feelings of relative deprivation are compounded by
the apparent decline in the quality and availability of government ‘services’,
and encourage them to demand such services from other sources, including
logging companies.
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It is very difficult to measure the contribution of the subsistence or non-
market sector to national GDP, but it is clear that the vast majority of the
rural population still produces the bulk of its daily food requirements
within this sector (see Fereday et al. 1994)7.  At the same time, the variety of
subsistence production has been substantially reduced over the last few
decades, as rural communities have abandoned many traditional
handicrafts, hunting techniques, and medical practices, and substituted
items of modern technology.  This means that rural villagers now tend to
make less use of natural forest products than their forbears did, and
therefore have less of an incentive to manage and conserve their forest
resources, except insofar as these are essential to the supply of food, fuel,
water and building materials.
During the colonial period, the subsistence sector subsidised the formal
economy by removing the need for expatriate employers to pay their native
workers a family wage.  Colonial labour regulations were explicitly
designed to maintain the viability of the subsistence sector by detaching a
limited proportion of the adult male population from their communities for
limited periods of employment on coastal plantations or in urban areas.
This element of subsidy continues, to the extent that many wage-dependent
households still produce some of their own food requirements (even in
urban areas), and otherwise engage in various forms of ‘gift exchange’ with
other members of their home communities.  But if the maintenance of this
3.2 Subsistence economy
7
French (1994) has made a rough attempt at valuing the consumption of starchy staples.  For a base population of 4 million, and
assuming that gardening meets daily calorie requirements (of 2000 calories per person), he calculates that a total of 3 million
tonnes of staple food production would be required to meet the population’s annual food requirements.  This equates to
between K600 million and K3 billion a year, if valued at K0.2 and K1 per kilogramme respectively.
Table 3.1  Selected social indicators
Life expectancy at birth 56 years
Adult literacy 70.5 per cent
Female literacy 60.6 per cent
Maternal mortality rate 930 per 100,000 live births
Infant mortality rate 68 per 1,000 live births
Under 5 mortality rate 95 per 1,000 live births
Population with access to safe water 28 per cent
Population with access to sanitation 22 per cent
Underweight children under age 5 30 per cent
Daily calorie supply 2615
Source:  UNDP 1996.
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sector helped to keep native wages low during the colonial period, it has
come to have a rather different effect since real wages rose markedly
around the time of Independence, because the availability of a ‘subsistence
option’ encourages workers to leave the labour market if formal sector
wages and work conditions deteriorate, and may inhibit the work effort and
productivity of those who remain.  The same argument applies to
smallholders faced with a decline in cash crop prices.
Subsistence farming systems involve a bewildering variety of garden and
tree crops.  Figure 3.3 shows the geographical distribution of the main
staple crops, but conceals the complexity of lowland agricultural systems,
in which the ‘staple’ often accounts for less than 50 per cent of the calorie
intake from subsistence food production.  For many years, the most
detailed information on subsistence agriculture was derived from a Survey
of Indigenous Agriculture conducted by the colonial administration
between 1961 and 1963, but this has now been replaced by the results of
more recent survey work by scholars of the Australian National University
in collaboration with the University of PNG and the PNG Department of
Agriculture and Livestock (Allen et al. 1993-97).
Some 500 species of plants are grown for consumption in PNG, with 45
species vital for sustenance (French 1994).  The most common garden crops
are sweet potato, yams, taro, bananas, chinese taro, cassava and sugarcane.
These are supplemented by greens such as aibika, rungia, pumpkin,
watercress, snake bean, winged bean and tulip.  A large number of fruits
and nuts are also eaten - many of which are harvested directly from the
wild.  Sago palms (which provide the staple diet in many lowland areas)
and other tree crops are commonly planted or cultivated in a variety of
locations between village, garden and forest.
Swidden horticultural systems generally involve the clearance and/or
burning of secondary re-growth or grassland fallows, followed by various
forms of soil preparation before one or more  crop rotations.  Cultivation
periods, crop combinations, management techniques and subsequent fallow
periods depend on a wide range of environmental, technical and
demographic circumstances.  Subsistence farmers are accomplished
innovators, and their innovations have helped them to adapt to rapid
population growth without necessarily extending the area under
cultivation.  Land use intensification techniques include the substitution of
more productive crops or cultivars, lengthening of cropping periods,
shortening of fallow periods, and a variety of soil maintenance techniques.
The latter include fallow species management though the planting of
selected tree species, transfer of organic matter into food gardens
Loggers, donors and resource owners 39
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(composting), rotations of leguminous food crops with root crops, soil
retention barriers (to reduce erosion), and mulching or use of animal
manure as a fertiliser (Bourke 1990).
Despite these innovations, a combination of population growth, extension
of the area of land planted to cash crops, and the diversion of time and
effort to a variety of commercial and political activities are still having a
negative impact on the productivity or sustainability of subsistence farming
systems in some areas.  Without some compensating growth in the formal
sector of the rural economy, we may then expect a corresponding
deterioration in the welfare of the rural population.  At the same time, the
real or anticipated growth of the cash economy may conceal the true value
of subsistence production in the minds of producers, especially when they
consider the prospect of getting ‘free money’ from the extraction of their
natural resources by a third party.  While the maintenance of subsistence
systems may seem a sound rationale for the promotion of conservation
initiatives, villagers may construe the loss of subsistence output as a
reasonable sacrifice for the short-term benefits of extractive development.
The history of commercial agriculture in PNG has involved a series of
economic and social experiments with different export crops, normally
involving some combination of plantations or estates under expatriate
management, indigenous smallholder production, and government
involvement in extension and marketing activities.  Figure 3.4 shows the
areas in which these different crops are now concentrated.
For the greater part of the colonial period, copra was the most important
export crop, and most of it was derived from coastal coconut plantations
which relied on a system of indentured native labour organised by the
colonial administration.  In the period following the Second World War, the
Administration tried to establish a system of marketing cooperatives for
coastal village producers, but this experiment was not a great success.  In
the period since Independence, most of the old plantations have gone out of
business, as their source of cheap labour has evaporated, and the
smallholder sector has declined in response to falling copra prices.
After the Second World War, a number of expatriate settlers cleared new
agricultural estates in the temperate valleys of the central highlands, on
land leased by the colonial administration, to grow arabica coffee.  Here
3.3 Commercial agriculture
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and elsewhere, local villagers also began to experiment with new cash
crops, and by the 1960s, their efforts were receiving the active support of
government extension officers.  In lowland and coastal areas, robusta coffee
and cocoa were the main subjects of this experiment, though villagers in
some areas were encouraged to grow rice (for the domestic market) and to
keep cattle (for local consumption).  In the period since Independence,
arabica coffee has been the most significant export crop, although
production levels declined in the late 1980s because of a combination of
disease and poor prices.  In those areas where smallholders have not had
the benefit of proximity to nucleus estates, production of coffee and cocoa
has been hampered by the poor quality of government extension services
and the decline of transport and marketing infrastructure, as well as by
periodic price falls.
During the 1960s, the Administration took steps to develop two new
plantation crops - oil palm and rubber - in ways which sought to capitalise
on the perceived success of the ‘nucleus estate’ model which had been
pioneered in the central highlands.  Large oil palm estates were established
in Oro and West New Britain provinces, and rubber estates in Central
Province, under joint ventures between the government and an overseas
partner.  Adjoining blocks were then set aside for indigenous settlers
recruited from other parts of the country, whose own output (along with
that of local villagers) was to be purchased and processed by the company
which managed the estate.  Although palm oil now ranks as the second
most important agricultural export, these experiments have not been totally
successful, mainly because of enduring conflict between labourers,
blockholders and traditional landowners.  While price factors have
persuaded the government to try and repeat these experiments in other
parts of the country, the resettlement component has now been dropped
from the design.
In the period since Independence, the national government and various
donor agencies have shown a good deal of interest in developing domestic
and foreign markets for indigenous food crops.  Bourke (1993) estimates
that average annual sales of food and betelnut are worth about K175
million, or approximately K250 per household.  The domestic market has
been expanding steadily with the growth of the urban population, but
further expansion is constrained by the high costs of transport and storage.
Perhaps the greatest agricultural ‘success story’ of recent years is the
phenomenal expansion of marihuana cultivation in the central highlands,
but marketing of this crop in PNG and Australia does not show up in the
country’s national accounts.
Loggers, donors and resource owners 43
The overall contribution of commercial agriculture to national export
revenues declined from 36 per cent in 1980 to 15 per cent in 1995 (Temu
1997).  Despite the fact that 85 per cent of the population earns its living in
the agricultural sector, the rate of new investment has followed this
downward trend, while productivity has remained low and domestic costs
have remained high.  In 1992, the national government made an effort to
counteract the impact of falling commodity prices by introducing a price
support scheme which contributed to the fiscal crisis which occurred over
the following two years, but this scheme has fallen victim to the latest
round of structural adjustment.  The prospect of reversing the decline of
this sector has recently been improved by the recovery of commodity prices
and the devaluation of the kina (by 50 per cent against the US dollar since
1994).8
The fluctuating fortunes of commercial agriculture have two main impacts
on the rate of deforestation and forest degradation.  On the one hand, the
establishment of large-scale agricultural plantations and estates in lowland
and coastal areas has been the most important single cause of deforestation
since European contact.  And it may well continue to be so, since the
national government has recently taken to encouraging foreign investment
in so-called ‘agroforestry’ schemes, which purport to develop new tree crop
plantations, but which may be motivated primarily by the investor’s
interest in harvesting timber without having to follow the procedures laid
down by the new Forestry Act (see section 4.4).  On the other hand, the poor
economic performance of the major export crops in recent years may well
have encouraged smallholders to seek an alternative source of cash income
by offering their forest resources for ‘selective’ industrial logging.  Here
again, the smallholder’s engagement with the formal economy is liable to
produce a form of calculation in which short-term rental incomes look more
attractive than the uncertain rewards of honest toil.
Some economists would say that PNG is a mineral-dependent economy,
while others might prefer to say that it depends on the extraction of a
narrow range of natural resources - oil, gold, copper, fish, and logs.  If we
only consider the formal sector of the national economy, leaving aside the
great mass of economic activity which is undertaken outside it, both forms
of dependency are much in evidence.  Extractive industry, almost entirely
3.4 Resource dependency
8
 The kina was worth approximately 70 US cents at the end of 1997, but only 50 cents by April 1998.
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under the management of foreign capital, currently accounts for something
like 90 per cent of the value of PNG’s domestic exports, and probably
contributes about half of the government’s non-grant revenues.  From this
point of view, PNG might therefore be described as a nation (and a
government) of resource rent collectors (see Filer 1997b).  Figure 3.5 shows
the spatial distribution of resource extraction projects in the period 1993-95.
Comparison of this map with those depicting the distribution of the human
population and commercial agricultural activities reveals that extractive
industry flourishes in areas of low population density and limited
alternative sources of cash income for the rural villager.
There has been a slow but steady increase in the significance of mineral
exports in the period since Independence, from something less than half to
something more like two thirds of all domestic exports.  The substantial
presence of mining capital in PNG clearly does have some negative effects
on other sectors of the national economy, mainly because of the way that it
affects the domestic market in various factors of production, but if we can
therefore say that the mining industry constitutes an ‘economic menace’ in
its own right, it has also been responsible for a psychological or cultural
form of ‘resource dependency’ which partly reflects the simple economic
fact that an ever-increasing proportion of PNG’s national income has been
collected in the form of mineral resource rent, but partly reflects (and
explains) the national government’s recent habit of passing more and more
of this income back to those few ‘lucky-strike’ communities which actually
play host to a mining or petroleum project.  The rest of the rural population
has thus been left to indulge in fantasies about their chances of joining the
club.
Stürzenhofecker (1994:27) has provided a graphic illustration of this state of
mind in her portrait of a highland community whose male members
blend received notions regarding powerful spirits with rumours regarding the
finding of oil resources, in such a way as to move from the picture of a sacred
landscape, whose fertility must be preserved for the future, to a picture of an
exploitable landscape available for manipulation by a company...  Their
peripheral location, coupled with rumours of the centralising potential of
company development, have given them an almost apocalyptic vision of what
such a form of development could bring to them, regardless of the likely
ecological consequences.
Although there may still only be a minority of the rural population which
actually does receive some form of resource rent, the vast majority now
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study46
seem to subscribe to the belief that their land does contain some valuable
resource - whether gold, oil, diamonds, or the truly visible logs - and that
their only chance of ‘development’ lies in their share of the rent to be
collected from the extraction of these resources by some ‘multinational’
company.  If and when the company comes, the expectation of deliverance
within its field of operations is far too great to be satisfied by the actual
conduct of its business, however many special deals or preferences are
bestowed upon the local population.  The business of ‘resource
development’, unlike ‘business’ in the Melanesian sense, is bound to be
directed to the ‘bottom line’, and not to the consumption or destruction of
excessive wealth in the creation of new personal relationships.  But while
people may not like the experience of ‘development’ which they actually
get from the mining companies (or the logging companies), and can readily
be drawn to express their feelings of disappointment, anger and frustration,
they are not cured of their addiction to the drug, they do not choose the
path of ‘self-reliance’ or ‘alternative technology’; they simply want the
‘company’ to give them more, or else to have another ‘company’ to keep
them company (Filer 1997d).
The resource dependency syndrome can be seen as a reaction against the
‘developmentalism’ espoused by both colonial and post-colonial
governments, but also represents an increasingly desperate and frustrated
search for the ‘development’ which government has increasingly failed to
deliver.  While it certainly seems to reduce people’s capacity for ‘self-
reliance’, it also reflects their loss of faith in governmental institutions.  And
while it may be seen as a form of subordination to powerful global forces, it
also contains a capacity for resistance which springs from the widening gap
between local expectations of deliverance and the benefits which the
developers deliver.
In the five-year period from 1989 to 1994, the national government fell
victim to the political psychology of resource dependency, as it completely
lost its earlier capacity to stabilise patterns of public expenditure in the face
of huge annual fluctuations in its mineral revenues.
The first fiscal crisis followed the closure of the Panguna copper mine on
the island of Bougainville by militant landowners and secessionist rebels in
July 1989.  In its last full year of operation, this one mine had been
3.5 Structural adjustment
Loggers, donors and resource owners 47
responsible for 8 per cent of GDP, 35 per cent of export receipts and 12 per
cent of government revenue.  The sudden loss of this revenue caused the
government to seek financial support from the World Bank, whose
conditions included a 7.5 per cent cut in public spending, a 10 per cent
devaluation of the kina, and the reduction of minimum wage rates.
However, the need for this first round of structural adjustment was just as
suddenly removed in 1992, when the government began to collect
substantial new revenues from the Kutubu petroleum project, which more
than made up for its earlier losses on Bougainville.
Apparently flush with cash, the government then embarked on a spending
spree which was meant to ‘kick-start’ the rest of the national economy, but
which rapidly produced another fiscal crisis.  By the first half of 1994, the
budget deficit had risen to 11 per cent of GDP.  By September that year,
there was a major squeeze on external reserves, which required a
substantial devaluation of the kina.  Although the budget deficit was
reduced to 0.5 per cent of GDP in 1995, GDP contracted by almost 3 per cent
in the non-mineral sector, annual inflation rose to 16 per cent, and the
government’s debt service payments also rose substantially (Mulina 1997).
Another appeal to the World Bank resulted in construction of a second
structural adjustment programme, for which the Bank and the IMF have
organised loans worth US$350 million.  The conditions attached to these
loans also have the backing of the Australian government, whose annual
grant aid to PNG is still worth more than A$300 million a year.  These
conditions include the usual mixture of economic policy and public service
reforms which are intended to stabilise prices, open up markets, reduce real
wages, promote private investment, rationalise taxes, and so forth.  The
government is now committed to reducing its own expenditures from what
had previously been a third of GDP (in 1992) to something more like a
quarter, and to shifting the balance of this expenditure from consumption to
investment.
It remains to be seen whether the government will sustain this kind of
commitment as it now faces the prospect of another substantial increase in
mineral revenues from a new gold mine on Lihir Island and new
discoveries and developments associated with the Kutubu petroleum
project.  The obstacles to structural adjustment, or the opportunities to
escape it, include the relative ease with which PNG has been able to use
mining and petroleum revenues to balance its books during moments of
economic crisis, as well as the limited technical capacities and decentralised
structures of government machinery, and the absence of a strong domestic
lobby in favour of the reform process (King 1997).  While the strength of the
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subsistence economy may provide a sort of ‘safety net’ to mitigate the
negative impact of structural adjustment on the more ‘vulnerable’ sections
of the population, a nation of rent-collectors still hankers after government
subsidies, political handouts, and restrictive business practices.
One of the conditions attached to the latest loan packages is a renewed
commitment to ‘sustainable forest management’ (see section 13.2).  At the
same time, the Bank has insisted on the installation of a more ‘progressive’
fiscal regime which substantially raises the share of the forest resource rent
which is collected by national stakeholders, thus providing a further
financial incentive for the national government and local landowners to
challenge this commitment to sustainability.  While it seems very unlikely
that the government’s revenues from this particular source will enable it to
duck the Bank’s policy imperatives by turning down the loan packages, it is
not so clear that further expansion of the mining and petroleum sector will
dampen its enthusiasm for granting more timber permits to the logging
industry.
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We now provide a more detailed portrait of the current state of the forestry
sector within the national economy, the role of government in the
regulation of the forest industry, and the difference between the actual and
potential values of national forest resources.  We pay particular attention to
companies engaged in the raw log export trade, which presently dominates
economic activity in the forestry sector, and to the regional setting within
which they conduct this kind of business.
The harvesting and export of raw logs currently constitutes the main form
of economic activity in PNG’s forestry sector.  According to the Bank of
PNG, raw logs currently account for roughly 97 per cent of the value of all
exports of ‘forest products’.  Woodchip exports from the Gogol Valley in
Madang Province account for most of the balance.  The domestic market
currently consumes about 400,000 cubic metres of timber a year, or roughly
15 per cent of the current log harvest (Bob Tate, 1997, personal
communication).  Despite the appearance of a national policy consensus in
favour of ‘downstream processing’, the raw log export business is still
responsible for an unprecedented share of output and activity in PNG’s
forest industry.
Figure 4.1 shows the growing significance of raw log exports as a
component of PNG’s international trade and as a source of national
government revenue over the period since 1978.  In 1996, government
planners were predicting an increase in the nominal export price of raw
logs at the rate of K8 per cubic metre each year for the next four years, and
were also projecting an increase in the physical volume of exports beyond
The PNG
forestry sector
4.1 The forest industry in the national economy
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the level of 3 million cubic metres per annum, which some commentators
(including the World Bank) regard as the limit of ‘sustainability’9.  Figure
4.1 shows that these have so far proved to be ‘over-optimistic’ estimates.
The government’s inclination to ‘solve’ its fiscal crisis by issuing new
timber permits, despite the efforts of the World Bank to prevent it from
doing so, is partly due to the fact that government revenues from log
exports are worth considerably more, per unit of export value, than those
obtained from the mining and petroleum sector.  Log export taxes currently
account for more than one third of log export values, while corporate taxes
paid by mining and petroleum companies account for less than 12 per cent
of mineral export values.  Furthermore, the ‘production’ of a new mining or
petroleum project is a far more complex and time-consuming business than
the issue of a new timber permit.  Fiscal constraints thus help to explain the
growing prominence of raw log exports within a ‘resource dependent’
national economy.
It is thought that the forestry sector, as a whole, currently employs between
6,500 and 7,000 people (nearly all men)10.  This represents about 3.5 per cent
of formal sector employment, which is roughly the same as the proportion
of jobs normally occupied in the mining and petroleum sector.  Of this total,
there are some 500 public servants employed in the regulation of the forest
industry, and perhaps another 2,000 people employed in the sawmilling
business, while the rest are engaged in logging and log exports.  There has
been some public debate about the numbers of ‘Asians’ employed in the
logging industry (see Henderson 1996), and while the poor quality of
PNG’s employment statistics does not enable us to quote precise figures on
this subject, a wide range of anecdotal evidence confirms that Malaysian
logging companies employ large numbers of Asian workers in skilled and
semi-skilled jobs (see Majid Cooke 1997a).
9
 By the end of 1996, the Bank had persuaded the Ministry of Finance to reduce the projected log harvest to exactly 3 million
cubic metres in 1998 and 1999.
10
 A recent newspaper advertising campaign by the Forest Industries Association claims that more than twice this number of
people are dependent on the forestry sector for their employment.  This claim takes account of additional jobs which are thought
to be generated by the industry’s backward linkages (Bob Tate, 1997, personal communication).
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When public debate about the reform of national forest policy reached its
peak in 1993, there was considerable speculation about the form and extent
of the control exercised over the log export industry by one Sino-Malaysian
company, Rimbunan Hijau (RH)11.  The debate came to a head in June of
that year, when the Forests Minister complained that this company was
using all sorts of ‘connections’ to block the implementation of the National
Forestry Development Guidelines (PNGMOF 1993b), even while it was
supposedly seeking to influence public opinion in its favour by financing a
new national daily newspaper.  At this juncture, the Post-Courier (the only
other national daily newspaper) published a feature article (Togarewa 1993)
which claimed, amongst other things, that RH controlled 80-86 per cent of
PNG’s log export market, and had made a profit of between K350 and K400
million on the export of PNG logs in 1992.  These claims were vigorously
denied by the directors of RH and its affiliated companies, who maintained
that they only controlled ‘about, or less than, 40 per cent’ of PNG’s log
exports, and could hardly have made such a remarkable profit on logs
exported in 1992 when the total value of PNG’s log exports in that year was
only about K179 million (Post-Courier, 23 June 1993).
Official figures show that the value of PNG’s log exports in 1992 was
certainly not more than K179 million, and might even have been less (see
Figure 4.1 above).  But the proposition that RH controls a very substantial
proportion of PNG’s log export market has been repeated in numerous
writings on the subject (see PNGADCP 1993; Kürschner-Pelkmann and
Callick 1995; Henderson 1996).  However, these claims cannot be
substantiated directly from the NFA’s own register of ‘industry
participants’, which was established shortly after the gazettal of the new
Forestry Act in 1992.
Figure 4.2 shows, in summary form, the connections which could be shown
to exist, in 1993, between those ‘forest industry participants’ who were
thought to be part of a Sino-Malaysian cartel which was either dominated
or controlled by RH.  The evidence clearly revealed the existence of several
distinct clusters of companies, each containing a combination of foreign
companies (including some which were directly engaged in PNG’s log
export industry) and national companies (normally local landowner
companies) with which they were obviously doing business.  The foreign
4.2 Concentration of capital
in the log export industry
11
 ‘Sino-Malaysian’ companies are defined here as Malaysian companies owned or controlled by persons of Chinese ethnic origin
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companies in each cluster were connected by mutual shareholdings,
overlapping directorships, or shared office facilities (as revealed by
common fax and phone numbers), while their links to the national
companies were typically revealed by the use of sequential cheques from a
single chequebook to pay their registration fees to the NFA.  In this way, it
was possible to identify a core group of companies associated directly with
RH, and five other companies or groups of companies whose links to RH
and each other were either tenuous or dubious:
• Cakara Alam, a subsidiary of Land and General Bhd, which was
contracted to export logs from the West, Central and East Arawe timber
permits in West New Britain Province;
• WTK Realty and its local subsidiaries, whose main operations were in
the Vanimo area of West Sepik Province, but which also had contracts in
Madang and West New Britain;
• the ‘Monarch group’ of companies, all subsidiaries of a Singaporean
company called Monarch Logging, whose main operations were in the
Log truck, West New Britain. About 50 per cent of log exports are under the control of a single Malaysian
company, Rimbunan Hijau, and another 30-35 per cent are under the control of other Malaysian companies
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Figure 4.2  The putative Sino-Malaysian logging cartel, 1993
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Lolo area of West New Britain, but which also had contracts in Madang,
Oro, and Milne Bay, and was effectively managed by Mr Hii Yii Ann;
• Dominance Resources, which held the Umbukul timber permit in New
Ireland, and was one of a group of companies under the effective control
of Dr Phillip Ling; and
• a group of companies registered in the Philippines, including Super
Mahogany and Timber Producers and Marketing, which had one logging
contract in Morobe Province.
Although the NFA’s database contained little or no evidence to show that
RH actually controlled all or any of these other corporate interests,
suspicions were converted into rumours, and even into ‘facts’, by the
circulation of long lists and elaborate diagrams based on this body of data.
From information which has become available since 1993, it is now possible
to identify a number of changes (or some new revelations) in this pattern of
corporate relationships (see Filer 1997c for further details).  These changes
do seem to indicate that RH has strengthened its own position in the log
export business, but not to the extent of directly controlling much more
than 50 per cent of it.
Table 4.1 shows that the core group of companies associated directly with
RH has been responsible for about 34 per cent of the log export market over
the last four years.  However, these figures definitely understate their
current market share, and may also understate the rate of its growth during
this period.  Firstly, the Hong Kong-based Seal Corporation sold its PNG
logging interests to RH in 1992.  Secondly, the Monarch group of
companies, though not shown to be part of the RH core group in the NFA’s
database, appears to have been taken over some time in 1991, not long after
RH had made its debut in the PNG logging industry.  Monarch Investments,
Saban Enterprises, and Putput Logging are certainly now regarded as RH
subsidiaries by officers of the Forest Industries Association (FIA), and there
is widespread circumstantial evidence of collaboration between the two
groups of companies over the last five years.  On the other hand, the same
sources maintain that the Dominance group, under the leadership of Phillip
Ling, is still operating independently of RH, and that this group has
increased its own share of the export market through the acquisition of
Yema Timbers from the Monarch group, and through the exercise of greater
control over the Super Mahogany group.  WTK Realty is also widely
regarded as a competitor of RH, despite the fact that these two companies
are owned and controlled by separate branches of a single Chinese ‘clan’
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study56
which dominates the logging industry in Sarawak12.  And Cakara Alam
hardly even qualifies for membership of the putative cartel, since the
chairman of its parent company, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, is a member of the
ethnic Malay business elite which has been promoted by the Malaysian
government to counter the influence of the ethnic Chinese business
community.
There have been suggestions that RH exercises some kind of control over
Turama Forest Industries (TFI), either through its stake in an offshore parent
company, or through the contractual relationship between TFI and Concord
Pacific, but these suggestions do not appear to carry much weight.  There is
no suggestion that RH exercises any kind of control over the Japanese
companies which run the Stettin Bay and Open Bay logging operations, or
over the Korean company, Nam Yang Timbers.  If we assume that RH
controls half of the business assigned to ‘other/unknown interests’ in Table
4.1, but we do not assume that it controls TFI or the Dominance/Super
Mahogany group, then RH is left with approximately 50 per cent of the total
log export business.  And we arrive at much the same result if we make the
equally plausible assumption that RH does exercise some kind of control
over the Dominance/Super Mahogany group, but only controls about 20 per
cent of the ‘other/unknown interests’.
12
 The two branches of the clan, now commonly known as the Wongs (WTK) and the Tiongs (RH), are thought to have ‘fallen out’
some years ago.  An article in the Asian Wall Street Journal, reprinted in the Times of PNG (3 March 1994), dates the ‘family
feud’ back to 1975.  On the other hand, they are still connected through financial institutions such as the Hok Hua Bank, which
might therefore be regarded as the axis of any Sino-Malaysian cartel
Table 4.1  Percentage share of PNG log exports produced by different corporate
interests, 1994-97
Interest group 1994 1995 1996 1997
Rimbunan Hijau core group 36.1 38.1 34.5 27.6
Seal group (under RH) 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8
Monarch group (under RH) 10.5 7.6 6.4 9.3
Dominance group 1.8 2.0 2.4 1.7
Super Mahogany group 1.3 0.2 0.6 0.9
WTK Realty 13.3 17.4 17.3 18.4
Cakara Alam 9.8 11.4 9.1 8.4
Turama Forest Industries 6.0 4.4 4.6 11.2
Stettin Bay Lumber 4.7 2.4 5.1 3.6
Open Bay Timber 4.4 2.7 3.8 2.7
Nam Yang Timbers 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.2
Other/unknown interests 8.2 10.8 12.8 13.0
Source: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest.
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4.3 The regional raw log trade
13
 Environmental lobbies in Australia, America and Europe have recently been exerting a great deal of pressure on mining and
petroleum companies to ‘clean up their acts’ in PNG, some of this criticism has been voiced at the annual general meetings of
these companies, and the companies have shown considerable sensitivity to this kind of criticism.
14
 For example, PNG’s share of the Japanese market may actually grow, while the total size of that market continues to shrink,
because other countries in the region decide to follow the Indonesian example of imposing a log export ban in order to encour-
age the development of a domestic plywood industry.  Furthermore, Figure 4.3 appears to understate the volume of PNG’s
exports to Japan by a very considerable (and annually variable) margin.  Data produced by the Japanese Lumber Importers
Association show that Japan imported more than 1.9 million cubic metres of logs from PNG in 1994 (Peter Dauvergne, 1997,
personal communication).
In either case, one would have to conclude that RH is certainly the dominant
player in PNG’s log export industry - a fact which is confirmed by Francis
Tiong’s erstwhile role as President of the FIA - but this does not amount to a
monopoly.  The role which RH plays within the log export industry might
then be compared with the role played by Chevron, Placer Dome, and BHP,
respectively, within the petroleum, gold, and copper export industries - in
other words, a relatively standard pattern of capital concentration in the
business of resource extraction.  It is the form, rather than the extent, of
capital concentration which seems to warrant the suspicion that Sino-
Malaysian domination of the log export industry is the main obstacle to the
rationalisation of forest management in PNG, primarily because the relevant
companies are not accountable to the shareholding public or other
stakeholders in their country of origin to the same extent as their counterparts
in the mining and petroleum sector13, and may therefore deserve to be
portrayed as a corrupting influence on the body politic (see Henderson 1996).
Figures produced by the NFA show that Japan is currently the destination for
well over half of PNG’s raw log exports, while South Korea is the next largest
customer, and a variety of other countries import the remainder.  Figure 4.3
fails to reveal what some commentators consider to be a long-term decline in
the Japanese market, which is due to material substitutions in the Japanese
plywood industry and competition from its Indonesian counterpart (see
Dauvergne 1996; Majid Cooke 1997a; Light 1997).  On the other hand, these
figures need to be treated with considerable caution, firstly because they may
represent short-term fluctuations which disguise the long-term trend, and
secondly because of the level of ‘political interference’ with long-term trends
in the regional log export trade14.  The rapid growth of PNG’s exports to the
Philippines over the last four years can be explained by the exhaustion of that
country’s own timber resources, and the consequent need to supplement the
supply of raw material to its domestic plywood industry, but since that
industry is also in decline, it is unlikely that PNG’s exports to this market will
increase much further (Peter Dauvergne, 1997, personal communication).
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Figure 4.3  PNG log exports by country of destination, 1994 and 1997
Source: PNG Forest Authourity Timber Digest
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The image of Malaysian logging companies in PNG is one of a politically influential, and even all-
powerful, machine.  Most of the Malaysian timber companies which operate in PNG are from Sarawak
in East Malaysia.  In Sarawak, the timber industry is dominated by one segment of the ethnic Chinese
population, the Fouchow (Majid Cooke 1997b).  They may have partners who are not Fouchow, in-
cluding Sarawak native groups and Malays from Sarawak itself and from Peninsular Malaysia, but in
such partnerships they remain the controlling party.
However, in the context of global trade, these contractors are nothing more than intermediaries in a
raw log production chain which is dominated by companies in consumer countries such as Japan and
Korea.  In the tropical timber industry, the Japanese sogo shosha (‘general trading companies’) domi-
nate the raw log trade, while their control of the tropical plywood trade has been weakened somewhat,
in recent years, by the planned entry of Indonesian products into the Japanese market.  The sogo
shosha link firms involved in the raw log trade, control distribution chains, and finance producers,
wholesalers, and distributors, as well as final consumers - all for a small fee.  According to Dauvergne
(1996), wasteful consumption is a necessary outcome of their function and corporate structure.  Moreo-
ver, they are able to control the market by the sheer volume of their purchases.  When raw logs are
Box 4.1  The role of Malaysian logging companies in the regional economy
Representatives of PNG’s log export industry appear to believe that
mainland China represents their best chance of compensating for any
further contraction in the Japanese and South Korean markets (Bob Tate,
1997, personal communication), but there is as yet little evidence of long-
term growth in the Chinese market.
The behaviour of the major logging companies in PNG cannot be fully
understood without some reference to the larger pattern of economic and
political relationships between national governments and corporate
interests in the Asia-Pacific region.  The Malaysian companies have been
key constituents in the PNG government’s ‘Look North’ policy, which is
designed to reduce national dependence on ‘traditional’ sources of
investment in Australia and other Western countries, and which is part of a
general trend sometimes know as the ‘Asianisation of the Pacific’.  Portraits
of the logging companies as ‘robber barons’ (see EIA 1996) are thus located
in a political context which not only features the familiar contrast between
long-term public policies and short-term corporate gains, and thus between
‘sustainable’ and ‘unsustainable’ forms of development, but also contains
an opposition between East and West which is clearly articulated in the
friction between the Australian and Malaysian governments over the
question of forest management in PNG (see Filer 1996).  At the same time,
the demonisation of companies like RH tends to conceal their own
subordination to other corporate interests which do not wish or need to
maintain a visible presence in PNG’s national economy (see Box 4.1).
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perceived to be in short supply, the sogo shosha commence a buying spree, sending prices up, creat-
ing instability and, ultimately, price collapse as excess logs are sold back into the market (Krause and
Sekiguchi, cited in Nectoux and Kuroda 1989).  Operating on a two-to-three month reserve stock,
sogo shosha are able to use these reserves to flood the Japanese market and lower log prices
(Dauvergne 1996).
In sum, producer companies in PNG, even the seemingly all-powerful Rimbunan Hijau, enjoy nothing
more than a subordinate position in a world raw log trade that is dominated by the appetites of con-
sumers.  Malaysian loggers in PNG function to cater to consumer appetites for timber which are
largely Japanese.  Having exhausted sources in the Philippines and Sabah in the 1960s and 1970s,
these consumers found new supplies in Sarawak and PNG (World Bank 1995:76).  Malaysian logging
companies, as long-standing suppliers to the Japanese market, are now also logging in Africa, South
America, and other South Pacific island countries apart from PNG - especially the Solomon Islands,
Vanuatu and Samoa (ibid.).  However, for these logging contractors, remaining in a subordinate posi-
tion does not imply complete subjugation, and often produces some real advantages, especially the
fact that  these relationships cushion raw log producers against price fluctuation.
Consuming countries, especially Japan and South Korea, dominate the world trade in tropical timber,
especially raw logs, while intermediate countries such as Malaysia occupy a special niche as produc-
tion agents.  The roles are hierarchical and cannot be easily changed, although Indonesia has man-
aged to modify the hierarchy to the point where it has gained significant control over the plywood trade
by cutting prices and circumventing the sogo shosha.  On the other hand, the Indonesian experiment
has had substantial economic and environmental costs, and PNG should not seek to replicate it, even
if this were a feasible option.  But PNG cannot compete directly either with Indonesia or with Malaysia,
where attempts have been made to attract Japanese investment to Sarawak with incentive packages
which include a mixture of planned infrastructure and other services.
The additional problem for PNG is that the consuming countries try their best to exclude any new
entrants who threaten their own control over the tropical timber trade, as they do by imposing high
tariffs on value-added products such as plywood, yet they have no desire to exercise any direct control
over the production and importation of raw logs.  This explains why countries such as PNG find it more
convenient to continue producing raw logs.  With changing patterns of production in consumer coun-
tries, the consumption of tropical raw logs has declined, and the trade may change direction with the
substitution of other materials (see also section 8.11 for a discussion of the potential of consumer
pressure and certification).  There is no bright economic future in the production and export of more
raw logs, because prices will need to be kept low to meet the needs of plywood manufacturers in
consumer countries, such as Japan, who already face competition from Indonesia.  This means that
PNG may have to produce more for less, with obviously detrimental effects on its economy and its
forest resources.  Hence the current need to explore the alternatives to large-scale logging.
Source: Majid Cooke 1997a.
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The national government has two agencies which are primarily
responsible for achieving the goal of sustainable forest management - the
PNG Forest Authority (formerly the Department of Forests) and the
Department (formerly Office) of Environment and Conservation.  The NFA
has about 425 staff, with a current operating budget of approximately K19
million.  The DEC has about 175 staff, with a current operating budget of
approximately K3.5 million.  Other national government agencies with an
interest or stake in forest management include the Department of
Agriculture and Livestock (DAL), which has a long-standing interest in
‘agroforestry’, the Prime Minister’s Department, which has a general
interest in matters of national development policy, the Department of
Finance (now Treasury), in its capacity as a revenue-collector, and the
National Planning Office, which has the notional responsibility for
implementing the National Sustainable Development Strategy (see section
7.6).
The NFA is a statutory body established by the Forestry Act of 1991 (see
Box 4.2).  Its current organisational structure is shown in Figure 4.4.  Before
the passage of the 1991 Forestry Act, forestry was regarded as a ‘concurrent
function’, meaning that powers and responsibilities were shared between
the national government and nineteen provincial governments.  As a
result, officers of the DOF, like their counterparts in the DAL, had little
control over the activities of provincial forestry officers, who were
commonly located within provincial Divisions of Primary Industry, and
accountable to their own ministers in Provincial Executive Councils (see
also section 5.3).  Although the national Forests Minister and the DOF
retained control over the allocation of timber permits under the old
Forestry Act, provincial governments were able to pass their own forestry
legislation, and the DOF had virtually no control over Local Forest Areas,
and very little capacity to monitor compliance with timber permit
conditions through the provincial bureaucracies.  The new Forestry Act
changed this balance of powers and responsibilities by reintegrating
provincial forestry officers into a unified National Forest Service under the
control of a National Forest Board, and accommodating provincial
political interests through the creation of Provincial Forest Management
Committees with various planning and advisory powers.  The Operations
Branch of the National Forest Service has since been reorganised to include
a number of regional offices, each of which is responsible for operations in
several provinces.
4.4   The role of government in forest management
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Figure 4.4  Corporate structure of the PNG Forest Authority
Source: PNGFA 1996
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The Forestry (Private Dealings) Act of 1971 (repealed 1992) allowed customary landowners to sell timber
harvesting rights directly to a contractor of their own choice, under the terms of a ‘dealings agreement’ which
required the assent of the Forests Minister, but which otherwise allowed the contractor to operate without a
Timber Permit and with minimal government supervision. Areas subject to this kind of agreement were known
as Local Forest Areas (LFAs).
The Forestry Act (Amalgamated) of 1973 (repealed 1992) provided for the State to acquire timber harvesting
rights from customary landowners under a standard Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) Agreement, and then to
grant a Timber Permit to an operator of its own choosing with conditions imposed by the government without
reference to the customary owners.
The Forestry Act of 1991 (gazetted 1992, amended 1993) repealed the Forestry Act of 1973 and the Forestry
(Private Dealings) Act of 1971.  It lays down a new set of conditions and procedures by which the NFA can
secure timber harvesting rights from customary landowners under a standard Forest Management Agreement
(FMA) and then allocate a Timber Permit to a registered ‘forest industry participant’ in accordance with condi-
tions specified in a National Forest Plan. The Act provides for new forms of consultation between government
officials and customary resource owners, but does not give the resource owners a role in the selection of an
operator.
The Environmental Planning Act of 1978 enables the Minister for Environment and Conservation to require that
developers produce environmental plans which spell out the physical and social impact of their proposals and
include appropriate measures for the mitigation of negative impacts. It also allows for developers to submit such
plans on a voluntary basis, in which case they do not have to be made public. The DEC is responsible for
approving the plans and for compliance auditing to ensure adherence to their provisions.
Box 4.2  Legislation directly relevant to forest management
The DEC is responsible for discharging a variety of conservation policies, and
ensuring compliance with various environmental regulations, many of which
have only limited or indirect bearing on questions of forest management.
Until very recently, these powers and responsibilities were not shared with
provincial governments, nor has the Department had any provincial offices of
its own, though moves are now under way to decentralise some of its
functions.  The main subjects of relevant Departmental activity have been the
environmental planning process for large-scale logging operations and the
management of National Parks and Wildlife Management Areas (see Box 4.2).
It is widely acknowledged that the DEC’s capacity to advance a forest
conservation agenda is limited, because it is politically weak, its conservation
mandate has been given a low priority by successive governments, low
budget allocations have been accompanied by poor financial discipline, and
staff morale has suffered from a lack of leadership and management direction.
Some of these constraints have recently been addressed by an aid-funded
institutional strengthening project, which is still being implemented.
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While the recent process of policy reform within the forestry sector has
primarily been addressed to the problem of asserting greater government
control over the activities of the logging industry, and a redistribution of
the economic benefits derived from these activities, some attention has also
been paid to the economic values which are lost through large-scale timber
harvesting, and the values which might be obtained from alternative forms
of forest utilisation.
In 1991, PNG was the subject of a case study on the application of a System
of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting devised by the UN
Statistical Office (Bartelmus et al. 1992).  This treated the economic value of
the forest resource entirely in terms of its timber content, thus ignoring non-
timber option values.  Even so, in their revision of the National Income
Accounts for 1989, the authors estimated that environmental damage
caused by logging was worth K10 million per annum - more than the
damage caused by agriculture but much less than that caused by mining.
These matters have also been discussed at some length in the Biodiversity
Country Study produced for the DEC (Sekhran and Miller (eds) 1994).  This
study tried to classify the whole variety of direct and indirect use-values of
4.5 Neglected values of the forest
The Conservation Areas Act of 1978 (amended 1992) provides for the protection of customary, government and
privately owned land for the purposes of establishing a system of terrestrial and marine conservation areas. It
envisages the establishment of Conservation Areas, at the request of customary landowners, under the control
of a ministerially-appointed local Management Committee. This Act has never been properly implemented.
The National Parks Act of 1982 provides for the protection of fauna and flora, scenic landscapes and sites of
cultural, educational and scientific value, based on the establishment of  national parks and reserves on public
land. Since there is very little public land with positive conservation values, and very little prospect of acquiring
more, this Act has little relevance to forest conservation.
The Fauna (Protection and Control) Act of 1966 (amended 1974) regulates the harvest, possession and trade of
native fauna.  This legislation provides for the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs), Sanctuar-
ies and Protected Areas to conserve fauna. The Act has a strong focus on local management, and enforcement
powers under the Act are weak; the maximum penalty for breaching a WMA rule is K20.
The International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna Act of 1979 enabled PNG to become a
signatory to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), and prohibits trade in spe-
cies covered by the Convention.
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the forest resource summarised in Table 4.2, and then to discuss the actual
or potential market values of these different uses, their relative
sustainability and mutual compatibility.
It is difficult to estimate the value of those forest products, apart from raw
logs, which are already being marketed in fairly large quantities.  Exports
of rattan, which is one of the few non-timber forest products currently
reaching overseas markets, may be worth something in the order of
K200,000 a year.  Wood and other forest products are used as raw materials
for the handicraft trade, which may be worth K300,000 a year.
There is an obvious connection between the artefact industry and the
tourism industry.  The latter currently earns K40-50 million in foreign
exchange each year (about 1 per cent of GDP), and employs 5-6,000 people
(almost as many as the forest industry), but foreign tourist numbers are still
quite small (about 14,000 a year), and expansion is constrained by the high
cost of transport and accommodation, and widespread concerns about ‘law
and order’.  It is difficult to say what proportion of the tourist trade could
Direct Indirect Non-consumptive
Timber and wood products, Tree plantations Eco-tourism
including handicrafts
Fuelwood Cash crops, including coffee, Conservation rents, used
cocoa and taro, grown in the as a disincentive to
forest periphery unsustainable uses
Fruits, nuts and fungi, Carbon swaps for carbon Access fees for research
including galip, pandanus sequestration services
and okari nuts, breadfruit,
pitpit and aibika
Tannins and plant oils, Resource conservation fees
including aromatic to protect hydrological and
compounds other forest functions
Rattan and bamboo
Orchids and decorative plants
Sago and nipa palm products
Wild fauna, including insects, fish,
and crocodiles
Exudates, including tree gums,
copal resin and gutta percha
Table 4.2  Use-values of national forest resources
Source: Sekhran 1996
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be defined as ‘ecotourism’, but scenic and
cultural diversity are obviously major attractions,
and the trade-off between these attractions and
the impact of extractive industry has not received
much attention in the policy process.  The DEC
has undertaken a contingent valuation survey of
people using the Varirata National Park, just
outside the national capital, but it is not possible
to extrapolate the results to other parts of the
country (Sekhran, Hedemark et al. 1994).
A considerable range of minor forest products are
consumed directly from forests or traded in small
quantities in local markets.  These products
include a variety of fruits and nuts, rattan,
bamboo, exudates, pharmaceutical products,
building materials, tannins and oils.  Fuelwood
harvested from forest trees forms the principle
source of energy in most rural communities.
Forests underpin subsistence systems in all sorts
of other ways which are critical to human
welfare, by stabilising watersheds, replenishing
nutrients, and providing wildlife habitats, as well
as offering a supply of food and raw materials, but the economic valuation of
these ‘natural services’ faces many technical and methodological problems.
The problem of measuring the actual and potential value of alternative forms of
forest use is compounded by the problem of estimating ‘sustainable’ levels of
utilisation for each of them and working out the extent to which these multiple
uses are compatible with each other.  Different types of ‘forest product’ may
derive from different types of forest, as when raw logs are extracted from
primary forest, while local villagers obtain their fuelwood from secondary re-
growth or planted fallows.  On the other hand, the value of some non-forest
products may be diminished by particular types of forest use, as when coral
reefs are damaged by the soil erosion which results from large-scale logging.
There are many options and opportunities to diversify the transformation of
natural forest values into monetary incomes - including the small-scale
production of ecotimber, the promotion of ecotourism, bio-genetic prospecting,
the sale of minor forest products, and carbon offset initiatives - but all are
predicated on the continued productivity of the resource base.  Some of these
options are considered in our subsequent discussion of non-timber forest goods
and services (see section 10.6).
The tourism industry currently earns US$30-40
million in foreign exchange each year, but
foreign tourist numbers are still quite small
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Let us now return to the point made in the introduction to this study, that
the State of PNG is the site of a tug-of-war between the politics of the
Melanesian village and the divergent interests of assorted foreigners.
National politicians and bureaucrats alike have personal connections to the
subsistence economy which tend to detract from the performance of their
roles as commanders or functionaries of the state apparatus.  In our
discussion of electoral politics, we use the masculine gender in order to
underline the extreme rarity of elected female politicians in PNG.
There is widespread agreement, both inside and outside the country, that
PNG has a relatively ‘weak’ state, but there is rather less agreement on the
essential features and implications of such weakness, or on their
relationship to the development of ‘civil society’.  Amongst the more
commonly cited features of PNG’s problem of ‘governance’ are the
following:
• Political parties are little more than parliamentary factions.  Party leaders
are parliamentary ‘big men’ who rally the wavering support of their
colleagues by promising material rewards (such as government
ministries) which they cannot always deliver.  Grassroot party
organisations are virtually non-existent in the intervals between national
elections, and it is barely possible to distinguish between the policy
platforms of different parties (Saffu 1996).
• The efficiency and effectiveness of the public service is constrained by the
inconsistencies of the laws and policies which it is expected to
implement, by rivalries between government agencies, by low levels of
Melanesian politics
and society
5.1 The strength and weakness of the state
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financial accountability, and by the growing tendency for government
ministers to fill senior positions with their own political supporters
(Larmour 1995).
• There is widespread popular distrust of elected politicians, who are
commonly thought to use the fruits of office for their own personal gain,
and a corresponding sense of frustration at the palpable failure of
government to deliver the benefits of ‘development’ which had been
eagerly anticipated at the time of Independence.  The legitimacy of state
institutions of all kinds has thus been called into question.
• There is a serious ‘law and order’ problem which has not been resolved
by a succession of ‘band-aid’ solutions, such as stiffer penalties or the
imposition of curfews (Dinnen 1996).  Criminal gangs in urban and rural
areas have made increasing use of firearms, and have often shown
remarkable brutality, in the conduct of their business.  Some parts of the
country (most notably the central highlands) have witnessed an upsurge
in ‘tribal fighting’, in which the participants have also resorted to
firearms, and to which the police have normally responded by mounting
their own armed raids on suspect (and sometimes innocent)
communities.
• For many years the national government was unable to find a political or
military solution to the crisis induced by a secessionist rebellion on the
island of Bougainville, where a state of virtual civil war, massive social
dislocation, and a drastic loss of living standards had persisted since
1989.  The government’s way of dealing with this crisis revealed an
unstable and fragmented approach to major policy questions which is not
so obvious, but no less real, when applied to questions less immediately
concerned with life and death.
These problems of governance enter into the assumptions made in the
design of many aid projects in ways which tend to turn these into so-called
‘killer assumptions’, which seem to condemn such projects to failure before
they have even begun to be implemented.  One consultant engaged in
projects designed to strengthen the institutional capacity of both the NFA
and the DEC has remarked on the difficulty of finding short-term remedies
for the perceived weakness of the state.
In summary, it is apparent that the reasons for lack of state authority in PNG
are structural and fundamental.  The state will not increase its ability to
impose its will on citizens overnight, by appointing more police officers or
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reorganising departmental structures.  Rather, a much longer process of
development is required in which citizens come to accept the legitimacy of the
state and its right to control various aspects of the way they live.  Indeed, the
major issue may be to ensure that the state does in fact pursue that path,
instead of short-term strategies which may have the effect of widening the gulf
between state and society, and ultimately hastening the breakdown of
democratic institutions.  Central to this pursuit is the state’s recognition that
its authority rests on the will of its people (Whimp 1997:367).
Despite the sense of gloom and doom which tends to afflict members of a
donor community confronted with the task of reforming or strengthening
government institutions, the State of PNG is not (at least not yet) as weak
as some of its counterparts in other developing countries, most notably
those of sub-Saharan Africa.  Signs of relative strength include the
following:
• Despite popular cynicism about the value of ‘politics’, the Westminster
system continues to thrive, voters continue to vote, and candidates
continue to multiply.  There have been two military mutinies since
Independence (in 1990 and 1997), but neither could properly be
described as an attempted coup d’état, and the prospect of an
authoritarian military or single-party government still seems remote.
• Despite the demand for ‘public sector reform’, most recently articulated
in the World Bank’s structural adjustment programme, there is still little
evidence of widespread bureaucratic corruption.  This is partly because
inflation has never reached the point of seriously eroding the real value
of public service salaries, so public servants have not been obliged (even
if some have been willing) to neglect their duties or participate in the
‘second economy’ in order to make ends meet.
• Although the administration of justice leaves much to be desired, the
judiciary has maintained its independence of the executive arm of
government, the Ombudsman continues to wage public battles against
political corruption, and the large volume of civil litigation testifies to
popular respect for the ‘rule of law’ (as does the framing of many
problems as ‘law and order’ problems).
• One of the reasons why there is so much public concern about political
corruption is that politicians, government officials and ordinary
members of the public make such extensive use of an uncensored
national press to complain about it.  And whatever the problems which
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afflict the formation and implementation of public policy, they are at
least transparent to those who read the newspapers or listen to the radio.
• Despite the recurrence of appeals to regional prejudice, such as that
which pits ‘Papuans’ against ‘highlanders’ or the small islands against
the mainland, the linguistic and cultural fragmentation of the nation
means that no ‘tribe’ or ethnic group has the size or solidarity required to
gain exclusive control over any government agency, even at the
provincial level.
We may therefore suggest that the State of PNG has a mixture of strengths
and weaknesses which depends on features of the national society over
which it is meant to preside, but to which it is partially subject.  At first
glance, it appears that this national society is made up of thousands of
traditional political communities, each with its own parochial interest, each
putting its own fingers into the public purse, and that the tragedy of the
state consists in the fact that it is literally being pulled apart by this form of
communal competition.  But that is not the whole story.  While elected
politicians and government officials do tend to function as the fingers or
brokers of their traditional communities, redistributing the benefits of their
participation in the state, they also participate in a range of other social
institutions which help to fill the gap between the state and the community,
or between the public and private sectors of the national economy.  In other
words, PNG has forms of ‘civil society’ which have outgrown local political
boundaries, and which make their own distinctive contributions to the
social integration and economic development of the country.
Religious organisations, sporting associations and educational institutions
are more significant in this respect than political parties, trade unions or
professional associations.  The weakness of political parties reflects an
absence of class consciousness which continues to belie the growing
disparities of wealth and income between different sections of the national
population.  Urban poverty and unemployment fuel popular antagonism to
the conspicuous consumption of the ‘elites’ in business and in government,
and this is clearly connected to the volume and violence of urban street
crime, but Papua New Guineans in all walks of life are reluctant to admit
the existence of real ‘poverty’, and prefer to believe that the so-called
‘wantok system’15 can or should compensate for economic inequalities
between members of the same ethnic group.  At the same time, ethnic
identities are subject to ambiguities of scale and partial dissolution because
of high levels of internal migration, the rapid ‘localisation’ of formal sector
15
 Wantok in Pidgin literally means ‘one-talk’, somebody who speaks the same language, but the term is used with varying
degrees of inclusiveness in different social contexts.
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The following ‘assumptions’ were made in the project planning matrix for the GTZ Landowner Aware-
ness Project, which is discussed at greater length in section 10.2.
• There will be no medium-term reduction in the level of external demand for natural resources
(primarily tropical timber) from Papua New Guinea.
• Internal political pressure in favour of the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources will persist.
• The executive arm of government continues to lack either the commitment or the capacity to resist
this pressure.
• There is no relevant government agency which has the capacity to coordinate project activities and
communicate effectively with project participants.
• There is no relevant government agency which has been able to provide the material counterpart
contributions required for the project (office space, operational costs, etc.).
• Relevant government agencies lack credibility and accessibility in their pursuit of the project’s
objectives.
• Capacity-building activities supported by international donor agencies will barely improve the
performance of the executive arm of government in the forseeable future.
• The lack of consistent ideological commitment to specific forms or models of ‘development’ makes
it difficult or impossible to predict the relative effectiveness of different types of strategic intervention.
• The ethnic and cultural diversity of the country (around 800 languages and perhaps 8000 traditional
political communities) makes it difficult or impossible to produce general or national solutions to the
problems of resource use by customary landowners.
Box 5.1 How problems of governance affect the feasibility of donor-funded projects
employment, and the frequency of inter-ethnic marriage in that section of
the population which has received secondary or tertiary education.  Most
members of the urban ‘middle class’ or ‘educated elite’ still acknowledge
their membership of distant rural communities, and maintain a variety of
material relationships with their rural kinsfolk, but have been away from
home for most of the time since they entered high school, and have since
taken a series of steps to enlarge their social universe.  Provincial and
regional identities are reinforced through the educational system itself, and
through the pursuit of team sports whose popularity varies markedly
between different parts of the country.  But relationships forged in the
classroom or on the playing field are still less significant than those forged
in church.
It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of organised religion,
especially the Christian religion, in the formation of PNG’s ‘civil society’.
The churches have continued to function as agents of the state in the
delivery of health, education and welfare services, although they no longer
dominate these activities in the way which was characteristic of the colonial
period.  But as Christianity has been ‘localised’, it has also been diversified,
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and herein lies a paradox.  During the colonial period, some of the
mainstream churches (Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist and
Presbyterian) agreed to recognise each other’s separate ‘spheres of
influence’ in different parts of the country, and thus to reduce the incidence
of religious conflict amongst their native converts, but a host of
unorthodox, evangelical, and even non-Christian sects has since been
encroaching on their respective strongholds, to the point where the bonds
of church membership now cut across the ties of ethnic identity, not only in
urban areas, but also in many traditional political communities.  The
paradox thus consists in the fact that organised religion seems to have been
‘taken over’ by an indigenous tendency to cultural fragmentation, and yet
the lines of fragmentation cut across the local boundaries of traditional
society.
This process of religious diversification may have important implications
for the growth of NGOs with a secular mission, including those which have
recently become involved in the forest policy process (see section 10.1).  On
the one hand, it is difficult for them to become engaged in the politics of
forest management in specific rural areas without entering into some kind
of relationship with local church organisations.  On the other hand, it is
difficult to maintain relationships with several local church organisations
when their members may have totally different approaches to the politics of
forest management, and when some of them are liable to discount all
questions of ‘sustainability’ because they believe that the world will soon
come to a glorious or horrible end.
PNG’s first national election was held in 1964, and the second in 1968.
Although the vast majority of adult ‘natives’ voted in these elections, the
first two Houses of Assembly were dominated by their expatriate members,
some elected and some appointed by the Administrator.  The first national
government to be dominated by elected indigenous members was the one
formed under the leadership of Michael Somare (now known as ‘the father
of the nation’) after the third national election in 1972.  This was the
government which presided over the transition to Independence in 1975
and the passage of a very substantial body of legislation, including the
National Constitution, which formed the charter of the newly independent
state.  One of these new laws, the Organic Law on National Elections of 1975,
prescribed that elections would henceforth be held at five-year intervals,
and substituted a ‘first-past-the-post’ system for the optional preferential
5.2 Electoral swings and roundabouts
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voting system previously favoured by the colonial administration.  On the
other hand, it retained the distinction between ‘open’ electorates and the
larger provincial (formerly ‘regional’) electorates which have continued to
be the favoured stamping ground of those expatriates who opted to take up
national citizenship after Independence16.  After the Electoral Boundaries
Commission had enlarged the number of open electorates, the 1977 election
produced a parliament which contained 89 open members and 20
provincial members, and all subsequent elections have been contested on
the same boundaries.
The political cycle which has developed since Independence is one in which
all matters of public policy have increasingly become the hostages or
victims of an unstable succession of coalitions between national politicians
whose own electoral survival commonly depends on their ability to reward
a very small local constituency with the maximum possible share of
government resources.
Each successive election has witnessed:
• an increase in the total number of candidates;
• a corresponding reduction in the proportion of votes required to win a
seat;
• an increase in the number of sitting members who have lost their seats;
• an increase in the number of winning candidates who have claimed to be
independent of the growing number of political parties; and,
• an increase in the intensity of the ‘horse-trading’ by which a new
coalition government has been formed after the declaration of results
(see Saffu 1996).
And in each of the quinquennial political cycles since 1977, the ruling
coalition established after the election has been defeated by a parliamentary
vote of no-confidence when one or more of its component factions has
crossed the floor and joined the previous Opposition (see Table 5.1).
In this form of parliamentary democracy, the fluctuating personal interests
of individual ministers and their own political patrons and clients have
come to undermine the capacity of public servants to maintain the
coherence of existing sectoral development policies.  In the year preceding
an election, all Members of Parliament, whether in government or
opposition, try to outbid their prospective opponents by repudiating all
16
 Expatriates Karl Stack, Forests Minister from 1988 to 1991, and Tim Neville, Forests Minister from 1992 to 1994, both
represented provincial electorates.
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17
  In December 1997, Haiveta was replaced by Michael Nali of the People’s Progress Party
Table 5.1  Coalition governments since 1972
Year Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister Formed after
1972 Michael Somare Julius Chan national
(Pangu Pati) (People’s Progress Party) election
1977 Michael Somare Julius Chan national
(Pangu Pati) (People’s Progress Party) election
1980 Julius Chan Iambakey Okuk vote of no
(People’s Progress (National Party) confidence
Party)
1982 Michael Somare Paias Wingti national
(Pangu Pati) (Pangu Pati) election
1985 Paias Wingti Julius Chan vote of no
(People’s Democratic (People’s Progress Party) confidence
Movement)
1987 Paias Wingti Julius Chan national
(People’s Democratic (People’s Progress Party) election
 Movement)
1988 Rabbie Namaliu Ted Diro vote of no
(Pangu Pati) (People’s Action Party) confidence
1992 Paias Wingti Julius Chan national
(People’s Democratic (People’s Progress Party) election
Movement)
1994 Julius Chan Chris Haiveta vote of no
(People’s Progress (Pangu Pati) confidence
Party)
1997 Bill Skate Chris Haiveta
17
national
(People’s National (Pangu Pati) election
Congress)
existing policies for which they have no personal responsibility in order to
recapture some of the permanently disenchanted voters in their own
electorates.  And in the formation of new coalition governments, the main
economic portfolios are often allocated to individuals who have already
built their political reputations around a commitment to radical
innovations in departmental policies.  Successive Ministers of Forests have
alternately supported or opposed one or more of the logging companies
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which dominate the industry in PNG, while candidates standing for
election in the growing number of electorates which actually contain
logging concessions will almost invariably seek to make some political
capital out of the distinctive nature of their own relationship to the
developer.
Over the twenty years preceding Independence, the Administration
established local government councils in all but the most remote and thinly
populated parts of the country.  The council system was conceived as the
main instrument for educating the ‘native’population in the practices of
liberal democracy.  A typical council area contained about 20,000 people,
and a typical council ward contained 500 (often two or three villages).
Councillors were elected at four-year intervals, and normally appointed
one or two deputies to assist in the performance of their duties.
Councillors and their deputies replaced the local headmen who had
previously been appointed directly by colonial district officers (known as
kiaps), and took over their function as brokers between the colonial
authorities and the mass of the rural population, responsible for settling
local disputes or bringing difficult cases to court, organising their
constituents to engage in unpaid ‘public work’ (such as road maintenance)
on certain days of the week, and helping the kiaps to collect census data and
council taxes during their routine patrols through each census division.
Council chambers were built at the sub-district headquarters or patrol post
which constituted the administrative centre of each council area, and the
councillors normally met there at monthly intervals to discuss the passage
of council ‘rules’ (bye-laws), appropriate levels of council tax, and
proposals for local expenditure on economic infrastructure and social
services.  Apart from the head tax levied on the local population, which
varied according to their perceived ability to pay, each council received a
direct grant from the Administration.  The deliberations of each council
were supported (and often effectively controlled) by one of the kiaps in his
official capacity as a ‘council adviser’.
In some parts of the country, the council system was opposed, more or less
strenuously, by a variety of local ‘cargo cults’18 or ‘micronationalist
movements’ (May 1982), whose members refused to participate in council
5.3 Provincial and local government
18
 ‘Cargo cults’ are a Melanesian cultural phenomenon, much studied by assorted academics, which appear to have been based
on the use of ritual or magical techniques to gain access to the ‘hidden sources’ of European wealth and technological superiority.
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elections or recognise the authority of elected councillors, and who sought
to establish alternative forms of community organisation which were not
subject to kiap control.  Such opposition was especially prevalent on the
island of Bougainville, where it was exacerbated by the heavy-handed
approach taken by the Administration in promoting the development of the
Panguna copper mine, and coalesced in a demand for secession from PNG
on the eve of Independence.  The first Somare government responded to
this threat by passing an Organic Law on Provincial Government, which not
only granted the Bougainvilleans a measure of political autonomy under
what they chose to call the North Solomons Provincial Government, but
also required that this new tier of government be established in the other
eighteen provinces (formerly ‘districts’) of PNG (see Figure 5.1).  Under this
form of decentralisation, each province acquired its own Provincial
Assembly, with roughly the same number of members as a typical local
government council, and these were also elected at four-year intervals.
Provincial governments were formed by unstable coalitions of elected
MPAs, in much the same way that national governments were formed by
unstable coalitions of national MPs.  Some of the functions and agencies of
the state (such as health, education, forestry, and agriculture) were partially
decentralised, while others (such as mining, police, and environment)
remained completely under central government control.  In the former case,
national government departments in Port Moresby normally took
responsibility for matters such as policy formation and coordination,
management of aid-funded development projects, and sectoral research and
training, while service delivery became the responsibility of a division or
section in each of nineteen provincial departments, whose officials were
accountable to one of the ministers in each provincial government.
Although provincial governments had some power to make their own
legislation on these ‘concurrent functions’, and some power to raise their
own taxes within their jurisdictions, they were still dependent on grants
from the national treasury for the greater part of their budgets.
In 1995, the great majority of national MPs decided that this form of
decentralisation had been a failure, and voted for a new Organic Law on
Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments which was intended to
remedy its deficiencies.  There were several reasons for their dissatisfaction
with the old system:
• Although some provincial governments (including North Solomons
until 1989) had acquired a reputation for reasonably efficient
administration, the national government had suspended most of them on
at least one occasion, for periods of one or two years, and assumed direct
control of provincial affairs through the appointment of an
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Administrator.  The usual pretext for suspension was financial
mismanagement, though it was sometimes motivated by political
differences between the ruling coalitions at national and provincial
levels.
• In many parts of the country, there had been a serious decline in the
quantity and quality of the services provided by provincial departments,
which could variously be attributed to bureaucratic incompetence,
political interference, or lack of financial resources.  Provincial budgets
were seriously constrained by the national government’s own distrust of
provincial accountability.
• Local councils had also lost some of their functions and capacities, even
in areas where they had once been quite popular.  As councils were often
unable to secure their diminishing budgetary allocations from provincial
headquarters, they also lost the legitimacy and enthusiasm required to
collect council taxes (or free labour) from the local population, and the
role of the councillor was often reduced to that of representing his ward
in dealings with outsiders.  Some provincial governments replaced local
councils with ‘community governments’ which represented smaller
populations with stronger ethnic identities, but this alone was not
enough to secure greater local participation in the planning and
management of rural development.
• Provincial and local planning priorities were distorted by the national
government’s inclination to ‘by-pass’ the provincial administration by
allocating ‘development funds’ directly to national MPs, to spend as they
saw fit within their own electorates.  These ‘slush funds’, as they soon
came to be known, were often used for pork-barrelling purposes, and
lent a peculiar air of hypocrisy to the national government’s claim that
provincial politicians were financially irresponsible.
• Last but not least, many provincial assembly members secured their
positions after being defeated in the previous national election, and
many lobbied consistently against their own open or provincial MP with
a view to unseating him at the next national election.  At the same time,
many of the candidates standing in provincial and national elections
were themselves drawn from the ranks of the provincial public service,
where their performance was sometimes affected by their political
ambitions.
The new Organic Law has removed or displaced this last form of political
competition by abolishing the second tier of the electoral system.  Each
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provincial assembly is now made up of the MPs who represent the province
in the national parliament, the elected presidents of all the rural local-level
governments in the province, one member to represent the heads of all its
urban local-level governments, an appointed women’s representative, and
up to three other appointed members to represent special interest groups.
One of the national MPs is appointed by the National Executive Council as
the Governor of the province, and assembles his provincial executive from
the remaining membership.  An effort has been made to reduce the number
of local-level governments by requiring that each open electorate in rural
areas shall contain no more than three of these bodies19, to side-step the
pitfalls of electoral politics by allowing that ward representatives may be
selected by ‘traditional’ means, and requiring that each body should
include two nominated female members.  Where necessary, the
administrative boundaries of rural districts within each province are to be
realigned in such a way as to make them coterminous with the boundaries
of open electorates20.  The bureaucratic agencies of the national government
are to exercise a significant level of control over the appointments made to
key positions in each provincial public service, and to play an important
role in developing ‘an effective and efficient provincial and local-level
planning and data system’.  On the other hand, political control over the
planning and budgeting process is reasserted in the formation of Joint
Planning and Budget Priorities Committees in each open electorate, chaired
by the MP representing that electorate, and including three members
appointed by himself, as well as the provincial MP and the heads of the
local-level governments in that district.  Each of these committees is to
receive a minimum unconditional grant of K1 million a year for the
purpose of district development, even though its own plans and budgets
are subject to approval by the provincial and national governments.
It is too early to say whether these reforms will have the intended effect of
restoring the legitimacy and efficiency of government in rural (or urban)
areas.  Some concern has been expressed over the quality and consistency
of the legislation itself.  The Organic Law has been subject to a series of
major and minor amendments since it was first gazetted in February 1995,
and the process of institutional reform is still incomplete.  Provincial
governors have been complaining vociferously about their budget
allocations from the national treasury, and the provision of government
services in some provinces has been further curtailed as a result.  The
abolition of provincial elections has certainly served to intensify the level of
19 
In some cases, Cabinet has decided to waive this requirement in order to preserve existing political boundaries.  There are
now 284 local-level governments, containing a total of 5,747 wards.
20
 When the colonial ‘districts’ became provinces, their component ‘sub-districts’ became districts in their own right.  But the
administrative boundaries of the country’s 87 districts had not previously been made to coincide with the political boundaries of
the 89 open electorates.
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study80
political competition for seats in the national parliament, and there were
huge numbers of losing candidates looking for new political roles in the
wake of the 1997 national election.  Many of them contested the local
government elections held in October 1997, and the winners of these
elections have subsequently been engaged in all sorts of unseemly struggles
to secure the presidency of their respective councils, and with it the chance
to become the deputy governors of their respective provinces.  Although
the reforms appear to impose new forms of financial control over
provincial expenditures, they also entail the transfer of additional powers
and responsibilities to the level of provincial and district administration,
and may thus be seen to represent a more radically decentralised system of
government.  By granting new forms of power to national MPs, they also
create the risk that open electorates (districts) will be more like personal
fiefdoms than they were before.
How should this portrait of the social and political landscape affect our
understanding of the national policy process, especially in the domain of
forest policy?  From one point of view (which is the donor’s point of view),
the weakest parts of the state are those which have been colonised by
village politics, but village politics may be the only kind of politics which
matters if villagers own or control the resources whose management is the
point of the policy process.  From this same point of view, the strongest
parts of the state are those which have been successfully (if temporarily)
colonised by the latest fashions in public administration - as propounded
by donor-funded consultants.  On the other hand, these interventions
commonly fail to win the understanding and approval of those Papua New
Guineans who are supposed to benefit from them.
This is not to deny the existence of a national technocratic constituency
which is prepared to voice its support for such global imperatives within
particular policy domains, but the harmony, continuity and sincerity of this
‘policy voice’ is often open to question.  During the first decade of national
independence, some commentators were inclined to regard this
technocratic constituency as an emergent ruling class.
The state occupies a central position which the technocracy uses to consolidate
its class power.  In this, it blocks any challenging advance of the national petty
bourgeoisie, even at the price of tolerating and encouraging foreign
domination (Fitzpatrick 1985:29).
5.4 National populism or the end of ideology
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Our own preference would be to say that national technocrats are
primarily engaged in a struggle with ‘landowners’, rather than with
members of a ‘national petty bourgeoisie’, especially in those policy
domains which are concerned with the distribution of a pile of natural
resources.  At the same time, we doubt whether this should be seen as a
struggle between two clearly defined groups of national stakeholders, or
‘social classes’, but would rather see it as an opposition of voices or
perspectives which may be articulated or adopted by all manner of people
- both citizens and foreigners - whose interests may draw them to one side
or the other, depending on the context or the issue which engages them
(Filer 1997b).
As we have seen already, the current process of provincial government
reform appears to be motivated by the desire of a national political elite to
rationalise the structures of the state in ways which help to insulate them
from the baneful influence of village politics, but the effect of these reforms
may only be to shift existing forms of political competition from one place
to another, or to rearrange the boundaries of the playing field without
changing the basic rules of the game.  While national MPs may now have
more control over the administration of their own electorates for the
period in which they hold on to their seats, this may only serve to provoke
the enthusiasm of their local opponents for the task of thwarting and
displacing them.  And there is no reason to assume that the business of the
national parliament will henceforth be conducted in ways which overcome
the present contradiction between the vitality of local politics and the
confusions of public policy.
Public servants also seem to espouse a technocratic perspective when they
seek to protect their own work practices from ‘political interference’, the
sources of which may range from village leaders to national ministers,
when national ministers are often seen as village leaders in a new disguise.
The fear of political interference helps to explain why many public
servants affect to despise the values of ‘community participation’, and
tend to regard local NGOs as a new kind of vote-gathering device.  And
yet their preference for ‘top-down’ approaches to the business of
government is belied by their habit of forming bureaucratic communities
which function like clans or villages whose ‘territories’ are specific policy
domains or bits of state.  And when they have occasion to participate in
the political life of their ‘real’ communities, as many of them do, they are
more likely to adopt the kind of ‘grassroot landowner’ perspective which
is illustrated by the following excerpt from a newspaper feature article on
the vexed question of resource compensation:
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When landowners stand with their compensation claims, it is not done in a
vacuum.  They stand opposed to the cunning, the smart, the educated and the
exploiters.  They stand, used and abused, and their land so often taken from
them.  It is in this light that we must look at compensation demands.  Only
then can we begin to understand why the people in the outlying areas of our
country seem to have the urge to create problems for the Government, to
provide challenges to their authority.  The complicated bureaucratic
bungling, the ineffective administration of resources, the unequal distribution
of national income, an economy making a few rich and many poor, unequal
distribution of services ... you want reasons for ‘unreasonable’ compensation
demands?  There you have them...  All these factors play a part in urging the
rural people to get benefits any way they can.  It allows the powerless to grab
a little power in this unequal world that is Papua New Guinea (Post-
Courier, 31 January 1992).
The contest between ‘elite’ and ‘grassroot’ perspectives in any given policy
process is therefore like a bridge or a tightrope, which members of the
‘political and bureaucratic elite’ are continually crossing back and forth as
they make vain attempts to reconcile the public interest with that of the
‘landowning community’ to which they finally belong, and in whose
ground they will most probably be laid to rest.
Some scholars writing about the relation between state and society in
Africa have used the word ‘populism’ to describe the politics of those who
demand or benefit from the existence of a strong state, and the word
‘localism’ to describe the politics of those who prefer to avoid or escape it,
and have regarded these as distinct constraints on the development of a
strong ‘civil society’ which can bridge the gulf between state and
community (Chazan 1994).  This contrast does not seem to work very well
in PNG, where the only prevailing ideology (apart from a fractured form
of Christianity) is a combination of ‘populism’ and ‘localism’, in which the
mass of the people are still demanding that government should do more
for them, and still participating in all sorts of activities designed to meet
that demand, but still insist on the primacy of their rights as members of
small landowning communities, and resist the efforts of government to
gain more control over the resources which they own.
PNG’s version of populism is one which breathes political life into a wide
range of institutions which serve to publicise and punish the practice of
‘political corruption’.  This is its great strength.  Its weakness, which turns
it into an ideology that is liable to distort the policy process, may be found
in its appeal to the ‘myth of Melanesian communism’ as the source of
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national (and local) salvation (see Box 5.2).  This is where we find the
element of truth in the efforts of the national elite to escape the divisive
nature of ‘village politics’ and cross back to the buildings of the state which
contain some definition of the ‘public interest’.  At the same time, while
many a foreign consultant has been mystified by the constitutional
requirement for public policy to be shaped in ‘Papua New Guinean ways’,
we still find donors crossing in the opposite direction, as they allow their
own interventions in the forest policy process to be guided by some latter-
day version of the populist myth.
Whatever their own position in the contest between technocrats and
landowners, neither the donors, nor the logging companies, nor any other
foreign stakeholders have any proven capacity to close the gap between
village politics and the public interest (see sections 6 to 10) .  If ‘traditional’
community values also lack this capacity, because they reflect and
encourage a very limited scale of social and economic cooperation, then the
best hope lies in those institutions of ‘civil society’ which may look like
‘grassroots initiatives’, but which actually depend on forms of institutional
innovation which derive their strength from both sides of the fence.
Chazan has observed that African NGOs which have recently been able to
translate their economic and cultural concerns into ‘a more effective policy
voice’ are those which
have a discrete constituency (regardless of size) [and] are endowed with well-
developed participatory structures, some resources and technical expertise,
and a younger, relatively well-educated leadership core.  All these associations
appear to be linked to the money economy, their members have undergone
some process of commercialisation, and they maintain communications that
span the urban-rural divide (Chazan 1994:275).
It is this kind of organisation which also seems most likely to lead to the
emergence of an effective ‘civil society’ in PNG.  But the measure of its
success will not lie in its ability to exert new kinds of pressure on the state,
but in its ability to form new constituencies out of the building blocks of
Melanesian society (see sections 11 to 13).
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Once upon a time there was a community whose members lived in complete harmony with each other
and with their natural environment, who jointly owned the land to which they had a mystical attach-
ment, who chose their leaders by consensus, settled arguments by compromise, and redistributed the
products of their labour to ensure that everyone enjoyed the same condition of subsistence affluence.
By general agreement, these are the ‘Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic
organisation’ whose preservation at the level of the village, and whose application to the business of
‘development’, became the fifth and last of the National Goals devised by the Constitutional Planning
Committee.
[The real story is] that Melanesian communities have always been on the verge of disintegration, even
in pre-colonial times, and it has always taken special qualities of leadership, in each succeeding
generation, to prevent them from splitting apart at the seams.  In pre-colonial times, such efforts were
directed to the pursuit of warfare, the practice of initiation, and the organisation of large-scale
gift-exchange, but the rules of these games were no more permanent than the social groups whose
continuity depended on the outcome.  Colonialism itself had a complex and contradictory impact on
this unstable state of affairs.
The new regime created opportunities for modernising leaders to establish their authority as middle
men between the colonising institutions and the rural population, even to enlarge the scope of their
authority beyond the confines of their own communities.  Yet their chances of success were limited,
just as the cost of failure was reduced, by the impossibility of wiping out the opposition.  Each new
addition to the institutions of ‘development’ has subtracted something from the solidarity of the com-
munity by dividing a diminishing amount of authority between a growing number of leadership roles.
[However,] the rate of social change has normally not been so great as to prevent each generation of
leaders, in each of these communities, from arriving at their own ‘Melanesian compromise’, making
their own peace with God and with each other, for as long as their leadership lasts. The majority
faction in each new gneration may choose to take a different ‘road’, and each new road may later
prove to be a dead end, but the process of social change has itself created new forms of ‘initiation’ (the
experience of Japanese occupation, indentured labour recruitment, high school education, etc.) which
mark the boundaries of each new generation and impose some sort of order on the transfer of
authority between them.
Source:  Filer 1990
Box 5.2  The myth of Melanesian communism
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In this section, we consider the way that stakeholders have been defined by
reference to their aims and objectives, or the way that these aims and objectives
have been attributed to a particular cast of characters in the policy drama, in a
series of documents which may be seen as some of the major stepping stones in
the history of national forest policy.  Having reviewed some of the documents
which either belong to the colonial legacy or which set the tone for its
repudiation at the time of Independence, we then go on to consider four main
bodies of documentation which heralded the more recent process of policy
reform:
• the findings of the Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forest
Industry (the Barnett Inquiry);
• the reform agenda embodied in the National Forest Policy and the Forestry
Act of 1991;
• the production, critique and refinement of the National Forestry and
Conservation Action Programme (NFCAP);
• the production, critique and refinement of PNG’s own Biodiversity
Conservation and Resource Management Programme (BCRMP).
There are two main lines of argument about the history of forest policy in the
decades preceding the initiation of a new round of policy reforms in 1989.  The
first maintains that a substantial reconstruction of the policy process occurred
after 1964, when the Australian colonial administration tried to bring about a
major expansion of the industrial forestry sector which had been recommended
6.1 The colonial legacy and its critique
Stakes and
stakeholders: who wants
what with forests?
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by the World Bank, and then again in the years between 1973 and
Independence in 1975, when the values of ‘conservation’, ‘self-reliance’ and
‘popular participation’ featured prominently in the charters of the newly
independent state of PNG.  The second line of argument maintains that the
rhetoric of independence had very little impact on the actual pattern of
relationships between the governing elite and the bulk of the ‘native’
population, since ‘black men in white masks’ simply reproduced the
attitudes and practices of their colonial predecessors.  From this point of
view, the newly independent state inherited a colonial legacy which
Brunton has recently described as a ‘culture of bureaucratic feudalism’:
The absence of true democracy and markets in colonial Papua New Guinea
meant that the legislative model for controlling forest resources was essentially
one of bureaucratic feudalism.  The colonial state by virtue of its status,
appropriated the trees from the landowners almost as of right, and in return
the landowners got next to nothing.  The landowners were induced by
promises of ‘development’ and royalties, or else they believed that the colonial
government had the power to take the trees and dictate the terms (Brunton
1996:112).
In the period before 1965, the commercial exploitation of PNG’s forest
resources was substantially constrained by the culture of colonial
paternalism.  This is exemplified in a paper produced in 1957 by two
officials of the colonial administration, J.S. Womersley (Head of the Botany
Division) and J.B. McAdam (Director of the DOF), on ‘The Forests and
Forest Conditions in the Territories of Papua and New Guinea’.
The ownership of the land and the forests thereon, generally speaking, is
regarded as resting with the Native inhabitants.  Normally, the land is owned
by a tribe or group with the individual holding usufructary rights by virtue of
his ownership in the tribe.
Natives are prohibited from selling, leasing or otherwise dealing with or
disposing of any land except to the Administrator who may purchase or lease
such land upon terms agreed upon between him and the owners.....
The Natives are a primitive people gradually emerging under contact with an
advanced European race, from a stone age culture.  It has been necessary to
win and keep the confidence of these people and in the matter of land dealings,
the Administration has been most circumspect.....
Except in the case of minor forest produce and limited quantities of logs, all
major transactions with the Native owners of forest produce are brought under
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the direct control of the Administration.  Also, if the Native owners are willing
to sell their land or the timber rights on it, the Administrator is empowered to
acquire it whereupon it becomes Administration land under the Forestry
Ordinance and timber authorities (permits and licences) may be granted to
enable the harvesting of forest produce (Womersley and McAdam 1957:34-35).
Although the Australian colonial administration had begun to survey the
timber potential of Papua and New Guinea in the early years of the
century21, a Forest Service was not established until 1938.  By that time,
Europeans had established a number of sawmilling operations to service
the needs of the domestic market, most of them on land which had already
been alienated from customary tenure, and the operators of coastal copra
plantations had begun to export some logs and flitches (especially walnut)
to the American veneer market in order to make up for the severe
depression in copra prices (ibid:36).  Following the defeat of Japanese
occupation forces in 1944, there was a substantial expansion of sawmilling
operations, many of them run by the Administration, to meet the demands
of post-war reconstruction.  In 1953, when the Territories were already self-
sufficient in sawn timber, the establishment of the Bulolo plywood mill –
‘probably the most modern plymill in the Southern Hemisphere’ – helped
to establish timber (in both processed and unprocessed forms) as the second
most important export commodity after copra (ibid:37)22.  By 1957, when
Womersley and McAdam wrote their paper, the Administration had
purchased timber rights over 71,234 acres of ‘native land’ in Papua, and
another 255,078 acres in New Guinea (ibid:35).  At the same time, a
commitment to ‘sustained yield’ had already been established as a feature
of colonial development policy, and forest plantations had been established
near Port Moresby and Rabaul, as well as in the Bulolo Valley, to maintain
the supply of raw material for the processing industry (ibid:40-41).
Despite the optimistic tone adopted by Womersley and McAdam in 1957,
development of the local timber industry proceeded at a pace which even
disappointed the expectations of the Australian Minister for Territories,
Paul Hasluck, who believed that ‘exploitation of national resources should
take place in conditions that safeguarded the future of the people and
should not have priority over but go hand in hand with their social
advancement’ (cited in Lamb 1990:27).  Between 1952 and 1963, the total log
harvest rose from about 46,000 cubic metres (of which less than 10 per cent
was exported) to about 183,000 cubic metres (of which 25 per cent was
21
 A survey of Papua’s timber potential was carried out in 1908, and both territories were surveyed again in 1934 (Womersley
and McAdam 1957:29).
22
 This investment in plywood production was made by the mining company which had been dredging gold from the Bulolo River
for many years (see Healy 1967).
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exported) (White 1975:37).  By 1963, the Administration had acquired
548,000 hectares of land for forestry purposes, of which 73 per cent had
been obtained through temporary Timber Rights Purchase agreements with
native owners under the Forestry Ordinance, but this fell a long way short of
the target which Hasluck had set in 1957, when he anticipated the
acquisition of 1.6 million hectares by 1967 (Lamb 1990:28).  Only two of the
eighty-eight timber permits which had been issued by 1963 covered areas of
more than 20,000 hectares, and only five of the eighty-two sawmills then in
operation had a daily production capacity in excess of 35 cubic metres
(ibid:28-29).
In 1964, the World Bank recommended ‘an aggressive policy of commercial
development’ based on its estimate that the natural forest alone could
sustain an annual harvest of 1.2 million cubic metres.  However, the DOF
found it difficult to implement this policy because the diversity of species
and the difficulty of the terrain deterred potential investors, the purchase
and allocation of timber rights over large areas of customary land was
constrained by the policy of retaining customary tenure, and the Indonesian
government was simultaneously offering much larger and more lucrative
timber concessions with far fewer restrictions on their exploitation (Lamb
1990:29-34).  As a result, the Department began to place more emphasis on
the development of plantation forests on land which had already been
alienated, and then to promote the clear-felling of natural forest for
pulpwood or woodchip production as an alternative to selective logging
(ibid:35-38).  The culmination of this latter effort was an agreement between
the Administration and the Honshu Paper company of Japan to establish a
woodchipping project based on the resources of the Gogol Valley in
Madang Province.  The Gogol project then became the focus of much, if not
most, of the public discussion of forest policy in the years preceding and
following the achievement of Independence in 1975.
On the eve of Independence, in April and May 1975, there were substantial
discussions of forest policy at two separate conferences held at the
University of PNG – a UNESCO-sponsored symposium on the ‘Ecological
Effects of Increasing Human Activities on Tropical and Sub-Tropical Forest
Ecosystems’ (see McAlpine 1975), which was primarily concerned with the
potential impact of the Gogol woodchip project, and the Ninth Waigani
Seminar on ‘The Melanesian Environment’ (see Winslow 1977), which could
be seen as a series of reflections on the much-quoted Fourth Goal of the
National Constitution – ‘for Papua New Guinea’s natural resources and
environment to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all,
and to be replenished for the benefit of future generations’.
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K.J. White, then Assistant Director of the DOF, presented papers at both
meetings in which he summarised that part of the colonial legacy for which
his own department was responsible.  He observed that the Administration
had eventually managed to secure timber rights over more than one million
hectares of customary land in various parts of the country, and that a
number of major concessions had either been allocated to developers
(Gogol, Open Bay, Kaut) or were subject to active negotiation (Vanimo,
Sagarai-Gadaisu, Kumusi, Kapiura, Kapuluk).  He also presented, but
failed to explain, the Department’s preference for downstream processing
over raw log exports:
While the desire of importers for log exports continues, log exports are
generally being phased out and timber in some converted form will be
exported.  The export market will require large volumes of standard qualities,
and this tends to favour the development of large-scale industries.  Market
opportunities will, however, continue for smaller operations (White 1977:402).
Despite this statement of preference, it was evident from his list of projects
under negotiation that the DOF had not completely abandoned its efforts to
promote the large-scale selective logging of natural forests, and one of his
appendices contained a set of ‘Resource Management Guidelines’ which
seems to assume that this would be the standard form of ‘forest
management’ in PNG.
Two other presentations at the Ninth Waigani Seminar were highly critical
of the Department’s policies and practices.  A pair of Australian
environmentalists, R. and V. Routley, complained about the destructive
impact of conventional Australian forestry throughout Melanesia,
attributing this impact
to the overwhelming commitment on the part of forest services to the interests
of big wood based industry, which interests dictate the large-scale mass
production forestry, and the heavy handed, capital intensive, factory style
operations that are so destructive of forest values (Routley and Routley
1977:376).
In the case of PNG, they restated the scepticism which the DOF’s Assistant
had previously expressed over the economic benefits of large-scale log
export operations:
Log export operations, because of the nature of Papua New Guinea forests,
yield minimum returns to the country and move through the country at a
great rate, leaving behind a degraded forest and a multitude of roads and
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tracks to be quickly overgrown (McIntosh 1971:17, cited in Routley and Routley
1977:380).
But they failed to see how this argument could justify the Department’s
preference for the Gogol woodchip project, given that this entailed the clear-
felling of huge areas with minimal provision for reforestation or conversion
to more profitable uses, and that its benefits would accrue to a Japanese pulp
and paper industry which had the capacity to maintain artificially low prices
for the exported product.
From the point of view of the local people who sell the timber rights, it may be
doubted that the paltry initial per capita sale price and the royalty price of
apparently less that $5 per head each year during the period of liquidation of the
forest, provide adequate compensation for the hunting, fishing and other forest
food and produce foregone, let alone compensation to them and their descendants
for the long-term degradation and possible irreversible destruction of the forest
and other adverse effects on their lives.....
There is clearly a trade-off between commercial benefits and environmental costs
to the Papua New Guinea population.  The Madang [Gogol] project, for example,
will provide revenue for the Government – the main reason for its existence –
only if no attempt is made to reforest even part of the area or to impose adequate
environmental standards (Routley and Routley 1977:388-9).
Having counterposed the positive values of ‘primitive affluence’ to the
negative image of ‘underdevelopment’ peddled by the orthodoxies of the
World Bank and the forest industry, they went on to propose a more
sustainable form of forest management for PNG:
The switch to small-scale, low impact, ‘village forestry’, would have to be
accompanied by appropriate reorientation of forestry education, training and
research.  For example, it would combine well with the training of ‘village
foresters’, a training perhaps along Chinese lines, less oriented to high energy
bulldozer technology and more oriented to the continuing management and
small-scale utilisation, in everybody’s interest, of the existing forest resource
(ibid:395).
And if the government were unable or unwilling to make this switch of
emphasis, then salvation might still be found in the failure or refusal of the
colonial administration to achieve a substantial and lasting alienation of
forest resources from customary tenure:
There is some prospect that the distinctive Melanesian pattern of land
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tenure, so far from being a major drawback, will serve in Papua New Guinea
... to block undesirable development and be in the interests of nature
conservation (ibid:379).
At the same conference, John Waiko presented an account of his own
community’s reaction to a proposed logging project, which not only
exemplifies the anti-imperialist rhetoric that was then quite typical of
PNG’s first generation of university graduates, but which also illustrates
and comments on the internal divisions of landowning communities
confronted with the prospect of ‘development’.  According to Waiko, the
logging proposal first arose as a result of an approach made in June 1973 by
Julius Chan, then Finance Minister in the first Somare government, to a
group of Chinese businessmen based in Hong Kong, but the DOF favoured
an alternative development proposal put forward by an American-
Australian company, Parsons and Whitmore.  He went on to describe the
conflict which developed between the community’s own political
representatives, who were apparently happy to endorse both proposals on
behalf of their constituents, and a number of students and other local
leaders, including himself, who argued that their people had not been
properly consulted or informed about the impact of either proposal.
Waiko argued that his community’s eventual rejection of the logging
company’s proposals showed that ‘Bindandere society has never been
shattered by colonial imperialism’ (Waiko: 1977:421), yet he acknowledged
that it had the effect of exaggerating traditional conflicts over clan
boundaries, dividing the older generation into those who wanted to get
some money before they died and those who saw themselves as custodians
of custom, and dividing the younger generation into those who were
attracted by the prospect of employment and those who feared the
disintegration of their own society (ibid:422).
.......The people are confused and do not grasp the goals of the government.
This situation produces the following effects.  Firstly, the bulk of the funds for
the Government comes from non-subsistence sources and the Government
tends to depend more on outside revenues, extending this dependence to the
people in relying on foreign corporations.  Secondly, the resources of the people
are sapped by the Government for foreign capitalists, and this makes the
people more dependent on outside assistance and more vulnerable to
exploitation by the international capitalist system.  Thirdly, the situation
creates social divisions in which the elite establish ties with multi-national
corporations to exploit the natural resources while the ‘half educated’ and
‘drop outs’ aspire to attain the standards of the elite by migrating to urban
areas and leaving the great mass of the population in the villages (ibid:424).
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He then goes on to describe the ‘cultural and linguistic gap’ between
villagers and leaders as one in which
those who are chosen to bridge the gap (such as field officers, councillors, etc.)
often turn out to be representatives of ‘progress’ and ‘development’.  The
result is that, whereas some people at the top may be under the illusion that
the reports made available to them are the results of dialogue between the
government representatives and the people, they are in fact hearing only the
government voice and its own echo.  The people are left in the worst situation:
either totally uninformed, or (at best) informed but unheard (ibid:426).
In later years, John Waiko became the first Papua New Guinean to be
appointed to a chair (in history) at the University of PNG.  In 1992, he was
elected to Parliament as the MP for Sohe, and eventually joined the Chan-
Haiveta coalition government as Minister for Education.  By this time, his
opposition to logging and imperialism had both been diluted in ways
which are fairly typical of the radical nationalist elite to which he formerly
belonged.  Yet his portrait of community politics has been equally typical of
the way in which the social impact of large-scale resource development is
construed by those who claim to oppose it.
From this brief account of the forest policy process at the time of
Independence, it should be clear that the costs and benefits of different
forms of resource exploitation were being couched in terms which are still
pertinent to the current situation.  However, there was very little public
debate on matters of forest policy over the course of the next decade, except
for the occasional note of complaint about the Gogol woodchip project
(De’Ath 1979, 1980), despite the threefold increase in raw log export
volumes over this period.  It was only in 1986 that the local newspapers,
especially the Times of Papua New Guinea, began to publish a series of
sensational articles pointing to some of the sinister connections which
logging companies had established with national and provincial politicians.
In April 1987 the Prime Minister, Paias Wingti, appointed an Australian
member of the PNG judiciary, Thomas (‘Tos’) Barnett, to conduct a
Commission of Inquiry into allegations of impropriety against the
executives of the Forest Industries Council and to assess the respective roles
of the Council, the Minister and the DOF in the marketing of timber.
Barnett could readily be identified as a member of the radical expatriate
6.2   The Barnett Inquiry into the forest industry
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intelligentsia which had previously played a major role in formulating
PNG’s constitutional agenda, so his appointment might seem, in retrospect,
to signal the government’s determination to adopt a radical solution to a
serious problem of governance.  On the other hand, we need to recall that
the appointment was made only two months before a national election, at
that point in the national political cycle when the coherence of national
government policy is lost in the urgency of parochial political contests, and
it is hardly possible to predict the shape of the next ruling coalition.
In the event, Wingti retained both his own seat and his position as Prime
Minister in a ruling coalition which still contained many of his most
prominent parliamentary allies.  In this context, Barnett was able to expand
his own terms of reference to include a variety of additional factors
responsible for what he later described (1992:97) as the ‘heavy odour of
corruption, fraud and scandal arising from the timber industry’.  As a
result, his inquiry lasted for more than two years and produced no less than
twenty volumes of findings in seven interim reports and one final report.
The final report was completed in July 1989, and duly presented to another
Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, whose own deputy and coalition partner,
Ted Diro, was the most prominent of the politicians and public servants
who now stood accused of receiving ‘improper benefits’ from logging
companies.  By this stage, Barnett felt that his life was in danger, and he left
PNG as soon as his labours were completed.
The economic dimensions of the forestry sector in 1988, during the main
period of Barnett’s investigations, were itemised by the World Bank in 1989:
• PNG’s total log harvest was estimated to be 2 million cubic metres, of
which 1.34 million cubic metres (67 per cent) was exported.
• Forest products as a whole were valued at US$159.2 million, which
represented 4.6 per cent of GDP.
• PNG’s total forestry exports were valued at US$111.3 million, which
represented 8.5 per cent of total export values.
• Raw log exports were valued at US$99.3 million, and were mostly
destined for Japan (63.6 per cent) or Korea (31.9 per cent).
• Government collected approximately K25 million in tax revenues from
the forestry sector, representing 4.5 per cent of all tax revenues23, while
the DOF spent roughly K5 million on its own operations.
• Approximately 5,000 people were employed in the forestry sector, of
whom 445 were employed as public servants in the administration of the
industry, about 2,200 in sawmilling, and most of the rest in logging.
23
 The government also received indirect budgetary support of between K4 and K8 million from the provision of social infrastruc-
ture by permit holders (estimated at K3-6 per cubic metre of log exports)
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It thus appeared that commercial development of the natural forest had
now surpassed the targets set by the World Bank back in 1964, yet Barnett
found that this was not a matter for congratulation or applause.
Although the Namaliu government failed to act on Barnett’s
recommendation that his final report should be freely distributed to
‘universities, public libraries and appropriate institutions such as
provincial governments, high schools and government departments’
(Barnett 1989:107), it would be wrong to assume that this government was
less responsive to his findings than its predecessor might have been.  While
it is true that Paias Wingti, being a highlander whose own interests were
primarily tied to the coffee business, was unlikely to suffer any personal
damage from revelations of corruption in the timber industry, it is equally
true that he presided, like all PNG prime ministers, over a loose coalition of
factional leaders which was almost bound to include some individuals who
would be damaged by such revelations.  Indeed, Barnett’s findings against
Ted Diro related to the latter’s occupation of the Forests Ministry in Wingti’s
coalition government from 1985 to 1987.  Diro did not desert this coalition
until July 1988, when his ‘party’ crossed the floor to join the Opposition in a
successful vote of no confidence.  The position of Deputy Prime Minister,
which Diro secured as a reward for his shift of allegiance, did not grant him
the power to either halt the progress of the Barnett Inquiry or prevent the
publication of its more sensational findings in the national newspapers.  In
fact, the Namaliu government began to implement many of Barnett’s
recommendations before these were even made public, as part of a larger
effort to strengthen or defend the capacity of the state to regulate the
development of PNG’s natural resources.  Rabbie Namaliu was still Prime
Minister in September 1991, when a Leadership Tribunal under the
chairmanship of Justice Graham Ellis found Diro guilty of eighty charges of
misconduct in office, thus prompting his resignation from Parliament.
Box 6.1  Justice Barnett’s conclusions
The situation which is described in these reports is that of a forestry industry out of control.  The reasons for this
are that the State, which is the constitutionally appointed guardian of the forests, has failed to assert the guiding
principles under which this trust is to be administered.  It has failed to establish adequate control measures to
contain the foreign companies which are exploiting the forests and it has failed to effectively administer such
controls as exist.
As a result of these failures on behalf of government foreign investors have been able to completely dominate
the timber industry.  By using a combination of bribery, ‘gifts’ and other benefits and by making contributions to
politicians and political parties the timber companies have made ‘partners’ of Papua New Guinea leaders at
national, provincial and local level.
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Once in control of a timber area the overriding preoccupation has been to maximise the volume of logs exported
with little or no regard to the damage being caused to the forests and the environment in the process.
By taking advantage of the weakness in the control systems the logs are being marketed fraudulently so that an
amount ranging between five and ten US$ a cubic metre is being transferred offshore causing very substantial
loss to the Papua New Guinea government and to the resource owners.
 By encouraging an ever increasing volume of log exports the government has allowed the previously existing
local processing industry to be all but destroyed.  Such processing as is still occurring is inefficient and incred-
ibly wasteful.  The product produced is consequently second rate and uncompetitive.
Our knowledge of the resource base is shamefully lacking and is insufficient to enable calculations of sustain-
able yield forest management to be made with any degree of certainty.  It is however clear that the existing level
of harvesting already exceeds the safe level of cutting and that the additional allocations already planned will
place the future timber industry in real jeopardy.
The failure to impose appropriate conditions on timber operations and to enforce those which exist has seri-
ously disadvantaged landowners who almost invariably gain unjustly low benefits from the exploitation of their
resource.
The message which cries out through these reports is ‘Slow Down!’  I have recommended that sustainable yield
management principles be forced into existing agreements and that no further allocation be made until the
resource has been accurately assessed and sustainable yield management plans have been drawn up.
For the sake of future generations the mad rush to export logs must be curbed and integrated onshore process-
ing, plantation forestry and proper care and enrichment of natural forests must become our primary focus.
Forestry policy, legislation and administration must be geared to these ends.  Foreign investment must be
brought under control and ways must be found to bring the illegal offshore funds, from which the bribes and
‘benefits’ are paid, on shore for the benefit of the country and the resource owners.
There are sufficient examples of more responsible timber operations in Papua New Guinea to show that it is
possible to exploit the natural forest in perpetuity following sustainable yield management principles.  To do this
will require the introduction of integrated onshore processing complexes where waste is reduced to a minimum
and value is added onshore.  Appropriate silvicultural techniques can be applied to help the natural forests to
regenerate and this process should be supplemented by large scale plantation forestry.  Large reputable timber
companies can be attracted to this concept if security of title can be arranged.  Also, in view of the increased
global concern over the loss of tropical forests, donor nations and soft loans can be attracted to this concept.
With the help of agencies like the World Bank Papua New Guinea could set in place a system which could be a
model of enlightened self perpetuating forestry bringing benefits for all concerned.
Source: Barnett 1989: 375-377
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Perhaps the most significant feature of Barnett’s findings was the assumption
that national technocrats and landowners could and should make common
cause against the corruption of their state and society by an unholy alliance of
foreign loggers, domestic politicians, and wayward public servants.  At the
same time, he was prepared to recognise that the restoration of ‘national
control’ over the foreign sources of corruption was a task which would be
easier to complete, and perhaps only feasible, with the support of ‘donor
nations’, multilateral aid agencies like the World Bank, and some ‘reputable’
or ‘responsible’ operators in the forest industry.  But if he could thus allude to
the distinction between good and bad foreigners, and between good and bad
loggers, his own position precluded him from saying very much about the
difference, or the relative balance of power, between good and bad members
of the national elite.  And although he made some reference to ‘future
generations’ as a distinctive group of stakeholders in the forest policy process,
thus reminding his audience of the Fourth National Goal, he had nothing to
say about the difference between the attitudes or behaviour of older and
younger members of the national community.
Barnett’s Commission of Inquiry was bound to produce recommendations for
action to be taken by the State of PNG, ‘which is the constitutionally
appointed guardian of the forests’, rather than by any of the other
stakeholders involved in the forest policy process, and was therefore bound to
carry the implication that PNG’s political and bureaucratic elite possessed the
capacity or willingness to act on such recommendations.  On the other hand,
his own willingness to address these recommendations to a foreign audience
could easily be taken as evidence of his lack of faith in their readiness to do so.
For example, in March 1991, almost two years after his departure from PNG,
Barnett was invited to discuss his findings with US Senator Albert Gore and
Congressman John Porter, both members of an organisation called the Global
Legislators Organised for a Balanced Environment, and both politicians used
his recommendations as the basis for resolutions proposed to their respective
chambers, while Gore announced that similar resolutions would be presented
to the Japanese and European parliaments.
Senator Gore was quoted as saying that the forests of PNG were ‘being
destroyed so quickly that they will be completely gone in less than 10 years’,
that the logging companies were ‘cheating the indigenous peoples, robbing
them of their homes, their culture, and the basic sustenance of their lives’
(PNG’s national daily newspaper, the Post-Courier, 3 April 1991).  Apart from
being truly hyperbolic, this did not go down too well with PNG’s Foreign
Minister, Sir Michael Somare, who replied that the Senator and the
Congressman might be in contempt of court, because ‘our legal system is not
made for other people to come and push us around’.
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Box 6.2  Barnett’s major recommendations
As well as recommending a long list of names for prosecution for various criminal and leadership
offences, and a series of measures to clamp down on political corruption, the Commission recom-
mended:
• the formulation of a national forestry policy;
• the enactment of revised forestry legislation;
• the establishment of a single forestry service under national control;
• full involvement of provincial government in provincial and national forestry planning;
• the inclusion of detailed requirements for sustained-yield forestry and environmental protection in
every permit over land intended for future forestry use;
• provincial governments to have power to veto projects in their own province;
• outside recruitment of experts to lead planning initiatives, resource surveys, monitoring of opera-
tions, marketing control and effective on-the-job training for local officers;
• formal consultation arrangements between national, regional and provincial bodies to prepare and
update national and provincial plans;
• the full involvement of landowners and provincial governments prior to allocation of permits in dis-
cussions of desired future land use and the conditions to be imposed on the developer by the timber
permit, to help ensure that where land is to be used in the future for forestry, details of sustainable-
yield harvesting and post-logging care appropriate for the particular area should be agreed and
specified before logging commences;
• the National Forest Development Programme to be revised drastically downwards;
• a review of all existing permits to introduce appropriate management conditions, revise harvesting
rates, and reform logging practices;
• radical changes to reduce transfer pricing, based on the Commission’s very detailed investigations
into this problem;
• a major increase in benefits for landowners and more effort to ensure that permits and licences
protect their interests; the enforcement of conditions of permits which are designed to promote the
interests of the local community.
Source: Barnett 1992: 104-107
Soon after the Namaliu government came to power in July 1988, the new
Forests Minister, Karl Stack, established a Consultative Steering Committee
under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Forests, Michael Komtagarea,
to produce a new National Forest Policy and drafting instructions for a new
Forestry Act.  The new government also sought international assistance
under the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), thus prompting the World
Bank to organise an ‘inter-agency review mission’ which visited PNG in
6.3 The twin pillars of the new forestry regime
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April and May 1989, while Barnett was still preparing his final report.  Later
that year, the Prime Minister seems to have grown impatient with the
progress of the Consultative Steering Committee, and appointed a Task Force
of his own to report on the implementation of recommendations made by the
Barnett Inquiry and the TFAP review mission.  While Barnett and the Bank
both exercised a good deal of influence over the construction of the new
forestry regime, this was carefully concealed behind an image (or facade) of
national sovereignty.  The drafting of the new Forest Policy and Forestry Act
can therefore be considered as an initiative of the national government which
was taken alongside, and even in advance of, the orchestration of donor
support for what later became the National Forestry and Conservation
Action Programme.
A draft of the new Forest Policy was first approved by Cabinet in April 1990,
tabled in Parliament as a white paper in July, and then circulated for further
discussion in November of that year, though it was not officially published
until September 1991.  Two draft forestry bills were produced in 1990, and a
third was finalised in May 1991 before being passed by Parliament (with
some ‘last-minute amendments’) in July of that year, but the new Forestry Act
was not gazetted until June 1992, in the last days of the Namaliu government.
The ‘Introduction’ to the new National Forest Policy states that forest policy
formulation is guided by the Fourth Goal of the National Constitution, which
has previously been described as PNG’s own charter for sustainable
development.  The second page of the document presents two main policy
objectives:
• ‘management and protection of the nation’s forest resources as a
renewable natural asset’; and
• ‘utilisation of the nation’s forest resources to achieve economic growth,
employment creation, greater Papua New Guinean participation in
industry and increased viable onshore processing’.
The third page presents three secondary or ‘supportive’ policy objectives:
• ‘the collection of information and advancement of knowledge relating to
the utilisation and maintenance of Papua New Guinea’s forest resources
through forest research’;
• ‘increased acquisition and dissemination of skills, knowledge and
information in forestry through education and training’; and
• ‘effective strategies, including administrative and legal machinery, to
manage the forest resource, and incorporating national, provincial and
local interests’.
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The rest of the document is accordingly divided into five parts - ‘Forest
Management’, ‘Forest Industry’, ‘Forest Research’, ‘Forestry Training and
Education’, and ‘Forestry Organisation and Administration’ - each of which
is devoted to a detailed account of the specific policies and strategies to be
adopted in the pursuit of these five objectives.  The final part of the
document - ‘Instruments for Implementation’ - contains some brief
observations on the need for relevant legislation at both national and
provincial levels and the need for consistency with other government
policies in the renewable resources sector.
The new Forestry Act replaced three previous pieces of legislation - the
Forestry (Private Dealings) Act of 1971, the Forestry Act of 1973, and the Forest
Industries Council Act of 1979.  The new Act had ten parts and 142 separate
sections, many of which clearly corresponded with specific policies or
strategies listed in the National Forest Policy:
• Part II of the Act (‘Papua New Guinea Forest Authority’) was largely
concerned with matters covered under Part VI of the Policy (‘Forestry
Organisation and Administration’);
• Part III of the Act (‘Forest Management and Development’) was largely
concerned with matters covered under Part II of the Policy (‘Forest
Management’); and
• Parts IV, V and VI of the Act (‘Registration of Forest Industry Participants
and Consultants’, ‘Marketing’, and ‘Forest Finance’) were largely
concerned with matters covered under Part III of the Policy (‘Forest
Industry’).
The Act established a ‘Papua New Guinea Forest Authority’, now
commonly known as the National Forest Authority (NFA),  to pursue six
objectives which closely resemble the five listed in the National Forest
Policy24.  The NFA was to take over the functions previously exercised by
both the DOF and the Forest Industries Council in light of the innovations
made by the new Forest Policy and the other provisions of the new Forestry
Act.  Its main functions would therefore be to:
• advise the Minister on matters of policy and legislation;
• prepare and review the National Forest Plan;
• direct and supervise the National Forest Service;
• negotiate Forest Management Agreements with timber operators;
24
 The increase in the total number of objectives was the result of separating the pursuit of ‘national participation’ in forest
management from both the pursuit of ‘development’ and the pursuit of ‘conservation’ for their own sake.
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• control and regulate the export of forest products; and
• oversee the administration and enforcement of the Act.
According to the Policy (PNGMOF 1991:52), the NFA was to be established
‘as a statutory corporation with regulatory and administrative
responsibility for management of the forestry sub-sector throughout the
country’, and would have two institutional components:
• a National Forest Board operating through ‘a system of specialist
advisory committees and Provincial Forest Management Committees’;
and
• a National Forest Service which would ‘absorb all the functions of both
the current National Department of Forests and the Provincial Forest
Divisions’ (ibid:55).
In this way, forestry would remain a concurrent function of national and
provincial governments, there would be greater opportunities for
‘consultation and cooperation’ between government and other
stakeholders, fewer opportunities for ‘malfeasance inherent in the exercise
of unfettered powers by a single person or group’ (ibid:49), and a larger
measure of corporate integrity and autonomy in the business of forest
management.
It should be noted here that composition of the National Forest Board and
the Provincial Forest Management Committees was one of the main bones
of contention in the drafting of the Act.  Evidence of this remains in the
published version of the Policy, where the membership specified in the
second draft of the Bill is still shown in the main body of the text (PNGMOF
1991:54,57), but the relevant sections of the Act itself have been added as
endnotes (ibid:62-63).  These show that:
• the Department of Finance and Planning secured a place on the National
Forest Board at the expense of the Department of Agriculture and
Livestock;
• the National Alliance of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO)
gained official recognition as the peak body representing what had
previously been described as ‘non-government organisations concerned
with environmental, social and developmental issues’; and
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25
  The composition of the Board was changed when the Act was amended in April 1993 (see Section 3.3.1 below)
Box 6.3  The National Forest Board and Provincial Forest Management
Committees
Section 10 of the new Forestry Act prescribed the membership of the National Forest Board as follows:
• the Director-General of the Forest Authority (as head of the National Forest Service);
• the heads of the three national government departments responsible for ‘finance and planning
matters’, ‘environmental protection matters’, and ‘trade and industrial development matters’, or their
nominees;
• a member ‘with appropriate experience in commerce and finance, preferably with respect to
forestry, nominated by the Minister’;
• the President of the Forest Industries Association, or his nominee;
• a member appointed by the Minister from a list submitted by the National Alliance of Non-
Government Organisations; and
• four provincial government representatives appointed by the Minister from lists submitted by each of
the four regional Premiers’ Councils.
The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Board were to be appointed by Cabinet from amongst
these eleven members
25
.
The Board was to establish a Provincial Forest Management Committee for each of the country’s nine-
teen provinces.  Section 22 prescribed the membership of these committees as follows:
• ‘a senior officer in the administration of the province, nominated by the provincial government, who
shall be the Chairman’;
• ‘an officer of the National Forest Service, nominated by the Director-General’;
• ‘one person to represent the local or community governments situated within those areas of the
province which contain forest resources, who shall be the president of such a local or community
government nominated by the provincial executive’;
• ‘two persons to represent land-owning groups in the province nominated by the Provincial Forest
Management Committee’; and
• ‘one person to represent non-governmental organisations concerned with environmental, social or
developmental issues nominated by the National Alliance of Non-Governmental Organisations’.
• Section 28 allowed that the owners of a timber resource under discussion by the Committee were
entitled to representation by two of their number during the course of the discussion, but these
representatives were not entitled to vote.  Section 29 required all members to disclose any personal
interest in matters under consideration by the Committee and exclude themselves from deliberations
and decisions on those matters.
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• the Provincial Forest Management Committees were no longer to include
‘two Members of Parliament of the Province, one the Regional member,
the other an Open Member of the area’.
This last change may have owed something to Barnett’s comments on the
first draft of the Bill, where he noted the risk that national MPs might
‘dominate the decision making at provincial level’ (Barnett 1992:112).  But
all three changes owed a great deal to the influence of the World Bank,
whose representatives presented the PNG government with their own
comments on the second draft of the Bill in March 1991.
In this context, the Bank has consistently sought to strengthen the hands of
senior public servants against the risk of ‘political interference’, whether at
the national or the provincial level, and these efforts have naturally
received a lot of support from the public servants themselves, even though
some of them have thus been placed in the awkward position of serving
two masters at once.  At the same time, the Bank supported the creation of
NANGO in 1990 because it wanted this organisation to be the primary
instrument of NGO representation in reform of the forestry regime, and
most other stakeholders soon concluded (with good reason) that this was
its primary function.  Finally, the Bank wanted the Department of Finance
and Planning to be represented on the National Forest Board because that
was the government department which shared the Bank’s own
responsibility for coordinating the delivery of foreign aid to PNG’s version
of the TFAP.
When Judge Barnett suggested that the PNG government could do with the
help of agencies like the World Bank, he simply acknowledged the
appearance of the Bank as a major stakeholder in the national forest policy
process during the course of 1989.  The other global stakeholders involved
in the TFAP Review mission organised by the Bank were: the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the UN Food and Agriculture
Organisation (UNFAO), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (now the World
Conservation Union - IUCN), the International Institute for Environment
and Development (IIED), the Australian International Development
Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), the New Zealand Ministry of External
6.4 The National Forestry and
Conservation ActionProgramme
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Relations and Trade (NZMERT), and the German Federal Republic’s
Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ).  Each of these organisations either
supplied or paid for the services of one of the nine members of the review
team.
The report of this team of experts, originally drafted in October 1989, was
divided into six main sections.  These considered:
• the general economic significance of forestry in PNG;
• the problem of defining and achieving ‘sustainable forest management’;
• the way to maximise national income from the forestry sector;
• the construction of a ‘conservation and land use strategy’;
• the strengthening of relevant government institutions; and
• the outline of an ‘action programme’ designed to attract support from
the ‘donor community’.
The team repaid Barnett’s compliments by endorsing most of his
recommendations and seeking to convert these into a form which would
make them eligible for inclusion in the proposed Action Programme.  The
TFAP Review identified a similar mixture of stakeholder interests within
the forestry sector, except that it betrayed a measure of scepticism about
Barnett’s assumption of a natural alliance between technocrats and
landowners.  This was evident, for example, in the remark that existing
legislation and resources had been insufficient to cope with ‘the pressure
from landowners and development companies’ (World Bank 1989:61), thus
placing ‘landowners’ in the position which Barnett had reserved for certain
‘politicians’.
The inclusion of a ‘conservation and land use strategy’ amongst the
products of the TFAP Review reflected an international reorientation of
TFAP objectives to address the disillusionment of many environmentalists
(see Mayers and Peutalo 1995), and the World Bank itself seems to have
regarded this particular exercise as a test case of its own sincerity in making
this adjustment.  On the other hand, the brevity of the chapter devoted to
this topic in the official report, combined with the appearance of a separate
report on ‘land use issues’ by the team’s ‘community forestry expert’,
suggests that there may have been some difference of opinion on the
manner and extent of the change required in the Melanesian context.
Considering the implications of property rights for the policy process, this
second report came to the conclusion that local custom, rather than the
national economy, would have to be the starting point for the development
of what the author called a ‘socially sensitive forest industry’ (Sargent
1989:7).
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The World Bank’s own report clearly recognised the peculiar nature of the
dilemma posed by customary ownership of the national forest resource:
This can expose resources to serious over exploitation, because forests can be
committed to logging without any technical or environmental supervision of what
is done..... [but] it offers the opportunity for traditional landholders to resist
pressures for logging in favour of retaining the resource for future generations,
where state forestry bureaucrats might encounter problems in resisting powerful
political pressures for exploitation (1989:18).
On the other hand, the wider problems of conservation, land use, and
customary land tenure were not seen to be matters of such urgency that they
would need to be addressed by the ‘interim mechanism’ which the Bank
proposed for the management of the Action Programme, since this mechanism
was to be located entirely within the Forests Ministry, comprising a Steering
Committee reporting directly to the Minister and a smaller Planning Group
comprised of senior departmental officials (ibid:viii).
Radical commentators were quick to complain about the perceived
shortcomings of the review process and its outcome.  Critiques of the report
were produced by Judge Brian Brunton, then Chairman of the PNG Law
Reform Commission, and by a collection of NGOs under the leadership of the
New Guinea Island Campaign Group and the Rainforest Information Centre,
both based in New South Wales.  Unimpressed by the Bank’s new green
clothes, they viewed the package of proposed reforms as a castle built on the
sand of several false assumptions, especially:
• that the Bank’s conception of economic growth was consistent with the goal
of national participation in the development process, rather than being an
instrument of national subordination to the capitalist world system;
• that the Bank’s conception of economic growth was also consistent with the
goal of nature conservation, rather than providing further opportunities and
incentives for environmental degradation;
• that national politicians and businessmen would voluntarily renounce the
ill-gotten gains exposed by the Barnett Inquiry, or be obliged to do so by the
formulation of new laws, policies, regulations or procedures;
• that national public servants could acquire the capacity to regulate
commercial timber harvesting by foreign companies in a manner which
would be consistent with any meaningful conservation values;
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• that PNG landowners could be forced or persuaded to submit to central
government decisions concerning the use of their own land.
Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, only one local NGO (Melanesian
Solidarity) actually refused to participate in the next stage of the reform
process orchestrated by the Bank.
The Round Table meeting convened in April 1990 might be compared to an
initiation ceremony in which the participating stakeholders were invited to
assume and endorse their respective roles and responsibilities in the
implementation of PNG’s Forestry Action Plan.  The Round Table was in fact
a square table, located in the conference room of Port Moresby’s Islander
Hotel.  The four sides were occupied by four different categories of
participants.  Once the Prime Minister had concluded his opening address,
the top end was reserved for the Ministers and Secretaries of the government
departments which had some part to play in the implementation of the Plan.
To their right sat the constantly shifting, sometimes serried, ranks of more
junior government officials, amongst whom the two line departments were
noticeably outnumbered by the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD) and the
Department of Finance and Planning (DFP) .  Facing them, on the other side
of the table, sat the unshifting, unserried ranks of the aid donors, multilateral
and bilateral, apparently lined up behind the representatives of the World
Bank and the UNDP.  The bottom end of the table was left to the NGOs,
national and international, with an occasional provincial public servant and a
delegation from the University of PNG.
By and large, the conference adhered to the ritual formalities prescribed by its
agenda: the Government welcomed the Plan, the NGOs expressed their
doubts about it, the donors indicated their interest in funding different parts
of it, and the Minister for Forests wrapped up the proceedings with a rousing
speech.  Nevertheless, there were three points at which some of the
participants managed to challenge the expectations of  their audience:
• The Prime Minister and the Forests Minister both told the donors that they
would probably have to pay cash compensation to resource owners before
the latter would be willing to sacrifice their expectations of ‘development’
for the sake of nature conservation, but the donors were clearly not
prepared to contemplate the payment of such ‘conservation rents’.
• The NGOs persuaded the rest of the meeting to endorse the establishment
of a Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas, which
would take immediate action to prevent the further encroachment of
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‘development’ on areas of special conservation value, and would thus count
as an extra project, and the first piece of serious action, in the Action Plan.
• The Forests Minister announced that he would recommend to Cabinet the
imposition of a two-year moratorium, starting in July 1990, on the granting
of any new timber permits, and an indefinite moratorium on the granting of
permits for the export of unprocessed logs, despite the World Bank’s clearly
stated opposition to such measures.
From these episodes, it appeared that an appeal to national sovereignty or the
‘will of the people’ was the only way in which the national politicians and the
NGOs could find common cause against the developmental orthodoxies
propounded by the donors and the public servants.
In the year which followed this meeting, most of the ‘action’ in the National
Forestry Action Plan consisted of talks between representatives of the PNG
government, the World Bank, and other donor organisations regarding the
titles, timetables and possible terms of reference of those projects in which
specific donors had already shown some interest.  In August 1990, a TFAP
Steering Committee was convened under the chairmanship of the DFP, with
representation from three other government departments (PMD, DOF, DEC),
NANGO, and UPNG.  In that same month, the government signed an
agreement with the UNDP for the latter to fund the Technical Support Project
which would provide the Steering Committee with a separate executive arm
for coordination of the Action Plan.  The Technical Support Team was to
comprise a forester as Team Leader, a second forester as Forest Management
Specialist, a Conservation Planner, and an NGO Specialist26.
In April 1991, on the anniversary of the Round Table, a World Bank mission
came to monitor the work of the Technical Support Team and advise the
Steering Committee on the general progress of the Action Plan.  By this stage,
the Bank was recommending that all NFAP projects should be assigned to one
of four distinct programmes within a ‘project matrix’ devised to reflect the
various objectives spelt out in the National Forest Policy and implied by the
simultaneous pursuit of a national ‘conservation and land use strategy’.  Those
projects for which the DOF had already been designated as the ‘lead agency’
were accordingly divided between:
• a ‘Forest Resource Management’ programme, whose objective was the
development of a ‘sustainable logging’ regime for natural forest under
customary ownership; and
26
 New Zealanders (all former public servants) were recruited to the first three positions, while a Papua New Guinean was
appointed to the last position, with ‘counterpart support’ from the IIED in London. Three members of the team began work in
January 1991, but the conservation planner did not arrive until May because of an inter-departmental wrangle over the
appointment.
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• a ‘Forest and Industrial Development’ programme, whose objective was to
raise the overall market value of forest products and rationalise the
distribution of resource rents derived from their sale.
The remaining projects were then divided between:
• an ‘Environment and Conservation’ programme, whose lead agency was
obviously the department of that name, and whose objective was the
rehabilitation, maintenance, and expansion of the nation’s system of
protected areas; and
• a programme called ‘Promoting Landowner Participation’, whose objective
was obvious from its title, but whose leadership and relationship to the other
three programmes were both matters of debate.
The Bank’s concern at this juncture was partly to sell individual projects to the
PNG Donors’ Consultative Group Meeting scheduled for May 1991, and partly
to help the PNG government to establish its own priorities.  However, the
donors and the public servants both seem to have decided that the task of
‘promoting landowner participation’ was one which could not readily be
addressed without the identification of a single government department as the
lead agency for each donor-funded project, for the action taken on this
programme continued to lag behind the action taken on the other three.
In July 1991, the Steering Committee agreed to rename the National Forestry
Action Plan as the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme
(NFCAP), largely because of a growing recognition that its conservation
component could not be confined within the provisions of the National Forest
Policy (see section 6.5).  This formulation of the ‘separate but equal’ status of
the two line departments, together with the problem of deciding who would be
responsible for which aspects of ‘landowner participation’, had the somewhat
paradoxical effect of encouraging the World Bank and the Technical Support
Team to reconstruct the project matrix in such a way that each of the NFCAP
‘sub-programmes’ contained a combination of ‘Forestry’ and ‘Conservation’
projects.  This new scheme of classification may have served to enhance the
level of practical cooperation between the DEC and the new NFA, but it does
not seem to have done very much to clarify or transform the mutual
relationships of the other stakeholders in the forest policy process.  Table 6.1
therefore makes greater use of the previous 1991 matrix to classify the projects
originally identified in documents presented to the 1990 Round Table, together
with the longer list of NFCAP projects identified by the Technical Support Team
after the inception of the programme.  This table also shows the extent of the
financial commitment of different donor agencies to the policy reform process.
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Table 6.1  NFCAP project implementation, 1990-94.
Original (1990) Subsequent title Implementation Costs (Kina Donors
millions) title
Immediate Technical Immediate 1991-95 2.15 UNDP
Support (DOF/DEC/ Technical Support (1.85) UKODA
NGOs) AIDAB/WB
NFCAP Started 0.30 AIDAB/WB
Management and 1992 (0.25)
Coordination
Revenue Study and Forest Authority 1992-95 2.70 AIDAB/WB
Corporate Planning Design Studies (2.50)
Forest Management Forest Management 1993-96 4.90 WB/JGF
and Monitoring Task and Planning (3.09)
Forces
Human Resource Support for Training After 1994 11.9 AIDAB
Development Institutions (10.6) NZMERT
Ecological, Ecological, Started 5.52 UNESCO
Economic and Economic and 1992 (4.92) ITTO
Social Sustainability Social Sustainability
of Tropical of Tropical
Rainforest Use Rainforest Use
Rapid Resource Rapid Resource 1993-94 3.50 AIDAB
Appraisal Appraisal (2.98)
Forest Resource Forest Inventory After 1994 n.a. AIDAB
Assessment Mapping System
Agroforestry Community Forestry Abandoned
Ecoforestry After 1994 0.40
(0.25)
Revenue Study and Forest Revenue Completed 0.64 AIDAB
Corporate Planning Study 1991 (0.56)
Forest Industry Forest Industry 1992-93 0.73 ITTO
Development Studies Development Studies (0.61)
Strengthening the Abandoned
State Purchasing
Option
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Strengthening DEC Strategic Plan 1993-94 0.21 NZMERT
Environmental & (0.19)
Conservation
Management
Strengthening DEC Strengthening After 1994 n.a. AIDAB
Environmental &
Conservation
Management
National Sustainable 1993-94 0.34 UNDP
Development (0.31) NZMERT
Strategy
Taskforce on Taskforce on 1990-91 0.05 WWF
Environmental Environmental (0.05)
Planning Planning
Conservation Needs 1992-93 0.23 USAID
Assessment  (0.21)
Rehabilitation and Rehabilitation of Abandoned
Development of Protected Areas
National Parks &
Wildlife Sanctuaries
Strategy, Design and Integrated Started 1993 6.20 GEF
Implementation of Conservation and (5.00)
Conservation and Development
World Heritage Areas
Queen Alexandra After 1994 n.a AIDAB
Butterfly
Conservation
Landowner Landowner Started 1994 5.00 GTZ
Awareness and Awareness (4.50)
Support
Support for Wau NGO Capacity 1993-95 0.50 AIDAB/WB
Ecology Institute Support (0.40)
and NANGO
Notes:
The horizontal lines in this table represent our own classification of NFCAP projects into ‘sub-programmes’, along the lines
indicated in the World Bank’s ‘project matrix’ of April 1991.
Column 4 shows project costs as stated in the NFCAP Status Report of June 1994, with figures in brackets representing the
funds derived or required from external sources.
Some AIDAB-funded projects were funded through the NFCAP Trust Fund administered by the World Bank (hence donor
indicated as AIDAB/WB).
Sources: World Bank 1989, Annex 10 (Column 1); Taylor et al. 1994 (other columns).
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An evaluation of the NFCAP Technical Support Project, written by the
project’s Chief Technical Adviser in February 1992, found that the
programme as a whole had already begun to overload the capacities of
central government agencies, without as yet showing much sign of creating
the relationships with other national stakeholders - provincial
governments, NGOs and local communities - which were essential for its
success.  Project implementation was being constrained by ‘a combination
of limited staff capacity, differing administrative approaches from donor
agencies, idiosyncrasies within and between various administration centres
in PNG, and, in brief, too few people attempting too much work’ (Familton
1992:2).
At that stage, the ‘outputs’ of the Technical Support Project itself were
supposed to comprise:
• a plan to restructure the national government’s ‘forestry administration’;
• a strategy to coordinate and schedule donor inputs to the NFCAP;
• a greater capacity of government and NGOs ‘to evaluate, manage and
plan the conservation of forests and to assist customary landholders to
establish conservation areas and to obtain a fair economic share from
forestry development activities, including logging and forest industries
as well as village and community based forestry activities’; and
• a ‘national public awareness programme’ which would ‘aim to promote
continuous awareness and capacity amongst landowners in forest
management, sustainable resource use and conservation’.
While the design of the Technical Support Project had included the
assumption that NGOs could and would be able to convey the views and
interests of resource owners to the government and the donors, this
assumption had yet to be tested in the light of practical experience.  At the
same time, it was not at all clear how messages about the shared
commitment of the government and the donors to ‘sustainable forest
management’ were to be transmitted in the opposite direction.  The Chief
Technical Adviser concluded that there were two main weaknesses in the
design and implementation of the NFCAP.  On the one hand, ‘human
resource development’ and ‘landowner awareness’ had been defined as
projects in their own right, whereas they ought to be regarded as integral
components of all the projects in the programme.  On the other hand, the
different values of the national forest resource had been defined as the
specific concerns of different ‘lead agencies’, whereas they ought to be
integrated into a single (and comprehensible) ‘national planning model’.
Nevertheless, a second two-year phase of the Technical Support Project
began in January 1993.  It had broadly similar aims to the first phase, with
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the exception of the ‘national public awareness programme’ which was
dropped as a project responsibility.
An independent review of the NFCAP as a whole, was commissioned by
the  UNDP towards the end of 1994 (Taylor et al. 1994), five years after the
programme had originally been designed27.  In their own portrait of
stakeholder relationships, the authors of this study observed that the task of
persuading different government agencies and NGOs to coordinate their
own approaches to the pursuit of sustainable forest management had
detracted from the task of persuading other stakeholders to join this
pursuit.  They felt that the Steering Committee had failed to give sufficient
strategic direction to the programme, not only because some of its members
had carried insufficient weight within their own organisations, but also
because it had not included representatives of the resource owners, the
donors, or the forest industry.  Despite some remarks about the continued
exploitation and manipulation of resource owners by logging companies,
they suggested the need for a new ‘tripartite partnership’ with both of these
other parties, and pointed out that the ‘much lamented concentration of
ownership should in practice facilitate such partnership’ (ibid:16).
But where did this leave the NGOs, who had been leading the chorus of
lament?  While the review observed that ‘NGOs are now considered to offer
an effective means of reaching landowners’ (ibid:16), the World bank’s
concern to secure the central coordination of NGO inputs to the NFCAP
was seen to have detracted from the capacity of individual NGOs to pursue
the process of engagement with landowning communities, and perhaps
made it easier for landowner companies to challenge NGO claims to
represent the interests of resource owners as a whole. Despite their
representative positions within the NFA, these claims could also be
challenged on other grounds.
For many landowners the forest is an obstacle and its exploitation a quick
entry onto the development path and access to infrastructure and cash.  Their
needs are simple, modest and consistent - roads, schools and health centres.
Government failure has led them to exploit their forests to meet these needs.
Forest owners in PNG and international environmental NGOs are thus very
differently motivated (ibid:15).
While there had been some evidence of conflict between national and
international NGOs during the course of their participation in the NFCAP,
27
 By that time, donors had committed about K27 million to the programme as a whole, though some of its component projects
had not yet been completed, and the review team was therefore asked to make recommendations concerning the coordination
of the programme’s second phase.
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it was not so clear that the national NGOs had a better handle on the real
interests of resource owners than their international counterparts.  In any
case:
the resource owners are the ultimate NGO and NFCAP should be concerned
with developing capacity there; intermediary NGOs are a means to an end, not
an end in itself (ibid:26).
The review team felt that resource owners could not be expected to support a
strategy for sustainable forest management ‘until the way is agreed to
compensate owners who agree to forego wood production and those who
agree to be 40th in the queue created by a 40 year cutting cycle’ (ibid:19).
The transformation of PNG’s version of the TFAP into a National Forestry
and Conservation Action Programme was largely motivated by changes in
the alignment of global stakeholders which took place in the years
immediately preceding the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.  This realignment of
global interests created opportunities for conservationists to secure a larger
stake in the policy process initiated by the Barnett Inquiry and the TFAP
Review Mission.  In April 1991, the World Bank mission engaged in a review
of the NFCAP Technical Support Project indicated that PNG was in a good
position to secure additional funding from the Global Environment Facility’s
Biodiversity Conservation Programme, and a formal submission was duly
made in September of that year.  The result was the establishment, towards
the end of 1992, of PNG’s own Biodiversity Conservation and Resource
Management Programme (BCRMP), otherwise known as the Integrated
Conservation and Development Programme, which was formally subsumed
under the NFCAP, but which became, in effect, the focal point for the design,
implementation and evaluation of those NFCAP projects whose ‘lead agency’
was the DEC28.  Management of the BCRMP was vested in a new
Conservation Resource Centre, whose functions included:
• experimentation with integrated conservation and development (ICAD)
projects in selected areas;
• development of methods for making ‘conservation covenants’ with local
resource owners;
6.5 The disputed grounds for conservation
28
 As if to underline this point, the Conservation Planner in the NFCAP Technical Support Team, who had played a major role in
the submission for GEF funding, was subsequently appointed as the Chief Technical Adviser to the BCRMP.
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• construction of biodiversity and conservation information systems;
• production of the PNG Country Study on Biological Diversity;
• coordination of conservation advocacy and awareness activities;
• provision of technical support to the National Conservation Council (in
the event of its establishment); and
• design of a Conservation and Environment Trust Fund (under the
management of the NCC) to provide long-term financial support for
conservation activities.
Although the design of the BCRMP was the work of a separate project
formulation mission, the pattern of stakeholder relationships into which it
was inserted is portrayed more clearly (and more controversially) in the
Conservation Needs Assessment (CNA), whose preparation took place over
the same period of time.  This was a NFCAP project funded by USAID and
implemented by a consortium of three international NGOs based in
Washington DC - the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy, and the
World Resources Institute.
The CNA was seen as the first step towards the design of a ‘Representative
System of Protected Areas’, in which the mapping of biodiversity values,
critical watersheds and unusual habitats would be used to set the priorities
for rehabilitation of those areas already under some form of protection and
the selection of new conservation areas, including the pilot ICAD project
sites envisaged in the BCRMP.  Since the government had already made a
notional commitment (at the TFAP Round Table) to protect or conserve 20
per cent of the country’s surface area, the CNA study was concerned to
apply the research findings of natural scientists to the task of deciding
which 20 per cent of the country would contain the optimum mix of
‘conservation values’.  However, while most members of the study team
were themselves natural scientists, national NGO participation was seen to
be crucial to the whole exercise, not only because this reflected the
philosophical approach of the implementing agencies, but also because the
practice of conservation was understood to require the development of
‘partnership mechanisms’ between these NGOs and the DEC.  The main
forum for their participation was a workshop held in Madang in April 1992.
The stakeholders identified as participants in the CNA Workshop included
‘representatives of government, representatives from PNG NGOs,
Landowners [sic], biological scientists, social scientists, lawyers, resource
managers, conservation planners, and donors’ (Alcorn 1993:xvi).  The most
visible participants were the natural scientists, most of whom were
expatriates, while the most vocal participants were the national NGO
representatives, who questioned the capacity and the right of the scientists
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study114
to determine national priorities, and a group of ‘Madang community
representatives’ who demonstrated against the meeting.
According to Brown and Holzknecht, the two anthropologists in the study
team, the antagonism between the biologists and NGO representatives
participating in the CNA Workshop was due to the radical difference in the
assumptions which each group was making about the wider pattern of
stakeholder relationships in the conservation business.  Most of the
biologists were assuming that:
• their own assessment of conservation values and priorities was an
objective exercise based on detailed field research in different parts of the
country, which already took account of human interaction with the
natural environment;
• it was up to the conservation planners and managers, as consumers of
this assessment, to make the ‘tough decisions’ and ‘stirring calls to
action’ which would persuade other stakeholders to sacrifice the short-
term benefits of development for the long-term benefits of conservation;
• the planners and managers should therefore be responsible for the
process of consultation with NGOs and local landowners, and for
dealing with questions of social feasibility and political strategy.
Most of the NGO representatives were assuming that:
• local knowledge and practice was the only genuine basis for determining
conservation values and priorities, and conservation planners could not
achieve their own objectives unless they adopted ‘culturally appropriate
methods’;
• instead of trying to create the right mix of incentives for other
stakeholders, conservation planners should be providing the information
and resources required for landowning communities to make their own
choices and take control of their own destinies;
• while NGOs themselves could make a positive contribution to this
process, the government was not really interested in securing their
collaboration (Brown and Holzknecht 1993:105-10).
If the national NGO representatives appeared to question the usefulness or
relevance of biological research, they were also criticising the scientists for
being the supporters or accomplices of an unholy alliance between the
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national government and the donor community - including the
international NGOs which were orchestrating the CNA.  As one of them put
it, American money and expertise had ‘closed the eyes and ears of the
government on what the real needs of the country are’ (Kau 1993:114).  Yet
some of the biologists were clearly unwilling to concede that their own
hard-won knowledge of the country’s ‘real needs’ was inferior to that
espoused by the lawyers and social scientists in the study team or by the
self-appointed representatives of the ‘grassroots’.  While the biologists seem
to have argued that a ‘natural’ combination of national and biological
priorities should take precedence over a combination of local and political
priorities, their opponents took the view that local priorities should be
national priorities and that ‘biological’ priorities could only be foreign
priorities in disguise.
At one level, this was an argument about rights and responsibilities - about
which stakeholders had the right or responsibility to decide on the
designation of conservation areas, and how this might affect their capacity
to achieve specific conservation objectives.  According to Brown and
Holzknecht, the national government’s constitutional rights and
responsibilities to pursue the goal of conservation require the pursuit of
‘Papua New Guinean ways’ of doing so, and since there is no such thing as
‘wilderness’ in PNG, this must entail some accommodation with the fact of
customary resource ownership.  This is taken to mean that the state can
only facilitate, and not direct, the activities of the resource owners, even
while it also has the responsibility to mediate between local communities
and the corporate developers of these same natural resources.  For this
reason, the ‘top-down planning’ approach favoured by the professional
conservation managers and natural scientists has to be modified, and the
selection of conservation areas has to be based on some assessment of
‘social feasibility’, as well as on purely biological criteria.  But there is no
clear space for such an assessment to be made if maps of species and
habitat distribution are used as the main instrument of conservation
planning.
The critical question here would seem to be the manner in which social and
cultural factors, including the attitudes of local resource owners, might be
combined with the biophysical criteria used to determine the ‘conservation
values’ of different areas.  But this only becomes a critical question if the
two sets of criteria yield very different results.  Brown and Holzknecht
suggest that landowners in areas of high biodiversity, which are normally
areas of low population density, have less responsibility for the
maintenance of conservation values than landowners whose resources are
under greater pressure from the forces of ‘development’.  But then we are
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led to ask whether community attitudes and interests follow this same
divergent pattern.
Section 12 of the Conservation Areas Act poses the same problem by declaring
that conservation areas should have ‘particular biological, topographical,
geological, historical, scientific or social significance or other special value
for the present community or for future generations’ (our italics).  How can this
wide range of possible community values, unevenly distributed between
hundreds of landowning communities, be accommodated by any coherent
national conservation policy or strategy?  This is no longer a question about
rights and responsibilities; it is a question about motivations and incentives.
Brown and Holzknecht maintain that all landowning communities, whatever
their internal divisions or different historical experiences, have the same
kind of structural relationship with external stakeholders, and manifest a
common desire for more information about the costs and benefits of different
conservation and development options.  If other stakeholders can provide
such information, this ‘will be a crucial step in strengthening Landowners as
a stakeholder group that can and will promote conservation of biodiversity
in PNG’ (ibid:74).  But the idea of ‘strengthening’ or ‘empowering’ resource
owners is not just part of an argument about motivations and incentives; it is
also part of an argument about institutions and procedures for stakeholder
negotiations - about the most ‘appropriate’ way for outsiders to negotiate
with resource owners whose own needs and desires could not be known
until the process of negotiation was already under way.  Brown and
Holzknecht saw the manifestations of conflict at the CNA Workshop as one
step in the formation of a coalition or partnership whose necessity derived
from the fact that no one stakeholder group can achieve its own conservation
objectives in isolation from the rest.  If conservation planners still had reason
to doubt the capacity of national NGOs to help landowning communities in
the assessment or implementation of various conservation and development
options, NGOs and resource owners were developing a shared interest from
their common feeling of exclusion from the planning process.  If the DEC had
gained some strength from its association with a global network of natural
scientists with a longstanding interest in PNG’s flora and fauna, these links
may have been forged at the expense of a parallel, and equally essential,
connection with the community of social scientists who had a longstanding
interest in the country’s cultural heritage.  And since rural villagers
commonly fail to distinguish between the interests and activities of different
government agencies, the DEC could hardly expect to share its own agenda
or raise its credibility with local resource owners except through some form
of collaboration with NGOs.
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It was arguments like these which seem to have persuaded the workshop
participants to agree the need for a Natural Resource Options Centre which
would combine ‘the development of broad-based awareness programmes
on environment and development’ with ‘the provision of balanced and
detailed information, especially to Landowner groups, on the available
natural resource development options, their consequences and impacts, and
the positive and negative development experiences of other Landowner
groups’.  But while they also seem to have agreed that this body should
ideally be ‘independent of government’, the CNA report has little to say
about the practicalities of its establishment, funding and management.
To some extent the need for  a Natural Resource Options Centre may have
been obviated by the establishment of the Conservation Resource Centre
(CRC) and the subsequent implementation of the NFCAP Landowner
Awareness Project, though both of these are donor-funded initiatives
contained within the formal structure of the DEC.
When PNG became one of the first countries to sign and then ratify the
Convention on Biological Diversity in the wake of the Rio Earth Summit,
the CRC also took responsibility for helping to implement the
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Log yard and road leading to temporary dock for shipping out logs, New Ireland. In 1989, the Barnett
Inquiry found that the forest industry was ‘out of control’, and set the tone for efforts to reform the
national policy process
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government’s renewed commitment to develop a National Conservation
Strategy29.  Having commissioned another team of experts to produce the
PNG Country Study on Biological Diversity (commonly known as the
‘Biodiversity Country Study’), CRC staff arranged another workshop in
Madang, in August 1994, at which some of the authors met with other
stakeholder representatives to begin the design of a Framework Action
Strategy (or Strategic Framework) for Conservation in PNG.
The Biodiversity Country Study had two aims and two audiences.  On the
one hand, it was intended to secure additional donor assistance for national
implementation of the Biodiversity Convention by ‘alerting the global
community to the alarming rate at which ecosystems are being degraded in
Papua New Guinea, to the current lack of durable conservation actions on
the scale necessary to address this trend, and to the need to reconcile social
and economic development with conservation management to meet the
needs of the key conservation stakeholders - the local landowners and
resource custodians’.  On the other hand, it was also meant to raise the
awareness of ‘key decision makers and planners’ in the national government
and national NGO community (Sekhran and Miller 1994a:1).
The economic analysis was primarily addressed to the question of how the
costs and benefits of conservation could and should be distributed between
PNG and the rest of the world, and between present and future generations
within PNG.  While many of the benefits of conservation accrue to ‘the
global community at large’ and to future generations of national
stakeholders, many of the immediate costs are borne (as opportunity costs)
by ‘local resource holders’, whose stakes are especially high because their
share of the current income from resource exploitation is not enough to
compensate their own descendants for their loss of self-sufficiency (Sekhran
1994: 16).  Furthermore, the adverse effects of resource exploitation on the
‘utility and production functions’ of other stakeholders - including foreign
tourists and members of neighbouring communities - are not incorporated
into the ‘implicit cost-benefit equations of local resource users’ because these
functions have no market price (ibid:29).  While those landowning
communities which presently support the unsustainable extraction of their
natural resources might opt to conserve a larger part of those resources if
they received a larger share of the revenues arising from such exploitation,
those communities which choose to resist such exploitation altogether are
trapped in a vicious circle of ‘perverse conservation incentives’.  They
cannot get a share of the benefits which accrue from resource exploitation in
29
 The need for a National Conservation Strategy had been widely canvassed when the DEC was first established, so the
Biodiversity Convention merely served to remind the Department of its original mandate.
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neighbouring areas; they are rarely if ever compensated for the damage
which such exploitation causes to their own resources; and they are unable
to cash in on the benefits which their own choice brings to other
stakeholders.  This is the essential economic problem posed by the
fragmented nature of customary resource ownership (ibid:35).
Other contributors were more concerned with the way in which local and
national cultural values might affect the willingness or ability of resource
owners to make a strictly economic calculation of the costs and benefits of
conservation.  How have current attitudes to conservation been affected by
an experience of rapid social change which entailed the loss of customary
knowledge and the simultaneous growth of economic inequalities within
landowning communities and the wider national society?  How have
changes in the distribution of wealth, power and knowledge between
resource owners and other stakeholders affected the way that resource
owners think about the choice between ‘conservation’ and ‘development’?
According to Filer (1994: 88-9), popular answers to questions of this sort
proceed along two main lines.
• On the one hand, there are those which assume that the relationship
between customary landowners and their natural resources is a very
close one (‘perhaps even a condition of mystical harmony’), then seek to
determine the combination of external forces which have broken this
form of association, and thus vary according to the way in which they
allocate the blame between various external agents — for example, the
colonial administration, national politicians, or foreign logging
contractors.
• On the other hand, there are those which proceed from the observation
that landowners want nothing more than ‘development’, then argue that
the intensity of this desire, and the frustration of its non-fulfilment, have
caused a willingness to sacrifice anything which they control in order to
achieve their goal, and thus vary according to their assessment of the
options available to landowners in their pursuit of this goal.
The contest between these two lines of argument was one of the features of
discussion at the CNA Workshop in 1992.  Filer goes on to suggest that each
line of argument results in a different approach to what he calls ‘the
problem of regional diversity’, which is to understand why landowning
communities in different parts of the country might now make different
choices between ‘development’ and ‘conservation’.
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• By treating ‘custom’ as a uniform starting point, the first line of
argument tends to explain such variation as the result of a process of
uneven spatial development in which some local communities have lost
more than others, and the desperation for ‘development’ is itself the
measure of this loss.
• By treating the desperation for ‘development’ as the constant factor in
the equation, the second line of argument makes more allowance for the
possibility that different interpretations of ‘development’ (and its
relationship to ‘conservation’) may reflect ‘traditional’ differences in
people’s attitudes or behaviour towards their natural environment.
Like the NGO representatives at the CNA Workshop, Holzknecht and
Warakai both seem to favour the first line of argument.  Warakai (1994:319)
argues that ‘local traditional knowledge and knowledge of environmental
conservation are one and the same thing’, and proceeds to blame the
disruption of this ‘organic unity’ on Christianity and Western materialism.
Holzknecht (1994:62) suggests that traditional values reflect a somewhat
paradoxical combination of conservative subsistence strategies, based on
the principle of risk avoidance, and an opportunistic interest in
experimentation, which serves to explain the tendency of younger people to
dismiss the relevance of ‘custom’ to ‘development’.  He seems to say that
resource owners have lost much of their former power, while keeping many
of their basic values, that rural communities have grown dependent on a
government whose own lack of capacity is driving them into the arms of
the ‘developers’, while donor-funded awareness programmes are supposed
to make use of ‘customary knowledge’ while searching to provide
alternative, and more sustainable, forms of ‘development’.
Filer took a rather different approach to the problem of disenchantment and
disempowerment by suggesting that the readiness of some resource owners
to sacrifice their natural environment to the spirit of ‘development’ might
be related to a form of traditional knowledge which was already based on a
sense of alienation from powerful natural forces, rather than a condition of
mystical harmony with them, but still allowed that new images of
traditional knowledge might have another kind of relevance to nature
conservation.
The progressive alienation of rural communities from ‘traditional values’ may
be regarded as a bad thing in its own right, but is only relevant to the business
of nature conservation if the arts of traditional resource management have the
capacity to mitigate new threats to biodiversity when they are recollected or
revived.  The question is not what the ancestors actually thought or did, but
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When a nation of gardeners becomes a nation of customary landlords, it is perhaps understandable
that many people would begin to believe that the royal road to ‘development’ is found in the collection of
natural resource rents from foreign operators, regardless of the actual incidence of such behaviour
amongst the wealthier sections of the community.  When individuals or communities really do come to
depend on this form of income, one might suppose that they are rapidly locked into some unsustainable
form of resource extraction, because the market in logging or mining licences produces a continual
adjustment of prices which allows for continued economic access by the operators.  However, Papua
New Guinea markets are remarkable for the rigidity of their pricing mechanisms and the absence of any
overt form of bargaining between buyers and sellers, and .... local gatekeepers sometimes contribute
to the conservation of their resources by raising the entry fees to the point which deters all potential
customers, either because their expectations of ‘development’ begin to exceed what can feasibly be
Box 6.4  Social inequality, political authority, and the prospects
for holding on to biological diversity
whether and how today’s villagers can be persuaded to associate their own
ideas of sustainable development with a sense of cultural autonomy or local
pride (Filer 1994:192).
Filer then goes on to suggest that the most persuasive voices may be those
of an ‘emergent middle class’ which is already partially alienated from
village life through the process of formal schooling and the modern
division of labour, but whose ‘urban occupations have given them some
freedom from the claustrophobia of village society, and whose level of
education has given them the capacity and motivation to absorb Western
ideas’ (ibid:193), even if they prefer to dress these ideas in traditional
costume.  In that case, the problem is not to decide whether the ethics of
‘conservation’ owe more or less to ‘custom’ than the politics of
‘development’, but to see how the defence of ‘traditional knowledge’ and
the ‘natural environment’, are used as weapons in the constant struggle to
redistribute wealth and power between individuals and communities.
The ‘Strategic Framework for Conservation’ in PNG has yet to be finalised.
The document is organised around twelve ‘strategic objectives’, most of
which are concerned with the planning and management of new
conservation areas.  The portrait of stakeholder relationships which
emerges from this document is one which allows for greater complexity,
and calls for greater flexibility, in the formation of a ‘national conservation
constituency’ than the ‘black and white’ picture which is implicitly
attributed to the critics of the CNA.  A national conservation strategy
which simply espouses a preference for ‘bottom-up planning’, which
maintains that NGOs can always do a better job than government, or
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realised from some particular economic activity, or else because they are pricing themselves out of the
market in order to achieve non-market objectives.
Chief amongst these objectives is the maintenance or restoration of social and economic equality
between individuals or communities.  The local version of the ‘tall poppy syndrome’ explains much of
the resentment and many of the accusations which are directed at those who demonstrate unusual
success in the acquisition of wealth or power.  It may be argued that the politics of envy is a major
obstacle to social solidarity and economic progress, but it can also be argued that the same egalitarian
ethos which traditionally caused some communities to degrade their land in an effort to keep up with
their neighbours in the business of competitive gift exchange may now have the unintended effect of
limiting the damage done by the industrial exploitation of natural resources as political conflict over the
distribution of rent eventually renders the exploitation uneconomic.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the deep sense of distrust which formerly separated the hundreds
of autonomous Melanesian communities has not only persisted down to the present day, but has also
become characteristic of relationships between individual leaders and many of their notional clients or
constituents, and thus of the general relationship between the village and the state.  Such widespread
lack of trust militates against the conscious implementation of collective nature conservation strategies.
It also tends to function as a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Unlike those countries in which networks of
patronage, bribery and corruption are longstanding features of the political system, such excuses still
seem to rankle with the majority of Papua New Guineans, and the current upsurge of Christian
sectarianism might even be seen as part of their desperate search to establish some new form of moral
community as a defence against the essential sinfulness of secular politics.
Remembering the ancient mutual distrust of neighbouring communities, a distinction still needs to be
drawn between the general alienation of the ‘shoe-socks’ from the rural population as a whole and their
continuing attachment to their place of origin, where their authority ... may be effectively exerted in
defence of conservation values.  Within the so-called ‘wantok system’, one should hardly be surprised
if leaders show a preference for making economic gains at the expense of other groups, and the
distinctive threat which is then posed for the maintenance of biodiversity is precisely the opportunity
which a democratic political system and a bureaucratic system of administration provide for politicians
and government officials to wage war on other people’s resources in order to enhance their reputations
in their own backyards.
Those politicians and officials who manage to resist local expectations of favouritism may still find
themselves obliged to adopt an attitude of arrogance or apathy when confronted by the fractious and
claustrophobic nature of rural society.  In this respect, their problems may be said to derive equally
from their lack of familiarity with the impersonal organisational culture of the Western world and their
own personal proximity to the villager’s own understanding of the world.  Their failures to engage
landowners in the pursuit of worthy causes need not be the result of incompetence or corruption, but
may simply reflect the difficulty of exerting any kind of effective leadership in a social environment which
is riddled by fear, jealousy and suspicion.
Source: Filer 1994
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which declares that conservation ‘must be based on traditional patterns of
landownership or must incorporate traditional notions of conservation or
must work within traditional frameworks of leadership is ignoring the
reality of Papua New Guinea’.  The reality is that no stakeholder has a
special claim to represent or understand the needs and aspirations of so
many local cultures and communities, and all stakeholders with a stake in
conservation must therefore develop the skills required to act on the reality
which exists in those places where they choose to operate.
The Draft Framework insists that biological criteria must first be used to
define those areas of ‘high conservation value’ within which a combination
of ‘socio-economic’ and ‘operational management’ criteria are then used to
identify smaller areas of ‘high conservation potential’.  The ‘socio-
economic’ criteria are said to include the motivations of local resource
owners, the existence and relevance of their traditional conservation
practices, and their capacity for self-reliance and experimentation, as well
as the nature and extent of any immediate threats to biodiversity values.
The ‘operational management’ criteria are said to include the chances of
collaboration and support from provincial and local authorities, NGOs
and donor agencies, as well as technical and logistical considerations.  The
primacy of biological criteria is justified in three ways:
• a national conservation constituency which shares the global interest in
biodiversity cannot afford to waste scarce resources on dealing with
local resource owners in areas of ‘low conservation value’, even if the
latter are more likely to grasp the idea that natural resources are in
limited supply;
• a review of existing protected areas in 1992 had found that landowners
requesting the declaration of Wildlife Management Areas by the DEC
were primarily motivated by the desire to assert rightful ownership and
exclude outsiders from making use of the area in question30;
• biodiversity conservation strategies cannot be effective unless
conservation areas are much larger than the areas owned or controlled
by the members of any single customary group.
The critical problem, therefore, is to enable conservation planners and
managers to learn more about local patterns of customary resource
ownership, to use techniques like Participatory Rural Appraisal when
dealing with local landowners, and to promote new forms of collaboration
30
 These findings were partly responsible for the abandonment of the NFCAP Rehabilitation of Protected Areas Project
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between neighbouring land groups or local communities.  At the same
time, it is necessary to ensure that those who succeed in such activities
receive a fair share of the rewards made available by the global community,
which might otherwise be monopolised by senior members of the
conservation constituency based in the national capital.
Finally, the Draft Framework also concludes that the basic lesson drawn
from experience with conservation programmes in other countries is that
resource owners will not support conservation without some combination of
‘moral’ incentives, which cause them to rethink the meaning of
‘development’, and ‘material’ incentives, which actually raise their
standard of living.  While moral incentives are understood to include the
process of community empowerment envisioned by the NGO
representatives at the CNA Workshop, the design of a ‘conservation
advocacy and awareness programme’ must still be flexible enough to allow
for a variety of roles and arguments to be adopted by NGO animators or
facilitators, government extension agents, local community leaders, and
other stakeholders.  The utility of appeals to local custom, demonstrations
of government authority, or attacks on political corruption cannot be
decided in advance.  A similar problem arises in the choice of appropriate
material incentives from a range of options which might include sweat-
equity schemes, the promotion of alternative income sources, the payment
of conservation rents, or the protection of intellectual property rights.
Those which are feasible or desirable in the short term (for areas under
immediate threat) may not give the recipients a long-term stake in the
maintenance of economic practices conducive to conservation.  And the
effectiveness of those which deliver tangible benefits to individuals or
families, rather than to whole communities, may be limited or undermined
by their unequal distribution and the social conflict which ensues.
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We now turn to the question of how the forest policy process is affected by
the negotiation of other policy issues in the national context.  In this case,
our task is to show how some of these other processes tend to pull forest
policy in different directions, and thus help to explain some of its internal
inconsistencies and inconclusive outcomes.
If we ask how policies within the ‘forestry and conservation sector’ are
influenced by those outside it, then we may be led to make the false
assumption that national governments routinely seek to integrate the
design and execution of different sectoral policies within a single package
which is tied up with the strings of logical and practical consistency.  This
way of thinking is evident in the wording of PNG’s National Forest Policy,
where it remarks upon the need for consistency with other government
policies in the ‘renewable resources sector’, since all policies in this sector
can (in theory) be subsumed under the Fourth National Goal.  However,
this way of thinking tends to overlook some important features of the wider
public policy domain in PNG:
• The production of ‘national government policy’ is still an activity which
tends to be dominated by foreigners, either donor-funded consultants or
public servants on expatriate contracts, whose prescriptions are
routinely ignored or contradicted in practice.  The entire NFCAP exercise
may be regarded as a classic case of this externally motivated, and
internally confounded, pursuit of public policy reform.
Policy influences
from outside the
forest sector
7.1 Mapping the public policy context
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• The nature of PNG’s political system means that politicians in general,
and national government ministers in particular, are rarely called upon
to demonstrate the consistency of their own decisions or actions with a
‘policy platform’ to which they have some notional commitment, and are
therefore free to treat their portfolios as personal fiefdoms whose rank is
determined by the opportunities which they provide for the collection of
a gatekeeper’s rent from the exercise of various licensing powers.  This
point is illustrated by the behaviour of some former Forests Ministers
and the perceived weakness of their counterparts in the Ministry of
Environment and Conservation, because the granting of timber permits
is seen to be a greater source of power than the approval of
environmental plans.
• National public servants have a tendency to convert policy statements
into a form of intellectual property by which to define and defend their
own ‘local’ interests within the metaphorical territory of the state, as if
they were seeking to create new forms of Melanesian community
through the mutual isolation of multiple ‘state secrets’.  The ‘unhappy
marriage’ between the DOF and the DEC in the early stages of the
NFCAP exercise exemplified this fragmentation of public policy by the
force of bureaucratic isolationism.
• Finally, the conventional classification of ‘sectors’, as reflected in the
separation of ministerial portfolios and government departments, fails to
accommodate the divergence between Western and Melanesian
constructions of the policy landscape.  While Western distinctions
between ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ and ‘tertiary’ sectors of the ‘national
economy’, or between different branches of productions and
reproduction within these sectors, are built around the technical
relationship between inputs and outputs, a Melanesian perspective
divides the policy landscape into multiple forms of property which are
related in different ways to customary resource rights and the ideology
of landownership.
In our own construction of the policy landscape, we recognise the
fundamental significance of land policy by defining ‘primary production
policies’ as those which concern productive activities on customary land, in
which landowning communities are acknowledged as stakeholders in their
own right, and ‘secondary production policies’ as those which concern
productive activities in the separate domain of the state - in urban areas, for
example, or in territorial waters.  So far as forest policy is concerned, the
most influential policy processes in other parts of the primary production
zone are those which concern the extraction of mineral resources and the
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production of agricultural commodities (see section 7.3).  And in the
secondary production zone, forest policy is primarily affected by industrial
development policies, in which rural communities of customary
landowners are placed on the sidelines, and ‘national participation’ is
normally construed in terms of the urban labour market (see section 7.4).
Over and above these different types of production policy, we may gather
together a range of other policy domains which are concerned with macro-
economic management, human resource development, maintenance of law
and order, public service reform, and other matters of that ilk.  Thanks to
the recent interventions of the World Bank, we can bundle these together
under the rubric of ‘structural adjustment and governance policies’ (see
section 7.5).  We represent this as a bank of cloud raining on the rest of the
national economy (see Figure 7.1).  As a result of commitments made at the
Rio Earth Summit, PNG should by now have developed its own National
Sustainable Development Strategy, which might be seen to exercise a more
benign influence on forest policy, and might therefore be represented by
rays of sunshine bursting through the clouds of Structural Adjustment.  But
(see section 7.6) it is still necessary to board an aircraft and fly above the
cloud layer before one can obtain a glimpse of the sun.
Figure 7.1   Forest policy in the context of other policy domains
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The best way to describe the evolution of land policy in the period since
Independence would be to say that it consists in a stalemate between a
growing national ‘ideology of landownership’ and a series of attempts by
donor agencies and commercial interests to persuade the government to
revive some of the policy initiatives of the late colonial period.  One of the
few points on which the World Bank agrees with Karl Marx is in its
apparent belief that the ‘liberation of the peasant from the soil’ is the basis
of the whole process of capitalist development.  But the ‘peasants’ of PNG
prefer to think of themselves as petty landlords, whose main aim in life is to
defend their territorial right to claim ‘compensation’ from the process of
resource development which takes place on their land.  And key sections of
the national political elite have much the same outlook.
The national Department of Lands and Physical Planning has spent most of
its time and effort on the administration of that 3 per cent fraction of land
already purchased or leased by the government during the colonial period,
and the defence of this land against a mass of claims by traditional owners
who believe they were robbed or cheated of their rights.  Generally
speaking, this function has not been shared with the provinces.  The
national government has shown no capacity to engage in systematic land
use planning outside of those urban areas declared as physical planning
areas under the Physical Planning Act. Although the Department of Lands is
notionally responsible for authorising the acquisition of new government
leases over customary land for various types of externally-funded
development, the actual work of negotiating such acquisitions has normally
been left to other sectoral agencies of government or even the developers
themselves.  In the mining and petroleum sector, for example, the
companies do all the necessary survey work, negotiate a ‘compensation
package’ with customary landowners, and present all relevant
documentation to a government lands officer for his signature.  The
settlement of disputes between customary landowners continues to be
handled by land courts which are part of the regular judicial system.
The World Bank has been the principal architect of several measures
designed to facilitate the use of customary land as security for commercial
credit.  These have included a ‘lease-leaseback’ scheme, under which cash
croppers in the central highlands were encouraged to lease twenty-hectare
blocks to the government, which then leased it back to them31, and a Land
7.2 Land policy and the ideology
of landownership
31 
The purpose of this circuitous exercise was to enable the original owners to use the land as security for bank loans
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Mobilisation Programme, which included a new round of experiments in
the registration of customary title.  In 1995, when the Bank’s interest in
further land reform was widely rumoured to have found a place in the
latest structural adjustment programme, there was an outbreak of popular
hostility which quickly persuaded the government to retreat to its
customary position of inertia (see Box 7.1).  These expressions of resistance
may be seen as the continuation of a process which began in 1972, with the
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters, whereby ‘landownership’ has
come to be defined as the foundation of national identity, as well as the
subject of local custom.  This process appears to have gained further
momentum from the growth of public debate about ‘resource
compensation’, which has followed on from the boom in extractive
industrial development in the 1980s.
Once released from their colonial subjection, Papua New Guineans (or
‘Melanesians’) have been learning to think of themselves as people who are
distinguished from other nations or races by their singular physical and
emotional relationship to ‘the land’ which all of them possess.  The citizen who
has no customary land rights is a contradiction whose existence cannot be
admitted.  The identification of ‘the people’ as (customary) ‘landowners’ is also
the flipside of denials that there is such a thing as ‘poverty’ in Papua New
Guinea.  It is because ‘we’ are all landlords that we can neither be peasants
nor be poor.  Declarations concerning the sheer abundance of national natural
resources (commonly contrasted with the folly of their current exploitation or
mismanagement) are also part of the same ideological construct.  So is the
proposition that there is no square inch of national territory which does not
have a customary landowner attached to it (the mental abolition of terra
nullius), the belief that customary land is always owned by groups called
‘clans’, and even the statement that land tenure is an alien concept (Filer
1997a:165).
The ideology of landownership goes hand in hand with the ‘resource
dependency syndrome’ which we described in an earlier part of this study
(see section 3.4), and both of them reflect and promote popular resistance to
government control over the use of land and other natural resources.
Oddly enough, the World Bank’s recent efforts to promote a process of land
reform have been partly motivated by the Bank’s concern to achieve greater
equity and transparency in the distribution of resource rents derived from
log exports.  While the Bank was pushing the national government to give
landowners a bigger share of this rental income, it was also attempting to
institutionalise the process of ‘land group incorporation’ (see section 7.3)
within the forestry sector, thus reducing the opportunities for individual
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Box 7.1  Extracts from letters written to the Post-Courier newspaper in opposition
to the registration of customary land
Registration of customary land ... will signal the loss
of power which is usually derived from the special
bond between people and their land.  It is this power
that brought giant mining companies crawling into
the courtroom; this same power legitimises our
rights to demand compensation from unscrupulous
transnational corporations; it is the power that holds
at bay bad business practices by foreigners by way
of prolonging negotiations, demanding proper
business deals, environmental plans, etc...  It would
be the beginning of division and destabilisation of
families, clans, tribes, communities and ultimately
the nation, hence the disintegration of our traditional
cultural autonomy (17 July 1995).
We know we are blessed with resources.  We are a
rich people with what we have - people who know
their true connection to the land will understand this.
Take the land from us, and we are true beggars on
our own soil (1 August 1995).
Land tenure is a Western concept like many other
foreign ideas which have failed terribly in this
country.  Land entitlement over time changes hands
and does not belong to a particular person, clan or
tribe for that matter.  That is why we have land
disputes all over the country...  If the landowners
and not landlords wish to participate in meaningful
development then teach them to be developers of
their own land.  Let them borrow the money from
the banks and let them run their own businesses
on their own land.  In this way we will have self
sustainable development co-existing with unspoiled
cultural environment.  Our land will not be turned to
desert by foreign companies (4 August 1995).
Source: Filer 1997a
Registration would promote the cunning middleman
looking for the slightest opportunity to make profit
at the expense of the silent customary landowner.....
Minor disputes within a clan may be suppressed in
order to get land registered.  Once the land’s value
has increased the land owner who was not happy
in the beginning cannot come back and sue
anybody because now he has to deal with a
corporate body’s land (10 August 1995).
We believe the Government’s wish to register our
customary land is a calculated move by it and the
World Bank to wreck the normal, easy and simple
village life of all customary landowners within this
country, which we know is one of [the] best in the
whole world (25 August 1995).
The assumption that a country’s age-old traditional
system can be wiped out at the whim of a financial
institution shows the contempt of outsiders for this
growing nation...  My brothers: in the Bible Esau
‘sold his birthright for a mess of pottage’!  Let us
pray that this Papua New Guinea of ours under
God, does not commit that same foolish error!  The
bride gives herself gladly to the groom: together
they find happiness in the future.  The groom rapes
the bride: tragedy is assured.  Landed or Landless:
It is the people’s time to choose (22 September
1995).
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landowners to misappropriate the benefits due to their respective
communities (see section 8.4).  But these efforts have not been widely
appreciated because they are seen to entail a perpetuation or reinforcement
of paternalistic forms of state intervention in the disposition of customary
land (see Taylor 1997).
The origin and application of the Land Groups Incorporation Act provides an
interesting illustration of the relationship between forest policy and the
neighbouring domains of agricultural and mineral policy, where all three
are fundamentally concerned with the use of customary land for
commercial production.  As previously noted (see section 2.5), the Act was
originally intended to facilitate the return of coastal plantations to
customary ownership, and thus represented a turning point in the
agricultural policy process (as well as the land policy process) at the time of
national independence.  However, the Act was hardly ever used for this (or
any other) purpose until it was ‘rediscovered’ by Chevron Niugini during
the development of the Kutubu petroleum project, and used as a vehicle for
organising local ‘clans’ as collective shareholders in the landowner
companies supported by Chevron’s business development staff.  Having
thus become part of the mineral policy process, this vehicle promptly
travelled across to the forest policy process, when the new Forestry Act
proposed that it should also be used to organise those landowning
communities who might henceforth enter into Forest Management
Agreements with the State (see section 8.4).
Generally speaking, PNG’s forest policy process does seem to borrow more
of its features from the mineral policy process than from the agricultural
policy process.  Agricultural policy is primarily concerned with the
relationship between large-scale production on leasehold land and small-
scale production on customary land, with the balance between export crop
production and food crop production, and with the role of the state in the
conduct of research, extension and marketing.  Mineral policy is primarily
concerned with the ownership and control of large-scale, capital-intensive
mineral export ventures and the distribution of mineral resource rents
between national stakeholders.  Small-scale mining is a marginal economic
activity, the domestic market for mineral products is very limited, and
government personnel play no direct role in the mineral production
process.  In the mining and petroleum sector, NGOs play the role of
7.3 Primary production policies
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environmental advocates, donor agencies play hardly any role at all, local
communities are organised around the collection and distribution of
‘benefit packages’ delivered by the developers, and the developers do far
more than government agencies to organise local communities for this
purpose.  In the agricultural sector, government agencies, foreign investors,
industry corporations, donors and NGOs are all in the business of
developing small-scale production on customary land - by seeking to
promote technical innovation, widen the scale of cooperation, and raise the
productivity of labour - but their impact is constrained by the sheer size of
the target population, and most village farmers therefore remain detached
from the rest of the policy process.
The forest policy process has come to resemble the mineral policy process
because the logging (or mining) of natural forests has become the dominant
economic activity in the forestry sector.  It would have been more like the
agricultural policy process if the national government had retained the
earlier emphasis on plantation forestry and found some way to relate large-
scale investment in forest plantations with woodlot cultivation or small-
scale harvesting of natural forest in adjoining areas of customary land.  But
the only surviving example of this kind of relationship is the Gogol
Oil palm plantation, West New Britain. Large oil palm estates were established on converted
forest land under resettlement schemes initiated by the colonial administration.  Although palm
oil now ranks as the second most important agricultural export, conflicts between estate workers
and customary landowners have reduced the impetus for resettlement
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woodchip project in Madang Province, in which plantation forestry and
woodlot cultivation have always played second fiddle to the clear-felling of
natural forest, and which has long since ceased to function as a model for
other investments in the forestry sector.  Between the log export industry
and the mineral export industry, there are many similarities in the mutual
relationships of resource developers, local landowners, government
regulators, and environmental NGOs.  The most obvious differences stem
from the contrast between ‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ ways of doing business,
and from the fact that Western mining and petroleum companies dominate
their enclaves far more thoroughly, and for longer periods of time, than
Asian logging companies.
But this is not the only way in which the forest policy process is affected by
the opposition of Western and Asian forms of development.  Firstly,
Western donors (including the World Bank) have been the main instigators
of policy reform in the forestry sector, and in this one respect have made
national forest policy look rather more like agricultural than mineral policy.
These donor interventions have also had the effect of giving local NGOs a
more varied stake in the forest policy process: they are no longer confined
to environmental advocacy, as they are in the mineral policy domain, but
are more actively engaged in the promotion of alternative forms of
development, as they are in the agricultural domain.  The fact that Western
donors have kept a low profile in the mining and petroleum sector seems to
reflect their belief that Western mining and petroleum companies, unlike
Asian logging companies, already act as responsible corporate citizens in
PNG.  The mining and petroleum companies have repaid this compliment
by granting moral and financial support to forest conservation projects,
thus joining the ranks of the donors in the forest policy process.
Meanwhile, in the agricultural sector, Asian companies have been
displacing Western companies (and Western donors) as sources of foreign
investment, just as they had previously done in the forestry sector.  This
further process of ‘Asianisation’ has included a series of investment
proposals for large-scale ‘agroforestry’ projects which would involve the
clear-felling of natural forest and the development of new tree crop
plantations in their place (see section 8.5).  Although these proposals seem
to follow the example set by the existing oil palm schemes, which were
pioneered by the Australian colonial administration, they have been treated
with grave suspicion by Western donors, who tend to regard them as
logging projects disguised as agricultural projects in order to bypass the
provisions of the new Forestry Act.  From this point of view, forest policy
begins to look like the subject of a tug-of-war between a collection of
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Western corporate and governmental interests, whose main economic stake
is located in the mining and petroleum sector, and an assortment of Asian
corporate and governmental interests which is steadily encroaching on all
other sectors of the national economy.  But the economic dimensions of this
contest are concealed, to some extent, by the presence of a third consortium
of Western environmentalists, Christian church groups and local NGOs,
whose members are generally hostile to capital-intensive forms of primary
production.
Although we can detect certain points of resemblance between forest policy
and other primary production policies, and even connect these to the
influence which some stakeholders exert in several policy domains, we
should not overestimate the extent to which specific institutions or practices
are transferred from one policy process to another.  The various applications
of the Land Groups Incorporation Act in all three branches of primary
production reflect the underlying significance of land policy for all of them,
but each branch has its own specific legal framework and fiscal regime, and
there is little evidence to suggest that the national government or any other
stakeholders (with the possible exception of the World Bank) have
deliberately sought to achieve a greater measure of consistency between
them.  The number of individuals - be they public servants, company
executives, environmental advocates, or resource owners - who are actively
engaged in more than one of these policy domains at any one time is very
small, and so is their collective influence.  This means that there are very few
opportunities for stakeholders engaged in the forest policy process to learn
lessons or borrow ideas from those engaged in the mineral or agricultural
policy domains.
In the period since Independence, successive governments have made a
great deal of noise about the virtues of import substitution and the need to
develop the ‘downstream processing’ of minerals, timber, food or export
crops - whether for local or overseas markets.  This kind of ‘industrial
rhetoric’ has commonly been directed towards the ‘law and order’ problem
which is attributed to the growing army of unemployed and under-educated
urban youth, whose members are apparently unable or unwilling to find
work in the primary production zone.  In practice, the urban population has
expanded far more rapidly than the volume of formal sector employment in
urban areas, and security firms have created more new jobs than any other
kind of private company.
7.4 Secondary production policies
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The most obvious opportunities for import substitution (in the food and
textile sectors, for example) had been exhausted within a few years of
Independence.  During the 1980s, the government embarked on a series of
‘special deals’ with individual investors, using import controls and other
forms of protection to create artificial monopolies in specific branches of
production.  These have made no positive impact on the overall levels of
investment or productivity in the manufacturing sector, which still only
accounts for 8 per cent of GDP, 5 per cent of exports, and 5 per cent of
formal sector employment.  And yet, despite the evidence of long-term
stagnation, the government has continued to produce absurdly ambitious
plans for further industrial development.  In 1993, for example, the
Department of Trade and Industry produced a policy document (‘Beyond
the Minerals Boom’) which promised to raise industrial output to 35 per
cent of GDP, double manufacturing investment and manufactured exports,
and quadruple formal employment in the manufacturing sector.
After two rounds of structural adjustment and the establishment of the
World Trade Organisation, the multilateral financial institutions now seem
to have won their long battle to persuade the government to sell its own
investments in manufacturing enterprise, get rid of import bans and
quotas, abolish domestic price controls, and abandon legal restrictions on
foreign ownership of certain kinds of business.  But while they may be
right to argue that these measures are necessary conditions for any further
economic expansion in the secondary production zone, it is not so clear
that they will be sufficient to overcome the many institutional constraints
which still exist.  Having presented a long list of such ‘liabilities’ (see Box
7.2), an economist with the Asian Development Bank suggests that
downstream processing of export crops and natural resources for niche
export markets and domestic consumption represents the only viable
strategy for job creation in the ‘commerce and industry’ sector, and
observes that the local furniture industry is especially well-placed to take
advantage of the availability of tropical hardwoods and indigenous wood-
carving skills (Cole 1997:111).  But if such opportunities have not
previously been exploited, one may wonder how much of the blame can be
laid at the door of the government’s formal policies on trade and
investment, and therefore how much difference will be made by the reform
of these policies.
Once we recognise that the industrial policy process merges into the urban
policy process, and therefore reaches out to embrace the problems of urban
housing, crime and unemployment, it no longer seems feasible to argue
that its dimensions will be radically altered by lifting restrictions on trade
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and investment.  Despite the government’s stated willingness to toe the
World Bank’s line on trade and investment policy, there is still broad public
support for the idea that national entrepreneurs and national workers need
to be protected from foreign ‘exploitation’, just as they need to be protected
from criminal gangs.  When public debate concentrates on the relationship
between industrial policy and forest policy, all stakeholders seem to agree
that downstream processing is a good thing, but their agreement conceals a
fundamental divergence of interests, motives and strategies.  National
politicians and NGOs have propounded the merits of a log export ban in
the belief that this would either force foreign capital out of the forest
industry, or else force foreign investors to employ more national workers,
but would at least give Papua New Guineans a greater share of the income
obtained from a more sustainable rate of extraction.  The World Bank and
its allies have decried such measures on the grounds that they would
encourage the growth of inefficient and uncompetitive processing
operations, lower the domestic price of raw logs, and thus reduce the
income available to resource owners, without providing any guarantee of
better logging practices.  This is not just an argument about the role of free
trade and state regulation in producing the most efficient or sustainable use
of available resources; it is also an argument about the ‘correct’ distribution
of political and economic power between national and foreign stakeholders.
And if the World Bank is correct, this second argument is misleading
because it conceals a more fundamental conflict of interest between the
rural and urban segments of the population.
Source: Cole 1997
• High operating costs (e.g. electricity, telephones, factory space, transport)
• Difficulties in acquiring registered land
• Strong exchange rate
• High wage costs
• Dearth of technical and managerial skills
• Small, fragmented domestic market
• Complacency about developing non-resource sectors
• Dependence on expatriate ownership and management
• Law and order problems
• Cumbersome approval process for new investment
• Uncoordinated system of incentives
Box 7.2  Obstacles to industrial development in PNG
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When the Deputy Prime Minister presented the 1997 budget to the national
parliament in December 1996, he tabled a ‘Finance Statement’ which
proudly recorded the government’s implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP) which was initiated in August 1995, when
the World Bank approved an Economic Rescue Programme (ERP) worth
K254 million.  Amongst the micro-economic reforms included in this list of
great achievements was the introduction of a new forest revenue system,
the adoption of a Logging Code of Practice, the provision of additional
funding to the NFA, and improvements in the supervision of PNG’s log
exports.  What the ministerial statement failed to record was the
government’s repeated efforts to repudiate or ignore its commitment to
meet the twenty-seven conditions attached to the original loan package,
especially those which bound it to maintain the process of policy reform in
the forestry sector.  It was only because the government had failed in its
attempts to raise additional revenue from other sources that it was finally
obliged to allow the Bank to dictate the terms of the 1997 Budget in order to
secure the release of a second tranche of loans worth K150 million.
The critical question raised during the course of this struggle was the extent
to which the Prime Minister and some of his Cabinet colleagues were
engaged in a deliberate campaign to discredit the SAP as a whole in order
to deflect public attention from the undertakings they had given to
powerful allies in the log export industry.  It may be argued, for example,
that ‘influential opponents of the ERP’ (Van Helden n.d.:13) were behind the
student-led protests against the Bank’s proposals for ‘land reform’ in July
1995, especially considering that these protests coincided with the Bank’s
approval of the loan package, and that ‘land reform’ was not one of the
twenty-seven strings attached to it.  On the other hand, the Bank had its
own reasons to highlight the significance of those strings which were
attached to the forest policy process, because these were tailor-made to
show that structural adjustment could promote sustainable development,
and thus appease some of the Bank’s customary critics.  In any case, it was
the government which eventually underlined the significance of these
conditions, firstly when the Prime Minister announced his opposition to the
new forest revenue system during the course of a visit to Rimbunan Hijau’s
Malaysian headquarters in April 1996, and then again in July 1996, when
the Forest Minister persuaded Parliament to pass an amendment to the
Forestry Act which gave Cabinet the power to appoint members of the
National Forest Board.  Although the majority of MPs were prepared to
accept that these measures represented a victory for the principle of
7.5 Structural adjustment and governance policies
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national sovereignty, rather than a breach of faith with the donor
community, the World Bank still had the economic leverage required to
humiliate the government, and a much better stock of ammunition for its
own campaign to win the support of local NGOs and other national
stakeholders who had become increasingly vociferous about PNG’s general
‘crisis of governance’, as well as the more specific crisis of forest policy.
While the World Bank and other donors may be happy to emphasise those
aspects of the SAP which are clearly intended to bolster their own control
over the process of policy reform in the forestry sector, they may also be
diverting attention from other features of the programme which have a less
direct and less predictable impact on this process.  For example, the new
forest revenue system is only one item in a package of tax reform measures
which are all likely to affect the economics of the forest industry in one way
or another.  The Forest Industries Association has thus been able to extend
its own battle against the new forest revenue system by joining a wider
chorus of opposition to the introduction of a Value Added Tax, arguing that
VAT will make a further dent in the ‘normal’ rate of profit which the new
revenue system has already imposed on the log export industry (despite the
compensating gains which might accrue from the simultaneous reduction
of import duties and real wages) (see section 8.10).
If ‘sustainable forest management’ is one of the general pretexts for the SAP,
this may or may not turn out to be consistent with its other general
objectives — the promotion of economic growth, the streamlining of
government capacity, or the alleviation of rural poverty.  In the ideal world
of the aid donor, these may all be part and parcel of a single process of
‘development’.  In practice, however, gains in one direction often come at
the expense of losses in another, and there is no obvious reason why forest
management’ should be amongst the winners, rather than the losers.  For
example, if the programme does enable the national government to balance
its books, it will also give national politicians greater freedom to escape the
straitjacket which donor-driven policy reforms have recently placed on
their relationships with logging companies.  And local landowners will
have all the more reason to join them if the programme has a neutral or
negative impact on rural standards of living.
In the short term at least, the pain of structural adjustment will be felt by
several groups of national stakeholders (politicians, public servants, other
wage-earners) whose interest in forest policy bears no comparison to their
interest in ‘bread-and-butter’ issues, and who may not appreciate the long-
term benefits of evil-tasting medicine.  The rain which is supposed to
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fertilise the national economy will also make a lot of people wet and
miserable.  If the proponents of structural adjustment have succeeded in
persuading their audience that ‘sustainable forest management’ is a crucial
part of this unstable weather pattern, then it may become the baby which is
thrown out with the bathwater when this particular package of reforms is
abandoned or amended because of its apparent failure to solve many of the
country’s social or economic problems.
The risk that it will be seen to have failed, sooner rather than later, is
compounded by the wealth of natural resources which gives the national
government room to push its own cross-sectoral policy packages across the
path of reform favoured by the donor community.  While the SAP
represents the leading edge of a donor-driven policy process in which all
forms of ‘tied aid’ are tied together by similar assumptions about the
current ‘weakness’ of PNG’s political economy, donors are still forced to
trade their own preferences for those of national politicians who do not
share these assumptions.  The most obvious example is the current process
of provincial and local government reform which purports to solve the
nation’s ‘crisis of governance’ by concentrating more power in the hands of
national MPs.  The SAP tinkers at the edge of this reform process by
insisting that the new provincial and local-level governments should
henceforth receive the resources needed to function effectively, despite the
general fiscal crisis of the state, but the World Bank could not persuade
national MPs to give up their notorious ‘slush funds’ in the name of greater
accountability, and took the softer option of insisting that the government
should try to improve the delivery of health and education services to rural
areas by granting additional resources to the churches which already
administer many of these services.  But if the process of provincial and local
government reform still fails to deliver the goods, its instigators will be
only too keen to blame the sacrifices forced upon them by the SAP.
The Structural Adjustment Programme and the new Organic Law on
Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments are not the only cross-
sectoral policy packages which seem to have some bearing on the forest
policy process.  It is not difficult to find other formal statements of
government policy, like the National Population Policy of 1991, which are
7.6 The National Sustainable
Development Strategy?
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no less relevant to this process.  But it is necessary to distinguish here
between those policy statements which are subject to intense and protracted
public debate, and thus evoke a real transformation in stakeholder
relations, and those whose impact barely reaches beyond the imagination of
the professional policy-maker.  There certainly has been a good deal of
public debate about PNG’s National Sustainable Development Strategy
(NSDS), and this did provide a bridge by which arguments about
population policy could cross into the domain of forest policy, but the
bridge was only open for a limited period of time, and efforts to rebuild it
have since become the unsung speciality of donor-funded experts who do
not even issue press releases.
As the Rio Earth Summit coincided with the national election of 1992, so
public debate on the NSDS coincided with the most radical phase of the
forest policy reform process under the Wingti-Chan government, and soon
lapsed into silence after the change of government which took place in
August 1994.  The DEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs hosted a
post-UNCED seminar on ‘Sustainable Development’ in November 1992; the
University of PNG devoted its biennial Waigani Seminar to the same topic
in September 1993; and the University of Technology followed suit with its
Huon Seminar in June 1994.  All three meetings were attended by a wide
range of stakeholder representatives, and attracted a good deal of publicity
through the reproduction of seminar papers in the national press.
Participants in the first of these three meetings agreed that the UNCED
Steering Committee should draft Terms of Reference for a ‘Technical
Taskforce’, develop ‘the Mission, Objectives, Functions and Activities of the
NSDS Steering Committee’, and combine with the Departments of the
Prime Minister, Finance and Planning, Environment and Conservation, and
Foreign Affairs to prepare a ‘substantive policy submission’ to the National
Executive Council (PNGDEC/PNGDFAT 1993:11-12).  These tasks seem to
have defeated the executive capabilities of the relevant government
agencies until September 1993, when a ‘Joint Interagency Mission’ of the
United Nations initiated a series of provincial meetings under the auspices
of the ‘NSDS Working Committee’.  In March 1994, Cabinet approved a
policy submission which finally made provision for the establishment of an
NSDS Steering Committee and Secretariat, but failed to resolve the question
of which government department would function as the lead agency.  The
UN mission simply recommended that the NSDS Secretariat should be
housed in the ‘Department of Planning’, which did not then exist.  By the
time that membership of the NSDS Steering Committee (under the
chairmanship of the DEC Secretary) was gazetted in the latter part of 1994,
the new Chan-Haiveta government had already decided to abolish the
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Policy Coordination and Monitoring Committee within the Prime
Minister’s Department, but had not yet decided to separate the National
Planning Office from the Department of Finance and Planning.
As a result, the second UN mission which arrived to assist the NSDS
Steering Committee in August 1994 was preoccupied with the question of
institutional responsibilities, to the obvious neglect of strategies for
securing broad popular participation in the planning process (Nadarajah
1995:8-9).  The main recommendation of the second mission was for a third
mission to be funded under the UN’s Capacity 21 programme, and spend
more time on the task of strengthening the government’s own planning
capacities.  After some months of deliberation, the new government did
manage to recreate a National Planning Ministry, and by the end of 1995,
the new minister had succeeded in extracting the National Planning Office
from the Department of Finance and Planning.
Meanwhile, the NSDS had fallen into one of the black holes reserved for the
ruminations of inter-departmental committees which have no immediate
budgetary impact, and received no mention at all in that part of the 1996
Budget Papers which dealt with the functions of the NPO.  As one
disgruntled commentator noted at the end of 1995:
After three years of work through the preparation of various policy papers,
documents, seminars and workshops, NSDS seems to be homeless.  The
interest and participation in this process has been fragmented, and no tangible
outcome has resulted from the past three years of formulation (ibid:26).
Although the UN’s Capacity 21 mission duly arrived in early 1996, with an
obvious mandate to resurrect the NSDS policy process, this mission also
came to the conclusion that nothing much could be done until the NPO had
been properly structured and strengthened.  The National Planning
Minister appointed his own committee of advisers to reflect on long-term
planning issues, but this ‘National Dreaming Committee’ (as it came to be
known in some quarters) had no explicit stake in the NSDS.  According to
the NPO’s new Director, the more immediate priority was to escape the
‘crisis mentality’ which had gripped the central organs of the state by
constructing a ‘fiscal responsibility package’ which would address five key
questions:
• how much should government be paying for health [and] education and
how much of the costs in these areas should be met by users?
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• how much of what the Public Service now does must be done by Public
Servants and how much can be contracted out?
• how rational is the government machine and can its cost be reduced?
• can we match resources that must go to the provinces with
responsibilities for expenditures?
• can we limit the numbers in the public service in Waigani and the
provinces? (Ai 1997:219)
These were clearly questions of structural adjustment, rather than questions
of sustainable development.  And while it is true that the NPO now has
more than its fair share of transient UN-funded consultants, some of whom
are meant to dig the NSDS out of its black hole and use it to strengthen
provincial and local planning capacities, experience suggests that most of
what the UN touches in this way will turn to stone when the consultants
make their exit, and one must therefore wonder how many more white
magicians will have to wave their wands at the NSDS before it takes root
and grows in the local soil.
Sustainable forest management could only be one component of the NSDS,
though it would obviously have to be a major component in a country like
PNG.  Questions of forest policy certainly were the focus of much of the
discussion which took place in the public meetings devoted to the NSDS in
the period from 1992 to 1994.  At the end of 1994, the NFCAP review team
even recommended that the same body should be responsible for
coordinating the NSDS and the second phase of the NFCAP.  In a sense, this
recommendation has now been implemented, because the NPO is officially
responsible for both of these activities, but what this means, in practice, is
that both are equally neglected or invisible - pieces in a technocratic jig-saw
puzzle on a table in a UN office in Port Moresby, far from the noise of battle
still being waged over the future of the country’s forest resources.32
32 
In April 1998, the Ministry of National Planning and Implementation was abolished and the NPO was returned to the bosom of
the Department of Treasury (formerly Finance).  Even after two years of design studies, the UNDP is unwilling to give the green
light for implementation of what is now called the Strengthening National and Decentralised Planning Systems Project, unless
or until the PNG government demonstrates its own willingness and ability to plan the future of its own planning institutions.
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The castle in the
forest: reforming
industrial forestry policy
In this section, we evaluate the progress which has been made in the reform of
industrial forestry policy in the period since 1989, concentrating our
discussion on those features of the National Forest Policy and the new Forestry
Act which have been the most prominent topics of debate between the main
stakeholders in the forestry sector.  This central component of our policy
drama may be divided into four ‘acts’ by reference to changes in the
composition of the national government and corresponding changes in the
occupation of the Forests Ministry.
• In the first act, which began with the installation of the Namaliu
government after a parliamentary vote of no confidence in July 1988, the
Forests Ministry was held by Karl Stack (from August 1988 to April 1991)
and Jack Genia (from April 1991 to July 1992).  During this period, the
revelations of the Barnett Inquiry in 1989 were followed by the inception of
the NFCAP and the imposition of a government moratorium on the issue of
new timber permits in 1990, the production of a new National Forest Policy
(‘the Policy’) and a new Forestry Act (‘the Act’) in 1991, and gazettal of the
latter piece of legislation in 1992.  These were the foundations of the reform
process conceived in the ‘partnership’ between the national government
and the donor community.
• In the second act, which began with the installation of the second Wingti-
Chan coalition government after the national election of July 1992, the
Forests Ministry was held by Tim Neville (from August 1992 to August
1994).  The main topic of debate in this period was the set of National
Forestry Development Guidelines (‘the Guidelines’) introduced in 1993,
which represented the high water mark in the tide of policy reform, and
against which the logging industry and its allies mounted a furious defence.
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• In the third act, which began with the installation of the Chan-Haiveta
coalition government after another vote of no confidence in August 1994,
the Forests Ministry was held by the two Andrews, Andrew Posai (from
September 1994 to May 1995) and Andrew Baing (from August 1995 to
July 1997).  The main topic of debate in this period was the national
government’s attempt to wind back several key elements of the reform
process, but the only significant monument to its efforts was the National
Forest Plan (‘the Plan’) produced in 1996.  These efforts were largely
unsuccessful because the government was trapped in the conditionalities
of the Structural Adjustment Programme orchestrated by the World
Bank.
• In the fourth act, which began with the installation of the Skate
government after the national election of July 1997, the Forests Ministry
has so far been held by Fabian Pok.  As this act continues to unfold, the
contest between the loggers and donors continues apace, and the
government has so far sat on its hands.  The policy innovations which
have so far been mooted during this period are discussed at greater
length in section 13 of this study.
Our discussion of different aspects of the policy reform process is organised
around the topics established by the Policy, the Act, and the Guidelines.
The amount of space which we devote to each of these topics partly reflects
the amount of debate which each of them has generated, though much of
this debate has taken place behind the closed doors which surround the
central corridors of power.  The one enduring theme which emerges from
most of these ‘scenes’ in our play is the problem posed by the unassailable
fact of customary resource ownership for those stakeholders who wish to
assert greater control over the utilisation of forest resources without
‘wasting time’ in discussion with their customary owners.  This theme is
commemorated in the tightly guarded gates which surround the
expensively carpeted and air-conditioned offices of the new Forest
Authority, our ‘castle in the forest’.
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The most contentious issue in public debate over the reform of industrial
forestry policy has been the relationship between the Forests Minister and
the NFA.  Successive ministers (and other national politicians) have made a
series of attempts to amend the Act in ways which would reassert
ministerial control over the membership and deliberations of the National
Forest Board.  Some of these efforts have received the tacit support of the
logging companies and the more open backing of those resource owners
(especially the directors of landowner companies) whose own stake in the
industry would be diminished by the process of reform.  They have
generally been opposed by the donors (especially the World Bank) and
those national stakeholders who have nothing to gain from the exercise of
greater ministerial discretion.
The significance of this issue was underscored during Karl Stack’s
occupation of the Forests Ministry, when Cabinet responded to the findings
of the Barnett Inquiry by imposing a moratorium on the issue of new
timber permits, firstly in those provinces which already accounted for the
bulk of raw log exports, and then throughout the whole of the country.
Even after the second moratorium had been imposed (in July 1990), the
Minister continued to produce all sorts of reasons for adding to the list of
projects which had initially been exempted on the grounds that they were
‘extensions to existing projects’.  By the end of 1990, he was maintaining
that the moratorium did not apply to ‘defunct projects being revived’,
projects which had been ‘allocated for some time’, projects which were
‘ready for allocation’, and new projects which could be substituted for those
which had previously been exempted, but which were ‘now having
problems’ (Post-Courier, 2 January 1991).  Stack justified his flexibility by
reference to the pressures which other stakeholders were exerting on his
own discretionary powers.
The fact of the matter is that my ministry is implementing the moratorium in
spite of the political (both provincial and national) and landowners’ pressure to
allow more projects to be developed...  In spite of daily lobbying and visits by
landowners and politicians to the Department of Forests and my ministry, we
are strongly honouring the moratorium and our advice to them has been that
until its expiry in 1992 the moratorium must stand...  I would like to make it
clear it was at my own initiative that the moratorium has been imposed and it
would be ridiculous if I were now to contradict it by allowing more projects
than the ones exempted (Post-Courier, 11 December 90).
8.1 The Minister, the Act, and the Authority
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Since the Minister had never seen fit to reveal the identity of the projects
which he had not approved because they were covered by the moratorium,
it was difficult to establish the criteria by which he had been dealing, on a
daily basis, with the queues of ‘landowners and politicians’ at his office
door.  Given the number of years which normally passed between the
demarcation of a TRP and the removal of the trees which it contained, it
was equally difficult to believe that there was any such project whose
Timber Permit might conceivably have been allocated before July 1992,
with or without the moratorium.  By the time that Jack Genia took over the
Ministry in April 1991, there was a widespread public perception that the
Minister still had a free hand to issue timber permits as and when he felt
inclined to do so.
The World Bank’s determination to reduce the area of ministerial discretion
was already evident in comments made on the second draft of the Forestry
Bill in March 1991.  A third draft, which addressed the Bank’s concerns, was
the one tabled in Parliament by Minister Genia in July, but when it was
passed a week later, it turned out to contain a number of ‘last-minute’
amendments.
• Section 7 (‘Functions of the Authority’) was amended to read:
‘Notwithstanding anything in this clause and subject to any law, the
Minister may give any direction he considers necessary to the Authority,
through the Board, for the purpose of implementing the objectives and
the functions of the Authority.’
• Section 19 (‘Delegation’) was amended to read: ‘The Minister may, after
consultation with the Board, by instrument delegate to any person all or
any of the powers and functions of the Board under this Act (except this
power of delegation).’
• Section 40 (‘Consultants’) was amended to read: ‘The Minister may, from
time to time - (a) after consultation with the Board and the Director-
General; and (b) within the limits of funds available for the purpose; and
(c) on such terms and conditions as are fixed by the Minister on advice of
the Board - appoint as employees of the Authority such consultants as, in
the opinion of the Minister on the advice of the Board, are necessary for
the purposes of the Authority.’
When these amendments came to light, they attracted some adverse
comment in the national press.  John Millett, Executive Director of the
Institute of National Affairs (PNG’s private sector think-tank), found the
first of them:
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difficult to interpret because it gives an over-riding power to a Minister of the
national government to direct the affairs of the authority which is meant to
represent all of the diverse forestry interests, including provincial
governments.....  There could be only two reasons for the Minister to be
unhappy with the board: It is not doing the right thing; or it is not doing the
thing right.  The first reason is related to policy, the second to implementation.
The remedy for the first sin is to change the policy and for the second one to
change the board.  In neither case does the effective remedy rest with the
Minister telling the board what to do and how to do it.  That would be like
barking after you have bought a dog.....  The rushed amendments have
introduced a second-best ‘catch-all’ contingent remedy where none was
necessary because the bill already contained first-best remedies; but it has
eroded and weakened the potential of the authority to discharge its statutory
responsibilities positively and objectively without fear or favour because
wherever the Act provides for board discretion the Minister may direct the
board to exercise that discretion in particular ways (Post-Courier, 2 August
1991).
Nevertheless, the remaining provisions of the new Act would not have
allowed the Minister to use such extra powers to allocate timber permits in
the absence of a National Forest Plan, and it seems that this was one of the
main reasons why he then sought to delay its gazettal.  The other reason, as
stated by his Departmental Secretary, Michael Komtagarea, was that the
government had yet to approve a structure and budget for the NFA.
The task of finding ways and means of replacing the old Department with
the new Authority was placed in the hands of the Forestry Transitional
Management Council (FTMC), which began its work in February 1992, with
substantial inputs from consultants engaged under the NFCAP.  At the
beginning of April, the FTMC Chairman, Wep Kanawi, secured the
signature of the Acting Forests Minister, Michael Singan, on documents
which would require gazettal of the Act on the 15th of that month (Post-
Courier, 7 April 1992)33.  Secretary Komtagarea instantly complained that he
had not been consulted, despite his own membership of the Council, and
that the Acting Minister should not have signed the documents after
previously writing to advise the Prime Minister of the need for further
delay (Post-Courier, 8 April 1992).  Singan explained that he signed the
documents because the World Bank had indicated the risk which further
delay would pose for donor support of the NFCAP (Post-Courier, 10 April
1992).  When Genia resumed the Ministry later in the month, he announced
33 
Singan was accompanying the Prime Minister on a campaign trip through the latter’s own constituency in East New Britain
Province.
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that the new act would not come into force until the 25th of June, because it
was first necessary to renew or extend nineteen timber permits which were
due to expire in 1992, and premature gazettal would entail a substantial
loss of revenue and frustrate the long-standing expectations of landowners
(Post-Courier, 22 April 1992).
It was then reported that eleven senior staff of the DOF had signed a
petition complaining about their Secretary’s insistence on rushing the
approval of ten new timber projects before the Act was gazetted, to which
the Secretary had replied that these were ‘the directives of Cabinet and if
the officers don’t want to work under pressure to get them off the ground,
they might as well resign’ (Post-Courier, 28 April 1992).  Next month, it was
reported that he had physically prevented the gazettal of the Act by
removing it from the government printery after it had been signed by the
Governor-General (Times of PNG, 14 May 1992), provoking a general outcry
from the NGO community.
At the end of May, it was reported that the FTMC had secured legal advice
on the validity of timber permits issued in breach of the moratorium
imposed by Cabinet in July 1990 and renewed in December 1991.  Part of
the advice was reported as follows:
Unfortunately any permits issued in breach of the moratorium will be valid
but they can be reviewed under provincial laws.  The only hope is for decisive
action to be taken by the prime minister to ensure that the minister and
secretary for forests and their staff observe the clear statement of government
policy (Times of PNG, 28 May 1992).
The source of this advice was the Islands Regional Secretariat’s legal officer,
Graham Powell, who had been counsel assisting the Barnett Inquiry, who
had more recently advised the Islands Premiers Council to challenge the
last-minute amendments made to the Forestry Act, and who had also helped
to draft the a piece of legislation by which the East New Britain Provincial
Government was now trying to prevent the issue of two new timber
permits in Secretary Komtagarea’s own district of origin (Post-Courier, 29
July 1992).
On the 1st of June, the Prime Minister complained that certain timber
companies and DOF officials were seeking to ‘by-pass’ the provisions of the
new Act, but that he and his fellow ministers would not allow for such
abuse.  The newspaper which reported this complaint also published the
text of a letter which he had previously written to Minister Genia,
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instructing him to gazette the Act ‘no later than June 25’.  The letter
continued:
The postponement of gazettal of this major piece of our government’s
legislation to the end of our current term of office is regrettable, particularly in
the light of the considerable work which has gone into the preparation for the
April ‘D’ Day which you had publicly pronounced; it may also have
unfortunate implications with the donor agencies, which were well aware of
the April deadline.....  We cannot afford further negative publicity over an
initiative which should be seen as a major achievement for our government.....
We must therefore clearly demonstrate that this is a once off postponement,
and does not detract from our commitment to effectively implement the new
policy and legislation (Post-Courier, 2 June 1992).
The text of another letter to Minister Genia, written by the World Bank’s
Director for East Asia and the Pacific on the 17th of April, was apparently
‘leaked’ in the same package.  This one supported the point previously
made by Michael Singan, advising that:
The Bank and other donors regard the new legislation and Forest Authority as
underpinning all other components of the NFCAP.  Continued delay in
promulgating legislation and instituting administrative reform will therefore
be interpreted by the donor community as an indication of waning
commitment of government to the reform process (Post-Courier, 2 June
1992).
On that same day, Minister Genia authorised a full-page newspaper
advertisement, entitled ‘Allocation of Timber Permits All In Order’, in
which he still maintained that all the projects for which he had issued
Timber Permits and Dealings were amongst the ten which Cabinet had
exempted from the moratorium in July 1990 and December 1991, and
denied that he had signed twenty-six new timber permits, as claimed in a
press release imputed to Wep Kanawi (see Box 8.1). This advertisement
prompted Opposition Leader Paias Wingti to promise another Commission
of Inquiry as part of his national election campaign.  It also seems to have
prompted some further leakages of inter-departmental correspondence.  On
the 11th of June, one newspaper published extracts from three letters
written to the Forests Secretary by the heads of other departments (Prime
Minister’s, Finance and Planning, Environment and Conservation) in which
they complained about the rush to issue new timber permits (Times of PNG,
11 June 1992).
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Box 8.1  Minister castigates bureaucrat
Apart from the moratorium imposed by Cabinet, I
as Minister for Forests still have all the power under
the Forestry Act to make decisions in the best
interest of the country and its people.  I have made
my stand public on a number of occasions and it
should not be a secret to anyone.  I have therefore
allowed a few small projects to be implemented in
certain least developed areas of PNG such as in
West New Britain, New Ireland, Morobe, Gulf and
Central...
I have approved new and am taking action with the
Department to renew Timber Permits (extensions)
but certainly I have not signed 26 of them as claimed
in the press release.  This is a blatant attempt to
sabotage the efforts of the Department and I in
carrying out Cabinet decisions.
It is still not clear to me what the motives are for Mr
Wep Kanawi and some advisors in releasing
baseless statements that only caused confusion.
Mr Kanawi should not overstep his appointment by
interfering in the operational functions of the
Department of Forests.  His function is mainly to
implement the smooth transition of the Department
of Forests, Divisions of Forests in provinces and
FIC to become the National Forest Authority.  He
has breached his authority by meddling in matters
he clearly does not have mandate in.
Had he forced the gazettal of the new Forestry Act
in April 1992, it would have been to the complete
Source: Post-Courier, 10 June 1992
detriment of the entire Forestry Sector, because he
was completely unprepared.  Only last week and
this week has he been bold enough to complete
the first draft of the Forest Authority which was never
available then because he was unhappy with the
work done by the Corporate Planning Consultant.
Even the draft submitted now is far from complete
and the Department, and in particular certain of its
divisions are completely rewriting their own
structures and duty statements.
Mr Kanawi has therefore misled everyone in
believing that he had completed the major tasks,
for which he was appointed....  His job is to produce
the structure and put a money tag on it, but leave
the detailed financial arrangements to those who
know better.
Lastly, landowners must continue to play a major
role in determining what happens to their resource,
and as much as any one else would like to think
differently the Government or Department of
Forests do not have total control over the forest
resources of this country.  No one can tell them to
lock up their resources if they do not have a positive
alternative to their expected income from developing
their forest resources.
Therefore anyone with an alternative solution
should now come forward and sell it to the resource
owners.  If it is acceptable I will stop issuing any
further new timber permits.
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Meanwhile, in that first week of June, a group of about seventy landowners
from six different provinces were said to have joined forces in Port Moresby to
persuade the Forests Minister to delay the gazettal of the new Act beyond
June 25 to allow for further ‘consultation’.  The group’s leader, Henry Peni,
was quoted as follows:
We don’t see any reason how the new Act will justify the protection of our rights
because it denies our rights.....  Because the government cannot do it for us, we
need to develop our resources to create employment and development in the rural
areas and earn an income.  What the government has done in its new Act is
creating a bottle neck situation for us landowners (Post-Courier, 9 June 1992).
Later that month, members of this group met to establish the PNG Forest
Resource Owners Association (FROA).  Interestingly enough, spokesmen for
the new association reportedly criticised the new Act for giving too much
power to the Minister and demanded that the FROA should have its own
representatives on the National Forest Board and the Provincial Forest
Management Committees.
The final shots in this particular aspect of the national election campaign
revolved around the accusations made against Minister Genia by various
Opposition MPs, to the effect that he had made an undertaking to grant more
timber licences to Rimbunan Hijau and its affiliates in return for a substantial
donation to the Pangu Pati’s campaign funds, and had ignored advice from
the FTMC which warned that these companies already controlled far too
much of the nation’s forest resources.  These accusations were strenuously
denied by the Minister himself, whose parting shot was to publish another
newspaper advertisement in which he recounted the splendid achievements
of his Department and its Secretary since the latter’s appointment in
September 1987, making particular reference to the twelve main
recommendations of the Barnett Inquiry (Post-Courier, 22 June 1996).
Nevertheless, two days after this advertisement was published, and one day
before the new Act was finally gazetted, the Minister did manage to issue
seventeen new timber permits (Henderson 1996).
When Parliament reconvened after the frenzied horse-trading which
customarily follows a national election, Paias Wingti recovered the
premiership which he had lost in 1988, consigning Jack Genia and the rest of
the Pangu Pati to the opposition benches34.  Although Wingti’s coalition
partners in the People’s Progress Party were known to have may friends in
the log export industry, and their leader, Julius Chan, was restored to his
34
 Genia was elected Leader of the Opposition, but died of a mysterious illness in 1993.
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previous role as Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister, the Forests
Ministry was allocated to an ‘independent’ MP, Tim Neville.  Like his
predecessor, Karl Stack, Neville was a wealthy white businessman, but one
who was rather more determined to show how wealth acquired outside of
the rainforest might provide some immunity from the temptations of this
particular office.  During the two years in which he held it, the flow of new
timber permits dried up completely, log shipments were delayed while the
Minister personally checked their credentials, and rumours of conspiracies
to murder him provided an extra touch of heroism in an Australian
television programme devoted to his exploits.  As the dashing ‘white
knight’ of the policy reform crusade, Neville relied on the support of an
unlikely pair of retainers.  First came Jean Kekedo, an experienced and
emotional public servant, who was appointed as Managing Director of the
NFA by the first meeting of the National Forest Board in December 1992,
and who once famously described herself as ‘a pawn in a sandwich’.  Then
came Conrad Smith, a Canadian consultant who was initially engaged to
conduct the ‘Forest Industry Development Studies’ prescribed by the
NFCAP, then appointed as the first General Manager of the National Forest
Service in September 1993, and who preferred the codename ‘Nemesis’ to
describe his own attitude towards the export logging industry, when
communicating through the Internet.  The slice of bread on which the day
of judgement had descended was defended by the same consortium of
loggers and landowner company directors whose public alliance had been
forged in the dying days of the previous government.
Despite Neville’s determination to make a clean break with the past, the
crusade took some time to muster its forces, because the NFA was by no
means ready for action when the Act was actually gazetted.  Although the
Prime Minister repeated his promise of a second judicial inquiry within
days of his election (Post-Courier, 7 August 1992), nothing more was heard
of this particular weapon.  And while the Forests Minister was uttering dire
threats against those timber companies which failed to register themselves
as legitimate ‘forest industry participants’35, several months elapsed before
he was able to remove the recalcitrant former Secretary, Michael
Komtagarea, from his new position as Acting Director-General of the new
Authority.  In January 1993, Komtagarea teamed up with the (Acting?)
Chairman of the National Forest Board to complain that the Minister had
35
 Under Part IV of the Act (Sections 104-114), all ‘forest industry participants and consultants’ were obliged to register with the
Forest Authority before doing business in the forestry sector.  Registration was at the discretion of the Board, and penalties
were prescribed for the conduct of various activities by unregistered persons.  The Policy (PNGMOF 1991:35) regarded the
process of registration as one of the strategies designed to secure the goal of greater national participation, but the Act treated
it as instrument for the control of malpractice.
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breached the Forestry Act by turning the ‘Director-General’ into a
‘Managing Director’ when making Kekedo’s substantive appointment to
the position, and by authorising the advertisement of several senior
management positions in the National Forest Service without even
consulting the Board (Post-Courier, 20 January 1993).  When these issues
were raised in Parliament, Neville announced that he would be seeking
special powers to suspend the entire Board under a Forestry (Interim
Arrangements) Bill, so that he would be able to expedite the establishment
of the National Forest Service and Provincial Forest Management
Committees, and get on with the business of producing the National
Forestry Development Guidelines and National Forest Plan without the
inconvenience of ‘obtaining board approval at every turn’ (Post-Courier, 18
February 1993).  This proposal did not go down too well with those other
crusaders who thought that the whole point of the new Forestry Act was to
ringfence the Minister’s powers and slow down the conduct of any
business which might lead him or anyone else to grant more timber permits
to the logging industry.  They persuaded him to settle for an amendment to
the Act which would reduce the size of the Board, and thus facilitate the
necessary meetings and decisions.  The Act, as duly amended in April 1993,
reduced its membership from eleven to six:
• the four provincial government representatives nominated by the
regional Premiers’ Councils were replaced by a single representative
appointed from a list submitted by the National Premiers’ Council;
• two (rather than three) heads of national government departments were
to be appointed by Cabinet in consultation with the Minister; and
• there was no place for the Minister’s own nominee.
The FIA and NANGO representatives remained on the Board.  The
amendments also confirmed the Minister’s previously stated intention to
divide the Director-General’s position between a Managing Director (as
Chairman of the Board) and a General Manager (as senior executive of the
National Forest Service).
By this time, the Minister was already in possession of a draft set of
National Forestry Development Guidelines (PNGMOF 1993a) which had
been prepared by some of the consultants engaged under the NFCAP,
including Conrad Smith.  At the beginning of May, Neville announced that
forest industry representatives had seven days in which to comment on this
document before he sought Cabinet approval, thus provoking the FIA to
wage a lengthy public campaign against several of the more radical
measures which it proposed, and which we shall discuss in subsequent
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sections of this study.  The FROA’s response, from which the FIA was
careful to distance itself, was to engage the services of an opposition
backbencher, Daniel Tulapi, to table a Private Member’s Bill which would
amend or repeal all those sections of the new Forestry Act which were seen
to restrict the freedom of the landowners (or landowner company directors)
to profit (or lose) from the sale of their own (or other people’s) resources to
the loggers of their choice36.  Under these proposed amendments:
• the National Forest Board would include three FROA representatives,
three FIA representatives, and three government representatives
(including the Managing Director), but no NANGO representative;
• all sections of the existing Act dealing with resource acquisition and
resource allocation would be repealed, thus giving the Board a free hand
in the issue of new timber permits; and
• all sections relating to the registration of forest industry participants, the
exercise of the state purchasing option, the imposition of penalties on
logging companies which failed to comply with permit conditions, the
powers to review existing projects, the prohibitions against export of
selected species, and the introduction of a new revenue system would
also be repealed.
Tulapi’s Bill even proposed to repeal one section (s.130) which had already
been repealed in Neville’s own amendments to the Act.
The purpose of these new ‘amendments’, as clearly spelt out in the
newspaper advertisements published by the FROA, was to turn the new
Forestry Act into a modified version of the old Forestry (Private Dealings) Act,
by reasserting the constitutional rights of resource owners to dispose of
their own private property, reducing the role of government officials to that
of providing advice to the buyers and sellers of timber, and almost totally
eliminating the powers of the Minister (Post-Courier, 20 July 1993).
Neville’s response, published in another newspaper advertisement, was to
describe Tulapi’s Bill as ‘the work of a foreign lawyer hired by a logging
operator’, to deplore the fact that genuine landowners were being ‘ripped-
off [sic] by many unscrupulous and unrepresentative landowner company
officials and foreign logging companies’, and to point out that his
determination to stop these abuses had already resulted in several threats to
his own life (Post-Courier, 18 August 1993).
36
 Tulapi’s own interest in this matter was rather difficult to gauge, since he represented a highlands electorate in which the
logging industry had no discernible interest.
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Box 8.2  The NGO campaign against the Tulapi amendments
Although Tulapi’s Bill was initially tabled in August 1993, Parliament did
not get around to rejecting it until March 1994.  In the intervening period,
Neville had secured Cabinet approval of a revised draft of his Guidelines,
and the government had established a Forest Coordination Group to secure
interdepartmental collaboration in their implementation.  When Cabinet’s
decision was made public in December, there followed another round in the
newspaper war between the Minister and his opponents, and FROA
Source: Times of PNG, 3 March 1994
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members tried to put a halt to logging operations in some provinces in an
unsuccessful effort to boost their parliamentary support.  At the same time,
officials and consultants in the NFA were preparing another set of
amendments which would have conceded the validity of some of the
complaints raised by the FIA and FROA.  Amongst other things, these
would:
• provide for a stronger landowner and private sector representation on
the Board;
• streamline and clarify the process for allocation of timber permits and
licences;
• limit the power of the Minister to determine the level of charges imposed
through the new revenue system; and
• allow for logging operators to pay some revenues directly to landowners
and landowner companies (Dolman 1995).
However, these amendments never reached the floor of Parliament, or any
other forum of public debate, because the Minister became embroiled in the
defence of Conrad Smith’s grand scheme to divide the whole country into
twenty-five ‘Timber Supply Areas’ (TSAs), so that each logging company
with a proven commitment to downstream processing could be granted
sole access to a resource which would be large enough to meet its long-term
need for raw materials.  In Smith’s view, this was also a concession to the
industry (Times of PNG, 31 March 1994), and was cautiously welcomed as
such by the FIA (Post-Courier, 25 July 1994), but local NGOs with strong
environmental sympathies, which had previously been vocal in their
support of the new Guidelines, now took sides with the FROA and several
national politicians who had not previously backed Tulapi’s Bill, as they all
opposed what they perceived as an attempt to challenge the hallowed right
of all native Melanesians to decide what should or should not happen on
their customary land37.  This unlikely partnership also had the backing of
many national officers in the National Forest Service, who had grown
increasingly resentful of what they perceived as the Minister’s reliance on
advice from ‘fly-by-night consultants’, and who had formed an Association
of Foresters to give occasional public voice to their grievances.
This was the context, in June 1994, in which the Minister lodged his appeal
to an Australian television audience, unidentified arsonists burnt down one
of the Forest Authority’s office blocks, and Jean Kekedo scolded the
‘unappreciative landowners and critics of [the Authority]’ for using her as a
37
 One NGO pamphlet translated the ‘TSA concept’ as ‘Total Silvicultural Annihilation’, because it ‘makes no allowance for other
forest uses apart from timber, excludes landowners, and threatens to greatly increase the rate of forest exploitation’ (Post-
Courier, 5 July 1994)
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Box 8.3  ‘Who’s the boss?’ - the voice of the disgruntled nationalist
Dear Editor,
I watched the Four Corners [Australian TV] program
about the logging industry in our country.  The program
made some good points but it was very one sided.  It’s
all very well to bash the logging companies but business
is business.  Companies will only do what they can get
away with.  The biggest rascals are our very own
government.  It’s the fat politicians and bureaucrats who
have taken bribes that have let the rip-off happen.
Mr Neville makes himself out to be Mr GoodGuy.  But
he’s little better than his predecessors.  Apart from the
show for the cameras, Mr Neville hasn’t bothered
lowering himself to talk to the people who actually own
the forests.  And he doesn’t even try to talk to the forest
industry.  Instead him and his bigmouth General
Manager, Conrad Smith, pretend to know it all and are
bullying everyone to get their own way.  And that means
getting lots of ‘jobs for the boys’ in their new Forest
Authority.
Canadian Conrad Smith used to be a consultant to the
Forest Authority until he landed the top job.  Since then
the stream of his wantok leeches suckering up around
the place has been never-ending.  And every one of
them is paid at well over K500 to K600 per day plus car,
hotel room and expenses - and all paid for from our
pockets.  It makes me sick.  A six month contract worth
close to K1 million was given to Smith’s old (?) Canadian
consultancy firm to set up the new revenue system that
Smith made such a noise about earlier this year.  Now
they’re left with fat pockets and the thing’s still not ready
to go.  A buddy of Smith’s from his last job has been
jetsetting between Canada and PNG for the past six
months or so.  He gets to make all the decisions about
which companies get to do all the forest processing in
our country.  And of course all paid at fat cat rates from
our pockets.  Where are our own people making these
decisions?
Now there’s another of Smith’s Canadian buddies arrived
and he’s got another few months worth of fleecing us
stupid Papua New Guineans.  And there’s an Aussie
who’s been taken on as a ‘marketing consultant’ for six
months at full consultancy rates.  Therealso a couple
more Australians who parade around like colonial
masters ordering everyone about.  They have been here
for more than six months acting as Smith’s hit men and
organising office furniture at the Forestry Fort Knox at
Hohola.  You don’t have to be a consultant to do these
sums.  Minister Neville and Mr Smith have dished out
close to K1.5 million of our money to their pals.  That’s a
lot of royalties.
And in spite of all the big talk by Mr Neville and Mr Smith
over the past 16 months, what’s been done?  Nothing!
Go to any logging site.  Where are all the forestry people
– you’d be lucky if you found a dozen in the whole
country.  But don’t worry.  Minister Neville and Mr Smith
have signed away K5.5 million for another pack of
overseas consultants to do it!  The Timber Supply Areas
which they are trying to bring in is just a fascist attempt
to take over landowners’ rights to their own land.  The
revenue system that cost so much, sits gathering dust
on the shelves and is fare too complicated to introduce
in PNG.  This is not Canada, Mr Smith!  Meanwhile, the
export taxes have been raised and the landowners are
not getting any more than they were before.
So who’s calling the shots at this supposed new
autonomous Forest Authority? It should be the managing
director, Jean Kekedo. But where is she? It seems that
all the real decisions are conspired behind her back
between Mr Neville and Mr Smith. Funny also how
they’re all expatriates. I thought that since 1975 we were
supposed to be running this country. So, Mr Neville,
before you start slanging off everyone else, how about
cleaning up your own act first? If you don’t then Mr Wingti
had better do it for you!
Source:  Times of PNG, 23 June 1994
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‘pawn in a sandwich’ (Post-Courier, 22 June 1994).  While other stakeholders
reflected on the significance of these messages, Sir Julius Chan was
preparing to desert the coalition government, and forge a new alliance with
the Pangu Pati and its leader, Chris Haiveta.  When this mission was
accomplished at the end of August, Tim Neville crossed over to the
opposition benches, and Chan allocated the Forests Ministry to one of his
own henchmen, Andrew Posai, who was closely aligned with the FROA,
and who promptly announced that his predecessor’s Guidelines would be
revised to reflect the concerns of ‘resource owners’.  Conrad Smith and the
TSA concept returned to their Canadian place of origin38, and the new
Minister tried but failed to persuade the National Forest Board to agree to
the removal of Jean Kekedo.  Having failed in this enterprise, he turned his
attention to the task of amending the Forestry Act.
Posai’s proposed amendments, first announced in March 1995, were totally
at variance with the rationale which the FROA had previously offered in
support of Tulapi’s Bill, because they were designed to maximise, rather
than minimise, the power of the Minister himself.  Section 8A would be
amended to state that it is the Minister (rather than the Authority) who ‘has,
in addition to the powers otherwise conferred on him by this Act and any
other Law, all powers to do all things that are necessary or convenient to be
done for or in connection with the performance of his function and the
achievement of this Act’s objectives’, and so:
the Minister may in his discretion suspend any operative provisions of this
Act where it is considered by him impracticable or inexpedient for any reason
to operate the provision of the Act [and] the Minister may:
(a) Grant a Timber Permit, Licence or Timber Authority for such term and
under such conditions and in such form as he deems appropriate, subject to the
availability of resource.
(b) Suspend or vary the terms of any existing Timber Permit, Licence or
Timber Authority.
(c) Transfer, amend or extend any Timber Permit, Licence or Timber Authority
to any third party.
And Section 9 would be amended to make the National Forest Board
‘subject to the directives of the Minister of Forests and/or the National
Executive Council’.
Once again, local NGOs swung into action with a series of full-page
newspaper advertisements attacking these proposals, while the Minister
was distracted from his task by a series of scandals which necessitated his
38
 Smith was replaced by Keith Dolman, a New Zealander who had been heading the NFCAP Technical Support Project.
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Critics ringbark Posai log plans (extracts from
Post-Courier, 5 April 1995).
Plans to vest more powers in the Forest Minister
were a step back into the past age of corrupt crony
deals, two critics charge.  Former Forest Minister
Tim Neville says an amendment to the current
Forestry Act would see PNG going back another
thousand years.  And his comments were backed
up by former PNG judge and forests inquiry boss
Tos Barnett, who said that a move in this direction
would be a tragedy for the country.  Both men,
joined by West New Britain premier Bernard Vogae,
said ... Minister Andrew Posai had been trying to
bring back to his control powers that would see him
holding sole responsibility for issuing permits.
Mr Neville and Mr Barnett made these comments
when being interviewed on Australian SBS TV’s
Dateline current affairs program.  The program also
reveals that Mr Posai had interests in a timber
company set up in Gasmata, West New Britain, and
that he had helped set up six companies for export
logging and sawmilling and was an advisor to these
companies from 1986 to 1992.  Premier Vogae said:
‘He more or less simply is a landowner for a start
and he also has a landowner company in which he
is an executive member while his brother is one of
the managing directors’.  Mr Posai denied to TV
interviewers he had any interests in the forestry
industry, however he made the admission that he
was a major timber landowner and chief of his tribe.
He told the interviewer: ‘And I own 3-400,000
hectares of forest.  I’m proud to say that.  But I
don’t own any vested interest in the timber industry
despite the facts that I own land.’  Mr Neville alleged
that at the time Mr Posai was appointed Minister,
he was also still the chairman of local landowner
groups that held timber concessions in the Kandrian
district.
Box 8.4  Minister caught with trousers down
Giant logger linked to Posai’s housing (extracts
from The Saturday Independent, 22 July 1995)
Suspended Forests Minister Andrew Posai is
occupying a K355,000 house in Port Moresby which
is owned by a catering company called Trinco
Number 10 Pty Ltd.  The directors of the company
are husband and wife, Ramonchito and Seral
Gatdula.  Mrs Gatdula, who is listed as the
shareholder of the company, is employed with a
travel agency called Travel Planners.  The Boroko-
based firm’s shareholders and directors are Henry
Peni and Dios Dado Gatdula.  Mr Peni was among
those who were vocal against the new forestry
guidelines when they were introduced by the former
Forest Minister Tim Neville...
Trinco Number 10 Pty Ltd telephone number,
255513, and postal address, Box 6399, Boroko, is
the same as that of logging company Niugini Lumber
Merchants Pty Ltd.  Niugini Lumber Merchants Pty
Ltd is a subsidiary of Malaysian logging giant
Rimbunan Hijau.  The detail of telephone number
and address was listed in Trinco Number 10 Pty
Limited’s application for electricity supply to the
Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission.  The
application was lodged by Doods Gatdula, who is
employed with Niugini Lumber Merchants.  The
electricity bills for the property are being sent to
Niugini Lumber Merchants...
Mr Posai was recently found guilty by a leadership
tribunal comprising of Justice Kubalan Los, Senior
Provincial Magistrate Mandik Kapin and Senior
Provincial Magistrate Raphael Appa, of 26 counts
of misconduct in office during his term as Minister
for Home Affairs and Youth in 1992 and 1993.  The
tribunal recommended that he be dismissed from
office.
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dismissal from this precious office.  In August 1995, Chan allocated the
Ministry to another member of the People’s Progress Party, Andrew Baing,
who promptly ‘directed’ the Board to issue six new timber permits before
the end of the year (Post-Courier, 12 September 1995).  On being advised that
this could not legally be done in the absence of a National Forest Plan, he
blamed Jean Kekedo for the Authority’s failure to produce one, and used
this failure as the pretext for persuading Cabinet to authorise her dismissal,
despite the Board’s repeated objections (Post-Courier, 18 October 1995)39.
The real reason for her removal, as revealed in Parliament shortly
afterwards, was her refusal to condone the allocation of a timber permit for
Vailala Blocks 2 and 3, in Gulf Province, to a company closely associated
with Rimbunan Hijau, because the timber rights had only recently been
‘acquired’ by the Deputy Prime Minister, Chris Haiveta, in a rather
unorthodox manner.40  Her replacement, Guao Zurenuoc, was far more
sympathetic to the Minister’s concerns.  From the time of his appointment,
in November 1995, a split soon developed within the senior echelons of the
National Forest Service, between those who shared this sympathy and those
who remained loyal to the spirit and letter of the legislation41.
Tim Neville and the NGOs immediately warned the public of the Minister’s
intention to make another assault on the Forestry Act, and their prophecies
were soon fulfilled.  Baing’s strategy was to change the composition of the
Board in ways which could be justified by a variety of extraneous criteria,
and to simultaneously grant himself or Cabinet greater control over the
actual process of appointment.  The National Premiers Council had
disappeared with the gazettal of the new Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local-Level Governments, so its representative was now to
be replaced by one of the nineteen Provincial Administrators; two new
spaces were to be created for the FROA and the PNG Association of
Foresters; and Baing suggested that the NANGO representative was an
unnecessary luxury, because NANGO already had representatives on all the
Provincial Forest Management Committees.  His proposed amendments
also allowed the Board to elect its own Chairman, instead of being
automatically chaired by the Managing Director.  Apart from the deletion of
the NANGO representative, all of these changes eventually passed into law.
But the proposal for all Board members to be appointed by Cabinet, from
recommendations made by the Minister, was anathema to the World Bank,
because it breached the conditions which the Bank had attached to the
39
 Ms Kekedo subsequently took the State to court for wrongful dismissal, and eventually won a substantial sum of damages.
40
 These permits were amongst those which had been issued by Minister Genia on the eve of the 1992 national election.  The
NFA had received legal advice to the effect they were invalid, because no TRP agreement had previously been made between
the State and the landowners (Post-Courier, 1 December 1995).
41
 The second camp was commanded by the new General Manager, Kanawi Pouru, a national officer who had risen through the
ranks of the service.
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country’s Economic Rescue Programme approved in August 1995.  Despite
the Bank’s warnings, Baing continued to ply his Bill through Parliament,
where it was finally approved in July 1996.  Even members of the
opposition had their nationalist feathers ruffled when the Bank then
threatened to scrap the rest of the country’s rescue package, and the Prime
Minister announced that the Bank could ‘go to hell’ (Post-Courier, 5
September 1996), but the government’s financial plight soon forced the
legislators to unamend the offensive amendment.  A small piece of pride
was saved by the Parliamentary Privileges Committee, which found that
the Bank had been guilty of contempt of Parliament, but recommended that
no action be taken to impose the statutory penalty comprising a K400 fine
or six months imprisonment (Post-Courier, 10 October 1996).  And the Bank
had the additional satisfaction of noting that the FROA, having finally
gained a seat on the National Forest Board, was now dominated by a
faction which preferred the Bank’s company to that of the log export
industry.  The new General Secretary of this organisation published an
article in one local newspaper, under the heading ‘Forestry reforms from a
layman’s perspective’, which concluded as follows:
The World Bank’s adamant stand on forestry reforms is in the best interest of
the nation, at least the silent majority in the hamlets in the most remote parts
of PNG who, in order to reach the nearest government post, travel the tracks
made by semi-trailers dragging logs through the forest for export.  Vitriolic
criticisms, arrogance, misinformation and naivety are the threats to our
sovereignty (Independent, 22 November 1996).
The best the Minister could now manage, in the remaining few months of
his term of office, was to lean on the Board to delegate some of its powers to
the Managing Director, in the expectation that this would expedite some of
the favours still sought by his friends in the logging industry.
The Barnett Inquiry (Interim Report 4) and the TFAP Review both
expressed grave reservations about the log harvest levels projected in the
1988 Medium Term Development Strategy produced by the DOF, noting
how these departed from the projections made in the 1987 National Forest
Development Programme (see Table 8.1).  The production of a national
forest plan came to be seen as an integral component of the policy reform
process because it was felt that projections like these were taking no
account of the true requirements of ‘sustained yield management’.
8.2 The National Forest Plan
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Table 8.1  Comparison of log harvest levels (in millions of cubic metres) projected
by the Department of Forests in 1987 and 1988.
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
1987 projections 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0
1988 projections 3.0 4.2 5.4 6.0 6.0
Source: World Bank 1989:12
Sections 47 and 48 of the 1991 Forestry Act required the NFA to produce and
present to Parliament a National Forest Plan based on a certified National
Forest Inventory, and comprising:
• a set of National Forestry Development Guidelines;
• a National Forest Development Programme; and
• an annual statement of ‘allowable cut’ (the amount of timber which may
be harvested) in each province for the succeeding year.
According to the Policy (PNGMOF 1991:13), the Guidelines were to form
the ‘primary political input’ to the planning process by providing ‘an
overview of the forestry sub-sector’s perceived role in the national
economy’ and being ‘broadly directed towards the areas of industrial, rural,
economic, and social development objectives’.  The Guidelines would ‘set
out broad objectives and predictions for the long term (i.e. the next 40
years) and address the medium term (i.e. the next 10 years) in greater
detail’.  The Programme, on the other hand, would ‘provide schedules for
the carrying out of resource inventory, acquisition and allocation tasks over
a five year rolling term’ in accordance with ‘priorities and land use
allocations as specified in the Provincial Forest Plans’.
Section 49 of the Act required each provincial government to produce and
present to the Minister its own Provincial Forest Plan in conformity with
the National Forestry Development Guidelines, and comprising:
• a set of Provincial Forestry Development Guidelines; and
• a rolling five-year Provincial Forest Development Programme.
According to the Policy (ibid:5), this would first require each provincial
government to identify five different types of land within its own borders:
• ‘production forests’, i.e. long-term timber production areas;
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• ‘protection forests’, excluded from production by various environmental
considerations42;
• ‘salvage forests’, i.e. forested areas to be cleared for other uses;
• land currently without forest cover which would be ‘suitable for
afforestation’; and
• ‘reserve forests’ - a residual category for forested areas which had not yet
been classified.
It seems that this classification was meant to form the basis for a ‘schedule
for the management and utilisation of forest areas within the province’
(ibid:6), which would itself be part of the Provincial Forestry Development
Guidelines, while the Provincial Forest Development Programme would be
required to demonstrate a more specific commitment to ‘sustained yield
management’ of those areas designated as ‘production forests’, by
application of a notional 40-year cutting cycle (see section 8.3 below).  These
calculations would then be incorporated into the National Forest Plan,
allowing the latter to arrive at its prescribed annual statement of ‘allowable
cut’ in each province for the succeeding year.
For the benefit of those who might easily get confused about the relationship
between the various ingredients in the proposed planning process, the
Policy included a summary statement of the agencies responsible for
preparation, approval and implementation of different components of the
plan (see Table 8.2).  On the other hand, no timetable was specified for the
completion of the process, which is hardly surprising when one considers
the amount of work which would have to be done and the number of ways
in which it could be delayed.  Barnett (1992:112) complained that the first
draft of the Forestry Bill was asking far too much when it required each
provincial government to produce its ‘forest classification’ within a year of
the Act coming into force, but the Act as finally passed dispensed with any
mention of this exercise, and only required that each Provincial Forest Plan
should be produced ‘as soon as practicable’.  Excessive haste in the
production of provincial plans would not of itself do anything to speed up
the appearance of their national counterpart, since this also presupposed the
production of the National Forest Inventory, and this, according to the Policy
(PNGMOF 1991:11-12), would take at least five years to be completed.  The
potential significance of such delay was highlighted by Section 54 of the Act,
which had not been present in the first two drafts of the Bill, and which
stated bluntly that: ‘Forest resources shall only be developed in accordance
with the National Plan.’  The implication appeared to be that no new timber
42
 The Policy (ibid:8) recognised ‘the national and global interest to support measures to secure the setting aside of land of
ecological importance as conservation areas’ even while it also acknowledged ‘the problems associated with acquisition of land
and provision of fair and lasting returns to the customary owners’.
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projects would be developed for several years after the Act came into force,
and this largely serves to explain the determination of Minister Genia and
Secretary Komtagarea to delay its gazettal.
The Draft Guidelines which Minister Neville presented to the newly
reconstituted National Forest Board in April 1993 covered much the same
range of topics as the earlier National Forest Policy, and could thus be seen
as an expanded policy statement.  Separate sections were devoted to ‘Forest
Resource Development’, ‘Management for Sustained Production’,
‘Reforestation and Afforestation’, ‘Forest Industrial Development’, ‘Forest
Revenue’, ‘Training and Localisation’, ‘Forest Research’ and ‘Review of
Document Preparation Approval or Review Implementation
or Supervision
National Forest Consultative Steering National Executive Minister and Forest
Policy Committee, then National Council Authority
Forest Board consulting
with Minister
National Forest National Forest Service National Forest National Forest Service
Inventory Board or National or contractor  to
Executive Council National Forest Board
National Forestry Minister consulting with National Executive Forest Authority
Development National Forest Board Council
Guidelines
Provincial Forest Provincial Forest National Forest Board Forest Authority
Classifications Management Committees
Provincial Technical committee of National Forest Board Forest Authority
Statements of National Forest Board
Allowable Cut
Provincial Forest Provincial Forest Provincial Executive Forest Authority
Development Management Councils and National
Programmes Committees Forest Board
National Forest National Forest National Executive Forest Authority
Development Board Council
Programme
Table 8.2  Allocation of responsibilities in the forest planning process,
according to the National Forest Policy
Source: PNGMOF 1991:15
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Existing Forestry Projects’, in that order.  However, the most significant
alteration to the Draft Guidelines which was made as a result of the public
debate in 1993 was the deletion of the original Part C, which dealt with
‘Preparation of a National Forest Plan’ (PNGMOF 1993a:5-7).
In its own detailed comments on the Draft Guidelines, the FIA did not
object to the principle of land use classification proposed in the Policy, even
though it doubted the capacity of provincial governments to demarcate the
required areas, but it complained vociferously about the proposal to base
future calculations of ‘annual allowable cut’ on the equation of ‘production
forests’ with areas already allocated under TRPs and LFAs, and it refused to
accept the ‘best guesses’ of the Rapid Resource Appraisal as a substitute for
the National Forest Inventory required by the new Act (PNGFIA 1993:5-8).
Rather than amend the relevant part of the Guidelines to accommodate
such objections, government officials decided to abandon it entirely,
primarily because their own doubts about the provincial planning process
were already greater than those of the FIA (see Box 8.5)43.
By March 1994, consultants working on the World Bank-funded Forest
Management and Planning Project (FMPP) had already supplied the NFA
43  
From this point of view, Conrad Smith’s ill-fated promulgation of ‘Timber Supply Areas’ may be seen as an attempt to short-
circuit the provincial planning process by producing an alternative basis for land use classification at the national level.
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with an ‘alternative approach’ to provincial forest plans which was based
on the assumption that:
the original approach ... was considered to be an exercise in futility, as it could
only ever be implemented to the extent that forest owners affected were willing
to participate.  Yet there was no guarantee that forest owners with forests
suited to sustained industrial wood production would be willing to have them
used for this purpose, or if they were, that they were willing to do so in
accordance with a Provincial Government determined ‘management and
utilisation schedule’ (PNGFA 1994a:4).
The alternative would be a ‘broader statement of the Provincial
Government’s preferred forest uses based on defined priorities for potential
forest benefits ... [which] would not predetermine specific boundaries, or
develop utilisation schedules ... [and which] would be backed up by a
Provincial Action Program aimed at encouraging forest owners to take part
by adopting forest uses in line with the priorities expressed in the plan’
(ibid:4-5).  A ‘Pro-Forma Provincial Forest Plan’ gave the following list of
examples of the ‘potential forest benefits’ from which the provincial
governments could determine their priorities:
• ongoing support for rural village living standards;
• protection of soil and water quality;
• biodiversity conservation;
• sustainable employment generation;
• industrial wood production to meet provincial demand for wood
products;
• industrial wood production for export from the province to other parts
of PNG and/or overseas;
• increased industrial wood production through the development of
plantation forests;
• social forestry to meet local forest product and services needs (PNGFA
1994b:7).
At the same time, the NFA and the DEC would supply PFMCs with the
information required for them to distinguish between those parts of their
province which either had the potential for sustainable industrial wood
production, or high biodiversity values, or both, and the PFMCs would use
this information to assess requests from landowners for their land to be
designated as ‘production forests’ or ‘protection forests’.  Requests for land
to be designated as new ‘production forests’ would be assessed in light of
provincial priorities, and also by reference to the criteria already laid down
by the National Guidelines, namely that:
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• the area should contain at least 100,000 hectares of ‘commercially
manageable forest’44 in order to ensure sustainability of wood production
at the project level;
• at least 10 per cent of the commercially harvestable area should be set
aside as a permanent conservation area;
• all participating land groups should agree to share the financial benefits
Box 8.5  The demise of forest classification in the forest planning process
Forest classification, as proposed in the National Forest Policy, has proved difficult to implement.  First,
political friction between national and provincial governments has constrained provincial input.
Increasingly, provincial and national politicians saw themselves as competitors for control over the
distribution of resources and delivery of government services.  In the early 1990s, the national
government considered a series of reform proposals clearly intended to undermine the political base of
provincial governments (Axline 1993).  The Bipartisan Select Committee on Provincial Government
reported to Parliament in March 1993, recommending replacement of the existing tier of provincial
politicians with provincial authorities.  These were to comprise national government members from the
province and local government leaders.  The recommendations formed the basis of reforms that
became law in 1995.
Second, the Forest Authority’s part in coordinating the process called for close management and
enormous technical input at a time when its attention was focused on internal reorganisation and
unresolved policy issues.  But perhaps the major obstacle to completion of this exercise has been
growing doubt over its ability to win the respect of landowners.  The unofficial demise of the classifica-
tion endeavour can be traced through successive drafts of the Guidelines.  The first draft presented to
the National Forest Board in April 1993 merely acknowledged some slippage in the time needed to
complete the task, nominating April 1994 as a ‘realistic target’.  The version approved by the National
Executive Council in December 1993 omitted the whole chapter on preparation of the Forest Plan and
made no reference to forest classification or land-use zoning. The view came to prevail that
landowners would reject, outright, any lines drawn on maps, at the whim of government officials or
politicians, which purported to tell them what they could or could not do with their resources.  The
alternative of country-wide consultation with all landowner groups was simply not feasible.
Despite the lack of progress and widely-held suspicion that forest classification is an exercise in futility,
no alternative basis for the Forest Development Programme has been agreed.  A National Forest Plan
remains a key component of the Forestry Act.  Without a plan in place it is questionable whether permits
can be legitimately granted, given the stipulation in Section 54 that forest resources can only be
developed in accordance with the Plan.
Source: Taylor 1997
44
 This was defined to exclude forested land which was environmentally unsuitable for sustainable wood production and land
already formally designated as part of a conservation area or water control district.
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of the project in accordance with the extent of their holdings within the
commercially harvestable area (so that the owners of the protected area
would not be disadvantaged);
• landowners should agree to enter into a Forest Management Agreement
(FMA) with the NFA; and
• commercial forest plantations of high-value hardwood species should be
established on 5-10 per cent of the area covered by the FMA (ibid:8-9).
The PFMC would also have some responsibility for helping the landowners
to meet these conditions.
The discussion paper prepared by the FMPP consultants observed that one
of the advantages of the alternative approach was that it would:
Avoid unrealistic industry and Government revenue expectations from being
developed through a statement of Annual Allowable Cut, which might not be
reached if forest owners did not agree to allow their forest to be cut in
accordance with the plan (PNGFA 1994a:6).
However, the Pro-Forma Plan included a table (PNGFA 1994b:11) which
required the derivation of a ‘maximum permissible annual cut’ from a
calculation of the ‘net commercially accessible area’, the ‘average annual
area available for cutting under a 40 year cutting cycle’, and the ‘mean
annual increment’ (in cubic metres per hectare per annum).  And while the
discussion paper proposed that the ‘net commercially accessible area’
should not amount to more than 25 per cent of the gross operable area
(PNGFA 1994a:7), the Pro-Forma Plan indicated that it should be 50 per cent
of the gross operable area (PNGFA 1994b: 10).  This discrepancy seems to
have arisen from different interpretations of the data produced by the Rapid
Resource Appraisal (see section 8.3 below)45, but there were several
statements to the effect that further information provided by the Forest
Resource Inventory could later be incorporated into the provincial planning
process since each provincial plan would be revised every three years.
In August 1995, the NFA produced a set of ‘Guidelines for Provincial Forest
Plans’ (PNGFA 1995a) containing a lengthy glossary and a revised version of
the Pro-Forma Plan which effectively reduced the provincial planning
45
 The discussion paper included an estimate of the net commercially accessible area in each province which arrived at a
national aggregate figure of approximately 3.9 million hectares, and assumed an average mean annual increment of one cubic
metre per hectare per annum to arrive at an aggregate annual sustainable yield of approximately 3.9 million cubic metres
(PNGFA 1994a:8).  The Pro-Forma Plan appeared to imply that both of these figures should be doubled.
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process to an exercise in ‘filling in the blanks’.  The preface to this
document included a statement recognising that some provincial
governments might still be unable to produce their plans in a format
acceptable to the National Forest Board, and offering the assistance of the
National Forest Service to remedy this deficiency.  By this time, however,
the technical limits on the planning capacities of provincial governments
were outweighed by the confusion arising from passage of the new Organic
Law on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments.  While the main
purpose of this law was to reduce the political autonomy, and increase the
administrative capacity, of provincial authorities (see section 5.3), it
included a variety of provisions relating to the management of renewable
resources which were possibly at odds with the provisions of the new
Forestry Act (see Box 8.6).  As a result, several provincial governments (or
their governors) began to rewrite their provincial forest plans, and even to
draft new provincial forestry laws, in ways which were unacceptable to the
NFA, and which therefore delayed the production of a National Forest Plan.
As we have seen (section 8.1), when Andrew Baing took over the Forests
Ministry in August 1995, he used this delay as his main pretext for getting
rid of the NFA’s Managing Director, Jean Kekedo.
In January 1996, Minister Baing directed Kekedo’s replacement, Guao
Zurenuoc, to form a Policy and Planning Advisory Committee in order to
expedite production of the National Forest Plan, and thus enable the
National Forest Board to allocate a series of new timber permits.  As a
result, a draft plan was hurriedly produced by senior officers of the
National Forest Service, but this patently failed to meet the requirements
laid down in the Act.  At this juncture, the leader (and last remaining
member) of the FMPP team drafted a discussion paper (Everts 1996a) in
which he itemised the reasons for this failing:
• The Plan could not be rendered consistent with the Policy, because the
Policy either lacked the necessary detail or the details made no sense
(e.g. the requirement that ‘follow-up land use plans’ be produced for
land committed to sustainable timber production).
• The Act contained no definition of a ‘certified’ National Forest Inventory,
and apparently ignored the practical constraint that detailed inventories
are normally only undertaken in areas where landowners are prepared to
grant management and harvesting rights to the state.
• The 1993 Guidelines were ‘only partially endorsed by the NEC’ and had
exerted ‘little influence on the development of the forestry sector’.  The
Guidelines contained policy statements which had either been ignored
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Box 8.6  Sections of the new Organic Law on Provincial Governments and
Local-level Governments (as amended) which are relevant to forest
management and planning
• Section 1 (‘General Principles’) includes the statement (s.1.5) that ‘wealth generated by lawful
exploitation of any natural resources must be equitably distributed by the National Government, the
Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments for the benefit of resource owners and all
levels of governments’.
• Section 42 originally stated that the ‘Law-Making Powers of the Provincial Legislatures’ extended to
the subjects of ‘forestry and agroforestry’ and ‘renewable and non-renewable natural resources (but
not maximum or minimum volume, or quantities, export prices, tax measures or taxation, levies or
dues to be levied).’  This section was later amended to include an additional sub-section stating that
such powers do not apply to ‘large-scale’ forestry ventures which ‘are declared by the Head of State,
acting on advice, to be ventures to which this subsection refers’.
• Section 43 originally stated that the ‘Principal Administrative Functions of Provincial Governments’
included the provision of ‘advice to landowners in relation to the development and control of their
traditional land’, and Section 45 originally stated that the ‘Principal Administrative Functions of Local-
Level Governments’ included ‘ensuring necessary arrangements and participation at forums on
renewable and non-renewable natural resources’ and ‘granting appropriate approval or entering
into dealings in relation to [these] resources ... including recommendations to relevant bodies or
authorities’.  Both sections were later amended to state that the principal functions of both levels of
government would simply ‘be as provided for in an Act of the Parliament’.
• Section 115 (on ‘Control of Natural Resources) states that the relevant National Minister shall
consult with the relevant Provincial Government, and all three levels of government ‘shall liaise fully
with the landowners’, in respect of any proposal to develop natural resources in a particular
province.  Section 116 (on the ‘Resource Development Process’) states that another Act of
Parliament shall make provision for ‘the type or types of development to which Section 115 applies’,
‘the consultation process’, ‘the establishment of natural resource development forums’, and ‘the
extent to which the parties may participate in the development of the natural resources’.  It also
states that another government agency, the National Economic and Fiscal Commission, ‘shall carry
out a cost and benefit analysis for and in relation to the development of natural resources’.
(e.g. removing the role of government in plantation development), or
had met with substantial opposition from other stakeholders (e.g. log
export bans), or had not been subject to consultation with other relevant
government departments (e.g. financial incentives for industrial
processing).
• The NEC had already disregarded Section 54 of the Act, which stated
that ‘forest resources shall only be developed in accordance with the
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National Plan’, when it had given its approval for a number of ‘agro-
forestry’ projects which entailed the clearance of large areas of forest (see
section 8.5).
• The requirement to produce a National Forest Development Programme
was based on the false assumption that national and provincial
governments had the right to manage and utilise the nation’s forests,
without first securing the agreement of their true owners, even in the
unlikely event that these two levels of government could reach
agreement with each other, and even if the government were to make the
necessary financial resources available.
• Annual statements of ‘allowable cut’ also made no sense if they were
applied to areas which had not (yet) been made available for cutting, and
could not influence the level of cut already allowed under existing
concessions, even in those provinces (notably West New Britain) where
the allowable level was unsustainable.
• Provincial governments did not have the expertise required to produce
separate sets of Provincial Forestry Development Guidelines and rolling
five-year Provincial Forest Development Programmes, nor did the NFA
have the expertise to do it for them, and the purpose of such exercises
was also defeated by the fact of private ownership of the resource in
question.
• Provincial Forests Ministers were no longer able to submit their
Provincial Forest Plans to the National Forest Board, because their offices
had been abolished by the new Organic Law, and the new provincial
authorities were using the same law to challenge some of the provisions
of the Forestry Act.
• The main benefit of the provincial planning exercise to date had been the
opportunity for consultation between provincial administrators and
national government officers, but this outcome could just as easily have
been achieved without the need for plans to be produced.
In light of these considerations, it was proposed that the relevant sections of
the Act should either be deleted or amended.  But it appears that the
discussion paper itself was never considered by the Policy and Planning
Advisory Committee, and work on the National Plan continued apace.
The inconsistencies noted in the discussion paper were blithely ignored in
the final draft of the Plan which appeared in May 1996.  The Plan was said
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Figure 8.1  General forest classification of Papua New Guinea
contained in the National Forest Plan
to be consistent with the Policy and the Act, the National Guidelines were
endorsed, the Rapid Resource Appraisal was still treated as an ‘interim
certified National Forest Inventory’  The RRA was also said to be the basis
of the ‘general forest classification of PNG’ (see Figure 8.1) and the
estimated national ‘annual allowable cut’ of 4.9 million cubic metres
(PNGFA 1996:11-12).  The Plan contained nineteen provincial maps which
showed existing ‘forest production areas’, ‘potential areas for future
development’, other ‘areas suited to sustained yield management’, areas of
forest ‘not suited to sustained yield management’, and other (non-forested)
areas.  They did not show the boundaries of any protected areas, despite the
fact that these were said to cover 1.7 million hectares in the forest
classification.  Once the Plan had been produced, the NFA proceeded to
advertise a number of new timber concessions in accordance with the
Minister’s frequently stated wishes.
Total Land Area
46 million ha.
Production Forest
11.9 million ha.
Other
6.7 million ha.
Reserve Forest
25.7 million ha.
Salvage Forest *
Protection Forest
1.7 million ha.
Afforestation
Potential *
Inundated Area
4.4 million ha.
Potential
Production Forest
8.2 million ha.
Forest on steep
slopes
13.1 million ha.
Identified
Production Forest
3.2 million ha.
Acquired Forest
8.7 million ha. **
*   Areas of salvage forest and areas
suitable for afforestation have yet to be
identified. Information will be included in
future revisions of this plan
**   This is gross area, consisting of
operable forest 3.7 million ha and
inoperable (too steep, watercourses,
inundated etc. within concessions areas)
Source : PNGFA 1996
* Areas of  salvage forest and areas
s it ble for afforestation have yet to be
identified. Information will be included in
future revisions of this plan
** This gross area, consisting of
operable forest 3.7 million ha and
inoperable (too steep, watercourses,
inundated etc. within concessions
areas)
Source: PNGFA 1996
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During the period of national independence, research on forests and
forestry in PNG has been undertaken by the Forest Research Institute (FRI)
in Lae, which is a branch of the NFA (formerly DOF), by academic scientists
at the two national universities, and by a variety of foreign researchers
whose activities have generally not been coordinated or directed at a
national level.  With very few exceptions (notably the Stettin Bay Lumber
Company), logging companies have not undertaken any research on their
own account.  Within the policy reform process which was initiated in 1989,
the major function of ‘relevant’ forest research has been to provide the sort
of data which can facilitate the production of national and provincial plans
for sustainable management of PNG’s natural forest resource.  In this
section, we are concerned with the recent history of research intended to
achieve the goal of sustained yield management, where the yield is a
volume of commercial timber extracted from the natural forest.
The TFAP Review found a number of deficiencies in the way that the DOF
had dealt with the problem of defining and measuring ‘sustainable forest
management’:
• the actual log harvest levels forecast in the revised National Forestry
Development Programme of 1988 were not shown to be related to any
clear conception of ‘sustained yield management’ (World Bank 1989:18);
• the Department’s plan to achieve the goal of ‘sustainability’ by
converting 10 per cent of all logged-over areas to forest plantations was
evidently contradicted by its plan to sell off the small areas of
government plantations which already existed (ibid:19); and
• official estimates that each hectare of productive forest contained 50-60
cubic metres of commercial timber did not match the actual measured
output of 20-30 cubic metres (ibid:21).
The World Bank produced its own calculation of sustainable yields from the
natural forest by:
• estimating that 40 per cent of the gross ‘operable area’ of 15 million
hectares was actually available for logging;
• multiplying the net utilisable forest area of 6 million hectares by an
estimated harvesting yield of 30 cubic metres per hectare; and
• dividing this total by an estimated rotation length of 50 years to arrive at
a maximum annual allowable cut of 3.6 million cubic metres (ibid:21).
8.3 Measures of sustainability
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The National Forest Policy followed a similar procedure when it proposed
that the ‘allowable cut’ in each province would initially be set ‘by dividing
the total merchantable resource within the production forest by an assumed
cutting cycle of 40 years’ (PNGMOF 1991:6), this being a provisional
estimate of the period of time which the average stretch of production
forest would take to recover its timber value after selective logging.
Barnett (1992:109) took particular exception to this method of achieving the
goal of sustainability, describing it as a ‘simplistic and unsatisfactory
device’.
This formula is not based upon research on Papua New Guinea forests, in fact
the very concept of there being a scientifically determined sustainable yield
cycle has been challenged by many competent authorities.  Moreover, many of
those who do believe in the concept would advocate a much longer cutting
cycle of around 70 to 80 years.  In any event, to work out a formula on a
province-wide basis rather than to consider the characteristics and needs of
each individual forest area would allow for gross and unnecessary overcutting
of some valuable and irreplaceable forests on the rationale that other forests
exist in the same province so that for the province as a whole, the annual
allowable cut will not have been exceeded (ibid:115)
The Policy did state (PMGMOF 1991:6) that the formula would be ‘subject
to review in the light of further research’, and although there was no
mention of such activities in that part of the document which was devoted
to research policies and strategies, the NFCAP included three projects
which promised to undertake this type of research:
• the ‘Ecological, Economic and Social Sustainability of Tropical Rainforest
Use’ (EESSTRU) project, which was to ‘promote and support research
and development with a view to improving forest management and
utilisation’, to ‘support and develop industrial tropical timber
reforestation and forest management activities’, and ‘to encourage the
development of national policies aimed at sustainable utilisation and
conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources, and at
maintaining the ecological balance in the regions concerned’;
• The ‘Rapid Resource Appraisal’ (RRA) project, which was to ‘provide a
quick estimate of the state of PNG forest resources, for use in production
planning under sustainable yield’; and
• the ‘Forest Resource Assessment’ project, which later became the ‘Forest
Inventory Mapping System’ (FIMS), which was to follow on from the
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RRA to produce ‘volume estimates, growth and yield models, and
management scale data to allow design of regional and forest
management plans’.
The EESSTRU project had five different components (or sub-projects), the
first of which was concerned with the definition of ‘sustainability’, while
the other four were to assess the impact of alternative management regimes
on the achievement of this goal.  The first sub-project was implemented in
1992, through the conduct of a UNESCO-funded workshop, organised by
the CSIRO Division of Wildlife and Ecology, which resulted in the
publication of a ‘Blueprint’ containing a set of criteria and indicators of
sustainability of forest use in PNG (CSIRO 1992).  Little progress has since
been made in the implementation of the other four sub-projects because of
an apparent breakdown in communications between the implementing
agency (FRI) and the funding agency (ITTO).  The impact of the ‘PNG
Blueprint’ has also been limited, mainly because it is couched in very
general terms, while its ‘ownership’ was very narrow.  Louman (1997) has
produced a detailed assessment of the biophysical parameters that can be
used to describe its criteria and indicators, and has shown how these are
largely ignored in a sample of environmental plans produced for logging
projects in PNG.  While Louman has proposed that more work needs to be
done to incorporate these parameters and indicators into the planning and
monitoring of forestry operations, other commentators believe that there is
a more urgent need to make operational use of the data produced by the
PNG Resource Information System (PNGRIS), the RRA and the FIMS
(McAlpine 1997).
The RRA itself, conducted in 1992 and 1993, was an interim measure, as its
title would suggest.  The main aim of the exercise was to produce an
interim body of data which would enable the National Forest Service to
produce the provincial and national plans required by the Policy, and thus
to meet the conditions required by the World Bank and other aid donors for
further funding of the NFCAP (John McAlpine, 1997, personal
communication).  Its implementation was actually delayed because of
concerns expressed by the DEC over its terms of reference, and these
concerns were reflected in the public statements of some NGO
representatives, who maintained that resource mapping was liable to
facilitate further exploitation.
The consultants engaged in this study arrived at their definition of the
‘maximum annual sustainable yield’ for each of the nineteen provinces
through the analysis of data produced by the DOF in respect of all actual
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and potential concession areas, and comparison of this data with other
information obtained from the PNGRIS46.
• First, they deducted from the ‘gross operable area’, which amounted to a
total of 12.6 million hectares, those areas which were not available for
logging because of previous disturbance or problems of access, and thus
arrived at a ‘net productive area’ totalling 8.8 million hectares.
• Having subtracted another 10 per cent (800,000 hectares) from this total
to allow for ‘buffer zones’ around streams and water holes, they
estimated that approximately 712,000 hectares out of the remaining area
had already been logged before 1993, while another 7.2 million hectares
had not yet been harvested by that date.
• A further 15 per cent deduction was made from this combination of
logged and unlogged forest in order to allow for roading and other
infrastructural requirements of logging operations, thus leaving a
‘potential forest area’ of approximately 6.8 million hectares.
• Assuming that this would be the maximum area available to a regime of
sustainable natural forest management, they proceeded to calculate the
‘maximum annual sustainable yield’ by making further estimates of the
volumes of commercial timber contained in the area which had not yet
been harvested, and the natural growth rates of commercial timber
species after selective logging had occurred47.
If the results of these calculations are compared with the actual volume of
log exports in 1994, it would appear that a claim to ‘sustained yield
management’ could be made in all provinces except West New Britain,
which accounted for more than half of all the logs exported in that year.
However, the authors of the study went on to point out that a substantial
proportion of the ‘potential forest area’ would not continue to be available
for timber harvesting, either because it would be set aside for conservation
purposes or (more likely) because it would be converted to other uses -
primarily subsistence agriculture.  In other words, the ‘potential forest area’
could not be equated with the area of ‘production forests’ defined in the
Policy because parts of it would either become ‘protection forests’ or
‘salvage forests’.  The problem, then, was to arrive at a more realistic
estimate of the ‘probable’, as opposed to the ‘maximum’, potential forest
46
 The basis of these calculations was a map of forest types at a scale of 1:1,000,000 (see Saunders 1993), although some work
was also done on the mapping of vegetation types at a scale of 1:100,000, in recognition of the fact that this interim study would
eventually be supplanted by a more detailed forest inventory (John McAlpine, 1997, personal communication).
47
 These growth rates were estimated at between 0.8 and 1.0 cubic metres per hectare per annum.
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area.  The authors of this particular study suggested that the figure could be
as low as 3.7 million hectares, which would of course entail a
corresponding reduction in the estimates of sustainable yield.  Other
commentators suggested figures as low as 3 million hectares, with a
sustainable log harvest of only 3 million cubic metres a year (see
PNGADCP 1993; Nadarajah 1994).
There were already a number of additional reasons for doubting the
sustainability of the harvest levels of 1994.
• Firstly, the official export figures almost certainly underestimated the
actual export volumes, since there were bound to be some operators
whose shipments were not fully reported to the government48.
• Secondly, the level of harvest will always be greater than the level of
exports.  Over the last few years, the difference has been officially
estimated at between 600,000 and 1 million cubic metres per annum49.
This figure is understood to apply to timber which is subject to further
processing before being exported or consumed by the domestic market.
• Thirdly, the volume of timber which is officially ‘harvested’ may not
include a substantial number of full-size logs which are wasted in one
way or another, and certainly does not include those very substantial
volumes contained in the (mainly immature) trees which are critically
damaged by careless logging practices, even though this second form of
wastage represents a substantial detraction from some future harvest.
• Finally, the very uneven spatial distribution of logging operations was
likely to create additional pressures for the conversion of forested land to
agricultural use in those areas (such as West New Britain) where current
harvest levels were extremely high, and those provinces in which harvest
levels were obviously unsustainable would also be those in which
logged-over forests were more likely to be cleared for other uses.
For these various reasons, it now seemed very unlikely that sustainable
timber production would be possible if the country officially exported more
than 2 million cubic metres a year for any significant period of time.  But
Figure 4.1 shows that exports have substantially exceeded this amount each
year since 1993.
48
  The volume of such ‘concealed’ exports may have been less significant than their value, because they were likely to comprise
those species (such as rosewood) which were subject to a species-specific export ban.
49
 Jant’s woodchip mill alone has been accounting for 200,000 cubic metres of logs processed onshore.
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The 1996 National Forest Plan (PNGFA 1996:11) seems to have ignored the
qualifications of the RRA when it declared that the total area of ‘production
forest’ was 11.9 million hectares, and the 25.7 million hectares of ‘reserve
forest’ included another 8.2 million hectares of ‘potential production forest’
(see Figure 2.4).  It seems that the Plan was now equating the combination
of actual and potential ‘production forest’ with what the RRA had defined
as the ‘gross operable area’, and that the NFA’s estimate of the size of this
area had grown from 12.6 million hectares to 20.1 million hectares.  These
calculations appeared to justify a projected annual harvest, from 1997, of 4.7
(or perhaps 4.9) million cubic metres, of which approximately 2.9 million
cubic metres would be derived from existing projects (ibid:13).
At first sight, it may seem that these optimistic forecasts have received a
measure of support from the FIMS, which has now supplanted the earlier
RRA in the calculations of the NFA, and whose summary results have been
described in section 2.2 above.  If we compare the provisional outputs of
the FIMS (Figures 2.3 and 2.4) with the corresponding estimates made in the
RRA, we may be struck by the difference between the 6.8 million hectares of
‘potential forest area’ which were thought to exist in 1993 and the 11.5
million hectares of ‘potential production forest’ which are now said to have
existed in 1996.  If we assume that these are two attempts to measure the
same thing, then it seems that the estimated area of ‘potential production
forest’ was 70 per cent greater in 1996 than it was in 1993.  This discrepancy
is all the more remarkable when we compare the earlier estimate that
712,000 hectares of forest had already been logged before 1993 with the
current estimate that 2.8 million hectares had been logged by 1996, which
seems to represent a simultaneous increase of nearly 300 per cent in the area
of forest whose potential production values have (at least temporarily) been
realised.  Should we therefore conclude that this new set of data justifies a
corresponding increase in the estimates of aggregate sustainable yield, and
therefore supports the claim implied in the Plan (and openly stated by
representatives of the log export industry) that PNG’s natural forest
resource can sustain an annual harvest of approximately 5 million cubic
metres, instead of the 3 million cubic metres implied by the calculations of
the RRA?
The architects of the FIMS maintain that there are three main reasons why a
positive answer cannot be given to this question:
• Firstly, the database shows that more than one third of the area which has
already been logged is classified as ‘non-potential production forest’ (see
Figure 2.5), which means that it should not have been logged under a
regime of sustainable forest management.
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• Secondly, the area of ‘potential production forest’ includes several ‘forest
types’ or ‘forest zones’ whose combination of tree species do not warrant
commercial exploitation under current market conditions, and which are
therefore excluded, in practice, from the area of interest to logging
companies.
• Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the estimates which have
previously been made of ‘typical’ regeneration rates, and which support
the idea of a ‘standard cutting cycle’ of 30-40 years, are now regarded as
maximum, rather than average, rates, and there are many ‘forest types’
or ‘forest zones’ in which the rates of regeneration are now shown to be
much lower, and in which the ‘cutting cycle’ should therefore be twice or
three times the ‘standard’ length (John McAlpine, 1997, personal
communication).
From these considerations, it can be argued that the FIMS provides more
reasons for the NFA to limit the numbers and types of forest area which are
made available for commercial logging than arguments in favour of
extending the aggregate area of ‘production forest’.
Under the old Forestry Act, the state acquired timber rights from customary
resource owners through the negotiation of a Timber Rights Purchase (TRP)
Agreement.  In theory, these agreements were meant to be signed by all the
customary owners, or at least the adult males amongst them, and some
effort was made to ensure this level of consensus during the last years of
the colonial administration, but when the rate of forest exploitation began
to rise substantially during the 1980s, the DOF began to adopt an ‘unofficial
policy’ of accepting 75 per cent of the relevant signatures as sufficient
evidence of landowner consent (Whimp 1995:51).  The Barnett Inquiry
found that even this level of consent had commonly been manipulated or
manufactured to suit the demands of the logging companies.  This kind of
manipulation was even more likely to take place in the declaration of Local
Forest Areas (LFAs) under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, which only
required the Minister’s assent to a Dealings Agreement purportedly
negotiated between the resource owners and representatives of a landowner
company interested in negotiating its own Logging and Marketing
Agreement with a logging operator.  Some LFAs were established in New
Ireland Province during the 1970s, but many more came into existence,
8.4 Resource acquisition procedures
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most notably in West New Britain Province, during Karl Stack’s occupation
of the Forests Ministry from 1988 to 1991 (ibid:52).
By repealing the old Forestry Act and the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the
new Act established a new set of resource acquisition procedures which
were primarily designed to safeguard the interests of customary
landowners against the risk of being misrepresented by a small minority of
self-interested individuals.  According to Section 46: ‘The rights of the
customary owners of a forest resource shall be fully recognised and
respected in all transactions affecting the resource.’  According to the Policy
(PNGMOF 1991:4), this meant that priority must be given to ‘the
development and promotion of forms of ownership and organisation based
on traditional precepts’ and ‘the use of arbitrary procedures to obtain the
approval of resource owners is not acceptable’.  On the other hand, the
Policy failed to indicate how the assertion of customary rights could be
reconciled with the assertion of greater government control over the
utilisation of forest resources on customary land.
The Act prescribed a process of ‘resource acquisition’ (Sections 54-60) in
which the NFA would henceforth enter into Forest Management
Agreements (FMAs) with customary owners whose title was either vested
in land groups incorporated under the Land Groups Incorporation Act or was
registered under a law providing for the registration of title to customary
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Constructing a logging road. A study in 1991 estimated that environmental damage caused by logging was
worth US$10 million per year
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land.  Where this was ‘impractical’, allowance was made for an FMA to be
executed by the ‘authorised agents’ of the owners, provided that 75 per
cent of the adult resident members of the landowning groups had given
their written consent.  Each FMA was to contain a map showing the
boundaries of the area which it covered, and to specify the volume of
merchantable timber which it contained, the benefits which the owners
would receive in exchange for the harvest rights, and the period required
for ‘proper forest management measures to be carried out to completion’.
The 1993 Guidelines indicated that the process of land group incorporation
should be preceded or accompanied by a Landowner Awareness
Programme which would provide landowners with the information
required for them to make their own assessment of ‘the likely costs and
benefits, impacts and responsibilities associated with a forest development
project’ and enable them to ‘truly participate in the project formulation
process and ensure that it is sensitive to their needs and concerns’
(PNGMOF 1993b:4).  It was also suggested (ibid:7) that the process would
enable dissenting groups of landowners to exclude their own land (or any
disputed land) from the area covered by an FMA.  This exercise was
apparently regarded as a precursor of the ‘development options study’
prescribed under the new resource allocation procedures (see section 8.5),
and caused the FIA to comment that the whole process was becoming so
‘lengthy and complex’ that it might prove to be ‘completely unworkable’
(PNGFIA 1993:30).
The Forest Management and Planning Project included a ‘Landowner
Involvement Component’ which was designed to strengthen the capacity
of the National Forest Service to follow the new resource acquisition
procedures.  The activities of the consultants engaged to implement this
part of the project, in the years from 1993 to 1995, have been documented
in a single collection of papers (PNGFMPP 1995), and the principal
consultant has since produced some broader reflections on this experience
(Holzknecht 1996, 1997).
The first test of the new procedures was the construction of the Turama
FMA in Gulf Province, where the proposed developer, Turama Forest
Industries, apparently played an active role in the process of land group
incorporation by virtue of the fact that it already held a timber permit in
the area (Hartmut Holzknecht, 1997, personal communication).  When the
National Forest Board used this FMA as the basis on which to issue an
‘extended’ permit to TFI in June 1995, local NGOs referred the decision to
the Ombudsman Commission on the grounds that it constituted a breach of
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Source: Whimp 1995
Incorporation of Land Groups is currently a function of the Department of Lands and Physical Planning (DOLPP).
It was taken over by the Department in 1992 as it was seen as an important part of the Department’s customary
land registration function. The procedure for registration involves the lodgement with the Registrar of an
application form attaching the Constitution. The Registrar notifies interested persons and allows a period of time
for objections. Once the notice period has elapsed and objections have been resolved, the Registrar issues a
certificate of registration.
The time taken to complete registration of a Land Group is perceived to be an impediment in terms of getting new
forestry projects under way. At present it takes four to six months (up to twelve months if an objection is involved)
from the time when the application reaches the Registrar. The incorporation of land groups for forestry projects is
currently facilitated by Forest Authority staff. This involves field trips where groups are assisted to undertake
genealogies, prepare property lists, and settle the Constitution. The application is then typed in Forest Authority
head office, and forwarded to the Lands Department for processing. The DOLPP do not have any established
positions to cater for this registration function. At present, they estimate 2-3 staff would be required to service this
function. Currently, organisations which have promoted and assisted in the formation of Land Groups (notably
Chevron Niugini and the Forest Authority) have provided staff to DOLPP to assist with registration.
A key issue in the formation of a land group for a forestry project is the necessity to resolve any potential land
disputes before the group is registered and begins to assume the right to speak for the disputed land. The Act
clearly envisages the importance of exposing any potential land disputes before registration, by requiring that
notice be given of intention to incorporate. Notice is to be given to the [relevant] provincial and local-level
governments, and in such other manner as the Registrar directs. Under current practice, the Group’s intention to
register its Constitution is broadcast on local radio. However, the Act does not require land ownership to be
identified as part of the registration process, and the Registrar has advised that the Department of Lands
considers the process of incorporating Land Groups does not involve any adjudication on the ownership of lands
(although many applicants mistakenly view recognition as an award of customary title). The effect of this is that
unless there has been some adjudication about land ownership by the Land Court or Land Titles Commission, the
Forest Authority enters into a legal contract for the purchase of timber rights on the strength of no more than the
Land Group’s assertion that it is the owner of the land on which the timber is growing.
Forest Authority staff who have undertaken ILG work in areas where forestry operations have already logged the
forest indicate that land ownership issues may be much more contested in these areas. This is partly because
people are aware of the value of the timber, and partly because people now seek to redefine ownership (at least
for the purpose of the forestry project) to remedy the inequitable distribution of royalties in the past.  PNG case
law suggests that if the Forest Authority enters into an FMA with people who are later determined NOT to be the
real owners of the land, then the FMA will be void - the Forest Authority will not have acquired a good title to the
timber. If Land Group work is undertaken by logging companies anxious to streamline the acquisition of a
resource they hope will be allocated to them, or if it is undertaken by unqualified people, there is a possibility of
short-cutting the procedures. These short-cuts will not affect the registration process - because identification of
clan members and property are not required by the Land Groups Incorporation Act. However, they will render it
more likely that assumptions about land ownership are incorrect.
Box 8.7  Land group incorporation procedures
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the new resource allocation procedures (see section 8.5), but the dissent
expressed by some local landowners appeared to indicate that some parts
of the enlarged resource had not been properly acquired in the first place
(Saturday Independent, 10 June 1995).  Given the bureaucratic complexity of
the land group incorporation process (see Box 8.7), it is hardly surprising
that political pressures on the NFA have resulted in the cutting of several
corners, including the use of logging company staff and facilities to
expedite the process, and occasional reliance on the ‘75 per cent rule’
endorsed by the new legislation, but there have also been some cases in
which the National Forest Board has rejected an FMA on the grounds that
land groups in the area have not been properly consulted or incorporated,
thus adding to the delays which have frustrated the logging industry and
its political allies.  The question of whether these procedures have served or
may yet serve to enhance the overall level of community participation in
the resource management or development process is dealt with at greater
length in section 10.3 below.
Under the terms of the old Forestry Act, the TRP Agreement formed the
basis on which the DOF would issue a Timber Permit for the exploitation of
forest resources.  More than half of the permits governing operational
forestry projects at the time when the new Act was gazetted had been
issued to landowner companies, rather than logging contractors.  In these
circumstances, the net result was rather similar to that which obtained in
LFAs approved under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, where the
landowner company entered into a separate Logging and Marketing
Agreement (LMA) with a logging company.  The main difference lay in the
Department’s power to attach specific conditions to timber permits and to
make the permit-holder responsible for their fulfilment.  However, many of
these conditions were ignored in practice, by both landowner companies
and logging companies, and the Department had been unable to prevent
the emergence of a bewildering variety of other ‘conditions’ through the
negotiation of LMAs.  The net result, as documented by the Barnett Inquiry,
was a mess.
According to the Policy, a new set of resource allocation procedures should
have the effect of enhancing the level of competition between developers
(PNGMOF 1991:33) and helping to ‘create an operating environment within
the industry that is conducive to attracting experienced and responsible
8.5   Resource allocation procedures
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operators that are committed to the long term development of the industry’
(ibid:30).  At the same time, the Policy envisaged that these procedures
would give preference to national companies or companies with national
shareholders (ibid:34) and to companies ‘with a strong background in
processing and marketing’ (ibid:33).
The new Act prescribed (in Sections 62-77) the standard procedure by which
the right to carry out a ‘forest development project’, including any rights
acquired under an FMA, would be allocated to a developer:
• Firstly, the National Forest Board, in consultation with the Provincial
Forest Management Committee, would commission a ‘development
options study’ of the proposed project area, normally to be carried out by
an officer of the National Forest Service.
• The Committee, in consultation with the resource owners and the
provincial government, would then submit draft guidelines for project
development to the Board for its approval50.
• The Board would then advertise the project and ‘seek expressions of
interest from registered forest industry participants’.
• The potential developers would then submit their project proposals,
having first sought the Managing Director’s permission to enter the
project area.
• The Committee would then evaluate the proposals in light of national
and provincial policy guidelines and recommend to the Board the names
of those proponents (if any) with whom further negotiations should
proceed.
• The Board, in consultation with the Minister, would then direct and
advise the Committee on the conduct of further negotiations with the
selected proponents.
• On the basis of these negotiations, the Committee would then submit a
draft project agreement with one of the proponents to the Board for its
approval.
50
 According to Section 59, the Board was obliged to consult with ‘the member or members of Parliament for the Province and
the electorate or electorates in which the area covered by the agreement is situated’, as well as with the customary owners and
the relevant provincial government, when pondering the allocation of a Timber Permit.  This provision seems to have been
introduced into the third draft of the Forestry Bill in order to compensate the national MPs for their exclusion from the Provincial
Forest Management Committees.  There is no mention of consultation with MPs in the division of the Act dealing with resource
allocation.
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• Once satisfied with the terms of the project agreement, the Board would
then recommend the Minister to grant a Timber Permit to the selected
developer51.
• On acceptance of the Board’s recommendation, the Minister would then
give the developer thirty days in which to submit a formal application
for the Timber Permit, including an Environmental Plan approved under
the Environmental Planning Act52.
• Once this was done, the Minister would then issue the Timber Permit,
setting out the various conditions under which the development would
be allowed to proceed, including the production of a project statement, a
five-year working plan and an annual logging plan, and payment of a
performance bond.
The Act also set down (in Sections 78-86) the procedures by which an
existing Timber Permit might be extended, renewed, transferred, amended,
surrendered or suspended. The Act allowed for two exceptions or
deviations from this standard procedure:
• Firstly, if the amount of timber to be harvested from a project area did
not exceed 5000 cubic metres per annum and was to be processed locally,
or if the area had already been designated as ‘salvage forest’ in the
National Forest Plan, there would be no need for a development options
study, project development guidelines, or a process of advertisement
(Section 87).  The Managing Director would refer the project proposal
directly to the Provincial Forest Management Committee for evaluation,
and the Committee could then recommend the relevant provincial
minister to grant a Timber Authority (rather than a Timber Permit)
subject to the approval of the National Forest Board (Section 89).
• Secondly, under Section 64, the Board to might also ‘consider
development proposals without advertisement for open tender’ if these
were either seen to represent ‘an extension of an existing approved
operation’ or to be ‘consistent with the National Forest Development
Programme’.
Barnett (1992:114) criticised the first of these exceptions because he thought
it would provide an opportunity for logging companies and provincial
51
 The Minister could ask the Board to reconsider its recommendation, but if the two parties were unable to reach agreement in
this way, the dispute would have to be referred to Cabinet.
52
 According to the Policy (PNGMOF 1991:8), this meant that a Timber Permit would not be issued ‘until an environmental plan
is submitted and assessed and approved by the Minister responsible for environmental matters’.
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authorities to persist in their former practice of disguising a single large-
scale logging operation as a collection of relatively unregulated small-scale
operations.  This concern was addressed in the third draft of the Bill by the
inclusion of Sub-section 87(1), which imposed a limit of 5000 cubic metres
on the amount of timber which any one developer could harvest from a
collection of two or more Timber Authorities whose boundaries were less
than ten kilometres apart.  Millett (1991) criticised the second exception
because he thought it would reduce the transparency of the allocation
procedure and thus deter investors’.  He might have added that the
question of what might or might not be counted as ‘an extension of an
existing approved operation’ had already become a hot political potato
before the Act was even passed.  From 1990 to 1992, Ministers Stack and
Genia both used this turn of phrase to justify the allocation of several new
timber permits in apparent defiance of the government’s own moratorium
(see section 8.1).
Part C of the 1993 Guidelines (on ‘Forest Resource Development’) restated
the resource acquisition and allocation procedures already stated in the
Forestry Act, and included a diagram representing the various components
of the new ‘resource development process’ (see Figure 8.2).
The ‘selected developer’ would now be required to lodge a substantial
financial deposit with the NFA before commencing its feasibility study, part
of which would reimburse the Authority for some of the expenses incurred
in its previous conduct of the ‘development options study’53, and part of
which would be advanced to local landowners as a means for them to
obtain independent commercial advice on their participation in the project
(PNGMOF 1993b:7-8)54.  The Guidelines also proposed:
• that the developer’s environmental plan should henceforth be integrated
with the ‘forest development plan and industrial development plan’,
although it would still require the formal approval of the Minister for
Environment and Conservation (ibid:9);
• that the allocation of new permits would take account of the need to
increase the level of competition between logging companies by
restricting any one company (or group of related companies) to a
maximum of 25 per cent of the permitted national harvest - a move quite
53
 It is interesting to note here that the Guidelines appeared to deviate from the Act by treating the ‘development options study’
as part of the resource acquisition process, rather than the resource allocation process.  However, the significance of this
change has yet to be realised in any practical way, because ‘the Forest Authority has failed to carry out any form of study
resembling that described in the Guidelines with respect to the Forest Management Agreements it has made so far’ (Taylor
1997:253).
54
 The second part of the deposit could be refunded if the developer subsequently failed to gain control of the resource, or could
otherwise be deducted from the developer’s subsequent tax obligations.
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clearly aimed at reducing the dominant position of Rimbunan Hijau
(ibid:19)55.
If this last measure was intended to produce a split in the ranks of the log
export industry, it does not seem to have succeeded.  The FIA was able to
present a united front in opposition to a process which frustrated all the
logging companies intent on expanding their scale of operations, and their
level of frustration now reached new heights because of the surge in log
export prices which took place during Neville’s occupation of the Ministry.
Those logging companies, like Rimbunan Hijau, which were already
registered as forest industry participants, had four main avenues by which
to maintain and enlarge their access to timber supplies in the face of these
legal and bureaucratic restrictions:
• First, they could try to secure their grasp on those concessions which
they had obtained from Ministers Stack and Genia, especially those
whose validity was now being questioned by the NFA or whose
exploitation had been delayed for other reasons.
• Second, they could try to gain control of the permits which these
ministers (or their predecessors) had originally granted to other
companies (including landowner companies), many of which were also
in a ‘dormant’ condition56.
• Third, they could exploit the loophole contained in Section 64, by
manufacturing spatial or temporal ‘extensions’ to those permits which
covered their existing operations.
• Fourth, they could throw their weight behind Tulapi’s Private Member’s
Bill, which aimed to repeal all sections of the new Act which dealt with
resource allocation.
To these four strategies, a fifth was added by some of the newcomers to the
resource allocation game, who pretended that their interest in felling trees
was merely incidental to their long-term interest in agricultural and
infrastructural development.  These companies received a warm welcome
from the Minister for Agriculture and Livestock, Roy Evara, who chose to
designate their proposals as a form of ‘agroforestry’.
55 
The Draft Guidelines had proposed a maximum of 20 per cent, but the FIA had pointed out that this would simply limit the
industry’s capacity to achieve economies of scale.
56
 Neville’s advisers had already alerted him to the possibility of amending the new Act to prohibit such acquisitions without prior
approval from the NFA (Dolman 1995).
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Source : PNGMOF 1993b:5
Figure 8.2  Stages in the new ‘resource development and allocation’ process.
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The first company to lay its cards on the table was Arrow Pacific Resources,
a consortium of Taiwanese and Singaporean interests, which proposed to
spend K100 million replacing 120,000 hectares of natural forest with oil
palm estates in Gulf and West Sepik provinces.  Shortly after Tim Neville
had unveiled his Draft Guidelines for public inspection, Arrow’s
subsidiary, Lianyi Investments, hosted a lavish dinner for its local
supporters, at which cheques for K100,000 were ceremonially launched at
each of the landowner companies whose representatives were in attendance
(Post-Courier, 10 May 1993).  The regional MP for West Sepik Province, John
Tekwie, and the Administrator of Gulf Province, Jacob Kairi, were amongst
the audience which joined Minister Evara in applauding this act of
generosity.  The Minister was especially pleased, because the larger of the
two projects, known as the Purari project, covered 80,000 hectares of his
own electorate.  But several political and bureaucratic hurdles still had to
be cleared before the developments could proceed.
The first of these consisted in the fact that the Purari project embraced part
of the area which the NFA had included in Vailala Blocks 2 and 3, and for
which a timber permit had already been issued to a company closely
associated with Rimbunan Hijau (see section 8.1).  This meant that some of
the landowners in the area had already made alternative arrangements for
the sale of their resources, while most had not yet been consulted on the
merits of Evara’s new proposal (Post-Courier, 6 May 1993).  When Lianyi
began logging in November 1993, a group of Vailala landowners obtained a
court injunction against the project, while the FIA indignantly demanded
some corresponding show of force from the Forests Minister (Times of PNG,
2 December 1993).  Unfazed, Evara declared that ‘the 40,000 hectares of land
to be cleared is on my land and the project has the full backing from all
chiefs in my area’, and equally implausibly, that Minister Neville had
agreed in Cabinet that this type of logging was not covered by his own
Guidelines (Post-Courier, 14 December 1993).  On these grounds, he
proceeded to allocate another 100,000 hectares of his own electorate to a
Malaysian company (Advance Synergy Bhd) which had now been alerted to
the potential virtues of ‘agroforestry’.  This ‘Baimuru’ project was to
encompass parts of another Timber Permit held by Rimbunan Hijau, and
resulted in more public protests from landowners who did not recognise
the Minister as their ‘chief’ (Post-Courier, 1 February 1994).  But the
Minister’s plans for Gulf Province received a serious setback in May 1994,
when the National Court found that the Purari project had breached five
separate pieces of legislation, including the new Forestry Act, and thus
confirmed the previous court order preventing further development.
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Over in West Sepik Province, Arrow Pacific’s plans to develop the 40,000-
hectare Lou project in the Aitape area had also run aground, as provincial
agricultural officials persuaded their national counterparts that the
company was in breach of government guidelines (Post-Courier, 28 October
1993), and university students tried to persuade local landowners that they
were being taken for a ride (Post-Courier, 26 January 1994).  These
opponents initially had the backing of the local MP, Paul Mambei, but his
doubts were apparently removed when the company put forward an even
more ambitious scheme to develop the neighbouring Siau-Batai project,
which covered almost 320,000 hectares (Post-Courier, 9 February 1994).  But
neither Mambei nor his regional counterpart, John Tekwie, had much
influence in Cabinet, and while Neville remained in his ministry, Cabinet
repeatedly refused to endorse any of the proposals being touted by Evara.
Neville also made sure that Evara’s dealings with the agroforesters received
a critical appraisal from the Australian television journalists who were
invited to publicise his own heroic work in June 1994.  Arrow Pacific then
seem to have lost some faith in their ministerial patron, and sold their
interest in the Siau-Batai project to a Malaysian company, Damansara
Realty.
By August 1994, Evara had apparently concluded that he would not get
Cabinet approval for his bundle of agroforestry projects, which he now
claimed would account for 7 million hectares of forested land, unless he
could secure the passage of an Agriculture Bill which would exempt them
from the provisions of the new Forestry Act (Post-Courier, 24 August 1994).
He never got the opportunity to pursue this course of action, because he
lost his portfolio with the demise of the Wingti-Chan coalition at the end of
that month.  But if forestry officials were relieved to see the back of Minister
Evara, they had not seen the end of ‘agroforestry’.  The key players in the
new Chan-Haiveta coalition were united in their determination to allocate
more forest resources, by fair means or foul, not only to satisfy the familiar
desire of individual MPs to ‘develop’ their own electorates before the next
election, but also to address the fiscal crisis caused by the previous
government’s spending spree.  In his capacity as Finance Minister, Chris
Haiveta was keener than most to expedite the development of the two
Aitape projects (Post-Courier, 23 November 1994), and Cabinet approved
both of them in February 1995, even though Damansara’s status as
developer of the Siau-Batai project had not yet been established (Post-
Courier, 21 February 1995).
However, the most enticing of the prizes which had yet to be distributed
were still those located in Roy Evara’s Kikori electorate, covering the
western half of Gulf Province, and the Middle Fly electorate in the
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neighbouring Western Province.  Despite being consigned to the
Opposition benches in Parliament, Evara had lost no confidence in the
virtues of his own pet schemes.  He now announced a new deal with
another consortium, known as Sino-PNG Resources, to invest up to K300
million in the Baimuru project, on a range of activities which included ‘oil
palm, rubber, rice-growing and livestock, breeding ducks and fishing and
various agro-forest activities, not just timber’ (Post-Courier, 16 February
1995).  The same company was proposing to invest five times this amount
of money in the Middle Fly electorate, where it also won the support of the
local MP, Bitan Kuok, whose assets had been recognised in his appointment
as the Vice-Minister for Forests.  But this proposal, once again, ran counter
to the interests of Rimbunan Hijau, whose largest operating concession (the
Wawoi-Guavi project) was already located in the same area.  RH had its
own designs on the rest of the timber in Kuok’s electorate, either through
the grant of an ‘extension’ to this project, or through acquisition of the
neighbouring Makapa Timber Permit, which Minister Genia had granted to
another Malaysian company - Innovision - but which had yet to be
exploited.  RH also had the support of Minister Posai, as well as some of
the landowner companies in the area.  In the event, these competing claims
created a political stalemate, and the NFA confirmed Innovision’s right to
the Makapa concession after that company had threatened legal action
against the State (Wood 1997).
But in Evara’s own electorate, the bottleneck was broken.  This was due, in
no small measure, to the fact that Chris Haiveta was not only the Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, but also the regional Member for
Gulf Province.  As we have seen (section 8.1), it was Haiveta who signed
the ‘TRP agreement’ which gave retrospective (though dubious) legal
validity to the Valaila Block 2 and 3 Timber Permits which were now
controlled by Rimbunan Hijau, thus putting the final nail in the coffin of
Evara’s Purari oil palm project.  The pressure to allocate this particular
block of resources may have originated with the Prime Minister himself,
but Haiveta also had other designs on the rest of the commercial timber
resources in Evara’s electorate.  These consisted primarily in his support for
the proposal by Turama Forest Industries (TFI), which was already logging
the area covered by the Turama Timber Permit at the far western end of the
electorate, to ‘extend’ its operations by means of an FMA that would cover
nearly all the commercial timber resources which had not already been
allocated, thus quadrupling the size of its natural assets.  To members of the
National Forest Board and senior managers of the National Forest Service,
this proposal had some undeniable merits.  TFI had no apparent connection
to RH, it was promising to build a K50 million plywood factory, had
willingly assisted in the work of land group incorporation, and was
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Box 8.8  Arguments over the allocation of the Makapa TRP
The Makapa Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) area, located in the Western province of Papua New
Guinea (PNG), has been the subject of a lengthy process of negotiation in which no party or interest
group has been able to exercise sufficient power over the other players to successfully impose their
own definition of the TRP on those other actors.  This is a case in which the various stakeholders have
failed to achieve a level of cooperation which would impose a workable order on their divergent
understandings of the Makapa TRP itself.  What has happened instead is that conflicts over the
definition of the Makapa TRP have so transformed and diluted this ‘project’ that it has yet to be scaled
up from the micro-world of proposals, maps, ideas, letters of intent and project agreements to the
macro-world of actual project development.
The Makapa TRP was not only potentially a major source of revenue for the government – it was, for a
time, seen by the reformers as being likely to exemplify many of the benefits of the reform process.  But
the failure to implement the Makapa TRP became an icon, to their opponents, of the reformers’ more
general inability to effectively implement their policies.  While the reforms weakened the discretionary
powers of the Minister for Forests, there was no real attempt to destroy or transform the alliances
between the wider political elite and the loggers.  If anything, the reformers succeeded in temporarily
transforming a ‘governing alliance’ between the loggers and the elite which had previously run the
forestry sector into a ‘defensive alliance’ which aimed at constraining, and winding back, the reform
process.  The reform process has not been robust enough to completely transform the permit given to
Innovision under the old Forestry Act into an arrangement that fully conforms to the procedures of the
new Act.  Moreover, the reformers have been unable to prevent alliances between politicians and
loggers from generating other definitions of Makapa which also seem to challenge procedures
established by the Forest Authority.  The competing loggers in the Makapa TRP have been reasonably
successful in continuing to operate with a model that allocates power to the political elite in the form of
the Minister for Forests, other ministers, and the National Executive Council.  Understood in these
terms, the Makapa TRP represents the failure of the Forest Authority to effectively impose its reformist
policies on the political elite.
Source: Wood 1997
prepared to ‘set aside’ most of the resources contained within the Kikori
ICAD project area (see section 9.1).  In these respects, its proposal appealed
to the residual supporters of Neville’s Guidelines or Smith’s ‘TSA concept’
within the NFA.  Furthermore, any substantial allocation made under the
new Forestry Act, even if it meant the exploitation of a legal loophole,
would go some way to satisfy Minister Posai’s demand for ‘more projects’
(Times of PNG, 16 February 1995), and this particular concession would
simultaneously knock the stuffing out of Evara’s Baimuru project, as the
latter obviously recognised (Post-Courier, 16 December 1994).  The FIA had
already sets its face against the ‘agroforesters’, and the Association’s
representative on the National Forest Board was none other than TFI’s
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Managing Director, Tony Honey - who naturally abstained when the Board
voted to grant the extended permit in June 199557.
The NANGO representative, Brian Brunton, also abstained from the vote,
claiming that the Board had not even had the opportunity to study the
proposal in detail, and then took his case to the local press and the
Ombudsman Commission, arguing that Section 64 should not have been
used to grant such a massive concession, and that the Kikori and Baimuru
Timber Permits should instead have been advertised in the normal way,
following completion of the Provincial Forest Development Programme
and the National Forest Plan (Saturday Independent, 10 June 1995)58.
Disgruntled landowners also took various actions (including legal action)
against the developers, though they might not necessarily have shared the
legalistic concerns of the NGOs.  Some were no doubt followers of Roy
Evara, who continued to complain that TFI had ‘bribed’ many of his
constituents (Post-Courier, 22 November 1995).  Even before the Board had
made its decision, one (apparently unregistered) landowner company
claiming a stake in the Kikori ICAD project area, Hekiko Forests Pty Ltd,
had written to the Prime Minister to protest that their resources had been
set aside without their consent (Independent, 5 July 1996), and later entered
into a ‘Forest Management Agreement’ with another developer, which
prompted forestry officials to publish a full-page newspaper advertisement
advising all the land groups in the area that this was thoroughly irregular
(Post-Courier, 31 May 1996)59.
Nor did the ‘official’ extension of the Turama Timber Permit do much to
reduce the clamouring for ‘agroforestry’ projects in other areas.  Over in
West Sepik Province, John Tekwie, now the Provincial Governor60, was
rapidly losing patience with the Provincial Forest Management
Committee’s refusal to make good use of the loopholes in Sections 87 and
89 of the Forestry Act by granting a Timber Authority to Damansara Forest
Products.  The Committee’s hesitation was hardly surprising, because the
company was planning to extract almost 1 million cubic metres of logs over
three years, before even starting the process of agricultural development,
and was asking the government to grant it a 50 per cent reduction in log
export duty on full-sized logs, and a 100 per cent exemption on under-sized
logs (Post-Courier, 20 November 1995).  Although forestry officials
57
 This was a 35-year contract allowing a maximum annual harvest of 180,000m
3
.
58
 The Ombudsman did eventually find some irregularities in the allocation process, but the concession has not been revoked as
a result.
59 
The identity of the politicians involved in this particular deal has never been made public.
60
 Under the new Organic Law, which had just been gazetted, those provincial MPs who were not national government ministers
became the Governors of their respective provinces, displacing the former Premiers.
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Piers, bridges and culverts constructed by logging companies are typically constructed from raw
logs and begin to collapse after only one or two years
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persuaded their new Minister, Andrew Baing, to pronounce his opposition
to unplanned clear-felling of natural forests, and the FIA was quick to
support his views (Post-Courier, 2 October 1995), Damansara’s local MP,
Paul Mambei, who had now assumed the Ministry of Environment and
Conservation, had no problem in approving the company’s Environmental
Plan.  According to one newspaper report (Post-Courier, 12 March 1996),
Governor Tekwie personally issued the necessary Timber Authority some
time in the new year, and Cabinet seems to have approved this action
without further reference to the National Forest Board.
The climate of opinion in Cabinet was certainly not such as to dampen the
enthusiasm of other ‘agroforesters’.  In July 1995, it had given its approval
in principle to another 40,000 hectare oil palm scheme (the Vailala project)
in Roy Evara’s electorate (Post-Courier, 31 July 1995)61, and a 50,000 hectare
rubber estate (the East Awin project) in Western Province (Saturday
Independent, 5 August 1995), even though no developer had yet been
identified for either of these investments.  But stranger things were to come:
• In the dying days of the old provincial government system, the Premier
of Oro Province endorsed a remarkably fanciful proposal by a Filipino
company, with a paid-up capital of US$7000, to replace the forests of
Collingwood Bay with plantations of dwarf coconut palms (see Box 8.9).
When this proposal came to light in 1996, a spokesman for the Prime
Minister’s office reportedly described it as ‘stupid, ridiculous, nonsense
and unrealistic’ (Independent, 28 June 1996), but its sheer absurdity
probably helped to galvanise support for an ICAD project in the same
area (see section 9.1).
• In March 1996, a Singaporean gentleman by the name of Dr Chong
Huang, described as an ‘advisor and consultant to both the Home Affairs
and Youth and Correctional Service Ministers’ announced that his
company, PNG Vision 2000 Pty Ltd, had secured US$150 million to
develop an ‘agro-forestry’ project covering the whole of Normanby
Island in Milne Bay Province, and had already won the approval of the
islanders (without yet submitting any proposal to the government),
while making arrangements for the two ministers to visit Singapore ‘to
study rehabilitation work both in prisons and for youth’ (Independent, 22
March 1996).  The plan apparently involved clear-felling the island,
building a veneer plant and woodchip mill, and replanting harvested
areas with rice and maize.  The NFA and the provincial government both
denied all knowledge of this scheme, and nothing more was heard of it.
61
 It is not clear whether this was done to appease or spite the local MP, but the 40,000 hectares covered by this proposal was
then absorbed into the new Vailala timber concessions granted to Rimbunan Hijau.
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• More serious, perhaps, was the proposal made public in November that
year, by three Chinese Canadians representing a company called
SanKung Trading Ltd, ‘to develop manufacturing operations in the agro-
forestry, fish cannery, agriculture and farming areas as well as general
merchandise and mining projects’ over a period of fifty years, in various
parts of East Sepik, West Sepik and Gulf provinces (Post-Courier, 14
November 1996).  Of course, the first five years would be devoted
entirely to logging operations, although the developer did not think it
necessary to apply for a Timber Permit.  It later transpired that Chris
Haiveta had signed deeds of agreement with SanKung, that several Sepik
politicians were also party to the deal, and that the Acting Finance
Minister, Nakikus Konga, had later granted ten-year tax holidays to the
company’s local subsidiaries (Independent, 26 September 1997).
Although it may have seemed that the ‘agroforesters’ and their political
allies were pioneering the use of Timber Authorities to circumvent the
resource allocation procedures laid down in the new Forestry Act, one
logging contractor, Concord Pacific, had already discovered another
application of the same device, by undertaking to construct a road on
behalf of the landowner company which had been granted Cabinet
approval to develop the East Awin ‘agroforestry’ project in Western
Province (see above), and then using the Timber Authority which had
previously been granted to that company as the pretext for harvesting all
the timber which lay within one kilometre of the road alignment in order to
pay for the cost of construction (see Box 8.10)62.  Andrew Posai must have
been apprised of this innovation during his brief occupation of the Forests
Ministry, because his ‘own’ landowner company, Gasmata Holdings,
induced the West New Britain Provincial Forest Management Committee to
approve a Timber Authority for construction of an equally devious ‘road’
across the Whiteman Ranges.
Alarmed by these developments, bureaucrats and consultants in the
National Forest Service drafted a Cabinet submission on ‘Conversion of
Forests to Agriculture and Development of New Public Roads Through
Forested Areas’ in May 1996.  This document described the ‘core issue’ as
Cabinet’s tendency to approve policy submissions from individual
ministers who might have no formal responsibility over forestry matters
and who were not formally obliged to consult with their departmental
officials on the merits of their proposals.
62
 The Minister for Environment and Conservation, Parry Zeipi, gave ‘conditional’ approval to Concord’s Environmental Plan in
July 1995, several months after logging had begun (Post-Courier, 28 July 1995).
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Box 8.9  Agroforestry as ‘cargo cult’
Documents relating to a multi billion coconut sap agro-
forestry project for Oro Province’s Collingwood Bay
reveal that major initiatives continue to be planned and
endorsed by the government with little landowner
participation and approval.  The documents also confirm
that a PNG diplomat supports this foreign project
proposal which promises an attractive, exorbitant
package to landowners, a surprising figure of K3.5 billion
annually per landowner family.
[The project] proposes to develop 120,000 hectares of
virgin forest land into dwarf coconut farms.  The purpose
is to process fresh coconut sap into a 100 per cent natural
food and health drink for export.  Project proponents
are Francisco Umali and Ewin Acoba who are
representatives of Ukadeco Pty Ltd, a company based
in the Philippines.  A joint venture agreement was signed
on August 7, 1995 between two parties, a landowner
company [called] Collingwood Bay-Musa Development
Corporation Pty Ltd and Ukadeco Pty Ltd, in support of
this project.  It was witnessed by the then Oro premier
Douglas Garawa.
The project has drawn the interest of PNG’s Ambassador
to the Philippines, James Pokasui.  Mr Pokasui has
written to the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, in support
of this project [in a] letter dated December 29, 1995:
‘I have read through the project proposal and concluded
that this project will be the first of its kind in the country.
Once given the opportunity to proceed, this project will
indeed boost the development efforts of the national
government in the following areas:
• Agri-livelihood development:  The fully developed
100,000 hectares of dwarf coconut farms will be
distributed to 25,000 farm families at four hectares per
family for free.  Each farm family is expected to earn
about K11,000 per month or K139,817 per year.  The
project will generate a total livelihood income of about
K3.5 billion annually.
• Agro-Industrialisation:  One coconut sap processing
plant would be built for every 5,000 hectares of fully
developed dwarf coconut farms - 20 plants will be built
in the Collingwood Bay area.  A can manufacturing plant
will also be built to supply the tin can requirements of
the 20 plants.
• Employment generation:  The project will generate
about 200,000 jobs in the gathering of fresh coconut sap.
An extra 11,000 jobs shall be generated by the
processing plants and another 1,000 jobs by the tin plant.
• Infrastructure development:  The project will develop
the Collingwood Bay area into a modern agro-industrial
community.  Facilities and amenities [which] will be built
include a pier, airport, water/power plants and
commercial shopping centres to sustain a community.
• Taxes to the government:  The project will generate a
total tax revenue of K3 billion in a period of five years
from round logs exports.  Over a 10 year period, it will
generate K11.1 billion tax revenues.
• Foreign exchange earning:  The project will generate
foreign exchange earnings at K26.03 billion per year from
the eighth year onward.’
According to Mr Pokasui, a fund of K128.53 million is
being set up by Mitsui International of Japan with
corresponding guarantee by Enrique Zobel International
of Philippines for this Papua New Guinea project....  Mr
Pokasui said he believes the project will succeed and
further recommended that:
• the national government should consider approving the
two parties request for concessionary tax of K12.85 per
cubic metre for the export of round logs from Collingwood
Bay area;
• the national government should consider granting tax
exemption for capital equipment and income tax holiday,
and
• the prime minister should consider giving both the
chairman and president of Ukadeco Pty Ltd Mr Edwin
Acoba and Francisco Umali the opportunity to meet and
discuss their project plan with himself and the ministers
of Finance and Planning, Forests, Agriculture and
Livestock and Commerce and Industry.
Source: Independent, 21 June 1996
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Once the NEC’s approval is obtained, the developers then behave as if [this]
automatically exempts them from the requirements of PNG law, or as if the
NEC approval means that all other legal requirements will be automatically
rubber-stamped by the relevant Departments.
The submission relied on Cabinet’s previous endorsement of the Forestry
Regulations (which included ‘Guidelines for the Issuance of Timber
Authorities’), the PNG Logging Code of Practice (see section 8.11), and
(above all) the conditions attached to the Economic Reform Programme, to
recommend that:
• Proposals for large-scale agricultural development which entail the
clearance of more than fifty hectares of forested land should be evaluated
by the NFA, the DAL, and the DECbefore being approved by Cabinet.  In
addition, the NFA should put the relevant Timber Authorities out to
public tender, the proponent of the agricultural development should be
prohibited from tendering for them, and should instead be required to
lodge a performance bond equivalent to 15 per cent of the total
agricultural investment with the NFA, to pay for rehabilitation of the
land in the event that it does not proceed with the proposed
development.
• Forest clearance for the construction of public roads should be confined
to 40 metre wide corridor (in accordance with the Code of Practice), and
the Forest Authority should not process Timber Authorities for this
purpose without a guarantee from the relevant provincial government
that it will take responsibility for maintenance of the road in question.
This submission was not greeted with much enthusiasm by the three
ministers for whom it was prepared (Forests, Agriculture, and Transport),
so the World Bank was left to ensure that the government agreed to comply
with its own Forestry Regulations at the same time that it agreed to reverse
its proposed amendments to the Act.
No attempt was made to revoke the Timber Authorities already granted to
Damansara and tender them to another developer, but the company was
required to lodge a performance bond and demonstrate some progress with
its agricultural investment in each 5,000 hectare block before proceeding to
harvest timber from the next one.  Serious doubts have since been raised
over the company’s compliance with these conditions, because the
company had already exported 25,000 cubic metres of logs by the end of
1997, but the current Minister has generously given back the bond.  Work
on the Kiunga-Aiambak road has been interrupted by disputes amongst the
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Landowners of the proposed 264 kilometre Kiunga-
Aiambak road in the Western province have called
on the National Forest Service (NFS) to review a
timber permit issued to Paiso Pty Ltd and
developers Concord Pacific whom they claim are
carrying out illegal logging operations in the name
of road development.  The permit - Timber Authority
024 issued to Paiso in April 1994 - allows the
company to clearfell 5,000 cubic metres of timber
harvested per year in an operation confined to 50
metres on both sides of the road corridor.  But so
far only 20 kilometres of road have been constructed
from Kiunga while, according to Forest Authority
records, the contractors are understood to have
exported 32,295 cubic metres of logs worth K5.4
million in 1996.
An Environmental Plan submitted to the Department
of Environment and Conservation and signed by
chairman of Paiso suggests that the Aiambak-
Kiunga road will be entirely financed by revenue
from log sales.  But a Forest Authority brief in
support of the landowner claims states that the
approval of the permit granted by the previous
Acting Forest Minister does not comply with existing
forestry regulations and guidelines, especially the
Forestry Act.
Last week, a group of Kiunga-Aiambak landowners
led by the President of the Lake Murray Local Level
Government Council travelled to Port Moresby to
seek legal advice on the operations of the two
companies.  They said they had had no benefits
from the project since it was initiated and were not
party to the agreement that was in place between
the landowner company and the developers,
Concord Pacific.  The President said Paiso Pty Ltd,
the landowner company, does not represent their
interest. The Council President has also raised the
Box 8.10  The Kiunga-Aiambak ‘road’
Source: Independent, 19 September 1997
concerns of the landowners, saying the road
construction is not of proper standard and has no
culverts and bridges.  He added that the road is
only five metres wide.  He said that although road
construction was good for people in terms of
transportation, the nature of how Paiso Pty Ltd and
Concord Pacific acquired the permit had to be
investigated.
According to the Forest Authority brief, contents of
the agreement between Paiso and Concord Pacific
suggest that the contractor will carry out timber
harvesting and road construction.  The agreement
also allowed the developers to construct the road
adequate for four-wheel drives and does not include
permanent culverts and bridges. The total costs of
the road construction was estimated by the
company to be around K12 million. According to
the brief, the managing director of Concord Pacific
advised the chairman of Paiso that the timber
harvesting based on the TA conditions was not
commercially viable, and undertook to work out the
economic analysis of the project, advising the
landowner company to seek variation of the original
terms and conditions of the permit.
In June 1994, the Vice Minister for Forests and the
national member for the area wrote a letter on
behalf of the landowner company seeking variation
to the original conditions, and to allow the contractor
to harvest 210,000 cubic metres of timber per year
and cover 1000 metres on both sides of the road.
In August 1994, the then Forests Minister Tim
Neville approved that variation, including Concord
as contractor.....  The Timber Authority issued to
Paiso expired on April 18, 1995, but the former
Acting Forest Minister, in his letter of May 22, 1995,
approved the renewal of the Timber Authority
covering a period of five years.
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landowners, rather than the intervention of the NFA63, while the ‘road
builders’ in West New Britain seem to have been defeated by their own
technical incompetence.
There is now less reason for Cabinet or individual politicians to condone
such irregular forms of resource allocation, not only because they are
operating under the watchful eye of the World Bank, but also because the
existence of a National Forest Plan has allowed (or obliged) the NFA to
advertise a number of concessions for which ‘legitimate’ developers can
openly compete.  On the other hand, no new permits have actually been
issued in the two years since Minister Baing ordered the advertisements.
Seven proposals were rejected by the National Forest Board at the
beginning of 1997 because their documentation was found to be inadequate
(Independent, 14 February 1997).  The smaller areas, which might not
produce more than 10,000 cubic metres of timber per annum in a 35-year
rotation, have apparently been too small to attract developers who are
willing and able to meet the exhausting standards imposed by the
allocation procedures.  In the largest of the advertised areas, the Josephstaal
FMA in Madang Province, the Board was unable to resolve the conflict
between the Minister, the Provincial Forest Management Committee, and a
local landowner company, each of which had its own favoured developer.
By the time the Minister had left the scene, faults were discovered in the
land group incorporation process, and forestry officials have since been
occupied with their correction.
As John Millett (1991) pointed out in his original commentary on the new
Act, ‘[t]he PFMC is the key to success of the entire operation because it
must resolve any conflict between landowners, conservation and
government interests’.  As we have seen, these bodies have not been
immune from political interference, but even when they make decisions on
the merits of the case, and these should therefore receive the approval of the
Board, other stakeholders, including the Minister, do not abandon their
own agendas in the face of a technocratic consensus.  The Policy and the
Act failed to set out any specific mechanism for the resolution of such
conflict, except insofar as they allowed for the Minister to question the
recommendations of the Board, which seems to mean that dissenting
stakeholders can rely on the intervention of the Minister (or Cabinet) to
safeguard their interests, and the Board’s trump card is the technicality on
which a final decision has to be deferred.
63
 Concord Pacific exported more than 123,000 cubic metres of logs in 1997, but it is not clear whether the whole of this volume
was derived from their ‘road clearance’ work.
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Whatever progress has been made in reform of the resource allocation
procedures, the fact remains that most of the logging operations in PNG are
still covered by agreements made under the old legislation.  The generosity
of Ministers Stack and Genia meant that the ‘maximum allowable cut’
under the permits and dealings approved before the new Act was gazetted
amounted to 8.45 million cubic metres in 1993, and would still be 4.82
million cubic metres in 2001 (PNGADCP 1993) - well beyond the limits of
sustainability which have so far been established (see section 8.3).  If this
provided a solid pretext for the policy reformers to restrict the allocation of
additional resources, it also posed the question how they could ‘reform’
existing projects.
According to the Policy (PNGMOF 1991:23), ‘all timber permits and
additionally all dealings under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act ...
current at the time this policy takes effect will be subject to the
requirements of new forestry legislation, and permits and dealings that are
inconsistent with this policy will be subject to renegotiation or termination
as required’.  This undertaking was embodied in Section 137 of the Act,
which ‘saved’ all these permits and dealings as Timber Permits granted
under the conditions set out in other parts of the legislation.  Millett (1991)
complained that Section 137 apparently gave the Board the right to change
any condition of an existing agreement which was considered to be ‘at
variance with the provisions of this Act to an extent which makes it
unacceptable’, but apparently made no allowance for appeal against such a
decision or delay in its enforcement.  This proved to be one of the main
bones of contention between Minister Neville and the log export industry.
When the Act was amended in April 1993, an additional clause was inserted
in Section 137 which allowed the Board to grant existing operations a ‘grace
period’ during which the provisions of the old legislation would continue
to apply, but the length of this period was not specified.  At the same time,
Part J of the Guidelines (on ‘Review of Existing Forestry Projects’) proposed
a mechanism for audits and field inspections of all such projects, which
would still enable the National Forest Board to ‘unilaterally’ vary their
terms and conditions to enforce compliance with the provisions of the new
Act.  Part J also noted that Logging and Marketing Agreements between
permit-holders and contractors under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act had
not been ‘saved’ under Section 137, and contractors operating under such
agreements would therefore need to obtain a licence under the new Act
before they could continue logging.  It was this part of the Guidelines,
especially in its draft form, that aroused the ire of the FIA, which threatened
8.6 The project review process
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that its members would take ‘legal action for compensation for
expropriation under the Investment Promotion Act’ if the Board were to
make full use of its powers under Section 137 (PNGFIA 1993:31).  The main
focus of their concern was the proposal to reduce the permitted levels of
harvest in existing concessions.
Although the Minister was unwilling to beat a public retreat from his
insistence on the process of review, the NFA’s legal advisers were not at all
certain of their capacity to defend any legal actions arising from unilateral
changes to existing agreements.  Nor did forestry officials have the time and
expertise to launch dozens of audits and field inspections in March 1994,
when the review process was scheduled to begin.  The only operation
whose agreements were subjected to serious scrutiny that year was the
Kapuluk project in West New Britain Province, and then only because a
group of disaffected landowners were able to secure the assistance of
consultants working for the donor-funded Kandrian-Gloucester Integrated
Development Project, and because the Korean developers, Nam Yang, were
prepared to accept a negotiated settlement entailing a substantial increase
in landowner revenues (Simpson 1997:28).
Once Neville had been removed from the Forests Ministry, the senior
reformers in the National Forest Service had other matters on their minds,
and no further attempt was made to reassess the content of existing
agreements until 1997, when the FIA’s campaign against the new revenue
system prompted the World Bank to institute its own version of the project
review process by engaging its own consultants to conduct an independent
audit of material benefits provided by logging companies to local
landowners under existing Timber Permits or Logging and Marketing
Agreements, and an equally exhaustive survey of the production costs of all
existing logging operations (see Section 8.7).  Since then, the Bank has also
thrown its weight behind the long-standing demand of local NGOs for
gazettal of the Fairness of Transactions Act, which was approved by
Parliament in 1993, and should have provided a more substantial legal
basis for landowners to challenge the validity of existing agreements
between landowner companies and logging contractors, which might
explain why it has never been gazetted64.
64 
Oddly enough, this Act received the public endorsement of Daniel Tulapi, even at the same time that he was moving his own
amendments to the Forestry Act (Post-Courier, 30 August 1993).
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During the first fifteen years of national independence, the forest revenue
system evolved in the rather haphazard manner which was typical of the
forest policy process as a whole:
• Timber royalties were initially levied at the rate of K3.18 per cubic metre,
this being raised to K3.95 per cubic metre in 1976, then to K5.41 per cubic
metre in 1981.
• In the early years of Independence, these royalties were divided between
the national government, the provincial government, and local
landowners in the ratio 1:2:1, but the national government gave its own
share back to the provincial governments in 1986, and later decided that
the ‘resource owners’ should be entitled to the whole amount.
• In 1979, the government introduced a log export tax, which was levied at
a flat rate of 10 per cent on f.o.b. prices for all species; the budget of
November 1990 introduced differential tax rates on species ranked
according to their market value.
• Local landowners (or rather landowner companies) were able to secure a
variety of additional cash benefits from logging contractors in the form
‘levies’ or ‘premiums’ which varied widely between one project and
another.
• Most permit holders (including landowner companies) agreed to spend
some of their own revenues on the provision of ‘social infrastructure’ or
other ‘benefits in kind’ within their concessions, some of which could be
regarded as an indirect form of budgetary support to the government.
The TFAP Review criticised (and effectively stalled) the government’s
proposal to revise the fiscal regime in the forestry sector in such a way that
royalties would be charged as a fixed percentage of export value, because it
carried ‘a potential political risk of exposing resource owners to the
consequences of market instability, from which they are presently shielded’
(World Bank 1989:32).  It was also critical of the use of royalty rate
allowances and indirect infrastructural levies as the preferred method of
compensating for variations in the average cost of production between
different logging operations, since low-cost producers would probably still
have the upper hand, and inefficient loggers might also be inefficient in the
business of providing social infrastructure (ibid:33).
8.7 The forest revenue system
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Under Part VI of the new Act (Sections 119-121), the government was
committed to the establishment of a new ‘forest revenue system’, but no details
were provided in the legislation.  The Policy (PNGMOF 1991:40) promised an
‘early comprehensive study on State taxes, levies, royalties, charges, and
obligations to be imposed on the forest industry, and minimum rentals and
purchase prices due to resource owners’, and in the meantime undertook to
maintain the existing method of calculating and distributing royalties, so that:
• ‘Resource owners will continue to receive all royalties collected from timber
and other forest produce harvested from natural forests.’
• ‘The national and provincial governments shall continue to receive 25 per
cent and 75 per cent, respectively, of royalties from timber and other forest
produce harvested from State land.’
The Act allowed the Minister and Board a substantial measure of discretion in
deciding the rate at which royalties and levies would be charged on individual
projects, presumably so that the Act would not have to be amended in light of
the revenue study promised in the Policy.  Millett (1991) expressed the
concerns of the private sector by complaining that this would cause
‘considerable investor uncertainty’ because it gave no guarantee of a level
playing field, and because the allowance made in Section 121 for the NFA to
meet its own costs out of levies charged on the industry might not be
consistent with its stated aim of achieving ‘increased down-stream processing’.
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Logging road creating large water pool, West New Britain. Many of the benefits that resource owners
associate with large-scale logging, such as roads, often last only as long as the logging operation
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The NFCAP Forest Revenue Study, completed in 1991, found that the
existing fiscal regime in the forestry sector was ‘reasonably efficient’, but it
was ‘probably not fair, certainly not simple, and does not seem to
encourage good forest management’ (Shedden Agribusiness 1991:viii).  It
went on to propose that:
• resource owners should receive a royalty payment of between K4 and K5
per cubic metre of all logs harvested;
• the government should tax the logging industry by a combination of
‘stumpage’ charges on all logs harvested, and an additional export tax on
all logs exported, and thus encourage downstream processing by
subjecting processors to the former, but not the latter, charge;
• stumpage charges should vary with the value of the species being
harvested, while log export taxes should vary with the export price; and
• tax receipts should be credited to a Forest Revenue Stabilisation Fund
which would first be used to cover the government’s own costs in
regulating the industry, and any surplus then made available to Local
Area Development Funds in each concession area.
The recommendations of the revenue study were subject to a certain
amount of interdepartmental consultation during 1992, but came under
heavy fire from the logging industry and landowner company
representatives when a revised version was incorporated into the Draft
Guidelines (see Box 8.11).  As a result, the version approved by Cabinet in
September 1993 proposed that the surplus stumpage should be paid to ‘a
representative body appointed by landowners in each project area’, which
might (but might not) turn out to be a landowner company.
In December 1993, Conrad Smith, in his capacity as Acting Managing
Director of the NFA, published a full-page newspaper advertisement to
show how landowners could expect to benefit from the new revenue system
proposed in the Guidelines, which was due to be implemented in March
1994 (see Table 8.3).  The log export industry’s opposition to this system
was primarily based on its belief that the new ‘representative bodies’ would
not be able to provide the same level of infrastructural benefits to local
communities as those already provided by the logging companies under
existing agreements, and on its claim that the NFA had underestimated the
real costs of production, even after these benefits were discounted.
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The Draft Forestry Development Guidelines presented to the National Forest Board in May 1993
(PNGMOF 1993a) proposed payment of a set stumpage fee direct to individual landowner clans, plus
an additional stumpage fee (essentially a share of the surplus on log sales) into a ‘project area
development trust’.  This trust was to be managed under government rules, with application of trust
account funds confined to ‘economically sustainable enterprises - on a loan basis’ or ‘construction and
maintenance of physical infrastructure - by way of conditional grants’.  Given the high prices prevailing
at the time, this proposal would have diverted a significant share of the proceeds of log sales away from
logging companies and into the trust accounts.
Not surprisingly, the Forest Industries Association was highly critical of the proposal.  Yet the strongest
protests were voiced by the PNG Forest Resource Owners Association, a body whose membership
comprised the directors and senior management of landowner companies.  The FROA’s motives were
as mixed as the conflicting allegiances of landowner companies.  The revenue proposal made no
provision for landowner companies, and severely restricted their capacity to continue to secure
premiums from contractors, given the large rental share which was now due to go to the new trust
accounts.  FROA members also relayed the concern of landowners in general at having their money
locked up in trusts.  PNG experience suggests that money set aside for a common purpose is likely to be
spent wastefully, if not misappropriated, by those entrusted with its management.  Landowners had an
understandable desire to see the money in their hands rather than in a remote trust account.  FROA
members were also inextricably linked with the logging companies.  Not only were landowner
companies dependent on logging companies for their income stream, but some also shared offices, fax
numbers, and even bank accounts with them (Whimp 1995:16).
As much as anything else, feelings of indignation drove the FROA’s protests.  Many landowner
company principals saw themselves as enterprising proponents of self-help.  Where the state had failed
to deliver even basic social services to their respective areas, landowner company principals, in
negotiating the logging agreements, had procured roads, cash incomes, and economic activity.  Land-
owner company principals considered that they had justly earned their prominent positions through the
role which they had played in brokering progress.  They were outraged by the state’s complete failure to
acknowledge their past efforts or current status.  This emotion was compounded by the fear that the
proposals would expose them as having bargained poorly on the landowners’ behalf.  As Simpson
(1997) observes, any public show of weakness or uncertainty on the part of landowner company
directors would have opened the door to rival aspirants to their positions.
Box 8.11  Opposition to the new revenue system
Source: Taylor 1997
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The Forest Revenue Study had included an assessment of the range of
variation in logging and hauling costs, based on a small stratified sample of
operations in different parts of the country.  The results of this exercise were
later reviewed and summarised by consultants working on the Forest
Management and Planning Project, and these calculations apparently
formed the basis of the NFA’s decision to assess the average cost at K50/m3
(then roughly equivalent to US$50/m3) in 1993 (see Figure 8.3).
The FROA continued to oppose the new system, because its members could
see that the NFA was unlikely to recognise most landowner companies as
appropriate bodies to control the ‘additional stumpage account’ which
would replace the levies and premiums which they were currently
collecting (Whimp 1995:29).  And the local processing industry could see
that its own costs would be raised by the need to pay stumpage on locally
purchased logs, thus losing the advantage which it derived from the
avoidance of the log export tax (Ben Everts, 1996, personal communication).
In the face of all this opposition, Cabinet decided to defer its final approval
of the new system pending further evaluation of its merits by a ministerial
committee which failed to hold a single meeting throughout 1994.  Instead,
Table 8.3  Revenue distribution under the ‘stumpage’ system proposed for
implementation in 1994 (in kina).
Income category Current system New system
Log export price (Kina/m
3
) 150.00 150.00
Income to local landowners: 13.00 49.62
     Royalties 4.00    5.00
     Levies and premiums to LOC (after tax)   9.00
     Additional stumpage to representative body 44.62
Provincial government levy: 0.50 1.00
Income to national government: 31.50 28.88
     Log export tax   28.50
     Income tax paid by LOC     3.00
     Special withholding tax   14.88
     Forest administration levy   14.00
Income to logging contractor: 105.00   70.50
Logging and hauling costs:   50.00   50.00
Operator’s profit:   55.00   20.50
Operator’s return on costs: 110%   41%
Source: Post-Courier, 29 December 1993.
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the government simply pursued the course which had been charted by the
budget of November 1993, by once again raising the rates of export tax
levied under the existing revenue system in the ‘mini-budget’ of March
1994 (see Figure 8.4).
Even so, the government’s failure to introduce a new revenue system, or
even to raise the rate of taxes charged under the old system, before the end
of 1993 seems to have created a substantial ‘windfall profit’ for the logging
companies during 1993 and 1994, as average log export prices rose as high
as US$170 per cubic metre.  One economist (Duncan 1994) has estimated the
size of this windfall profit to have been about K225 million - more than the
sum of about K200 million which the government actually collected in log
export taxes over the same period.  Another economist (John Millett, 1996,
personal communication) has estimated that the government would have
made an extra K200 million in log export taxes over the four years from
1992 to 1995, if the new revenue system which was eventually introduced
had already been in place during that time.
The World Bank was well aware of these losses when it negotiated the
terms of PNG’s Economic Rescue Programme in 1995.  It was also quite
obvious, even to the Bank, that landowners had suffered a very substantial
decline in their relative share of the timber resource rent because the royalty
rate had been fixed in a period of rapidly rising log prices.  The government
was therefore told to introduce a new revenue system as one of the
conditions attached to the first tranche of its structural adjustment loans.
The new system, approved by the Bank and proposed in the 1996 budget,
differed substantially from the one which had been recommended by the
Forest Revenue Study:
• there would be no system of ‘stumpage’ charges on all logs harvested,
only a new method of calculating the log export tax;
• there was no provision to channel tax receipts through a Forest Revenue
Stabilisation Fund in order to cover the operating costs of the NFA;
• resource owners were to receive a substantially higher royalty payment
of K10 per cubic metre of all logs harvested (from which the national
government would deduct a 5 per cent royalty withholding tax); and
• resource owners would also be entitled to the benefits of a ‘Project
Development Levy’ (PDL), charged at a standard rate of K13 per cubic
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Figure 8.4  Export tax rates under the old revenue system, 1979-1995
Note: The weighted average represents the effective subsidy to downstream processors.
Source: PNG Forest Authority
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metre, but with some provision for this to be geared to the log export
price.65
This last form of revenue was intended to replace the various levies and
premiums already being paid to landowner companies, and to take account
of all the landowner benefits provided by logging contractors under
existing agreements, the value of which would be deducted from their
liability to pay the new levy.  The PDL was apparently also designed, in
part, to satisfy Section 98 of the new Organic Law, which states that the
developers of natural resources which are not covered by existing
agreements shall pay annual ‘development levies’ to the provincial and
local-level governments of the province or area in which the development
is situated, and that these are to be ‘controlled through a trust fund which
shall be managed and administered in accordance with an Act of the
Parliament’66.  In this instance:
• 40 per cent of the PDL was to be distributed in cash to members of the
local community, providing a mechanism which could be used to
‘compensate’ those landowners who were not currently having their
trees cut down, or those who might never have their trees cut down
because they occupied a designated conservation area; and
• 60 per cent would be allocated to Project Development Committees,
which would include representatives of the NFA, the provincial
government, and the holder of the Timber Permit, and which would
spend these funds on the general ‘development’ of the project area.
In the case of new projects, these committees would also gain access to the
reforestation levies previously paid to the national government.
The new export tax regime was considerably more ‘progressive’ than its
predecessor, because the rate of tax was now to be tied directly to the export
value of the logs, and so the government’s share of the economic rent
would increase with the market price of the commodity.  Table 8.4 shows
how export tax rates are calculated under the new revenue system, while
Figure 8.5 compares the levels of tax collected under the old system and the
new system at different log export prices.  Figure 8.6 incorporates the
impact of the new system into a portrait of the changes which took place in
65  
The standard ratye was to apply where prices ranged bteween K151 and K200 per cubic metre. If prices  exceeded this range,
an additional 7.5 percent of the export price would be added to the standard rate. If prices fell to K100, the PDL would only be K2
per cubic metre.
66 
According to Section 98, ‘development levies’ are to include ‘infrastructural development levies’, ‘economic development and
land use follow-up levies’, ‘community and social development levies’, and ‘any other levies as are from time to time determined
by national law or by agreement’.
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Figure 8.5 Comparison of export taxes under the old and new revenue systems
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67
 At this stage, forestry officials were estimating that average logging costs fell within the range of K60-70/m
3
, while industry
representatives claimed that they fell within the range of K90-110/m
3
, suggesting that the typical logging contractor had hardly
made any profit at all over the previous three years.
the overall distribution of log export values between different stakeholders
and different forms of income over the period from 1988 to 1996.
Table 8.4  Export tax rates under the new revenue system, 1996
Price band Tax rate
Up to K90/m
3
15% of f.o.b. value
K91-110/m
3
K13.50 + 30% of amount above K90
K111-130/m
3
K19.50 + 50% of amount above K110
K131-150/m
3
K29.50 + 55% of amount above K130
K151-200/m
3
K40.50 + 60% of amount above K150
Over K200/m
3
K70.50 + 70% of amount above K200
Source: PNG Forest Authority
Figure 8.6 shows the logging contractor’s residual share of log export
revenues in both nominal and real prices, in order to take account of the
fact that one kina could buy more in 1988 than it could in 1996, because of
the effects of devaluation and inflation following the fiscal crisis of 1994.  At
a log export price of US$130 per cubic metre, which was close to prevailing
market prices in 1994 and 1996, this figure shows that the new system had
the immediate effect of reducing the logger’s share of log export revenues
from 62 per cent to 55 per cent of the gross revenue (i.e. before subtracting
assessed logging costs), while increasing the landowner’s share from about
5 per cent to about 12 per cent.  The government’s share, which had been
raised substantially by the ‘mini-budget’ of March 1994, had hardly been
altered by the introduction of the new system.
This might perhaps explain why the government was willing enough to
apply the graduated export tax as soon as it had been announced in the
budget of November 1995, but wilted in the face of the usual pressure from
the logging industry and landowner companies by failing to implement the
landowner benefit component of the new system until the Bank stepped
back into the breach.  During the first half of 1996, the FIA mounted another
publicity campaign against the new system, claiming that the industry
could not afford the new level of landowner benefits because the
government (or the World Bank) was still underestimating their costs of
production by a substantial margin67, and had failed to make allowance for
the logger’s need to save some surplus for the rainy day when log export
prices would surely fall below their current levels (Post-Courier 14 March
1996, 9 April 1996).  Matters came to a head in July that year, when the
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government finally gazetted the new royalty rates and the PDL.  The FIA
advised its members to refuse to make the extra royalty payments (Post-
Courier, 12 July 1996), but the FROA was now split on this issue (Post-
Courier, 25 July 1996), and the Bank called the industry’s bluff by holding up
the second tranche of the structural adjustment loans until the government
had agreed to collect the outstanding amounts at the same time that it
reversed its ‘unacceptable’ amendments to the Forestry Act (Post-Courier, 4
October 1996).
The bluff worked, the loggers coughed up, but they did not stop
complaining about the Bank’s intention to drive them out of business.  The
FIA sought to retrieve the wavering hearts and minds of the ‘landowners’
by commissioning a series of cartoons which (somewhat ironically)
trumpeted the level of benefits which they were now receiving from the
industry.  But the tone of its publicity became increasing hysterical in 1997,
as log export prices continued their downward slide, finally sinking below
US$100 per cubic metre by the end of that year.  Amongst the new concerns
raised during the course of this campaign were:
• the government’s intention to introduce a Value Added Tax in 1998, as
yet another step in its programme of Structural Adjustment, which
would almost certainly add to the industry’s overall costs68;
• the prospect of what the FIA calls a ‘processing tax’, which is part of the
same programme, and which introduces a new version of the ‘level
playing field’ by forcing the local processing industry to pay world
market prices for its logs; and
• the NFA’s refusal or inability to disburse some K7 million previously
collected in the form of reforestation levies, and an equivalent amount
which was formerly due to provincial governments as their 25 per cent
share of royalties, but which should now be transferred to resource
owners (Jim Belford, 1997, personal communication).
On this last point at least, the industry might have hoped to receive some
sympathy from the World Bank, which had its own reasons to doubt
whether forestry officials were properly discharging their own duties under
the new revenue system.
Meanwhile, the Bank’s own consultants were travelling the countryside in
68
 The FIA estimated an increase as high as 5 per cent, but the Internal Revenue Commission maintained that it would not
amount to more than 1.3 per cent.  The truth has yet to be determined, because the new tax has been deferred to 1999.
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Box 8.12  The FIA’s vision of landowner benefits
Source: Post-Courier, 1 November, 1996
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Source: Post-Courier, 8 November, 1996
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their endeavour to assess the actual value of the ‘landowner benefits’
already being distributed by the logging companies, in order to determine
the level of rebate which they could henceforth claim from the PDL, and to
measure the variation in their actual costs of production, in order to settle
the long-standing argument on this sore point.  The provisional results of
both studies were announced in February 1998.
• The first found that 18 out of 49 operational projects had not delivered all
the benefits promised in agreements between the contractors and the
landowners, but that the overall level of compliance was fairly high, and
that the total value of these benefits amounted to K30 million out of a
notional liability of K39 million in PDL over the period of 16 months
following gazettal of the new revenue system.
• The second found that logging costs (excluding taxes, royalties and other
landowner benefits) ranged between US$45 and US$70 per cubic metre,
that the average cost was higher (in US dollar terms) than had been
estimated in 1993, that the total cost of production (including taxes,
royalties, etc.) in some high-cost operations was as high as US$140 per
cubic metre, and that the range of variation was such that export tax
rates would have to vary between 13 per cent and 58 per cent of export
prices in order to achieve the same normal rate of profit in each
concession.
Although the FIA seems to have regarded these findings as a partial
vindication of its own claims, the Bank has not yet shown much inclination
to vary the revenue system in favour of the industry, despite the claims of
an impending ‘sell-out’ by Greenpeace and ICRAF.  If any concessions are
to be made, they will most likely involve an interim reduction in log export
tax by 15-20 per cent (if the Department of Treasury can be persuaded to
accept this loss of revenue), and an agreement to waive the retrospective
application of the PDL (because the NFA has been advised that this might
be illegal).
It is interesting to ask, at this juncture, whether the Bank’s determination to
secure implementation of the new revenue system has been motivated by a
belief that this is the best (and perhaps the only) way to achieve the ‘slow-
down’ which Barnett had recommended in 1989, or whether it is motivated
by considerations of equity and efficiency which may or may not be
consistent with a move towards ‘sustainability’.  Although the policy
reformers have applauded the Bank’s apparent concern to raise the share of
resource rent which ends up in the pockets of local landowners, they have
generally failed to comment on the possibility that such an increase in
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Box 8.13  A sample of the FIA press campaign against the new revenue system
Source: National, 19 September 1997
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Box 8.14  Selling in and selling out - recent shots in the newspaper war
1. Text of Greenpeace/ICRAF advert (from Post Courier, 4 March 1998):
2. Text of PNG Forest Authority advert (from The Independent, 13 March 1998):
HONOURABLE MEMBERS OF NATIONAL
PARLIAMENT
WE ARE ABOUT TO BE SOLD-OUT BY THE
LOGGERS,
THE WORLD BANK AND THE FOREST
AUTHORITY
Selling out our children
The World Bank and the Forest Authority are
currently in secret negotiations with the loggers
to devise an industry rescue package that involves:
•  the lowering of export tax from the current 30%
to 0%
• relaxing species that can be exported as logs
• giving exemptions on royalties and Project
Development Levies
Selling out the landholders
The PNG Forest Authority this month confirmed
K39 million was owing to landholders in Project
Development Levies, back-dated to July 1996.  But
these levies would not be paid to landholders.  The
World Bank and the Forest Authority have given
in to the logger’s propaganda, and will only pay
out K9 million.  K30 million of the levy will go to
the loggers, as a credit for infrastructure and
premiums.  This is illegal.  Premiums are not paid
to landholders, but to landowning companies
through logging and marketing agreements;
infrastructure is between the PNGFA and the
loggers in the Project Agreements.
World Bank consultants confirmed that K2 million
each month disappears in the log export prices to
Japan.  The NGOs reported this last year.  PNG
loses K24 million a year to the Japanese.  The
consultants cannot say where the money goes.
This is because the Japanese Government
protects its timber importers and will not release
importation documentation.
THE FACTS OF THE FALSE AND
SENSATIONALIST MEDIA CLAIMS BY
GREENPEACE AND ICRAF REGARDING
THE FOREST INDUSTRY
The Forest Authority has never had any ‘secret’
negotiations with anyone regarding a forest
industry rescue package – including the World
Bank and the FIA.
• There never has been any proposal to drop the
log export tax to zero.
• There is no intention to relax the species that
can be exported as logs.
• There will be no exemptions granted on any
Royalties or Levies.
The Forest Authority’s role is to protect the
interests of the landowners and the State.
No-one is about to be ‘sold out’!
The Forest Authority recently held a major seminar
to explain and discuss the findings of three major
consultancy studies regarding the forest industry.
Over 70 representatives from NGOs, Government
departments, research organisations, provincial
governments, the FIA and donor organisations
attended. This included ICRAF/Greenpeace
representatives! The facts presented at the
seminar compared to the interpretations taken by
the ICRAF/Greenpeace people demonstrate that
‘there are none so blind as those that will not see’.
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To set matters straight:
• The Project Development Levy (PDL) was
gazetted in July 1996 to ensure that a minimum
level of landowner benefits are provided at all timber
projects.
• For all new projects, PDL was to be paid
immediately from gazettal date.
• For existing projects, an assessment was to be
made to make sure that loggers are not double
charged for payments and other benefits to
landowners that are already being provided
according to existing legally binding contracts.
• PDL was to apply from gazettal date for existing
projects, but no payments were required to be made
until the allowances for each project were assessed.
• An independent Audit Study of Landowner
Benefits is almost completed.  Where companies
are providing assessed benefits less than the PDL
requirement, then they will be required to pay the
difference on each shipment of logs exported.
• The consultants’ assessment of PDL shortfall
payments between July 1996 and December 1997
landowner revenues will provide an additional financial incentive for
landowners to applaud the unsustainable exploitation of their own forest
resources.  The proposed absorption of the reforestation levy into the PDL
may likewise be seen as a way of discouraging the local pursuit of
sustainability (Gerald Ward, 1997, personal communication), even if the
NFA has not previously found a good use for it.  The reformers have tried
to square this particular circle by suggesting that landowners have not
previously possessed the knowledge, or perhaps even the power, to make a
‘rational’ response to market signals (see Brunton 1996), but it is not at all
clear whether other stakeholders have now developed the capacity to
convince landowners that the short-term financial gains from large-scale
logging carry a long-term price which ought not to be paid by future
generations or the global community (see Filer 1997b).
was about K9 million.  This compares to an
assessed K30 million which was provided as
landowner benefits over the same period – in
addition to royalties.
• It is acknowledged that there are major problems
with the representativeness and accountability of
landowner companies.  That is why properly
representative bodies are required for all new
forestry projects.  Unfortunately there is little that
can be done to change the legally binding contracts
of existing projects.
• The legality of back-dating PDL payments is being
challenged and the Government are currently
working to resolve this issue.
• The difference between the PNG export log prices
and Japan import prices can largely be explained
due to freight, insurance and exchange rate costs.
However, the consultants have identified that there
is an amount of about US$14 per cubic metre
difference which they cannot explain.  This is
currently being looked into.
Signed: Gabriel Samol, Deputy Chairman, National
Forest Board.
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8.8 The downstream processing debate
Given:
• the wide variation in the quality of commercial timber resources between
different concessions, as reflected in average export prices69;
• the separate variation in costs of production between these same
concessions, as revealed in the latest study;
• the tendency for the ‘productivity’ of each logging project to decline
during the course of its operational life; and
• the low levels of operational efficiency which are typical of the log export
industry as a whole, as reflected in the number of days lost to production
each year;
it is hard to see how any revenue system could extract the maximum share of
resource rent from each individual project that would be consistent with the
purpose of encouraging each operator to invest in more efficient and
sustainable extraction - and keep the cost of administering this system at
anything like a reasonable level.
Some commentators have thus been led to propose a radical revision of the
revenue system, which would remove the need for government (or donors)
to continually measure the financial parameters of the log export industry,
and remove the temptation for politicians and officials to bend the financial
rules in favour of specific operators.  For example, Duncan (1994) has
proposed a system based on the auctioning of Timber Permits, while the
World Bank’s latest team of consultants have toyed with a system of
Individually Transferable Quotas, of the kind which has been developed in
the taxation of fishing operations in some parts of the world, where the items
for auction would be the rights to export batches of logs (Rohan Nelson,
1997, personal communication).  These innovations are intended to create a
situation in which the operators ‘bid away’ the resource rent in their
competition for access to the resource.  But they seem to be based on a series
of unrealistic assumptions about the transparency of market mechanisms in a
context where logging companies and resource owners alike are embroiled in
a thoroughly opaque set of property relations.
The one issue on which the World Bank has been consistently at odds with
the majority of national stakeholders in the forest policy process, from the
most outrageously hypocritical politicians to the most radical members of
69
 The NFA’s own database showed that logs exported from the Rottock Bay project during 1995 secured an average of
US$205/m
3
, while logs exported from the Gar project (in the same province) secured an average of only US$89/m
3
.
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the NGO community, has been the question of whether the logging industry
would be a better industry if logs were not exported but converted into
other products by the ‘downstream’ segment of the forest industry.
However, Barnett’s vision of ‘integrated onshore processing complexes
where waste is reduced to a minimum’ concealed a division of opinion
within the protectionist camp, between those whose main aim has been to
add more value to the logs, as part of a strategy for national economic
growth, and those whose main aim has been to conserve the value of the
natural forest, by imposing additional economic penalties on all forms of
large-scale logging.
The TFAP Review was highly critical of the raft of measures announced by
Minister Stack in 1989 as part of his own attempt to promote import
substitution and downstream processing (World Bank 1989:44-5).  These
measures (as well as a proposed log export ban) were criticised for their
failure to recognise the uncompetitive nature of the processing sector, itself
due to high labour, energy and transport costs, low productivity, an
unstable policy environment, imperfect market knowledge, and lack of
trained personnel (ibid:45-6).
If local industry can compete in the market for the final product only because it
pays less than the full (world market) price for the raw material, the
government is merely redistributing income from resource owners to the local
resource-processing industry.....  If the objective of a log export ban is to slow
down the rate of forest extraction, the same objective is better achieved .... not
through an export ban but a production ban... (ibid:46)
One inefficient policy (excessively profitable log exports) combined with
another inefficient practice (unprofitable processing) usually add up to two
inefficiencies rather than one cancelling out the resource allocation distortions
caused by the other (ibid:47).
The conclusion drawn from these arguments was that the best way to
maximise national income from the forestry sector - assuming that this was
the main aim of government policy - was to exercise greater control over
the log exporters, and otherwise leave them to get on with their business.
But why assume that this should be the main aim of government policy?  In
his own critique of the Bank’s report, Brunton argued that
[t]he reason why PNG needs to stop exporting logs is not because it could earn
more money by selling processed timber.  PNG must stop exporting logs
because logging is out of control, because the environment is in jeopardy,
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because there is no sustained yield management, because we cannot trust the
logging companies, because we cannot control traditional landowners, because the
present forest bureaucracy is institutionally weak and there are very few controls
in effect over timber companies (Brunton 1990:7).
Yet these were certainly not the reasons why Minister Stack surprised the
NGOs at the TFAP Round Table by announcing the blanket moratorium on
new log export licences.
The National Forest Policy was equivocal on this subject.  It proposed to
encourage the domestic processing of timber ‘wherever this is economically
and financially viable’ (PNGMOF 1991:30), primarily by imposing relevant
conditions in the allocation or renewal of timber permits.  Raw log exports
were to be prohibited ‘in cases where forest resources in the vicinity of current
or prospective local markets are limited’ (ibid:36), and a combination of export
and import controls would be designed to expand the domestic market for
processed timber (ibid:38-39).  The NFCAP project known as Forest Industry
Development Studies, on which Conrad Smith was engaged as the main
consultant in 1992, supplied the elaboration of these policy statements which
was incorporated into the Guidelines of 1993.
Part F of the 1993 Guidelines (on ‘Forest Industrial Development’) undertook
‘to effect further successive reductions in the volume of logs which may be
exported nationally so far as is necessary to achieve development of a
domestic based processing industry’, and implied that raw log exports would
be phased out completely over a period of five years.  The government would
seek to:
• ‘disperse forest industrial development throughout the nation as widely as
is economically feasible’;
• ensure that such development only takes place ‘where it can be sustained
with a constant supply of raw material in perpetuity’;
• encourage the participation of incorporated land groups in the process of
industrial development; and
• promote the establishment of a private sector transport and marketing
system to develop the domestic market for raw logs and intermediate
products and export markets for intermediate and final products.
To achieve these goals, the government would grant the domestic processing
industry the right of first refusal on all raw logs destined for export (at current
export prices), and would provide some additional fiscal incentives, but it was
claimed that the processing industry would still need to be ‘internationally
competitive and not reliant on subsidisation’ (PNGMOF 1993b:16-17).
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One of the FIA’s strongest objections to the Guidelines was that the
proposal to phase out log exports would violate the terms of existing
timber permits (see section 8.6).  The FIA also considered that:
• the government’s desire to disperse processing operations made little
economic sense;
• the NFA could not do much to engineer substantial reforms to the
national transport system; and
• the ‘right of first refusal’ would seriously distort the operation of existing
market mechanisms.
Nevertheless, Minister Neville steamed ahead with his demand for logging
companies to submit proposals for downstream processing by the end of
July 1994, or else risk the penalty of losing their ‘existing raw log export
privileges’ (Post-Courier, 3 February 1994).
The Minister’s stance softened slightly in March 1994, when he announced
that log export volumes would be reduced by 10 per cent a year from 1995,
and that operators who failed to submit their feasibility studies by the end
of July would only lose their entitlement to new export permits.  This was
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Log yard, New Britain.  The domestic processing industry sometimes complains about the shortage of
raw material because it is unwilling to pay world market prices for logs
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study226
the point at which ‘Timber Supply Areas’ (see section 8.1) were wheeled out
as one of a series of positive incentives which also included:
• the insertion of ‘recovery factor allowances’ into the new revenue
system;
• the grant of compulsory purchase rights and coastal trading licences to
allow processing facilities to secure their domestic log supplies;
• duty exemptions on the import of equipment and building materials
required for construction of an approved processing plant;
• exemption from export tax on any processed product derived from such
facilities for a minimum period of five years; and
• reduction of log export taxes on operators who have commissioned one
third of the capital investment in those facilities which have a capital cost
of more than K75 per cubic metre of installed capacity (Dolman 1995).
These messages were not lost on the logging companies.  As early as
February 1993, Rimbunan Hijau had announced a grandiose plan for the
construction of processing facilities in several parts of the country,
including one enormous complex in the national capital (see Box 8.15).  By
the time that Neville’s deadline expired, the other major companies had all
produced their own ‘major investment proposals’, and Turama Forest
Industries was already using its own proposal as leverage for its campaign
to secure the first Timber Permits to be issued under the new Act (see
section 8.5).  Yet none of these facilities has ever been constructed, even
though TFI has assembled most of the ingredients as part of the price paid
for its success.
The evaporation of these undertakings was mainly due to the resurgence of
the World Bank’s economic orthodoxies in the national policy process
following the departure of Minister Neville and his key adviser, Conrad
Smith, in August 1994.  This change in direction was reflected in the
NFCAP Review completed at the end of that year.  This study noted the
apparent contradiction between a revenue system designed to maximise
national rental incomes from raw log exports and a policy commitment to
downstream processing which would have the effect of reducing these
incomes, and which might still not generate a sufficient increase in formal
sector employment to compensate for this loss (Taylor et al. 1994:35).  While
domestic sawmillers sometimes had trouble in securing their raw materials
because nearby areas had been allocated for log exports, their problems
partly reflected their own unwillingness to pay the export price for logs.
And where logging companies had been obliged to process part of their
harvest under the conditions of their timber permits, they had sometimes
met this obligation by processing poor quality logs and leaving the sawn
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Setting up of plywood and veneer plants in strategic
areas of the country is one of the long term
commitments of Rimbunan Hijau.  In February this
year, the company’s chairman, Datuk Tiong Hiew
King announced in Port Moresby that Rimbunan
Hijau will build a K150 million integrated wood
processing complex near Port Moresby.  The
complex will process plywood, veneer, sawn timber
and associated wood products.  Datuk Tiong said
the complex was in line with the PNG government’s
policy on downstream processing.
‘We have full confidence in the future development
of this country and are encouraged by the
cooperation given to us by officials and community
leaders.  Our meetings with Government leaders
have also motivated us to take a long term view of
our presence and commitment to PNG,’ Datuk Tiong
said.
At full production, the complex would produce about
500,000 cubic meters of timber and related products
a year.  It is expected to provide jobs to thousands
of Papua New Guineans and bring in hundreds of
Box 8.15  Rimbunan Hijau committed to downstream processing?
Source: RH ‘Fourth Anniversary Supplement’ in the Post-Courier, 18 August 1993
timber to rot.  Conrad Smith’s ‘TSA concept’ had been designed to secure
the long-term supply of raw material for the processing industry, while
reducing the concentration of capital in the logging industry, but ‘it is not
clear that an inefficient processing sector, no matter how diffused its
ownership, would be better for the economy than an efficient log export
industry with concentrated ownership’ (ibid:37).  The Review therefore
proposed that the NFA should promote small-scale processing for domestic
and niche export markets, and that the permitted volume of raw log
exports should represent the difference between the total allowable cut and
the volume of logs required by the small-scale processing sector.
In practice, those companies processing timber for the domestic market
have continued to receive a certain amount of protection from the
government.  Those based in the national capital have had the benefit of a
1993 Cabinet decision to create a Domestic Supply Zone, with a radius of
millions [of] kina in foreign exchange a year.  These
figures, Datuk Tiong said, were based on the
company’s operations in Malaysia and elsewhere.
Datuk Tiong said the investment would increase
the value added on export of PNG timber.
‘We are confident of transferring our technology to
PNG and training more skilled nationals in the
timber industry.  We finally believe that with full
encouragement of the Government and proper
forest policy, PNG’s timber has a bright future.’
Meanwhile, RH executive officer George Yong said
that they are now in the final state of negotiation
with landowners to acquire the land for the multi-
million kina veneer and plywood factory.  ‘As soon
as this is completed, RH will start putting up the
complex’, Mr Yong said.  He said that they are
committed to do more downstream processing if
bigger resource areas were allocated to them so
that they could set up more allocated veneer and
plywood plants in PNG.  The company plans to
put up these plants in the Western Provinces,
Momase, and New Guinea Islands.
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100 kilometres, from which raw log exports are (theoretically) banned.  And
all of them have had the benefit of a new revenue system which has (so far)
enabled them to purchase logs at prices which exclude the export tax, even
if this has caused them to complain about the problem of supply.  This has
resulted in a form of competition between different sections of the forest
industry that is perfectly exemplified by the long-standing argument over
the definition of a ‘flitch’.  This particular argument initially arose from the
government’s decision to ban the export of certain high-value species, such
as rosewood or ebony, in ‘unprocessed’ form, thus causing the exporters to
look for ways of defining the minimum amount of ‘processing’ which
would pass muster with the customs authorities (see Filer 1991b), but the
flitch-makers would not have the incentive to export their product if they
could get a better price in the domestic market (see Box 8.16).  In the name
of greater transparency, the Bank has therefore been urging the government
to force local processors to pay the world market price for their raw
Pressure from furniture manufacturers for the Government to ban the export of flitches has been
exerted many times in the past.  It probably arises every time a furniture manufacturer is short of logs
and sees wood of a species suitable for furniture manufacture being exported as large cross-section
roughly sawn flitches.
A move to formally ban flitch exports was made by then Minister for Forests Karl Stack in 1990.  A copy
of the circular issued to all log exporters ... includes a written definition of a flitch plus a diagram.  The
circular makes reference to an earlier definition issued by the then Forest Industries Council in 1989
indicating that an effort to ban the export of flitches was also made at that time.
What we are actually seeing is market forces at work.  In essence the landowners are choosing to sell
their logs to the flitch manufacturers rather than to the furniture makers, as the flitch manufacturers are
offering them a better price.  We cannot blame the landowners for this.  The question then arises, of
whether it is fair for the Government (through the PNG Forest Authority) to bow to furniture maker
pressure and to ban flitch exports so that their log supply is better protected.
It appears that the call for the ban on the export of flitches is coming from Port Moresby based furniture
manufacturers.  The NEC has already established a 100 km radius zone around Port Moresby from
which log exports are not permitted.  Whilst it appears possible (through NEC decision or regulation) to
also ban the export of semi-finished products (e.g. flitches) from this zone, there would still need to be
shipment by shipment inspection to ensure compliance with the restriction.
It is the view of the writer that the State should not give in to pressure from the furniture manufacturers
to protect their log supplies through regulatory intervention.  If this view is accepted then a definition of
a flitch is not required.
Source: Everts 1996b
Box 8.16 Who cares about the definition of a ‘flitch’?
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material, through the imposition of an ‘output’ or ‘processing’ tax
equivalent to the log export tax, before it creates any fresh incentives to
expand their business.
In order to be seen to represent the interests of all its members, and because
it regards the World Bank as the deadliest of enemies, the FIA has never
seen fit to complain against any kind of subsidy which the government
wishes to provide to any section of the industry.  Nevertheless, in December
1995, one local sawmiller (Vudal Timbers) went public with its view that
the FIA’s campaign against the new revenue system had failed to draw the
correct inference from the decline in log prices and the parallel rise in sawn
timber prices, which should have been ‘to concentrate on assisting and
promoting downstream processing instead of supporting and defending the
unscrupulous operators [who were] raping our natural resources at the
expense of our successors (Independent, 9 December 1995).  The FIA
President reminded Vudal Timbers that his organisation was actively
campaigning against the introduction of the ‘processing tax’ (Post-Courier,
22 December 1995), but this did not prevent the company’s managers from
reiterating the ‘frustrations of having [a] continuous stream of large, fully
loaded jinkers, going practically past our logless, empty sawmill, [all] year
and being treated almost like a beggar when it comes to trying to secure
resources for processing’ (Post-Courier, 29 December 1995).  Mindful of such
complaints, the FIA later requested the Forests Minister to enforce the
prohibition on raw log exports from the Domestic Supply Zone, when it
appeared that this was being ignored (Post-Courier, 8 October 1996).
However, the Association denies that there is any systematic conflict of
interest between exporters and processors, because the main exporters of
processed timber are the big logging companies themselves (Jim Belford,
1997, personal communication).  And it holds the World Bank responsible
for the reams of red tape which are supposed to have obstructed the
development of new processing facilities by these same companies, because
the Bank’s obsession with a ‘transparent’ revenue system has done nothing
to address the problems of resource security and government support (Post-
Courier, 29 August 1997).
Since government ministers have never ceased to proclaim their own
support for more downstream processing at every available opportunity,
the Bank and the ITTO both commissioned another round of studies on this
subject in 1997.  In the Bank’s case, this was combined with the study of
logging costs and other features of the revenue system, in the expectation
that this would facilitate some kind of consensus on the relative costs and
benefits of raw log exports and processing for both the domestic and export
markets.  The provisional results of this study indicate that prices for sawn
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timber and plywood in the domestic market (as previously pointed out by
Vudal Timbers) are so much higher than those in Indonesia or Malaysia that
tariff barriers are the only thing preventing the local industry from being
wiped out by overseas competition (which Vudal Timbers might not like to
face).  For example, sawn timber purchased in the national capital costs about
US$450 per cubic metre, but would cost less than US$300 per cubic metre if it
were imported from Malaysian sawmills duty-free (John Keating, 1998,
personal communication).  If local processors were obliged to pay world
market prices for their raw material, this differential would presumably be
even greater.  The same factors which raise the price of locally processed
products in the domestic market - such as the diversity of species in the
natural forest, the low skill composition of the workforce, and the very high
cost of transport and other utilities - clearly reduce PNG’s comparative
advantage in overseas markets for tropical plywood or sawn timber, which
are currently contracting in any case.  The disadvantage will remain unless or
until regional competitors run out of raw material from their own countries,
as has already happened in the Philippines, and is now happening in parts of
Indonesia.  But these examples only seem to prove that a processing industry
supported by a log export ban tends to accelerate the depletion of natural
forest resources (Dauvergne 1996).  The Bank’s consultants have therefore
concluded that the only way for PNG’s processing industry to make further
inroads into the world market is by means of very substantial capital
investment in new technologies which can manufacture specialised products
from those particular species which happen to be abundant in some parts of
the country (Evan Shield, 1998, personal communication).  Yet there is little
prospect of the government creating the conditions which would be sufficient
to attract this kind of investment.
The Barnett Inquiry made a number of detailed recommendations regarding
the control of transfer pricing, which included
abandonment of the minimum export price system; creation of an effective
commercially-orientated state marketing agency; prohibition of third country
invoicing without specific approval and production of all letters of credit;
making the production of authenticated destination end-documents mandatory
as an agreed condition of the permit, so Papua New Guinea export documents
and declared prices can be compared with end-buyer prices for each shipment,
and establishment of government-to-government relationships with importing
countries to this end (Barnett 1992:106-7).
8.9 Control of transfer pricing
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The National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:37) aimed to minimise the
incidence of transfer pricing in the log export trade through the exercise of
the State Purchase Option by a State Marketing Agency within the new
Forest Authority.  Under Part V of the new Act (Sections 115-118), the State
Marketing Agency had the right to ‘purchase compulsorily at the market
price from the holder of the timber permit up to 25 per cent of the amount
of logs which the holder of the timber permit is permitted to export in any
one year’, but no other provisions were made for the ‘control or prevention
of transfer pricing’ except those already contained in the Income Tax Act ‘or
as are prescribed’.  This last verbal gesture may have been a response to
Barnett’s expression of disappointment with the first draft of the Bill, in
which he found that ‘few of the proposals recommended by the
Commission of Inquiry to reduce the level of transfer pricing appear to
have been accepted’ (Barnett 1992:117).  When the Act was amended in
1993, the State Purchase Option was retained, but the NFA lost the function
of appointing and supervising the State Marketing Agency, which had not
actually been established.
Although the 1993 Guidelines were silent on this subject, moves were
already being made to engage a private company to undertake the
surveillance role which the Act had assigned to the State Marketing Agency.
In May 1994, the government signed a contract worth K5 million with a
Swiss company, the appropriately named ‘Society for General Surveillance’
(SGS).  While the FROA, acting in its usual role as the mouthpiece of the
logging companies, had declared that ‘the money spent on SGS should be
awarded to us to enable us to hire consultants who can do the job just like
SGS does’ (Post-Courier, 22 February 1994), the FIA’s Executive Officer
welcomed the new deal:
We are relieved that we will not have to continue to operate under a situation
where any person or organisation can make unfounded criticisms of the
industry as a whole about imagined widespread transfer pricing (Post-
Courier, 25 May 1994).
Minister Neville formally launched the SGS work programme in July that
year, but work did not begin until February 1995 because the government
could not find the money to pay the contractors, and the European Union
eventually had to divert K3 million from the country’s Stabex allocation to
pay for the first two years of the programme (Post-Courier, 31 March 1995).
This seems to have been a reasonably sound investment.  An extra K2
million in log export taxes was reportedly collected in the first six months
of the company’s monitoring operations (Times of PNG, 19 August 1995).  By
the end of 1997, SGS had ninety national and five expatriate staff making
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random checks of log shipments from every concession in the country, and
its contract had been extended to the end of 1999.
A recent comparison of PNG’s log export prices and the import prices
reportedly paid by Japanese buyers still reveals an average difference of
US$54 per cubic metre, which greatly exceeds the US$14 per cubic metre
which is thought to represent the average cost of freight and insurance
(Rohan Nelson, 1998, personal communication).  Although this suggests
that there is still a transfer of economic rent from the logging companies to
the Japanese trading companies which may be worth as much as US$2
million a month, the recent audits of logging company accounts have
found very little evidence of the standard transfer pricing practices which
featured so heavily in the findings of the Barnett Inquiry, and the NFA’s
occasional exercise of the State Purchase Option does seem to have
ensured that current export prices are the best on offer.  The remaining
discrepancy would therefore seem to be due to the oligopolistic structure
of the Japanese market (Dauvergne 1996), over which the State of PNG has
no control.
Box 8.17  Outsourcing the control of transfer pricing
The combination of record high log prices and relatively ineffective monitoring from a forest service
which is in a state of major change, has provided an opportunity for companies to under-record log
value and volume.  These were the major concerns exposed through the Commission of Inquiry.  As it
will take time before the Authority can adequately inspect and monitor log exports, a contract for
independent log monitoring and border surveillance has been obtained, and this will provide for:
• inspection of all logs during preparation and loading;
• establishment of a resource management system that will deliver a comprehensive data base of the
industry with world-wide market information;
• commercial exposure and training for future inspection and monitoring staff of the Authority;
• design of improved export procedures;
• a transparent audit trail to facilitate accurate monitoring and reporting.
This service will cost in the order of K2.5 (US$2.5) per cubic metre. For this price, PNG will be
guaranteed to receive the full and appropriate share of forest revenues due. All exports will be
correctly identified and the full duties paid by the logging contractors.  The increase to export revenue
will more than cover the cost of the programme.  Additionally it is hoped that this programme will
remove the spectre of distrust between government and industry by exposing the true extent of
malfeasance and transfer pricing, and in so doing will clear the way for positive collaboration in the
future.
Source: Dolman 1995
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Even assuming the existence of a new legal and institutional framework in
the forestry sector, the TFAP Review found that the development of
management capacity would be ‘the most important single challenge facing
the sector’, and one which would require ‘considerable external assistance’
(World Bank 1989:vii).  That study found that the number of government
staff directly engaged in the supervision of logging operations had declined
by 22 per cent between 1973 and 1987, despite the massive increase in the
level of harvest (ibid:63).  Although the new resource allocation procedures
require the logging companies to spend a lot more time and money on their
promises of good performance (see section 8.5), the Policy and the Act had
very little to say about the means by which the government would ensure
that these promises were kept.
Most of the logging projects established under the old regime had not even
been obliged to produce Environmental Plans before the commencement of
their operations (Nadarajah 1993).  Early in 1992, the Minister for
Environment and Conservation announced that he would close all
operations for which a plan had not been submitted by the end of April that
year (Times of PNG, 16 January 1992), but no action was immediately taken
against the forty companies which apparently failed to meet the deadline
(Times of PNG, 26 March 1992).  The new Minister, Parry Zeipi, continued to
utter occasional threats against the defaulters (Post-Courier, 25 June 1993),
but it was later reported that he had been granting some of them
‘exemption notices’ instead (Times of PNG, 10 February 1994).  In December
1993, his Department published a new set of guidelines for Environmental
Plans covering commercial forestry operations, as had been envisaged by
the National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:8), but these do not seem to have
improved the quality of the plans actually being submitted (Louman 1997).
Nor was any substantial improvement made in the Department’s capacity
to monitor and enforce the companies’ compliance.  On the one occasion
when DEC officials came close to prosecuting an offender, Minister Zeipi
ordered them to drop the case because the Department had not been
monitoring the company’s performance for the past four years (due to lack
of funds), had not warned them of possible legal action, and really ‘should
encourage investors’ (Post-Courier, 9 and 10 March, 1995).  In practice,
therefore, bureaucratic control over large-scale logging operations has
fallen almost entirely to the lot of forestry officials.
Part D of Minister Neville’s Guidelines (on ‘Management for Sustained
Production’) contained a number of statements about the way in which the
8.10 Control of logging practices
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Forest Authority would seek to monitor and enforce compliance with the
management conditions set out in each Forest Management Agreement.
The FMA itself was regarded as ‘the means by which the Authority can
secure a commitment from landowners to accept and foster recommended
forest management practices aimed at achieving production on a sustained
yield basis’, and in those cases where the FMA gave the NFA (rather than
the landowners) the responsibility for achieving sustainability, the NFA
would normally contract these activities to the permit-holder, whose own
incentive to achieve this goal would be enhanced by granting Timber
Permits on the same ‘evergreen’ basis as the FMAs to which they were
connected - ‘e.g. an initial term of 50 years with provision for extension by
agreement for a further ten years every ten years’ (PNGMOF 1993b:12).  At
the same time, the NFA would use a system of ‘harvest authorisations’ as
the main instrument for routine control of the permit-holder’s harvesting
activities, so that developers would have to demonstrate their compliance
with certain standards of practice in one logging coupe before being
allowed to proceed to another (ibid:13).
But the real problem was to make sure that operators complied with
conditions attached to those permits which had been ‘saved’ under the new
Act, most of which had only a few years to run.  During Neville’s period in
office, some provincial forestry officials evidently did feel that they had a
new mandate to crack down on corporate misbehaviour (Nen 1997; Sagir
1997), and their capacity to do so should have been enhanced by the
substantial upgrade of their field offices and vehicle fleet which began in
May 1994.  But new technologies could not compensate for the fact that
‘current timber permits, logging agreements, environmental plans, and
forest working plans contain piecemeal, and often contradictory, controls
on logging [which have] resulted in excessive canopy removal, damage to
residual trees, soil erosion, and siltation of rivers and reefs’ (Taylor
1997:252).
It so happened that Neville’s departure from the Forests Ministry in August
1994 coincided with the start of a campaign by the World Bank and the
Australian government to persuade all the Pacific island nations to
subscribe to a ‘regional code of conduct’ for sustainable forest management.
By August 1995, officials in the NFA and the DEC had combined to produce
a 70-page ‘Papua New Guinea Logging Code of Practice’ (PNGFA/
PNGDEC 1995), constructed around a set of 24 ‘Key Standards for Selection
Logging’ that dealt with such matters as the protection of watercourses and
coastlines, soil disturbance and damage to residual trees, waste
management and operational planning.  These standards were also
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incorporated into a more detailed document produced by the Forest
Authority for the use of its own staff, on ‘Planning, Monitoring and Control
Procedures for Natural Forest Logging Operations under Timber Permit’
(PNGFA 1995b).  These procedures were to be applied to all existing
operations, and divided the work of control between different levels of the
National Forest Service:
• Headquarters staff in the Resource Development Division are
responsible for vetting the five-year forest working plans (along with
proposals for log pond and base camp construction) which operators are
to supply once every three years.  The five-year plans for new projects
are to specify which five of the 35 ‘annual logging areas’ delineated in
the feasibility study will be harvested during the plan period.
• Staff in one of the five regional offices of the Operations Division are
responsible for vetting annual logging plans, which should divide the
area to be logged into ‘set-ups’ of no more than 150 hectares each.
Box 8.18  The modular surveillance system
Forestry officers in remote logging sites in the country will for the first time carry out their surveillance
monitoring duties in offices.  The latest model portable modular offices will have modern communica-
tion units consisting of VHF radio and computer data network.  On Tuesday the Managing Director of
the Papua New Guinea Forestry Authority Jean Kekedo conducted an inspection at the Hornibrooks
NGI Steel premises in Port Moresby, where the offices are being built.  An initial order of 18 offices has
been completed and will be transhipped from Port Moresby commencing May 23.  A single modular
office costs K25,500.  This covers base unit, power, internal fittings including septic tank and rainwater
tank, and transportation and erection.  The offices are portable and can be moved to new locations...
Ms Kekedo said [that] due to budget constraints, the New Guinea Islands region and selected ‘hot spot’
projects in the Momase and Southern regions will be given priority.  The next set of orders will be
dictated by the budget availability. Ms Kekedo said no longer will the international community be able to
criticise PNG [for] negligence in surveillance.  ‘No longer will our resources be labelled “out of control”
and no longer will our precious forest resources be depleted and not sustained.
In November 1993, the National Forest Board approved a capital expenditure programme worth K5.2
million for project offices and project site houses (K3 million), [plus] vehicles and field equipment
(K2.2 million).  Under the capital expenditure and mobilisation programme it was envisaged that the
Authority will procure and establish 35 project site offices; 104 project site houses; 39 units of radio
communications; 68 four wheel drive landcruisers; 13 dump trucks; 12 tractors, trailers and slashes;
33 motorcycles; 22 19 foot dinghies; 22 40 HP outboard motors and eight 2-WD vehicles.
Source: Times of PNG, 5 May 1994
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Regional Inspectors are responsible for checking the ‘Set-Up Monitoring
and Control Logbooks’ compiled by Project Supervisors, and for making
periodic (sometimes unannounced) visits to check the work performance
of these field staff.
• The Project Supervisors themselves are responsible for vetting the set-up
plans and granting clearances for previous set-ups.  There should
normally be no more than three set-ups ‘active’ at any one time in each
concession, so that logging can continue while Project Supervisors
approve these clearances.  Set-up plans are supposed to include a
‘document from the landowners confirming that they have identified all
cultural sites to be excluded from logging’, and a map of clan boundaries
if these fail to coincide with set-up boundaries.
Under this division of labour, ‘it is expected that Project Supervisors will
actively develop and promote an open and professional relationship with the
logging operator’s senior field managers [which] should allow minor field
performance concerns to be sorted out on a face to face basis without
difficulty or rancour’ (ibid:38).  The Procedures set out a series of graduated
Logs await carriage to a ship, New Ireland. Since 1994, the government has engaged a private contractor to
monitor log exports in order to control the incidence of transfer pricing by logging companies
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responses to non-compliance, ending with the issue of Lawful Directions or
the seizure of timber or equipment.
The government was apparently reluctant to endorse the Code of Practice
when it was first drafted, and even attempted to delete the regional code of
conduct from the agenda of the South Pacific Forum meeting which it hosted
shortly afterwards (Post-Courier, 13 September 1995).  Cabinet finally
endorsed the Code in March 1996, after the World Bank had made this one of
the conditions for the second tranche of the structural adjustment loans.
Thence began a series of training workshops for Project Supervisors, which
were designed to phase the application of the Code into the working
practices described in the Procedures.  Meanwhile, the FIA has continued to
grumble that its members were never consulted in the drafting of the Code,
and maintains that forestry officials are obliged to make ‘exemptions’ in a
piecemeal fashion because some of the Key Standards are simply impractical
under local operating conditions (Jim Belford, 1997, personal
communication).  The World Bank is more inclined to regard such
aberrations as evidence of continued malpractice on the part of an industry
which refuses to recognise the virtues of self-regulation.  Since the Bank now
seems to recognise that the new revenue system may not induce the loggers
to raise their game, it is now looking at ways to persuade the NFA to collect
the performance bonds which are allowed under the regulations to the Act,
to incorporate its assessment of an operator’s past performance into its
criteria for resource allocation, and to apply the full range of sanctions to
those operators which fail to comply with the Code.  But it is also
considering the need for an independent body to monitor the monitoring
operations of the Operations Division (see section 13.3), as if to concede the
further point that government officials cannot regulate the working practices
of logging companies unless some other kind of pressure is applied to both
of them.
It has sometimes been suggested that this pressure should and could be
exercised by local landowners (see Brown and Holzknecht 1993; Holzknecht
1997), but it is most unlikely that they would be prepared to do such work,
even if they had the requisite technical knowledge, without being paid for it,
and there is no sign to date that landowner companies, logging companies,
or the NFA itself are prepared to make the necessary outlays.  While it is true
that landowners would have to be included in any training programme
directed at the workforce already employed by the logging companies,
proposals for the development of a separate ‘community-based’ monitoring
system face all of the wider problems associated with community
participation in the logging industry (see section 10.3), and it is not clear how
other stakeholders, especially government officials, would have the interest
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While preparation of the Code of Practice is clearly an efficient use of state expertise, the code is
ultimately a value judgement on the merits of competing environmental and commercial interests.
Landowners may or may not agree with that judgement.  If landowners are to define the local interest,
they should have the option of adopting the code, adjusting it to local circumstances, or rejecting it.  To
ensure that the code is not rejected out of ignorance, the state will need to educate landowners on how
it works.
If landowners adopt the code, the real challenge will be its enforcement.  The state might best deploy
its resources to train landowners to do their own monitoring, rather than field its own massive
inspectorate.  Landowners should be very effective in enforcing the code, given their local knowledge,
proximity to operations, and self-interest motivation.
In summary, on grounds of technical capacity alone, the state cannot make a stronger claim than
custom to the political task of defining the local interest.  The state can deploy its technical capacity to
supply landowners with resource management expertise and knowledge, yet refrain from imposing its
judgement of how their commercial, social, and environmental concerns should be balanced.  In adopting
a supportive rather than coercive role, the state is more likely to mobilise landowners to monitor the
timber industry themselves.  In doing so, it should greatly reduce the pressure on its own resources of
having to field inspectors for every logging project.
Box 8.19  Can local landowners control their logging contractors?
Source: Taylor 1997
or obligation to act on the results of such an exercise.  It therefore seems
unlikely that such a system can be established except as a series of ‘pilot
projects’ funded by donor agencies and possibly administered by local
NGOs, but its extension and sustainability would still be highly
problematic.
The other stakeholders who might bring pressure to bear for an
improvement in logging practices, apart from those funded directly out of
donor pockets, are the consumers of logs or processed products exported
from PNG.  Taylor (1997) has expressed some concern that the ITTO’s
‘Target 2000’, which requires member countries to ensure that all imported
tropical timber is derived from ‘sustainably’ managed forests by the end of
this decade, may provide a perverse incentive for PNG landowners to sell
their resources as quickly as they can.  However, even if the timber buyers
took this deadline seriously, very few local landowners would be aware of
it, and they presently lack the ability to speed up the resource allocation
process.  While local NGOs have recently made some moves to adopt the
certification standards espoused by the Forest Stewardship Council in order
to facilitate the export of ecotimber from small-scale forestry operations (see
section 10.5), it has generally been thought that the Asian markets which
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account for the vast bulk of the country’s raw log exports are not ready to
pay the premiums implied in the adoption of such schemes (Jim Douglas,
1997, personal communication).  There is some evidence of changing
consumption patterns in Japan, where some local authorities have begun to
ban the use of tropical hardwood plywood by their building contractors in
response to campaigns by environmental NGOs (see Light 1997), and this
may be linked to a wider penetration of ‘green’ perspectives into Japanese
boardrooms (Evan Shield, 1998, personal communication).  Whatever the
mix of moral and economic motives which accounts for the evident decline
in Japanese tropical timber consumption, however, it would seem that
Japanese buyers are more interested in material substitutions, as
exemplified in the growth of temperate softwood plywood imports, than in
paying higher prices for certified tropical timber.
In the late 1980s, the government was attempting to enlarge the area of
plantations on customary land through the New Zealand-funded
Demonstration Reforestation Project (see Filer 1989; Sagir 1997), but the
problems encountered by this project were cited by the World Bank (1989)
as evidence of the implausibility of the official target.  Nevertheless, the
National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:7) promised to promote
reforestation through the development of plantations ‘as a means to
maintain a permanent forest estate to supply existing and new forest
industries’ and a forestry extension programme designed to encourage the
establishment of woodlots and the practice of agroforestry in those parts of
the country which suffered from a shortage of timber.  Logging companies
would be required to participate in the development of new plantations
through the imposition of new conditions in their timber permits, which
would take account of the ‘options for profitable processing within the
country’, while the NFA would ‘take primary responsibility for supervising
long term investment in reforestation ... where social and environmental
factors are a prime consideration’ (ibid:27).  The Policy did not include any
statement about the ownership or sale of timber derived from plantations
established on customary land by private companies or government
agencies.
Barnett (1992:115-6) was especially critical of the failure of the new Act to be
more specific about the role of ‘reafforestation’ in Forest Management
Agreements and Forest Working Plans.  As if to make amends for this
omission, Part E of the 1993 Guidelines (on ‘Reforestation and
8.11 Reforestation and afforestation
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Afforestation’) proposed a series of mechanisms by which the NFA might
secure the collaboration of other stakeholders (loggers, donors and resource
owners) in these two activities.  The Guidelines allowed that:
• ‘reforestation’ might involve ‘enrichment planting of selected high value
species’ as well as ‘industrial forest plantations on clear-felled land
within a project area’, while
• ‘afforestation’ might either involve the ‘supply of timber in areas where
natural forest resources are unable to satisfy local demand’ or the
‘establishment of export oriented commercial tree plantations on
accessible grasslands’.
The government’s largest block of plantations, located near the Bulolo
Forestry College, would be used as ‘a demonstration model of national
importance for training and research’, but the other plantations on state
land would either be returned to customary ownership or else leased out to
private companies.  The NFA might still provide grants or seek foreign aid
to promote the development of new plantations on customary land under
separate FMAs with the landowners, but would otherwise leave the
funding and management of new reforestation or afforestation schemes to
the private sector (PNGMOF 1993b:14-15).
This movement towards the privatisation of state assets seems to have
provided the pretext for the National Forest Service to suspend its own
plantation development programme, which was designed to use the
reforestation levies imposed on selective logging operations to fund the
planting of 4000 additional hectares each year.  No progress was made with
implementation of two NFCAP project proposals that would have
conducted experiments with the reafforestation of grasslands in the central
highlands.  The Kandrian-Gloucester Integrated Development Project
(KGIDP) in West New Britain Province (which was not a NFCAP project)
did include a moderately successful experiment in training local
landowners to practice Timber Stand Improvement techniques in areas
which had been selectively logged (Cameron and Vigus 1993)70, and some of
the larger logging companies have developed their own reforestation or
enrichment planting programmes, but the remaining operators have not
possessed the interest or expertise required to duplicate such efforts, let
alone to bid for the right to manage the plantations which the government
had already established.
70 
This resulted in the production of a Tok Pisin video, ‘Lukautim Bus’, which has been mooted as one of the key ingredients for
a community-based monitoring system (see section 8.10).
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The Reforestation and Extension Division of the National Forest Service
was finally established in October 1995, and took over the reforestation
function previously handled by the Resource Development Division, which
now consisted primarily of managing the Bulolo plantations.  Its other
main functions were:
• to restore basic management techniques on another ten or twelve
government-sponsored plantations, including those located on
customary land71, which had been neglected since the start of the policy
reform process;
• to promote enrichment planting practices of the type which had been
pioneered by the KGIDP;
• to provide technical assistance to small-scale and community forestry
projects; and
• to help the Operations Division to ‘provide an integrated general
forestry service to the communities in which they work’.
The head of the new division observed that the reforestation levies
accumulating in the NFA’s trust account had come to be seen as a ‘tax on
bad logging practices’, and a serious reforestation programme, conceived
as an alternative to the present emphasis on monitoring unsustainable
selective logging practices, would entail a tenfold increase in these levies
(Skelton 1996).
This suggestion found no favour with the architects of the new revenue
system.  Although some forestry officials still believe that further
plantation development is the only way to feed a viable processing
industry, they now seem to recognise that this would have to be driven by
private sector investment and might well require a new approach to
landowner revenue issues (Peter McCrea, 1997, personal communication).
In December 1995, Cabinet resolved to sell the greater part of the state’s
equity stake in the Bulolo plantations to its joint venture partner, a
subsidiary of the Singapore-based Prime Group, leaving only 20 per cent to
be held on behalf of local landowners (Independent, 16 December 1995).
However, the World Bank does not place much store by plans to expand the
country’s total stock of forest plantations, because of the general lack of
private investors willing to take the long-term risks involved (Jim Douglas,
1997, personal communication).
71 
These included two plantations on alienated land (Kerevat and Brown River) which had simply been handed back to customary
landowners.
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The National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:30) placed a good deal of
emphasis on the role of citizens, ‘especially resource owners’, as
shareholders in companies, especially landowner companies, which were to
play a growing role in the harvesting and processing of timber.  The Policy
proposed that national participants in joint ventures with foreign
companies should hold a ‘minimum of 5 per cent equity free of charge’ and
a right to acquire additional equity at par (ibid:34).
The Policy also aimed to promote the recruitment and training of citizens
within the forestry sector, but that part of the Policy which dealt with
‘Forestry Training and Education’ was largely concerned with the
management of the government’s own training institutions.  Although the
National Forest Service would take some responsibility for ‘close
examination of company training and localisation programmes’ (ibid:48), no
statements were made about regulations or incentives intended to raise the
relative size and skill composition of the national workforce within the
private sector.
The Guidelines promised that FMAs and Timber Permits would henceforth
be designed to specify the ‘avenues for landowner participation in a forest
development project, whether as stakeholders, contractors or employees’,
and stated that all unskilled or semi-skilled workers should either be
recruited from the ranks of local landowners or long-term residents of the
province in which a project was located (PNGMOF 1993b:25).
No progress was ever made with the policy of granting free equity to
national participants in joint ventures with foreign companies.  The
‘national capitalist’ still typically makes his appearance as the director of a
landowner company whose stake in the industry rarely reaches beyond the
collection of resource rents, some of which may be invested in other sectors
of the economy, but rarely materialise as investments in the forestry sector,
except in those few cases where such companies have bought into
sawmilling ventures or plantation management (Bob Tate, 1998, personal
communication).  Some former forestry officials and other citizens of more
questionable expertise have set themselves up as ‘consultants’ in the hope
of capturing some of the income which accrues to landowner companies or
some of the donor funding directed at the policy reform process, but these
activities have not resulted in the creation of a distinctive group of private
sector stakeholders.
8.12 Promoting national participation
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Unlike their counterparts in the mining and petroleum sector, foreign
logging companies have made little effort to provide themselves with a
distinctive national voice in the forest policy process, through the
appointment of well-qualified Papua New Guineans to manage their
public relations.  They have preferred, instead, to rely on the voices of
landowner company directors and sundry politicians with whom they are
closely associated, and these have commonly failed to carry much weight
in the court of public opinion.  Some logging companies have also
received adverse publicity for their engagement of Asian field supervisors
and manual workers, in apparent breach of the country’s immigration
rules, thus raising suspicions of corruption in the relevant government
agencies.  While the industry has recruited a stratum of technical
personnel from the country’s specialist training institutions, it has
generally not followed the lead of the mining and petroleum companies in
luring forestry officials away from the bureaucracy with offers of better
terms and conditions of employment.
Box 8.20 ‘Logging provides employment?’
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The FIA has made occasional efforts to indicate a potential conflict of
interest between resource owners and other citizens employed in the
forestry sector, but the fact remains that the national forestry worker is most
commonly employed to harvest the resources of his own community.  Some
forestry workers and furniture makers may be working in isolation from
their rural origins, but there is presently little scope for a numerical
expansion of these occupational categories, or for any further displacement
of foreigners from their ranks, except insofar as this reflects a general
contraction of the industry in response to the rapid deterioration in market
conditions.
These considerations explain the continual reduction of questions about
national participation in the forest industry to those questions about
community participation which we shall deal with in more detail in a later
section of this study (see section 10).
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No room at the inn:
reforming forest
conservation policy
In this section, we are concerned with the changes recently made or
attempted in the way that the Department of Environment and Conservation
(DEC) goes about the business of ‘selling’ the values of natural forest
conservation to other stakeholders in the forest policy domain, or regulating
those activities which threaten to undermine these values.  The political
weakness of the DEC reflects the limited domestic market for such intangible
‘commodities’, but is compounded by the Department’s failure to satisfy the
demands of the market which already exists in the local NGO and global
donor community.
This section is shorter than the last one, because the activities (and
inactivities) of the DEC have attracted very little in the way of public debate
and few signs of overt stakeholder conflict.  In amongst the country’s forests,
most resource owners have no inkling of the Department’s role, or even its
existence, and what they do know about the government’s conservation
policies is normally derived from their contact with provincial Wildlife
Officers, who are not part of the DEC establishment, or with NGOs which
have been actively engaged in battles with the logging industry.
We begin this discussion with a short history of the Biodiversity Conservation
and Management Programme (BCRMP).  This includes mention of the Task
Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas, because this was
the first NFCAP project to be started (and finished), and because it provided a
foretaste of several problems which have continued to afflict donor-funded
efforts to raise the Department’s profile in rural areas and redefine its role in
the forest policy process.  We then go on to review the design and
implementation of the DEC Strengthening Project, which represents the other
main example of such donor-driven policy reform.
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By 1991, when implementation of the NFCAP began in earnest, PNG’s stock
of protected areas covered less than 3 per cent of the country - a great deal
less than the 20 per cent which was touted at the TFAP Round Table as a
suitable national target.  The existing areas included eighteen Wildlife
Management Areas, fifteen National Parks (four of them on government
land), two Protected Areas and two Wildlife Sanctuaries.  Three of these
areas accounted for roughly 80 per cent of the total area under some form of
protection.  Most of them were too small to be taken seriously as part of the
commitment which the national government subsequently made by signing
the Convention on Biological Diversity in 1993.
In its original design, the NFCAP included one project which was intended
to improve the DEC’s management of the existing network of protected
areas, and another project which was intended to develop a strategy for
making substantial additions to this network.  The first of these two
projects proceeded no further than a review conducted by WWF-
International in 1992, with funding provided by the European Union, which
documented the inadequacies of the existing management regime, but
failed to entice any donor agency to commit the funds required to remedy
these deficiencies.  Following the advice of the World Bank, the second
project was redesigned to pass through the Biodiversity Conservation
‘window’ which was opened by the Global Environment Facility in 1991.
By this means, US$5 million was secured for the BCRMP, whose central
feature was to be a process of experimentation with ‘Integrated
Conservation and Development’ (ICAD) projects, and the elaboration of an
institutional, legal, financial and policy framework for the expansion of the
country’s protected area system on the basis of lessons learned from these
experiments.  In 1993, a Conservation Resource Centre (CRC) was
established within the DEC to pursue this mandate.
In the original conception of the BCRMP, the CRC was to produce
Conservation Area Management Plans for each of its pilot ICAD projects,
which would:
• describe the biophysical and socio-cultural features of each project area;
• negotiate conservation and development options with local resource
owners;
• divide the area into specific zones by reference to the problems and
prospects of promoting different types of conservation or development
activity in each one of them;
9.1 Conservation area management
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• describe the activities to be undertaken in the pursuit of conservation
objectives;
• determine the most appropriate designation for each area within the
framework of national legislation;
• develop appropriate conservation covenants and incentive packages in
consultation with local resource owners; and
• establish methods of monitoring and evaluation.
The first area selected for this process of experimentation was the Weittin
Valley, located squarely in the middle of the Lak Timber Rights Purchase in
southern New Ireland.  The Weittin Valley had previously been visited in
1990 by the Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas
(see Box 9.1).
The Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas (TFEP) was established in 1990, as the result
of a resolution passed at the TFAP Round Table.  This resolution, which was sponsored by the NGO contingent
present at that meeting, called for immediate action to counter the threat of logging in any of the twenty-seven
areas which the World Bank’s TFAP Review (1989, Annex 6) had recommended for protected status.
Its stated aims were to ‘provide maps of the listed areas, identify areas of conflict between conservation and
development projects, and provide advice to the Minister of Environment and Conservation on appropriate con-
servation strategies, development regulation, and priority needs’.  It was recognised that the government would
not be able to protect proposed conservation areas from the immediate threat of uncontrolled logging operations
unless it could persuade the customary landowners in these areas to do the same thing.  DEC officials subse-
quently produced a project description which emphasised the necessity of producing ‘benefit packages for land-
owners and government for revenues foregone in conservation areas’.
The Task Force made two ‘multi-disciplinary’ expeditions to potential conservation areas in Milne Bay and New
Ireland provinces. During these brief forays into the countryside, the Task Force discovered that the people of
Woodlark Island, in Milne Bay Province, were quite well disposed to the idea of granting protected area status to
parts of their territory, whereas the people of the Lak area, in New Ireland Province, were found to be quite
resolute in their determination to have their forests logged as soon as possible, and deeply suspicious of any
government moves to interfere with their long-held dream of ‘development’.  Despite (or perhaps because of) this
finding, the DEC and its technical advisers later decided that Lak was the best place in which to conduct their first
experimental ICAD project.
In effect, the TFEP did little other than confront the problem of landowner awareness in the two areas which it has
visited. No serious work was ever done on the design of the contentious benefit packages.  However, a number
of inferences were drawn from this experience:
• Mobile inter-departmental committees are very expensive and relatively ineffective vehicles of communication
between Government and landowners.
Box 9.1  The taskforce on environmental planning
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The choice of the Weittin Valley was apparently made in response to a letter
written in August 1992 by the same provincial politician who had
previously hosted the visit of the Task Force.  The letter was initially sent to
the ITTO, which sent it back to theNFA, which passed it on to the DEC,
where it was ‘was seen by project proponents as a social invitation from a
unified group of landowners eager to explore alternative methods of forest
development’ (McCallum and Sekhran 1997:19).  The Task Force may have
been partly responsible for the author’s ability to recite so many phrases
dear to the donors of the day, but the Task Force had also discovered and
documented his own doubts about the willingness of his constituents to
forsake their interest in logging for an alternative interest in conservation
(Filer 1991a).  Shortly after the Task Force had visited the area in August
1990, the Minister for Forests had granted a Timber Permit to the local
landowner company, Metlak Development Corporation, in apparent
violation of his self-imposed moratorium, and the Minister for
Environment had incidentally approved the company’s Environmental
Plan, which made absolutely no provision for a conservation area within
the TRP.  Since DEC officials and ICAD project proponents had already
been apprised of those ‘socio-cultural features’ of the project area which
were likely to present a serious obstacle to the pursuit of this objective, one
can only conclude that their decision to return to Lak was either the result
of bureaucratic inertia and structural amnesia, or else a deliberate move to
• Outsiders generally, whatever their affiliation, will not make much impact on village attitudes during the course
of a single visit to the village.
• Educated members of landowning communities are the most plausible conveyors of a conservationist
message at the grassroots level, assuming they believe in it themselves and maintain regular contact with
the other members.
• Landowners who have no previous experience of logging operations are not easily persuaded of their nega-
tive impact.
• The best (if not the only) way to persuade landowners that conservation is a good thing is to represent it as
an alternative form of ‘development’.
• It is very difficult to represent conservation as an alternative form of ‘development’ without raising expecta-
tions or making promises about the delivery of such development.
• It can also be very difficult to engage landowners in a dialogue about conservation and development options
without exaggerating the intensity of factional struggles within their communities.
Sources: Filer 1991a, Filer 1991b, Young 1991
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‘take the fight to the enemy’ by taking the local politician’s words at face
value, and seizing the opportunity to mobilise a re-enlightened community
against the forces of darkness which it had previously been so eager to
embrace.
The first meeting in the second round of dealings between the DEC and the
Lak landowners took place in December 1992, and the directors of Metlak
Development Corporation formally requested the removal of the Weittin
Valley from their Forest Working Plan in April 1993.  This was no great
sacrifice on their part, since the logging contractor (Niugini Lumber) had
already removed nearly all of the accessible commercial timber in the valley.
ICAD project operations began with a Biodiversity Rapid Survey in January
1994, followed by the establishment of a Lak Conservation Area Management
Committee and the inception of a Landowner Awareness Programme
contracted to a national NGO.  The same NGO was commissioned to produce
an Alternative Incomes Assessment, but this failed to reveal any alternatives
to logging which could produce anything like an equivalent level of short-
term benefits.  As a result, the ‘development’ component of the project was
redesigned around three basic components:
‘Our landowner company has engaged a Malaysian company as [a] logging contractor to harvest and market the
timber resource on its behalf.  [By] the same token, we are also mindful of our forest environment as we do not
want to see unnecessary destruction of our forest resources.  Hence we are trying very hard to control the actual
logging operation by our logging contractor to minimise environmental damage as well as promoting sustainable
forestry management.
‘Our local company is also trying to promote other means of income generation as well as developing the road
infrastructure and other Government Social Services that are lacking in the area.  In this regard we are trying to
promote eco-tourism into the Weittin Valley which is located within the resource area.  We are intending to
develop the Weittin Valley as an ICAD project eventually leading to the declaration of the zone as a World
Heritage-listed area.
‘Thus we are writing to inform your organisation of our intentions as we need technical and financial assistance
to assist our organisation to carry out the following:
• Assist our local company with technical expertise to monitor and control the logging operation to ensure that
minimal environmental damage is done, as well as sustainable forest management.
• Establish a Conservation Foundation for the Weittin Valley thus generating economic activities centred around
conservation.
• Obtain funding for a Wildlife Management Programme incorporating profitable environmental activities.’
Box 9.2  Letter from a provincial politician to international donors
Source: McCallum and Sekhran 1997:18-19
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• a Sustainable Forestry Project to be undertaken through a joint venture
between the Metlak Development Corporation and The Nature
Conservancy (Sekhran et al. 1996);
• a carbon offset proposal submitted, through the PNG government, to the
United States Initiative on Joint Implementation (Stuart and Sekhran
1996) (see section 10.6); and
• an Early Rewards Schedule, which was intended to meet some of the
immediate needs identified by local community members, and thus
provide a ‘tangible sign of commitment’ on the part of the proponents.
The design of this package was complete by May 1995, when work finally
began on the local ICAD project base.  The first two elements of the package
required the Metlak Development Corporation to terminate its Logging and
Marketing Agreement with Niugini Lumber, and thus put an end to
conventional logging in the area.  Although ICAD project staff were able to
secure an ‘overwhelming’ vote in favour of this move at a meeting of 200
community representatives in April 1995, the logging contractor was able to
mobilise its own factional supporters, including some of the Metlak
directors, to prevent the landowner company from taking a firm stand on
this issue.  In the ensuing tug-of-war between the loggers and the
conservationists, it soon became clear that the behaviour of individual
community leaders was not constrained by the resolutions made in public
meetings, or even by their own public statements, and most landowners
were inclined to play both ends against the middle by waiting to see which
side would eventually offer them the best deal.  Meanwhile, the
continuation of conventional logging was rapidly depleting the commercial
timber resource.  As a result, in November 1995, the sponsors of the ICAD
project decided to abandon the first two elements of their new development
package and scale down project activities in order to test the level of
community commitment.  When the Chairman of the Conservation Area
Management Committee later defected to the opposition, the ICAD project
finally withdrew from Lak, leaving its rather expensive base camp as its
only local monument.
Early in 1995, the CRC decided to initiate a second ICAD experiment in
Madang Province, on the north-eastern slopes of the Bismarck Range,
where the 1980 national census maps show the existence of a National Park,
though its existence had never been officially gazetted under the National
Parks Act of 1982 because no attempt had been made to alienate the land in
question from customary tenure.  The reason why this had once been
considered a serious possibility was that the area appeared to contain no
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• Though biological criteria may be drawn upon to identify broad areas of interest for conservation,
socio-economic criteria must dictate the actual choice of project site.
• The style and substance of an ICAD project’s initial contact with local communities will have implica-
tions for its subsequent ability to handle the issue of ‘dependency’.
• Unless communities come to redefine their strategies for seeking development in ways that ICAD
projects can support, then ‘conservation through development’ will continue to fail.
• If ICAD projects are to survive, they require that recipient stakeholder communities already have a
high level of social cohesion and cooperative endeavour.
• ICAD projects that are required to operate in partnership with government or non-government
agencies that lack planning and management capacities must make allowance for this deficiency at
the planning stage.
• In areas where communities lack a basic conservation philosophy and environmental awareness,
education programmes are unlikely to be effective in the time frame required to compete with
exploitative development activities.
• The commitment of personal time, energy and emotion by project proponents can affect their
objectivity when evaluating project progress.
• The level of a project’s physical presence on site should not exceed the demonstrated commitment
of the local community to project objectives.
• The land management requirements of biodiversity protection may well be incompatible with
traditional land tenure systems.
• The quality of social relationships developed between conservation workers and local stakeholders
are likely to determine the viability of the project, particularly when the surrounding cultural
environment is built on customary exchange.
• Donor-funded ICAD projects which have to play by strict administrative rules cannot compete with
logging contractors in the forest allocation stakes.
Box 9.3  Some lessons learned from the Lak ICAD project
Source: McCallum and Sekhran 1997
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human inhabitants.  The combination of minimal population density and
enormous altitudinal range had now led the CRC’s technical advisers to
conclude that it ought to contain ‘more biodiversity’ than any other area of
equivalent size in PNG.  Furthermore, the government had not even begun
to negotiate the acquisition of timber rights over any part of it.  In light of
the Lak experience, the immediate threat of logging was no longer
considered to be a useful criterion for the selection of new ICAD project
sites.
The earlier proposal to create a National Park in this area had actually been
abandoned in 1986, following a DEC patrol which found that one part of it
had been invaded by ‘squatters’ from the Jimi Valley in Western Highlands
Province.  In April 1995, the CRC organised another patrol to the area, with
a view to locating some of its inhabitants and discussing the concepts of
‘conservation’ and ‘development’ with them (Filer et al. 1995).  Following
this patrol, the CRC defined a rectangular ‘area of interest’ which covered
more than 3,000 square kilometres, including the whole of the proposed
national park area, but also including all those surrounding areas which
might include some of its customary owners or claimants to ownership.
This large square contained approximately 20,000 people, the great majority
of whom were living in the upper reaches of the Jimi Valley, where
population densities were very high, and there was evidence of considerable
pressure on subsistence resources.
Considering the lessons being learned in Lak, CRC staff decided that an
entirely new approach to ‘community entry’ would now be required for the
Bismarck-Ramu project.  In particular, patrols led by white scientists
carrying lots of expensive equipment would only have the effect of raising
expectations of ‘development’ which could not possibly be met, and even
the discussion of a ‘project’ was liable to induce a form of ‘cargo cult
mentality’ which could only serve to inhibit any genuine local interest in
conservation or sustainable development.  The new approach featured
Community Development Teams consisting entirely of Papua New
Guineans with substantial experience of ‘landowner awareness’ work,
whose entry to each village in the area of interest would precede that of any
other project staff, and seek to establish the conditions of further interaction
by using the techniques of Participatory Rural Appraisal.  Candidates for
membership of these teams, along with the staff of CRC and its project
partners, were all trained in the use of a standard ‘PRA toolkit’ at a
workshop held in May 1996 (Grant 1996).  Thereafter, as the teams gradually
made their way around the area of interest in a series of Community
Development Patrols, they were followed by a rural sociologist engaged by
the National Research Institute to conduct a Social Feasibility Study,
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combining the PRA results with other sources of information to determine
which communities in the area of interest were most likely to support and
sustain some kind of conservation initiative.  The Social Feasibility Study
was completed at the end of 1997 (van Helden 1998), at the same time that
the PRA techniques yielded their first positive result, in the shape of a
spontaneous initiative by one village community in the area of interest to
establish a conservation area in their territory (Mike Parsons, 1998,
personal communication).  At the time of writing, the Community
Development Teams are still patrolling the area, and have not even made
their first contact with many of the villages within it, but the future of the
ICAD project remains uncertain, since there is no guarantee of donor
support beyond the end of 1998.
As part of its mandate, the CRC has not only sought to engage NGOs as
project partners in its own ICAD experiments, but has also attempted to
promote the exchange of information and advice between the proponents of
other ‘ICAD’ projects in PNG, most of which are initiatives taken by a
combination of national and international NGOs.  Although some of these
NGOs have doubts about the utility of the ICAD concept as a central
organising principle for conservation area management, and even greater
doubts about the DEC’s long-term capacity to provide a model of best
The Hunstein Range in East Sepik Province has long been the focus of a struggle between the
provincial supporters and opponents of large-scale logging. Here, villagers draw a map of their
clan boundaries in response to an NGO initiative to create a community conservation area
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practice in such activities, they have all been prepared to participate in the
biennial roundtable discussions organised by the CRC (see James 1996), and
these have not generated the sort of friction which was evident in the
earlier Conservation Needs Assessment workshop in April 1992 (see section
6.5).
Eleven terrestrial conservation projects seem to have qualified for
membership of the ICAD club over the past decade (see Table 9.1), and all
of these could reasonably be described as forest conservation projects
intended to protect specific areas of customary land from the threat of large-
scale resource development, or else to maintain existing levels of
biodiversity in collaboration with the customary owners.  The DEC has
only been directly involved in three of these projects, and in each case has
relied heavily on technical assistance from donor agencies whose funding
commitments have a limited lifespan.  The Oro Butterfly Conservation
Project, which is one of the DEC projects, is something of an odd man out,
because of its focus on the protection a single species (the Queen Alexandra
birdwing butterfly) which is found in scattered pockets of rainforest habitat
in Oro Province, and because it was initially intended to protect this
creature against the expansion of an oil palm scheme supported by the
World Bank.
Five of these projects (Kamiali, Crater Mountain, Kuper Range, Lak and
Collingwood Bay) were in some sense initiated by local people, although
the initiative normally came from a single village, or even a single
individual, and the sponsors have generally sought to expand the area and
population involved in the project though some form of landowner
awareness exercise.  The exception is the Kuper Range project, which is still
confined to a single village, and if it were not for the fact of external
sponsorship by a national NGO located in the vicinity, this ‘project’ would
appear to have much the same status as many of the applications which
local groups have submitted to the DEC for the declaration of Wildlife
Management Areas within their respective territories.  The Crater Mountain
project is located in one of the very few WMAs which has been officially
gazetted, and which is large enough to meet the requirements of a national
conservation strategy, as natural scientists understand them, but its
boundaries only encompass four traditional political communities (see
Johnson 1997).  At its maximum extent (as shown in Table 9.1), the Kamiali
project also covered four communities, but has since narrowed its focus to
one of them (Lababia) in circumstances rather similar to those which
afflicted the Lak project (James 1996:16).
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The Lak and Kamiali projects are the only ones in which the sponsors have
tried to help local landowners to extract their forest resources from a Timber
Permit which had already been granted.  In the Hunstein Range and
Collingwood Bay, conservation initiatives have been predicated on the
existence of a Timber Rights Purchase negotiated under the old Forestry Act,
in areas which have since been granted high priority by the Conservation
Needs Assessment, and NGOs have allied themselves with community
leaders who now oppose the granting of a Timber Permit over these areas.
The Kikori Basin is in a similar situation, except that the alliance formed
against the loggers includes a multinational oil company which has long
been engaged in the process of organising the local landowners along the
route of its export pipeline, and has its own vested interest in protecting the
Project Province(s) Sponsors Duration Area (km
2
)
Kamiali (Lasanga) Morobe Village Development Trust, From 1989 800
World Wide Fund for Nature
Crater Mountain Gulf, Chimbu, Research & Conservation Foundation, From 1990 2,700
E. Highlands Wildlife Conservation Society
Kuper Range Morobe Wau Ecology Institute From 1991 7
Oro Butterfly Oro AusAID, DEC, CSIRO, From 1991 n.a.
Conservation Project Wau Ecology Institute
Hunstein Range East Sepik Friends of the Sepik, East Sepik From 1991 5,000
Council of Women,
World Wide Fund for Nature
Kikori Basin Gulf World Wildlife Fund (US), From 1993 2,200
Chevron Niugini
Lakekamu- Gulf, Central Foundation for Peoples of the From 1994 2,500
Kunimaipa Basin South Pacific (PNG), Conservation
International, Wau Ecology Institute
Lak (Weittin Valley) New Ireland Global Environment Facility (UNDP), 1994-96 800
DEC, Foundation for Peoples of
the South Pacific (PNG)
Bismarck-Ramu Madang Global Environment Facility (UNDP), From 1995 n.a.
DEC, Christensen Research Institute
Collingwood Bay Oro Conservation Melanesia,Greenpeace From 1996 n.a.
Table 9.1  ‘ICAD’ project sites in Papua New Guinea
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pipeline corridor from any additional social or environmental disturbance.
Part of the Crater Mountain WMA appears to be covered by a recent FMA
which should, in theory, have excluded it, while most of the Lakekamu-
Kunimaipa Basin is designated in the National Forest Plan as ‘potential areas
for future development’.
The ‘development’ component of these various projects has comprised a wide
range of feasibility studies, of the kind undertaken in Lak, and a rather more
limited range of practical interventions which have delivered some tangible
benefit to local resource owners.  These interventions have included:
• the production and sale of various ‘non-timber forest products’, especially
traditional or modern handicrafts (see section 10.6);
• the construction of guest houses for use by visiting scientists or
ecotourists, and the collection of fees by local guides who show them the
scenery;
• the practice of ‘ecoforestry’, typically based on the operation of small
portable sawmills by village-based business groups (see section 10.5);
• improvements or innovations in the production of cash crops and supplies
of meat from domesticated animals; and
• the construction of new educational or health facilities, or other items of
social infrastructure.
Although there has been a good deal of discussion about potential markets
for ‘ecological services’ (such as carbon sequestration), the sale of
biodiversity prospecting licences to pharmaceutical companies, or the
payment of pure ‘conservation rents’ to customary landowners, all these
options still face major institutional obstacles at the local, national and global
levels (see section 10.6).
The other critical questions which have been repeatedly discussed in the
meetings hosted by the CRC are:
• how to reconcile the different criteria which have been used for ICAD
project site selection - most notably the extent of local initiative, the
measurement of biodiversity values, and the threat posed by large-scale
logging operations;
• how to secure a lasting commitment to conservation by several
neighbouring communities, whose members have no traditional basis for
active cooperation in the management of natural resources, and may
sooner or later be offered the temptation of substantial rents from large-
scale logging operations (Sekhran 1996);
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• how to avoid the development of a ‘project-dependent’ mentality which
turns ‘development packages’ into a form of ransom paid to customary
resource owners for the global benefits of conservation (Orsak 1996);
• where to find the funds required to create and sustain the kind of
development assistance which will last long enough for resource owners
to develop their own capacity to manage an ‘ICAD’ project on their own
account;
• whether the diversity of local social and economic conditions permits the
formulation and application of a ‘standard model’ of conservation area
management which can evolve from repeated applications of the ICAD
methodology;
• how donor agencies can enter into ‘conservation covenants’ with
customary landowners under legislation which appears to prohibit
anyone except an automatic citizen (or the State of PNG) from doing so
(Fingleton 1993); and, last but not least,
• what role the DEC can realistically be expected to play, with or without
substantial quantities of technical assistance from donors, in the
maintenance and expansion of a national system of protected areas.
The World Bank and other donors take a dim view of the national
government’s capacity to resolve any of these questions, and have therefore
spent a long time searching for an institutional mechanism that would
enlarge and stabilise the flow of funds to the most promising experiments
in conservation area management, without sacrificing the government’s
official stamp of approval or providing another set of excuses for the
government to shirk its own responsibilities.  The outcome of these
deliberations had been a proposal to establish a national Trust Fund for
Environment and Conservation, jointly managed by government and NGO
representatives, open to bids by any national stakeholder, and partly
funded by environmental levies which the government may one day
manage to impose on the developers of natural resources.  Not surprisingly,
the outstanding bone of contention is the extent to which the DEC will be
able to either fund or control this organisation.
The establishment of this Trust Fund appears to be based on the premise
that there is no alternative to the ICAD methodology which has been
advocated by the CRC, despite the patent inability of the DEC to function as
a rural development agency.  The most obvious alternative would be for
donors to use their financial leverage to persuade the national government
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not to pursue FMAs or issue Timber Permits over areas which are known to
be rich in biodiversity.  In that case, it would not be necessary for
conservationists to enter into any kind of negotiation with local resource
owners, let alone worry about the construction of alternative development
packages.  Although there are good reasons to doubt the NFA’s long-term
commitment to implementing this kind of conservation strategy, the
bureaucratic entanglements of the resource allocation process which it now
administers has been partly responsible for providing the breathing space in
which ICAD projects have been testing the waters of community sentiment.
The irony here lies in the risk that those ICAD projects which are not
directed to areas which are under immediate threat of large-scale logging
may only serve to whet the appetite of resource owners for some ‘serious’
development when that threat finally arrives.  Nor does the ICAD process
remove the need to persuade the NFA to keep its hands off designated
conservation areas; it can only promise to motivate resource owners to add
their own distinctive weight to the act of persuasion.  It is therefore
reasonable to ask whether the preference for ‘integrating’ conservation and
development owes more to the intellectual fashions of the donor community,
or its desire to provide a space for NGOs to practice their good works, than
to the principles of cost-effectiveness.
Although the BCRMP has played some part in efforts to bolster the
organisational capacities of the DEC, these activities have been limited to the
Conservation Division, and related specifically to the Department’s role in
meeting the PNG government’s commitments under the Biodiversity
Convention.  For example, the Programme commissioned a training needs
assessment which identified a lack of opportunities for DEC staff to be
trained in the planning and management of conservation areas (RCF and
Lincoln University 1995), and has been responsible for setting up a
Biodiversity Data Management system in the Department’s Resource
Inventory Branch (Hedemark 1997; Hedemark and Peters 1997), which has
been part of the process of refining the biophysical criteria for prioritising
possible conservation areas.  However, since 1994, AusAID has funded a
project designed to strengthen the whole Department, which is being
implemented by the Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria, with
substantial input from the Victorian Environmental Planning Agency.  This
project is not specifically concerned with the Department’s role in the forest
policy process, but it was conceived as part of the NFCAP, and has focused
9.2 Institutional strengthening
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on the need to improve the statutory regulation of environmentally
hazardous activities, of which large-scale industrial logging is a prime
example.
A chronic shortage of financial resources has often been held to explain the
DEC’s lack of institutional strength, especially by those who work in it, but
the cuts routinely made to its operating budget have been partly justified by
the Department’s failure to execute those tasks for which its staffing levels
should be more than adequate.  For example, it took the DEC fourteen
months to make even the most elementary comments on the NFA’s
proposed format for Provincial Forest Plans, and five years after PNG
signed the Global Convention on Climate Change, the Department has yet
to produce any baseline data on the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.
And the whole environmental planning process has fallen into disrepute,
because other stakeholders have come to believe that the DEC’s method of
evaluating and approving plans submitted to them, if there is any method at
all, has virtually nothing to do with the information, predictions or
undertakings which they happen to contain.  If there is one set of tasks for
which the lack of funds has created a really serious constraint on the
Department’s effectiveness, it is those which involve travelling to any place
outside Port Moresby, which helps to explain why conservation areas are
not properly managed and environmental plans are forgotten as soon as
they are submitted.
The New Zealand government paid a lone consultant to assemble a new
Strategic Plan for the DEC in 1993, but the results of this exercise were also
forgotten amidst the deluge of Australian consultants who began to arrive at
the end of 1994.  One informant has compared the initial impact of the DEC
Strengthening Project to the act of pouring a huge bucket of cold water over
the whole Department.  By the time that a mid-term review was conducted
in 1996, it was recognised that this had failed to create an appropriate sense
of ‘national ownership’ of the many innovations previously recommended.
As the project approaches its completion date in 1998, the emphasis has
shifted towards the creation of an institutional momentum which will carry
forward those environmental policy reforms that require the collaboration
of other stakeholders, and which could therefore take some time to reach
fruition.
The most significant of these reforms is the development of a new
Environmental Regulatory Framework (ERF), as represented in the fifth,
sixth and ninth of the project’s ten components (see Box 9.4).  The first step
in this development was the adoption of a new set of Strategic Directions
(PNGDEC 1995), which envisaged a partial devolution of the environmental
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management system, under the rubric of ‘Total Catchment Environment
Management’, with greater inputs from provincial governments, resource
developers and community organisations.  The process of devolution was
to be encouraged by the formation of a new Field and Support Services
Division, whose staff are supposed to escape the culture of ‘crisis
management’ by taking a ‘multi-disciplinary’ approach to the ‘core
business’ of the Department.  An initial discussion paper on the ERF was
produced in 1996 (PNGDEC 1996), and then revised in light of comments
from other stakeholders (PNGDEC 1997).  The stated intention is to turn the
process of environmental planning and protection into a ‘one-stop-shop’,
whose legal foundation will be a new Environment Act which supersedes
the Environmental Planning Act, the Environmental Contaminants Act and the
Water Resources Act.  Under the new Act, activities with minor
environmental risks will only need to comply with general guidelines or
codes of practice, while those which pose greater risks will require specific
permits, and those with the greatest impacts will require Ministerial or
Cabinet approval.
The project strategy seeks to bring about the cultural changes necessary to get DEC to act and behave
strategically.  These include acting collaboratively with government agencies, industry and stakeholders
(particularly landowner groups); being a field-focused organisation and developing an entrepreneurial
culture in which officers have the skills and confidence to make decisions and apply them effectively.
This will be achieved through a change management approach which provides a different focus for
each level of the organisation.  Effective change management requires careful scheduling of training
and technical assistance inputs so that the external contributions do not dominate the internal workings
of the organisation.  The large number of externally-funded projects impinging on DEC present the risk
that its limited absorptive capacity will be overwhelmed by project overload. The project comprises ten
components:
1. Strategic Management:  This component will transform the way DEC is managed so that a clear
mission is established, clear directions and priorities are set, each part of the organisation knows what
is expected of it, good relationships are established with all stakeholders, the Minister is assisted to be
an effective performer for the Government, effective decisions are made throughout DEC, and the
budget is stretched to enable DEC to develop an effective presence in key areas of PNG.  The compo-
nent includes an organisational study, a revenue study, and assistance to develop a public relations
capacity within DEC.
2. Human Resource Development/Training:  The project will strengthen DEC’s human resources to
the point where they possess the competencies to make them fully effective in the jobs they do.
3. Work planning:  This component integrates strategic planning with medium-term and annual
planning.
Box 9.4  The DEC strengthening project
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As in other resource policy domains, the provincial and local government
reforms have created additional obstacles for these innovations in
environmental planning policy.  Provincial governments are keen to gain
control of the issue of Water Use Permits under the existing Water Resources
Act because they see an opportunity to supplement their revenues in a
manner consistent with other powers granted to them by the new Organic
Law, whereas the new Environment Act proposes to replace Water Use
Permits with broader Environmental Permits which would be issued by the
DEC.  The new ERF has apparently been developed without any reference
to the National Sustainable Development Strategy, which has become the
‘property’ of the National Planning Office, and the role of provincial and
local-level governments in the environmental planning process is thus
dissociated from attempts to build up their broader planning capacities.
This problem is compounded by the lack of correspondence between
provincial boundaries and the DEC’s ‘catchment management areas’,
whose number has now been reduced from seven to three (the northern
4. Financial management:  The project will improve the accounting controls and develop the system
to a stage where managers can run their programmes with accurate and up-to-date financial
information.
5. Environmental Approvals and Monitoring:  This component brings together strengthening
activities for assessing environmental plans and the subsequent requirements for monitoring their
social and physical impacts in the forestry, social and industry units in DEC.  The approach is to train
personnel in the necessary techniques and then put them alongside a project trainer/adviser in their
day-to-day work in the field.
6. Environmental Protection:  This component seeks to strengthen the capability of the Environmen-
tal Protection Branch and to develop effective linkages between this unit and the water quality functions
of the Bureau of Water Resources (BWR).
7. Species Management:  The component will reorientate the Species Management Branch towards
a more planned approach to species management throughout PNG, as well as examining opportunities
for utilising national fauna (and to a lesser extent flora) species for income-generating activities.
8. Information System:  The project will establish a centralised database and management system
appropriate for the tasks of every unit in DEC as well as allow for communication of relevant information
between units.  The system will also perform a management role of regulation, licensing and event
monitoring on a scheduled basis.
9. Legislation & Enforcement:  This component will review the legislative framework governing DEC’s
operations and strengthens its capacity to enforce its legislation.
10. Infrastructure & Project Management:  This component will examine the scope for cost-effective
improvements to the work environment and assess the facility, equipment and housing needs of DEC
and its staff.  It also provides the effective management necessary for a successful project.
Source: ‘Project Brief’ dated March 1995
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mainland, the southern mainland, and the offshore islands).  And there is
still a good deal of confusion about the way that staff of the new Field and
Support Services Division, whose structure is still awaiting approval from
the Department of Personnel Management, will relate their own activities
to those of other public servants operating at regional, provincial or district
levels, including regional and provincial forestry officials, who presently do
nearly all the work of monitoring large-scale logging operations.
The provincial government reforms have created a similar set of problems
for the design of a Species Management Strategy, which is meant to be the
other major contribution of the DEC Strengthening Project to policy reform.
The project’s mid-term review recommended the abandonment of this
component, partly because it seemed to duplicate the role of the BCRMP in
strengthening the Department’s Conservation Division and preparing the
groundwork for the long-awaited National Conservation Strategy, and
partly because the function of conservation area management was now
destined for devolution to provincial governments under the provisions of
the new Organic Law.  However, DEC officials insisted on the retention of
this project component, hoping perhaps that this would provide new
options for the Department to retain some of the staff positions due for
transfer to the provinces.  While these transfers have not yet been effected,
work on the Species Management Strategy has also been postponed, as the
DEC Strengthening Project is still consumed by the task of establishing the
new ERF.
This project is presently due for completion in the latter part of 1998, by
which time the institutional strengthening component of the BCRMP will
already have finished.  Given the uncertainties which presently beset the
future status of the Department (see section 13.3), there are serious question
marks over the institutional sustainability of the policy initiatives taken by
both of these external interventions.  The DEC Strengthening Project may
prove to have been more successful in limiting the Department’s ambitions,
by focusing attention on its role as a regulator and streamlining the legal
framework of its operations, than in promoting the kind of ‘entrepreneurial
culture’ which is mentioned in the Project Brief.  One cannot expect a
tortoise to reconstruct its shell while shaking hands with other animals.
And yet it does seem rather strange that the project has not even made any
attempt to develop the DEC’s motivation and capacity to deal effectively
with the NGO community, when donors (including AusAID) have
otherwise been doing so much to entrench NGOs in the front line of the
battle over forest conservation.
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While local community representatives are apparently united in their own
sense of exclusion from the forest policy process, there is apparently no
stakeholder with an interest in this process who does not claim to believe in
the value of ‘community participation’.  On the other hand, there are few
stakeholders who believe that other stakeholders know how to realise this
value in practice.  Their common point of departure is the perception that
‘government’ presently delivers very little to rural communities except a
growing sense of frustration and alienation, but from that point they have
developed a variety of strategies for gathering support amongst the
resource owners in the distance.
We begin this section with a review of the way in which the local NGO
‘community’ has emerged, through the policy reform process, as a group of
stakeholders whose stake revolves around their claim and their capacity to
bridge this gap.  We then review the wayward history of the one NFCAP
project which was intended, from the outset, to develop policy reform
messages for the rural populace, and develop the role of NGOs as their
messengers.  Since the design of this project took almost six years to
complete, other NFCAP projects took over some of its intended functions.
But one of the reasons for the delay was the divergence between donor-
funded approaches to the problem of community participation in the two
‘sectors’ covered by this programme of reform.  Having considered the
ways in which this problem has been tackled in the new-look forest
industry and the new-look conservation business, we then look at some of
the material incentives for sustainability which donors and NGOs have put
into the ‘benefit packages’ offered to landowning communities as a reward
for their decision not to participate in any form of large-scale forest
exploitation.  Finally, we remark upon the tendency of forest policy
Mushrooms in the
dark: community
participation strategies
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10.1 Policies and practices of NGOs
reformers to assume that several thousand landowning communities, each
with its own history and traditions, will exhibit the same response to the
same bundle of incentives and messages, as if to say that there is only one
problem of community participation, rather than a multitude of local
problems which reflects the wider problem of creating one national society.
Approximately fifty resident NGOs presently claim to have some sort of
stake in the forest policy process72, and these probably account for between
one third and one half of the organisations which make up the entire ‘NGO
community’ in PNG.  Their sources of institutional and financial support
include international environmental NGOs, the Christian churches, and
foreign government aid agencies.  Their scale of operation ranges from the
global (including organisations like Greenpeace) to the truly local
(including organisations like the Barok Heritage Association of New
Ireland).  Most NGOs (with the notable exception of the overseas volunteer
agencies) are predominantly staffed by PNG citizens, although the larger
ones (especially those with overseas counterparts) still make considerable
use of expatriate staff and consultants.  Their principal activities within the
forest policy process include environmental advocacy, applied research,
legal aid, conservation area management, promotion of non-timber forest
products, and provision of business development advice.  There will
always be scope for argument over the definition of an NGO, but in a
context where the critical problem is to bridge the communication gap
between government agencies and rural communities, the official definition
or legal form of an organisation is far less important than the function
which it is willing or able to perform in the resolution of this problem -
whether it be research, training, marketing, advocacy, or whatever.
Within the forest policy domain, a broad distinction can be made between
the radical and pragmatic wings of the NGO community, or between those
groups and individuals who specialise in campaigning for various policy
options and those who specialise in facilitating certain types of rural
development:
• the radicals tend to have a wider spectrum of concerns, they produce
strong public statements attacking the practices and motives of other
72
 These are the organisations listed in a database maintained by the GTZ Landowner Awareness Project (see section 10.2
below).
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stakeholders, and they seek a fundamental transformation of stakeholder
relationships in the policy process;
• the pragmatists tend to focus their activities on the gaps left by
government agencies, are more interested in constructing partnerships
than denouncing their enemies, and adopt an incremental approach to
policy reform by offering proof of their own practical achievements.
It may be tempting to interpret this as a distinction between tub-thumpers
and service-providers which parallels the distinction between politicians
and public servants.  But this temptation should be avoided, because the
NGO community does not represent an alternative form of government,
and its internal relationships are structured in a very different way.
The Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF) recently spelled out its position on forest policy:
• The NFA should no longer be allowed to purchase timber rights from customary resource owners.  FMAs
should be freely negotiated between resource owners and developers, but should only cover the sale of timber
(or other forest resources) from specific areas.
• The size of timber concessions should be progressively reduced in order to facilitate local community control
over resource development.  Emphasis should be placed on medium and small-scale projects in order to
minimise environmental impact and maximise the value of the resource.
• Resource owners should have access to lawyers of their own choice in order to acquire a better understanding
of existing legislation and negotiate the sale of their resources.
• The government should stick to its stated policy of phasing out log exports by the year 2000, and should
therefore review all FMAs which allow for export logging to proceed past this date.
• Existing FMAs and Timber Permit conditions should be reviewed and revised by an independent judicial com-
mission, preferably with reference to the Fairness of Transactions Act, which was passed by Parliament in
1993 but has never been gazetted.
• Contracts for the harvesting of timber should be reserved for national contractors, who should therefore be
granted access to credit facilities required for the purchase of logging equipment.
• The NFA should prohibit overseas sales of logs by resident logging companies, and either exercise the State
Purchase Option allowed under the Forestry Act or require that logs be sold to independent export agents.
• New foreign investment in the forest industry should be restricted to downstream processing activities, and
Box 10.1  A radical NGO policy position
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local investors should hold 55 per cent of the equity in all such ventures to ensure that resource owners
receive a fair price for their timber.
• Assistance should be provided to eco-forestry, eco-tourism, and other forms of local business enterprise which
make use of forest resources, to help them identify domestic and overseas marketing opportunities.
• Local communities should be directly involved in the planning, management and monitoring of all economic
activities which utilise their forest resources.
• Women should participate equally in all aspects of the forest policy process, and should have equal access to
employment and training opportunities in the forestry sector.
Source: ICRAF 1997
Most of the local NGOs which now participate most actively in the forest
policy process have been established over the course of the last decade, and
many have taken advantage of the funds made available through donor
support of the NFCAP.  On the other hand, the prominent part played by the
World Bank in mobilising this support has been a constant point of friction
within the local NGO community, while the recipients have struggled to
develop the capacity to meet the expectations of their benefactors.
By the time of the TFAP Round Table in 1990, the Bank had devised three
main avenues for NGO participation in the policy reform process:
• The newly-established National Alliance of Non-Government
Organisations (NANGO) was to function as the peak body for what the
National Forest Policy described as ‘non-government organisations
concerned with environmental, social and developmental issues’
(PNGMOF 1991:54) and thus provide a single voice for the local NGO
community.
• The NFCAP Technical Support Project was to include an NGO Specialist,
with a brief to facilitate the involvement of NGOs in other NFCAP projects,
as well as a broader dialogue between NGOs and national government
agencies.
• One other NFCAP project, then known as the Landowner Awareness and
Support Project, had already been designed around the use of NGOs as a
channel of communication between the national government and local
groups of landowners.
The twisted history of this last initiative is described in the following section
(10.2).  In this section, we review the subsequent development of relationships
between NGOs and other stakeholders in the wider policy domain.
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Box 10.2  Profile of a pragmatic NGO
The mission of the Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific, Papua New Guinea (FSP/PNG) is to
facilitate community development projects that aim to improve people’s quality of life and sustainable
resource management through continued support in the areas of education, awareness and economic
development.
In its commitment to promotion of equality, participation and self-reliance, FSP/PNG gives special
attention to proper care of the environment.  Its current programmes include:
• Awareness Community Theatre (ACT).  This is an effective vehicle for transmitting messages and
information in a way that illiterate people can understand.  ACT runs awareness workshops and
theatre performances on issues such as environmental protection, AIDS, domestic violence and
consumer awareness.
• Ecoforestry.  Within the Melanesian cultural context of customary landownership, FSP advocates
the development of sustainably managed forest-based enterprise at local community level.  Ecoforestry
enterprises can help communities to improve their well-being by generating cash, while maintaining
their forest resources as well as their traditional uses and practices.
• Grass Roots Opportunity for Work.  This programme aims to improve rural lifestyles and natural
resource management through promoting sustainable agricultural practices, basic health care and
nutrition.  It particularly focuses on the role of women as agriculturalists.
• Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD).  This programme works to promote develop-
ment and conservation initiatives by establishing direct linkages between an increase in the socio-
economic well-being of landowners and conservation of natural resources.  At present the programme
focuses on the Lakekamu-Kunimaipa Basin in Gulf Province.  The ICAD programme promotes the
conservation of the lowland forest of the Basin and its upland watershed by focusing on research
and building the capacity of the local landowners to be leaders in their own development.  The
programme integrates conservation and development by supporting ecotourism and the marketing
of non-timber forest products.  The ICAD programme also gives training and on-site assistance.
• FSP collaborates with local and international partners in its day to day activities, and has been at the
forefront of efforts to develop standards for sustainable forest management through its association
with the Forest Stewardship Council.
Source: Diwai, Volume 2.9, October 1997
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NANGO’s constitution was finalised in January 1991, and a representative
promptly appointed to the NFAP Steering Committee.  Discussions within
NANGO were initially concentrated on the question of when and how the
NGOs would be able to obtain donor funding for their contribution to the
programme, and the conditions under which they would agree to
participate in some of the government projects which had already been
designed.  Since government officials were no less sceptical about the
prospects of a dialogue or partnership with local NGOs, the World Bank
quickly moved to establish a Trust Fund for ‘pure’ NGO projects, and
persuaded the Australian government to finance this initiative.  Although
the creation of this mechanism was announced in July 1991, local NGOs did
not see any of the money until August 1993 (see section 6.4).  The
frustration caused by this delay gave added weight to the radical argument
that NANGO should concern itself with ‘policy’ rather than with ‘projects’.
But the parallel delay in gazettal of the new Forestry Act, which promised
NGO representation on the National Forest Board and Provincial Forest
Management Committees, was even more important in this respect, because
it appeared to prove the government’s own lack of commitment to policy
reform, and thus to demand that NANGO’s main function should be to
carry on the fight against the forces of corruption in the forest industry.
Even after the Act had been gazetted, further publicity campaigns were
NGO workers examining a logging site in New Ireland. A range of NGOs have some stake in the
forest policy process through activities such as environmental advocacy, applied research, legal
aid, conservation area management, promotion of non-timber forest products, and provision of
business development advice
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required to prevent its amendment by the political supporters of the
logging companies, and NANGO’s public profile reached its peak during
the period of this contest, from 1992 to 1995 (see section 8.1).  It seems, in
retrospect, that this was precisely the role which the Bank had always
wanted it to play, even though the campaigning NGOs retained their deep
suspicion of the Bank’s ultimate motives, and began, in 1995, to campaign
against the Bank’s proposals for ‘land reform’ with the same vigour which
they had previously applied to the logging industry.
Although NANGO played its part as a pressure group in the peak years of
public debate about the reform process, it also served as a forum for all
manner of personal and ideological battles between its members, which
have been reflected in the rotation of executive positions within the
organisation and the alternation of NGO representatives in the decision-
making structures of the NFA.  Some commentators have ascribed these
internal conflicts to the unrealistic expectations of other stakeholders, and
the diversity of the demands which they have made of an organisation
which is itself an ‘alliance of diversity’ (Mayers and Peutalo 1995:18).  On
the other hand, the specific nature of the policy process for which it was
initially created, and the campaigning role which arose from its location in
this process, could never have accommodated such diversity, and may have
actually closed off several options for communication with other
stakeholders.  Whilst NANGO found it  difficult to facilitate a partnership
between local NGOs and the National Forest Service in the implementation
of NFCAP forestry projects, other government agencies with a specific
interest in developing such partnerships were inclined to regard NANGO
as a nuisance or an irrelevance, because of its attachment to a single policy
domain.
NANGO now seems to have passed its use-by date.  Its campaigning role
has been taken over by two radical NGOs - ICRAF and Greenpeace - which
have decided that there is little to be gained from further efforts to control
the political orientation of an umbrella organisation.  The more pragmatic
local NGOs with a stake in conservation and resource management issues
have likewise chosen to invest more time and energy in their relationships
with international counterparts and target communities in rural areas.  This
does not mean that there is less communication or cooperation between
local NGOs, but this now takes place through a more informal network of
contacts and through meetings held to discuss particular issues or projects.
The Conservation Resource Centre and the Landowner Awareness Project
have both played an important part in brokering this exchange of ideas,
and the World Bank continues to consult with the NGO community over
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the direction of its own policies, even though some members of the
community remain in fundamental disagreement with the outcome.  While
the pace of policy reform has slowed, there is more evidence of a general
consensus between donors and NGOs about the several roles which the
latter should be playing, and about the overriding need to keep on building
their capacity to do so.
Box 10.3  NGO participation in the NFCAP
In their report on the experience of NGO involvement in NFCAP, Mayers and Peutalo (1995) drew
various conclusions on success and failures.  The principal successes of NGO participation in the
Papua New Guinea NFCAP are:
• Involvement of NGOs in key formal decision-making bodies and structures for participation.
• Organised and effective support from NGOs for progressive government initiatives in forest policy
and institutional reform.
• Institutional support to develop NGO networks, chiefly through support for the founding and
development of the NGO alliance - NANGO.
• Increase in NGO capacities in forestry and related fields, through funding, training and information
support.
Continuing constraints to fruitful NGO participation include:
• The perception amongst NGOs that NFCAP does not belong to them.  The framework of the NFCAP
was conceived and shaped before any formal mechanisms for national NGO consultation were in
place.
• Opportunities for substantial NGO participation developed far more rapidly than the NGO capacity to
consider the policy implications of the NFCAP.
• Slow development of initiatives oriented towards the identified primary beneficiaries of NFCAP - the
customary landowners.  Funding procedures for NGO participation were also opaque and unduly
lengthy.
• Lack of widely-agreed goals for the type of NGO capacity which was needed, and hence the process
for deciding which NGOs should be supported.
Papua New Guinea has created almost unprecedented opportunity for NGOs and customary
landowner groups to participate in decisions about the management of national forests. NFCAP has
also put NGOs on the political map in PNG and a delicate relationship continues to evolve between
NGOs and government. It will take commitment over a considerable period yet to ensure that this
process lives up to its billing and engenders lasting enrichment of PNG’s development process. As far
as NFCAP is concerned, the level of this commitment is uncertain.
Source: Mayers and Peutalo 1995.
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In the process of consultation between the TFAP Review Team and PNG
government representatives during 1989, the Landowner Awareness Project
was initially conceived to be part of a National Literacy and Awareness
Programme, which would itself be part of the Resource Management
System then being developed as a national planning mechanism within the
Prime Minister’s Department.  The ‘Landowner Awareness and Support
Project’ (LOASP), as described in Annex 10 of the TFAP Review (World
Bank 1989:168) was designed to secure:
• the commitment of customary landowners to the ‘concepts of sustainable
management and conservation of the natural forest’; and
• the knowledge and skills necessary for them to ‘participate effectively ...
in the development of the forest resource’.
It was suggested that education alone would not produce the required
commitment, and a programme of ‘awareness’ would therefore have to be
combined with two additional ingredients:
• a package of material incentives or ‘benefits’ (the element of ‘support’),
which would be designed to address the popular demand for
‘development’; and
• a process of continual negotiation between the landowners and other
interested parties, which would take account of the popular perception
that transactions in customary land cannot be permanent.
Despite this ‘rationale’, the ‘project outline’ appeared to make no provision
for anything beyond a programme of awareness: there would be a non-
profit-making company with a broadly representative board and a ‘training
and information centre’ from which ‘mobile teams’ would be despatched to
‘carry out extension activities with landholders’.
It was agreed by the participants at the Round Table that the LOASP would
be critical to the success of the whole programme, and its implementation
should therefore begin as soon as possible.  Indeed, this was one of the
reasons why some of its functions were incorporated, as an interim
measure, into the design of the Task Force on Environmental Planning (see
section 9.1).  The World Bank had already persuaded the German
government aid agency GTZ to take responsibility for funding the project,
but only on condition that it be subjected to the very thorough planning
procedures adopted by this agency.
10.2 The NFCAP Landowner Awareness Project
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Meetings during the latter part of 1990 agreed that the LOASP would
sooner or later be administered by a Landowner Awareness Centre to be
established as an integral component of the National Literacy and
Awareness Programme.  This was to be a private company in which the
shares would be held by five government departments (including DOF and
DEC), and whose board of directors would include representatives of eight
government departments, along with NANGO and the Melanesian Council
of Churches.  The Board would report to the Secretariat of the National
Literacy and Awareness Council, while the Managing Director (with two
support staff) would oversee the operations of a seven-person Publication
Unit (initially accommodated by the Prime Minister’s Department) and an
eleven-person Mobile Training Unit (initially accommodated by one local
NGO - the Wau Ecology Institute).  Although forestry and conservation
issues would be given priority, the Centre’s Articles of Incorporation would
be written in such a way as to allow other government agencies to use the
service as well.  It was evidently recognised that this elaborate scheme
would cost a good deal more than had been allowed under the previous
budget for the LOASP, and would almost certainly require support from
more than one source of overseas aid.
The architect of this scheme then exchanged his job in the Prime Minister’s
Department for a more lucrative position in the World Bank, and the
conceptual structures surrounding the LOASP promptly vanished into thin
air.  In April 1991, the World Bank’s NFAP review mission produced
another conceptual structure which featured a ‘sub-programme’ entitled
‘Promoting Landowner Participation’.  The suggestion was that the element
of ‘landowner support’ be formally removed from the LOASP and divided
between the Task Force and two entirely new projects.  The Bank also urged
the NFAP Steering Committee to address three specific problems associated
with the design of this sub-programme:
• the need to create an effective mechanism to identify and fund
landowner benefit packages, which was seen to arise from the limited
success of the Task Force;
• the need to determine a mechanism for appraising and funding NGO
activities in support of the NFAP, which might be addressed in a similar
manner; and
• the need to decide what approach should be taken towards the
Landowner Awareness Project (LOAP), and the manner in which this
project might also be related to the funding of landowner benefit
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packages — the element of ‘support’ which had now been removed from
the title of this project.
These three issues were discussed at some length, and it was recognised
that progress on each front was being held up by the lack of progress on the
other two.  It was then decided that the third issue was the one on which an
attempt should now be made to the break the deadlock.
The Steering Committee therefore asked one of its members to produce a
report on various issues affecting the design of the LOAP, excluding the
question of how to relate ‘awareness’ to ‘support’.  This report noted the
discrepancy between the visions of ‘landowner awareness’ espoused by the
NGOs and by many government officials, especially those in the DOF:
There is a perception in some quarters, especially amongst the NGOs, that the
LOAP is essentially an environmental awareness project, or a project whose
primary function is to alert landowners to the social, political and physical
hazards of large-scale logging in any form.  According to this view, the ‘forest
industry’ cannot be reformed or rationally managed, which seems to imply
that most or all of the NFAP projects within the forestry sector are doomed to
failure.  At the same time, the process of reform which is actually being
attempted through these projects is one which clearly will not work unless it is
widely understood and accepted by all the parties involved, including the
landowners.  From this point of view, the LOAP is essentially a project to
explain this process of reform.....  The question is whether the LOAP can
encompass both of these perspectives.  DOF clearly does not want an LOAP
which deliberately sets out to interfere in the demarcation of ‘production
forests’ by trying to persuade local landowners that large-scale logging is not
in their interest.....  The situation which surely needs to be avoided is one
in which two ‘landowner awareness projects’ compete for the attention
of the same landowners - one promoting ‘forestry’ and the other
promoting ‘conservation’ (Filer 1991c:15-17).
This was the circle which apparently had to be squared.  Forestry officials
had a pragmatic interest in educating landowners about the provisions of
the new Forestry Act, facilitating the negotiation of Forest Management
Agreements, and promoting forms of community organisation adapted to
this process.  Members of the NGO community were more interested in
using the Barnett Inquiry as the basis for a protracted homily on bribery
and corruption in the forestry sector, and were naturally inclined to target
those areas in which they stood a chance of persuading local landowners to
reject proposals for new forestry projects.  A third position was occupied by
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study274
the DEC officials who had an interest, but almost no capacity, to negotiate
the acquisition and management of new conservation areas with
landowners who might or might not be ‘threatened’ (or delighted) by the
prospect of large-scale logging.  It was hard to see how the NGOs and the
government could jointly implement a project which encompassed all these
types of activity.
But the main sticking point in the design of this project had been evident
from the outset - the vexed question of ‘partnership’ between government
and NGOs in its coordination and implementation.  This question was aired
at great length in the project planning workshop hosted by the GTZ
Appraisal Mission in June 1991.  Those local NGOs which had already
developed some speciality in the field of ‘landowner awareness’ were
clearly not prepared to accept any national government department, or
even one of their own number, as the ‘lead agency’ responsible for
coordinating their own participation in this project.  The planning
workshop therefore proposed the creation of an ‘LOAP Trust Fund’,
administered by a board of trustees which would include the
representatives of four government departments and four different types of
NGOs.  NANGO would nominate the four NGO representatives, and the
whole board would elect a chairman from amongst the four government
representatives.  This board would determine the allocation of project funds
between government or non-government agencies proposing to undertake
activities which would serve the aim of promoting sustainable forest
management through ‘dialogue and cooperation’ between local landowners
and other stakeholders.
Unfortunately, the head of the Appraisal Mission was unable to complete
his report to the satisfaction of GTZ, whose own officials therefore placed
this project in the ‘too-hard basket’ for the next two years.  So this was
evidently not the way to break the deadlock which the World Bank had
identified.  The Bank proceeded, rather slowly, to establish another Trust
Fund to support the activities of local NGOs (see section 10.1), but did not
seek to establish a body of national trustees whose constitution would
occasion further bickering amongst the membership of NANGO about the
roles and powers of government departments.  The Bank also moved to
address the problem of landowner awareness in the forestry sector by
including a ‘landowner involvement’ component in the NFCAP Forest
Management and Planning Project, although this was primarily concerned
to develop the Forest Authority’s capacity to manage the land group
incorporation process as part of its resource acquisition procedures under
the new Forestry Act (see section 8.4).
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As the ‘conservation’ component of the rechristened NFCAP was enlarged
by the allocation of GEF funds to the BCRMP, this programme assumed
many of the functions previously allocated to the Task Force on
Environmental Planning, including the conduct of awareness campaigns
and the design of ‘benefit packages’ for landowners in areas selected for
experimental ICAD projects.  The Conservation Resource Centre entered
into a contract with one local NGO (FSP) to supply a Landowner Awareness
Specialist for the Lak project, whose two years of work were later described
as the ‘backbone’ of this experiment (McCallum and Sekhran 1997:47),
despite its apparent failure.  Indeed, the failure of this first experiment
resulted in an even heavier emphasis on this type of activity in the
Bismarck-Ramu project (see section 10.4).  At the same time, the BCRMP
inherited the problems raised at the GTZ Appraisal Mission workshop
through its separate mandate to design a Conservation and Environment
Trust Fund, distinct from the fund already being managed by the World
Bank, and in the absence of further communication from GTZ, this was still
regarded as the most appropriate method of funding the LOAP.
When GTZ finally awoke from its slumbers, therefore, several of the
ingredients in the original conception of the LOASP had already been taken
over by other NFCAP projects, but their mutual relationship was something
of a puzzle.  GTZ sent a Project Manager to PNG in early 1994, and he spent
more than a year familiarising himself with the local institutional scenery
before a final project planning workshop was held in May 1995, some time
after the first phase of the NFCAP had already been completed and
reviewed.  By this time, GTZ had decided that there was no option but to
treat the LOAP as an ‘official’ DEC project, because the BCRMP had not yet
made much headway with its own solution to the problem of establishing a
Trust.  On the other hand, the Project Manager had concluded that the DEC
would not provide a congenial physical environment for the LOAP, and had
decamped to a suite of offices in the building which houses the various UN
agencies in Port Moresby.
The final design of the LOAP was centred around three ‘demonstration
projects’ which would ‘develop and test forms of sustainable resource use
by customary landowners’, and then make the results available for public
consumption:
• a ‘small-scale logging project’ would experiment with the production
and marketing of timber by village or clan groups using portable
sawmills;
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• a ‘medium-scale logging project’ would experiment with methods of
coordinating the production and marketing activities of several such
groups in neighbouring communities; and
• a ‘large-scale logging project’ would experiment with feasibility studies
for a subsequent investment by an environmentally responsible and
socially sensitive developer.
A number of other ‘mini-projects’ were designed to provide an opportunity
for local NGOs to provide particular types of assistance to local
landowners in the areas selected for these demonstrations.  For example,
one NGO would be contracted to provide them with legal advice, another
to conduct conflict resolution workshops, and a third to promote concepts
of self-reliance through ‘community awareness theatre’.  Apart from these
endeavours, the project also aimed to develop a national communication
network linking all stakeholders with an interest in conservation and
sustainable development, to boost the broadcasting capacities of provincial
radio stations, and to distribute a variety of mass media messages and
educational resource materials.
The first demonstration project ran into difficulties when the government
unexpectedly issued a Timber Permit covering the project site73, the legal
advisers supplied to the local community were unable to organise a
successful challenge to this action, and project staff began to have serious
doubts about the economic and social sustainability of the small-scale
operation which they were supporting.  The second demonstration project
never even got started, because the NGO contracted to organise the local
sawmill operators was unable to secure their cooperation, and the third had
to be radically redesigned as another kind of ‘medium-scale’ forestry
enterprise in which GTZ project staff took over much of the developer’s
intended role in partnership with a local landowner company.  Although
the project seems to have been quite successful in promoting the exchange
of information within the network of interested stakeholders, it still
obviously suffers from a shortage of raw material with which to
manufacture optimistic messages.
Even if this problem can be overcome, and some of the partnerships with
local NGOs turn out to be more productive during the remaining life of the
project, many of its activities still go way beyond the present mandate of
the DEC, and hence the purposes for which the Department is being
‘strengthened’ by another donor (see section 9.2).  At the same time, the
73
 This was the permit for Vailala Blocks 2 and 3 (see section 8.1).
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LOAP may have provided a pretext for the rest of the Department to ignore
the need to develop stronger ties with local NGOs, and this means that GTZ
will face serious difficulties as it tries to leave an institutionally sustainable
legacy behind it.
The National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:34) regarded landowner
companies as one of the most important vehicles for greater ‘national
control’ over the forest industry.  This was understandable, when one
considers that such companies held more than half of the operational
Timber Permits which had been issued under the terms of the old Forestry
Act, as well as representing the ‘landowner interest’ in all the Local Forest
Areas declared under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act.  Even under the
new Forestry Act, landowner companies remain the most obvious vehicle
for national participation in the ownership and control of large-scale
logging operations, because the resource owners who sign a Forest
Management Agreement will not normally countenance the direct
participation of citizens who do not originate from their own area.
However, if landowner company directors were entitled to think that their
commercial initiatives bore the stamp of government approval, many of
them felt (with good reason) that the policy reform process represented a
threat to their own positions of leadership within their respective
communities.  Once the reform process began in earnest, following gazettal
of the new Act in 1992, their response to this threat was seen as proof (if
further proof were needed) that they were nothing more than puppets of the
logging companies, and could not therefore claim to represent the interest
of their communities (see Simpson 1997).
The main reason why landowner company directors could not be readily
accommodated in the reform process was that most of these companies had
been formed for the exclusive purpose of ‘capturing’ a foreign logging
contractor, within a space which had been cleared by the failure of previous
experiments in rural development and for which traditional models of
collective enterprise were clearly inadequate.  The colonial administration
had tried and failed to establish the economic viability of agricultural
marketing cooperatives in various parts of the country.  Most of the
‘development corporations’ established by provincial governments and
10.3 Community participation in the large-scale
 logging industry
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national politicians in the early years of independence had also come to a
quick and sticky end.  Small family business groups had become the
standard form of rural enterprise, but their expansion was (and still is)
constrained by poor management skills, limited access to credit, and a lack
of support from the government’s own ‘business development officers’,
whose performance has generally been lamentable.  Although some rural
entrepreneurs had broken through these barriers, they had rarely done so in
those parts of the country which are most attractive to the logging
companies.  On the other hand, the business development programmes
sponsored by Bougainville Copper Ltd and Ok Tedi Mining Ltd had offered
a more promising example of the benefits which could be obtained from
‘joint ventures’ between local landowner companies and some of the
mining industry’s major sub-contractors.
In most cases, the new breed of landowner companies, which were
established to pursue comparable joint ventures with foreign logging
contractors, reflected a genuine popular desire - sometimes bordering on
desperation - for this kind of extractive development.  Many became
‘unrepresentative’, and their directors lost their popularity, when further
decisions had to be made about the details of their contractual
arrangements and the distribution of costs and benefits which these
entailed.  At the same time, the policy reform process created an apparent
need for new forms of community organisation which do not, or should
not, share the same functions and aims.  The reformers were concerned
with the question of which specific form of organisation was best adapted
to each specific form of community participation, within a policy
framework which emphasises the values of democracy and accountability.
This question became the subject of a consultancy report on ‘Representative
Resource Owner Bodies for Forestry Projects’ produced for the PNG Forest
Management and Planning Project in 1995.  The author of this report
considered that landowner companies were appropriate only for the
pursuit of strictly ‘commercial’ objectives, but were far less appropriate for
the pursuit of those ‘social’ objectives which were concerned with a
community’s overall quality of life.  Under the government’s new policy
regime, representative bodies were expected or encouraged to perform
several tasks or functions which served the social, rather than commercial,
aims of resource owners in the development of large-scale forestry projects.
These included:
• negotiating (or renegotiating) the basic conditions of project
development, especially the priorities for social and economic
infrastructure;
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Box 10.4  The problems of landowner companies
Although it is frequently said that landowner companies (LOCs) malfunction because they are not representa-
tive, it is likely that the reasons are somewhat more complex.  The establishment of a representative structure
may not, by itself, necessarily resolve all the problems which these bodies experience.
Logging companies foster their own interests by garnering favour with LOC managers and directors at the
expense of broader community interests.  The ability of the community to take action with respect to breaches by
the LOC is handicapped because the dispute between the company and the community has been shifted to a site
within the community itself, often exploiting pre-existing factional divisions.
Many LOCs lack the capacity and capital to effectively manage a logging operation and so become dependent on
the logging contractor, sharing offices and fax numbers and even bank accounts.  The interests of the LOC thus
become inextricably tied to those of the contractor which provides its income stream, at the expense of the
interests of the resource owners the LOC is presumed to represent.
Board members will regularly engage in political manoeuvring to secure their power and influence on the board
and then consolidate their position through patronage.  When the powers of board members under the articles of
association are unrestricted, and particularly if they have control over the appointment of company management,
their opportunity to manipulate the company in this way is virtually unchecked.
Few resource owners properly understand the role and responsibility of office-holders, or the nature of the
fiduciary obligations they owe to shareholders.  Many mistakenly assume that the company belongs to its
office-holders.  It is common for directors to utilise community funds as their own, much as they perhaps see
some politicians using government funds.  Lack of compliance with audit requirements, and the inability or un-
willingness of shareholders to demand adequate reporting and accountability, compounds this situation, so that
problems may not be identified until the resulting losses are significant.
Standard articles permit loans by the company to directors without the consent of shareholders, and authorise
the payment by directors to themselves of directors’ fees, also without shareholder approval.  These problems
can be overcome with changes to company articles, but this almost never occurs.  Internal management
structures are not adequate to enable management to resist ‘pilfering’ of company assets by board members.
There are examples of logging operators perpetuating this state of affairs by making advances direct to board
members and deducting these from the company’s income.
In addition, it has been government policy for some time to relax controls on companies which are wholly nation-
ally owned, presumably on the basis that many of the requirements are too onerous, or on the assumption that
only non-citizen office bearers are likely to abuse their powers.  While the objective of making company operation
simpler for Papua New Guineans is an admirable one, the provisions which are relaxed are the very ones which
might force directors to provide a greater level of accountability to shareholders.
Source: Whimp 1995.
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• formulating and applying rules for the distribution of project revenues
earmarked for the benefit of the entire community;
• monitoring the compliance of developers with timber permit and
environmental planning conditions, and seeking compensation for any
breaches of such conditions;
• lobbying the government or the developer for greater community access
to project employment or business development opportunities;
• resolving disputes between resource owners over the progress or impact
of the project; and
• organising activities designed to promote the regeneration of forests
which had already been logged (Whimp 1995:21-22).
The report recommended that all such activities should be the
responsibility of landowner associations established under the Associations
Incorporation Act, whose membership would be restricted to land groups
established under the Land Groups Incorporation Act.  While the new Forestry
Act had already recognised the formation of incorporated land groups
(ILGs) as a key ingredient of the resource acquisition process (see section
8.4), they were now to be treated as the basic ‘building blocks’ in the
formation of representative bodies which would exercise a much wider
range of ‘social’ functions, and might also participate as shareholders in
reconstituted landowner companies which would still be dedicated to the
pursuit of those commercial objectives from which landowner associations
would be legally excluded.  This model of the mutual relationship between
the three types of community organisation was the one which had been
pioneered by the developers of the Kutubu petroleum project, and was
ultimately based on some of the experiments conducted in East Sepik and
East New Britain provinces under the auspices of the Land Mobilisation
Project (see Fingleton 1991; Power 1991)74.
The diagram used to represent this triangular relationship (Figure 10.1)
reveals some of its complexities and uncertainties.  The assumption made
here is that the boundaries of each timber concession should ideally be the
boundaries of a single landowner association and a single landowner
company, and that the landowner company, as holder of the Timber Permit,
should still be the body which enters into a Logging and Marketing
Agreement with a logging contractor.  This leaves open the question of
whether and how the landowner association might relate to the logging
contractor, and what kind of ‘policy directives’ it might use to exercise
control over the landowner company.  The diagram also recognises the
74
 The Land Mobilisation Project, like the FMPP, had been directly supported by the World Bank.
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Figure 10.1  A structure for representative resource owner organisations
Source: Whimp 1995, adapted from Power 1995.
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possibility that the landowners of a single timber concession might be
divided in their allegiance to a number of separate associations or ‘business
groups’, but glosses over the problems which are likely to arise as a result
of political conflict between these competing bodies.
In practice, the NFA has made little or no progress in the application of this
model of community participation, because it simply does not have the
resources necessary to organise the formation of all these representative
bodies, and the only other organisations from which it might solicit
practical support in this exercise are those same logging companies whose
undue power and influence are meant to be diminished by this form of
community empowerment.  Forestry officials have barely been able to
handle the process of land group incorporation required for the issue of
new Timber Permits under FMAs.  As the project review process has
ground to a halt (see section 8.6), resource owners in those concessions
granted under the old Forestry Act have largely been left to their own
devices, which means that they are still ‘represented’, for better or worse,
by their respective landowner companies.  This has provided additional
ammunition for the logging companies and the FIA, who can argue that the
NFA’s insistence on new forms of community representation is nothing but
a pretext for the national government to retain possession of the Project
Development Levy which accounts for the greater part of the increase in
landowner benefits under the new revenue system (see section 8.9).
The experience of the Kutubu project might well have served as a warning
against the adoption of this model of landowner representation in the
forestry sector.  Government officials played a minimal role in constructing
the complex hierarchy of land groups, landowner associations and
landowner companies which now exists in the area covered by the
Petroleum Development Licence.  The staff of Chevron’s Lands,
Community Relations, and Business Development sections, who were
largely responsible for creating it, have continued to spend a great deal of
time and money on the maintenance of ‘correct’ relationships between these
various bodies, because this task continues to surpass the understanding
and capacity of their actual members (Tony Power, 1998, personal
communication).  A multinational oil company can afford this luxury, and
the government is probably entitled to approve their good intentions, even
if the results often confuse or frustrate the ordinary villager.  There is no
reason to expect that logging companies can earn the same kind of approval
from the NFA, especially while donor agencies stand guard over the forest
policy process.
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Even if the government had the capacity to duplicate Chevron’s labours in
a hundred separate timber concessions, doubts would still remain about the
kind of community participation or empowerment which its efforts might
achieve.  The new Forestry Act seems to regard the active involvement of
forestry officials in the process of land group incorporation as an essential
condition of the collective property rights which that process is meant to
establish (Whimp 1995:32).  This may seem to make sense, if the only
alternative is for logging companies to do the necessary work on behalf of
the government.  But the assumption made here is that resource owners do
not have the capacity to organise themselves in a manner which can satisfy
the legal requirement for genuine accountability.  The need for external
bureaucratic or corporate assistance to create ‘democratic’ grassroot
organisations in what is supposed to be an egalitarian society is surely a
problem in its own right.  Does the process of land group incorporation
grant new powers to resource owners who have yet to appreciate the
modern legal foundations of true democracy, or is it a method of regulating
the wayward behaviour of local community leaders in order to advance the
interests of other stakeholders in the policy process?  This question came to
the fore when the General Manager of the NFA tried but failed to persuade
the National Forest Board to establish provincial associations of ILGs which
could represent the interests of resource owners in the deliberations of
Provincial Forest Management Committees.  This move was opposed by
both the FIA and the NGOs, who feared that such associations would do
little more than apply rubber stamps to decisions made by forestry officials
(Brian Brunton, 1997, personal communication).
Perhaps the most important aspect of this problem is the difference in the
scales of representation at which the values of democracy, participation and
accountability are meant to be realised (see Figure 10.2).  The argument that
landowner companies have shown themselves to be ‘undemocratic’ or
‘unrepresentative’ forms of organisation tends to conceal the problem of
establishing any kind of democratic decision-making body with widespread
popular support at the scale at which landowner companies have sought to
operate - which simply approximates the size of the timber concessions
which the NFA regards as an essential condition of sustainable forest
management.  The great virtue of ILGs, in the eyes of their proponents, is
that they represent those customary social groups, normally labelled
‘clans’, which already possess the capacity to make collective decisions
about the use of their natural resources.  But these groups are normally
very small, containing less than a hundred members, which normally
means that decisions require the consent of less than twenty adult men.
This is the typical scale, and also the typical limit, of ‘traditional consensus’
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on such matters.  Traditional political communities, or ‘tribes’, may be
regarded as loose confederations of such customary groups, maintained for
military purposes, whose ‘jurisdiction’ over the allocation of natural
resources rarely extended beyond the formation of rules for the allocation
of land acquired through the conquest of their tribal enemies.  And these
communities were also very small, rarely exceeding a membership of more
than a thousand people, and more likely to divide before their population
reached even half this number.  The leaders of so-called ‘cargo cults’ in the
colonial period were trying to create new forms and scales of local
organisation in full knowledge of the fact that ‘custom’ provided them with
no model for such an enterprise, and were therefore liable to treat ‘custom’
as an obstacle to their endeavours.  And the colonial administration
attempted to take the heat out of their activities by ‘incorporating’
traditional political communities as the basic units of representation in the
‘properly’ democratic and accountable institutions called ‘local government
councils’.
The pursuit of land group incorporation could be regarded as a rather
similar exercise, but at a smaller scale and in a more restricted policy
domain.  In this case, the ‘provocation’ came not only from the dubious
dealings of landowner company directors, as latter-day leaders of the
‘resource development cult’, but also from the ‘clan agents’ who could not
be trusted to act in the interests, or with the agreement, of their fellow clan
members when signing resource development agreements.  The analogy
falters over the fact that earlier cargo cult leaders were not living in the
pockets of foreign companies, and the more disturbing fact that
government officials can no longer be trusted to deal with landowner
representatives in that same spirit of bureaucratic (and paternalistic)
detachment with which colonial officials approached the formation of
‘native councils’.
Land group incorporation is meant to prevent one small group of
individuals, who might be clan agents or landowner company directors,
from making decisions about the use of resources which belong to many
other small groups of individuals, who are their ‘real’ collective owners.
The new Forestry Act clearly conceives the basic power of an ILG as the
power to refuse the government’s offer to purchase the rights to its forest
resources through an FMA.  From this point of view, the basic function of
land group incorporation is the production of ‘informed consent’ to the
latest version of the resource acquisition process.  Why should we expect
such limited powers and functions to provide the basis for community
participation in resource management decisions on a much wider scale,
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Figure 10.2 Forms and scales of local organisation.
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rather than to reinforce the customary social isolation of the many fractions
into which traditional political communities have previously been divided?
In a timber concession of any considerable size, we might expect to find ten
or twenty traditional political communities, and maybe ten times that
number of customary land groups.  Imagine a project-wide landowner
association in which each of these groups had its own representative on the
central executive.  It would be hard enough to organise a meeting of so
many individuals, let alone expect this meeting to take tough but sensible
decisions on such matters as the spending of the Project Development Levy,
the demarcation of conservation areas within the Timber Permit, or a
programme for community involvement in monitoring the permit-holder’s
compliance with various standards of sustainable forest management.  Of
course, this problem can be addressed by further delegations of power - by
creating a variety of sub-committees with jurisdiction over specific aspects
of the development process, for example, by creating an intermediate layer
of smaller associations representing the land groups in different parts of the
permit area, or by getting the land groups in each village or council ward to
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elect a single representative from amongst their number.  But whatever the
wider structure of representation might look like, the critical question is
whether the previous establishment of ILGs makes any difference to the
quality of the decisions taken jointly by their representatives.  If the same
quality of deliberation can be achieved where the members of each clan or
village or council ward simply elect or nominate their representatives, in
the same way that they choose their local councillors, or their local school
boards of management, then the process of incorporation begins to look like
a sledgehammer applied to the wrong nut.
In practice, most of the landowner associations which have been
established, under the Associations Incorporation Act, to negotiate the
conditions of resource development on customary land, have been set up to
deal with mining and petroleum companies holding exploration licences, in
much the same way that landowner companies have been established to
deal with logging contractors who seek access to timber resources.  Both
types of organisation have been equally ‘unrepresentative’, in the sense that
their leadership normally appears to be largely self-appointed, yet still
accepted and sometimes overtly supported by its local constituency.  This
difference in the way that landowners have spontaneously chosen to
organise themselves, or allowed themselves to be organised, follows from
the fact that landowner companies can reasonably expect to get their hands
on a Timber Permit, but not on a Special Mining Lease or a Petroleum
Development Licence.  In the mining and petroleum sector, landowner
associations have typically served as vehicles for negotiating the terms of a
‘landowner benefit package’ with both the government and the developer,
and have lost most of their significance and influence once that process of
negotiation is completed.  The package invariably contains an undertaking
by the developer to provide further opportunities for community
participation through support for landowner companies and local business
groups, while the government commonly agrees to share its own revenues
with some kind of elected local authority.
Given the practical problems of land group incorporation, and the
unavoidable presence of landowner companies as the actual voice of
resource owners in the forestry sector, it is reasonable to ask why so little
attention has been paid to the actual or potential role of local-level
governments as vehicles of community participation in this arena.  In her
own report to the NFA, Whimp (1995:30) did suggest that landowners who
had already been incorporated into land groups should then have the
choice of being represented, on a higher level, by their local-level
government, rather than an incorporated association.  However, even by
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1995, when the new Organic Law was already on its way through the
national parliament, it was hard to predict the extent to which it would
grant new powers and functions to a level of government which had been
grossly neglected for the previous twenty years.  In many parts of the
country, local government councils or community governments had truly
become the runts of the state, unable to access the share of provincial
government revenues to which they were theoretically entitled, and unable
to raise revenues from their own constituents because of widespread
popular disaffection with all forms of ‘government’.  Although the new
Forestry Act allowed for them to be represented on Provincial Forest
Management Committees, and thus to play some role in planning the use of
forest resources in their respective areas of jurisdiction, the main impetus
for policy reform in the forestry sector preceded the efforts to revitalise the
role of local-level governments in the wider field of resource management.
As a result, the new Forestry Act and the new Organic Law sit uneasily
alongside each other, with quite different perspectives on the nature of
community participation in the large-scale logging industry, while their
respective guardians wait for the other side to make the amendments which
would reconcile these perspectives.
Space is possibly the greatest obstacle to reconciliation.  The boundaries of
timber concessions have not been drawn to match the boundaries of local-
level governments, but to fit the forester’s definition of a commercial
timber resource.  To make matters much worse, both sets of boundaries
have been subject to separate forms of bureaucratic and political
manipulation.  While landowner companies managed to reduce the average
size of timber concessions through the declaration of LFAs under the
Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the technocratic reformers who got rid of that
legislation have since tried to enlarge the size of timber concessions granted
under FMAs in order to promote the sort of long-term investment which
will make investors think about sustainability.  Over the same period, some
provincial governments replaced unpopular local government councils
with smaller community governments, in order to establish a sounder but
narrower basis for collaboration between the leaders of traditional political
communities, but the new Organic Law has partially reversed this form of
devolution, by seeking to limit and standardise the number of local-level
governments in each national electorate.  These two processes of spatial
contraction and expansion have taken place without any reference to each
other, and still coexist in a situation of ongoing uncertainty about the future
movement of their boundaries.
The proponents of land group incorporation are well aware of the
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government’s lack of capacity to sustain a series of special-purpose
landowner organisations whose powers are limited to certain phases or
issues in the development of only one type of natural resource, and whose
members cannot even determine the geographical limits of that resource.
The NFCAP Review (Taylor et al. 1994) saw the ‘resistance’ of resource
owners to forest policy reform as a function of the lack of coordination
between government agencies promoting alternative forms of resource
management on customary land, and proposed that some type of multi-
sectoral agency should henceforth be responsible for supervising the
incorporation of land groups and the establishment of landowner
associations.  The problem with such proposals, and the main reason why
little progress has been made in their implementation, is that most rural
communities do seem to need some form of external supervision or
encouragement before taking action on their own account, and there are no
external agencies which have the capacity to offer this kind of support
without getting locked into existing structures of administration - which
either means the apparatus of local-level government or some sector-
specific policy regime.  And in the case of the large-scale logging industry,
donors and NGOs with an interest in the forestry sector, and government
agencies which lack this interest, all have many good reasons not to provide
external support for the development of new forms of community
participation in what they conceive to be an unsustainable form of resource
exploitation.
The FIA still maintains that the whole thrust of the policy reform process
was to drive a bureaucratic wedge between resource owners and logging
contractors, and that those landowner companies which have survived this
process, and even begun to show signs of functioning quite effectively, are
now threatened by the superimposition of ‘Trust Committees’ to haggle
over the distribution of the Project Development Levy (Jim Belford, 1997,
personal communication).  Some commentators who do not have the same
axe to grind over the new revenue system would agree that much more
could have been done, and may still need to be done, to make landowner
companies more efficient and more accountable.  Considerable efforts were
directed to this end in the early stages of the Kandrian-Gloucester
Integrated Development Project, whose consultants were obliged to deal
with landowner companies as the standard expression of ‘community
interest’ in West New Britain, but these efforts ran counter to the growing
weight of ‘progressive’ opinion in the donor community (Simpson 1997)75 .
Nevertheless, having withdrawn its support for this element of the KGIDP,
75
 The KGIDP was never accepted into the NFCAP club, partly because NGOs in Australia and PNG complained so bitterly
about the project’s engagement with landowner companies.
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Box 10.5  Who represents the Hunstein range?
During preparations for the 1997 national elections, someone noticed that the population of the Ambunti-
Dreikikir Open Electorate, in East Sepik Province, was considerably larger than the population of the
neighbouring Wosera-Gawi Open Electorate.  Although this disparity has existed since 1977, when the
country’s electoral boundaries were last redrawn, no-one now believes that the Electoral Boundaries
Commission has the capacity to rectify such anomalies.  In order to even things out a bit, a group of
villages was ‘transferred’ from one electorate to the other, and their local government councillors were
simultaneously transferred from the Ambunti Local Government Council to the Gawi Local Government
Council.
In practice, these councillors no longer attend council meetings, because the Gawi Council meets in
Pagwi, which is much further away than Ambunti station, where the Ambunti Council meets, and most
of them would have to travel through Ambunti to get to Pagwi.  Since Ambunti station was the head-
quarters of the old Ambunti District, which included the Gawi Council area, and is still the headquarters
of the new Ambunti-Dreikikir District, which does not include the Gawi Council area,
no-one in Ambunti station seems to know which district, and which council, is now responsible for
delivering government services to the villages affected by the transfer, but are generally inclined to
believe that the result will be no services at all.
By some strange coincidence, the villages which have fallen into this political and administrative black
hole happen to contain most, though not all, of the customary owners of the April-Salumei TRP area,
whose boundaries might or might not coincide with those of a conservation area proposed for the
slopes of the Hunstein Range.  This area has long been the focus of a struggle between the provincial
supporters and opponents of large-scale logging, many of whom derive from villages which have no
territorial rights in the TRP, but which are much closer to the government services available in Ambunti
and Pagwi, and which therefore boast many more members of the country’s educated elite.  The joke,
or the lament, amongst the public servants in Ambunti is that the government has now decided to leave
the administration of these April-Salumei-Hunstein villages to the NGOs which have so far been
successful in keeping the loggers out of it.
AusAID has more recently allowed for its inclusion in the NFA’s Human
Resource Development Project, which it is also funding, in recognition of
the fact that forestry officials also have to deal with landowner companies
as a fact of life, even if they are also charged with the task of incorporating
land groups and establishing other types of community organisation.
This is still a tall order.  It is hard to see how forestry officials can succeed
in engineering the bureaucratic reconstruction of ‘project-wide
representative bodies’, even within their limited domain, when the
Australian colonial administration and a multinational oil company have
both come to grief in the minefields of ‘local politics’.  One point on which
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local NGOs are in agreement with the FIA is that the state cannot create and
maintain genuine vehicles of community participation in anything.  But,
whereas the log export industry is prepared to take landowner companies
at face value, and let the directors settle their own accounts with rural
communities, the NGOs are led to conclude that large-scale industrial
forestry is socially unsound, regardless of any steps taken to improve its
economic or environmental sustainability, because no form of community
organisation can represent the interests of all the people grouped beneath a
single Timber Permit.  Yet this conclusion overlooks another point: that it is
not only the experience of ‘resource development’, but also the demand for
it, which is undermining indigenous models of community leadership,
even at the lowest end of the scale, where ‘clans’, like landowner
companies, are now presenting themselves as the recipients and
redistributors of resource rents (Filer 1997a).
How do the imperatives, and possible structures, for community
participation in ICAD ‘projects’ differ from those which apply to the large-
scale logging industry?  In one respect, at least, they are very similar.  That
is because the donors who fund these projects in order to harness the global
benefits of biodiversity conservation believe that protected areas should be
just as large, or even larger, than the timber concessions whose size is
thought to be a necessary condition of sustainable forest management by
large-scale logging companies.  From a strictly biological point of view, it is
argued that conservation areas in PNG should cover at least 8000 square
kilometres of contiguous territory (Beehler 1993), and the addition of a
‘development zone’ around the edge would add to this requirement
(Sekhran 1996).  Conservationists are therefore in the business of promoting
yet another set of large-scale, special-purpose forms of community
organisation in areas whose boundaries are liable to overlap or cut across
the jurisdictions of local-level governments or the blocks of territory which
different national government agencies have earmarked for different types
of extractive development (see Figure 10.3).
Donors and NGOs are certainly prepared to commit more of their own
resources to community organisation for conservation, or for conservation
with a certain amount of ‘appropriate development’ thrown into the
bargain, than to any equivalent exercise designed to facilitate community
participation in the large-scale logging industry.  Nor has the government
10.4 Community participation in the ICAD process
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tried to place bureaucratic obstacles in the path of their negotiations with
local landowners, by insisting that ‘conservation rights’ should be
transferred to the state by the consent of incorporated land groups before
the proponents of ICAD projects can be allowed to practice their own arts
of persuasion.  In practice, of course, logging company representatives
continue to deal directly with the owners of those timber resources which
they covet, just as they did before the gazettal of the new Forestry Act, but
their interest in structures of community participation has rarely extended
beyond the manipulation of landowner company directors.  In the
‘conservation sector’, donors and NGOs look more like brokers between
the local community and the national government, attempting to secure a
deal with the former which can then be ratified by the latter.  In practice,
this puts them in much the same boat as the mining and petroleum
companies to which the government has granted exploration licences76.  To
secure their own long-term interest in certain natural resources, they must
first prove that they are looking after the interests of a ‘community’ which
is deeply and mysteriously divided by its own leadership.
Figure 10.3  Overlapping boundaries - a recipe for pandemonium
Petroleum Prospecting Licence
Local-Level
Government
Forest Management Agreement
Proposed
Conservation Area
Mineral Exploration Licence
76
 In theory, these companies are not dealing with local ‘resource owners’ at all, since mineral resources are legally the property
of the State.  But this point is rarely appreciated by the people who live on top of them.
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The legislation which covers the establishment of protected areas on
customary land requires the formation of ‘management committees’ as the
appropriate vehicles of community participation.  Apart from the Kikori
Basin area, where land groups had already been incorporated by Chevron
before the ICAD project was initiated, the option of land group
incorporation has not yet been pursued by the agencies sponsoring such
projects.  Given the use of this particular form of community organisation
in the petroleum and forestry sectors, there is an obvious risk that
conservationists could raise the ‘wrong’ kind of expectation if they were to
follow suit.  However, conservation area management committees resemble
ILGs, and differ from landowner companies or landowner associations, to
the extent that they are not normally established by local community
leaders searching for new forms of wealth or power, but have to be
introduced to a population which may at first be mystified by their
purpose.  On the one hand, this means that external agencies which sponsor
the creation of such bodies can try to ensure that their constitution is not
subject to the kind of political manipulation and factional conflict which is
typical of ‘spontaneous’ forms of community organisation.  On the other
hand, it also means that these agencies may need to manage the
management committees to an extent which discourages a local sense of
ownership or participation.
This problem may be illustrated from the experience of the Crater
Mountain ICAD project, where an international NGO (the Wildlife
Conservation Society) has been engaged in this kind of activity for more
than a decade.  Even after a Wildlife Management Area was finally gazetted
in 1994, and separate committees had been established to regulate the use of
resources within its boundaries and to manage various types of ‘eco-
enterprise’,
the intermittent presence of fieldworkers has not proven sufficient to assist in
the development of the embryonic institutions in the WMA.  During the
lengthy absence of a fieldworker from a site in the WMA, confusion or conflict
has arisen.  The committees have lacked the confidence and experience to take
action or to make rulings on topics related to the operation of the WMA or the
eco-enterprise.  This is complicated by the fact that collaborative management
of the WMA and its enterprises requires cooperation between clans that may
have been traditional enemies.  A resident fieldworker must still be present to
‘walk’ most of the committees through the motions of conducting a meeting,
delegating responsibility, identifying action, making a law, writing letters, or
resolving conflict (Johnson 1997:418).
This kind of dependency may partly be attributed to the low levels of
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literacy and formal education amongst the scattered population of this area,
and the corresponding absence of other ‘modern’ forms of community
organisation which could either support or challenge the bureaucratic
imperatives of the conservation effort.  But there is also cause to wonder
whether the limited volume and substance of communication between local
villagers and visiting American scientists will ever be sufficient to create a
common understanding of these imperatives.
In this particular case, local people’s commitment to conservation has not
yet been seriously tested by the availability of development options which
offer more substantial rewards than the sale of artefacts or guided tours to
foreign visitors.  The boundaries of the WMA do overlap with those of an
Exploration Licence and an FMA, but there are no serious plans for a
mining project and the loggers have not yet invaded the area.  As a result,
this ICAD project has not yet had to deal with a situation in which the
integration of conservation and development entails a form of multiple
land use planning in which local stakeholders agree to conserve one part of
their forest in exchange for the development of another part.  Where local
stakeholders are divided between a large number of landowning ‘clans’,
and the protected area embraces several adjoining clan territories, this
agreement has to make allowance for the people in the conservation zone to
participate in the development of other people’s land (Sekhran 1996).
Given the jealousy with which landowning groups defend the right to
benefit from the use of their own land, this kind of ‘transfer mechanism’
may be difficult or impossible to negotiate.  The short history of the Lak
ICAD project illustrates this problem very clearly.  The Conservation Area
Management Committee drew most of its support from those clans whose
land had already been logged, while the local landowner company drew
most of its support from those clans which were still waiting in the queue
for ‘development’ (McCallum and Sekhran 1997) (see section 9.1).  Even if
the ICAD project sponsors had succeeded in ‘selling’ a sustainable forestry
project to both of these organisations, there would have been plenty of
scope for further factional disputes over the physical location of its
operations and the social distribution of its benefits.
Of course, resource developers also have to deal with such disputes, and
sometimes have to abandon their projects when these get out of hand (see
Leedom 1997a).  However, the developers have one great advantage, which
is that people in the centre of their operations, with the greatest power to
shut them down, also have the strongest claim to compensation for their
lost resources.  In order to keep the peace amongst a wider group of ‘project
impact area people’, resource developers can then distribute progressively
smaller ‘benefit packages’ to people who live at progressively greater
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distances from this central point.  But while developers are thus engaged in
‘feathering the edges’ of their impact area77, the conservationists must also
be contortionists who have to find a way of ‘feathering the centre’, which,
in their case, is the place where resource owners have to bear the
opportunity costs of conservation.  No ICAD project in PNG has yet
devised a form of community participation which has successfully
addressed this problem.
ICAD project sponsors are therefore caught between two equally
uncomfortable scenarios.  If they try to compete with the logging
companies by promoting alternative methods of harvesting forest
resources, as they did in Lak, they find that local patterns of resource
ownership and community leadership militate against the integration of
this kind of development with their ultimate goal of biodiversity
conservation.  If they move deeper into the forest, to places like Crater
Mountain, where their pursuit of this goal can be presented as a form of
development in its own right, the general ‘underdevelopment’ of the area
militates against the formation of autonomous local management
structures.  One response to this dilemma has been to search for ways to get
around the pervasive syndromes of ‘resource dependency’ and ‘project
dependency’ by adopting new forms of community entry which are
primarily designed to foster attitudes of self-reliance, and which enable the
‘social feasibility’ of an ICAD project to be tested before local people’s
expectations are raised, or local politicians’ appetites are whetted, by any
mention of a ‘project’, let alone of ‘conservation’ or ‘development’.  This
‘softly, softly’ approach is best exemplified in the design of the Bismarck-
Ramu project, whose proponents now prefer to describe it as an open-
ended process of dialogue with the population of a broadly defined ‘area of
interest’ (see section 9.1).
There is certainly no short cut to construction of a local constituency for
sustainable resource management.  However, the new emphasis on
techniques of community entry can only postpone some of the tough
decisions which must eventually be taken if the process of local
empowerment is to be reconciled with global conservation imperatives.
Where several local communities are given the time and space in which to
make their own choice between activities which may have positive or
negative impacts on biodiversity values, there is no guarantee that people
who make the ‘right’ choice will occupy a series of contiguous territories
which combine to make a single conservation area of several thousand
77
 This is the phrase used by Chevron’s community relations staff (Tony Power, 1998, personal communication).  Chevron’s own
support for the Kikori Basin ICAD project is one example of this strategy.
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Box 10.6  Consensus management and rural politics
Source: James 1996
The landowner committees of the Crater Mountain WMA represent four villages and over thirty land-
owning clans.  Establishment of these organisational bodies has already gone through several
iterations, and future modifications are likely.  However, it may be useful to look at some of the problems
that arose in the early stages of developing a management structure for the WMA.
In the first instance, individual village leaders approached visiting scientists and expressed a willing-
ness to increase economic development through nature conservation.  As often happens with village
leaders, these individuals often spoke on behalf of constituencies which they could not fairly represent
and who were not well-informed of all of the details of setting up a wildlife management area.  The fact
that they offered to participate in the WMA program did not necessarily indicate an overall trans-clan
consensus on conservation.  This situation was hard to rectify through small-scale programmatic
efforts because of the geographical constraints imposed by the area on field staff seeking to increase
local participation.  Most project activities can only reach one or two constituencies at a time, and only
ambitious individuals who travel long distances to active sites interact directly with project staff.
Many very early forays by project staff into the area were via helicopter, which obviously impressed
rural constituents eager to sign on to the program.  At one such village meeting in Haia, NGO and
government representatives explained that in order to set up a WMA, resident landowners had to
submit a list of rules and names for representatives of a local management committee.  Because
residents were afraid they may not see the people in the helicopter again for a while, they nominated
their local committee on the spot.  The fact that most PNG communities require time for achieving
consensus renders this kind of approach unsuitable, and in Haia it is especially problematic since the
society there is semi-nomadic, and at any given time a large percentage of the population may be far
from the village hunting or harvesting sago.  Furthermore, once residents contributed their names, they
expected their recognised authority to achieve some kind of tangible results.  A whole year passed
before there was any follow-up to the original meeting, and by then people who expressed an interest
in conservation, but were not present at the nominating session, expressed their discontent.  Over time,
as it became clear that the WMA would not result in immediate benefits, some representatives changed
places with other clan members who wished to contribute their lands to the WMA plan.
Today the landowner committees of at least three villages in the WMA state that they have set aside
land protection.  Resident clans contribute these lands to their local committees, which then are
responsible for upholding the rules they describe to manage them.  The overall functionality of commit-
tees continues to be poor, and is probably the result of early influences from outside organisations
moving too quickly to establish the WMA.  Now that more field staff are on the ground in the WMA, there
may be a greater opportunity to instil local proponents with more realistic expectations and sincere
motivations for management of the WMA.  The bottom line is that the long-term resident approach of a
project to establishing stakeholder committees is far superior to rapid reconnaissance missions.
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square kilometres.  If anything, it is rather more likely that neighbouring
communities, or even sections of a single community, will take different
options as a new means to represent and pursue their existing social and
political divisions.  One group may opt for ‘conservation’ simply in order
to defend its territorial boundaries against neighbouring groups whose
encroachment expresses their own desire for ‘development’ (van Helden
1998).  In these circumstances, a greater sense of local autonomy provides
no instant solution to the problem of achieving a broader scale of consensus
and cooperation.
Even amongst those groups who can redefine their own desire for
‘development’ in ways which make it compatible with conservation
objectives, it may be difficult for donors and NGOs to provide the support
required to realise that desire without creating new forms of dependency
which undermine the earlier process of empowerment.  This problem is
most likely to arise when local ‘business’ ventures fail to meet community
expectations, or else become a new focus of factional dispute within the
community, because Western business management methods remain
fundamentally incompatible with the ‘Melanesian way’ of redistributing
material wealth (Brooks 1996).  And if local experiments in ‘sustainable
development’ do fail, for one reason or another, their failure will jeopardise
any ‘conservation contract’ which has been negotiated with community
representatives, regardless of the manner in which the community has been
organised for this purpose.
In the final analysis, the existence of an incorporated body, or a contract to
which it is a party, is no guarantee that the agreement reached will be
honoured by the members of a customary group.  Enforcement of contracts
poses the same problems as enforcement of laws.  Is there any reason to
suppose that voluntary compliance will be greater where the desired outcomes
have been negotiated rather than imposed? (Whimp 1997:365)
This type of uncertainty could even be ascribed to the fact that PNG’s rural
communities already have too much autonomy.  Unlike their counterparts
in the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya, they have no need to make and
keep bargains with conservationists in order to defend their resources
against an authoritarian state which does not even recognise their
customary land rights (Leedom 1997b).  As resource developers know to
their cost, resource owners can change their minds as often as they change
their chosen representatives, and do so with impunity.  A protracted process
of community ‘empowerment’ therefore risks a double dose of bad faith, as
the conservationists conceal their real motives, and the community conceals
its real power.
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The National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:34) saw the goal of greater
national participation in the forest industry as one which could partly be
achieved by the involvement of ‘small national groups’ in ‘small scale
processing operations subject to compatibility with broad planning
requirements and commercial viability’, with advice and support from the
National Forest Service and other ‘relevant agencies’ (ibid:36-37).  In
practice, the NFA has done little or nothing to provide this kind of support,
because its primary concern has been the management of large-scale
logging operations.  The Community Forestry Project, which was the only
NFCAP project which might have diverted some bureaucratic attention to
the lower end of the scale, was abandoned after its feasibility study had
been completed in 1992.  In 1995, a new Reforestation and Extension
Division was established within the National Forest Service, and the
functions of this division were supposed to include the provision of
technical assistance to small-scale and community forestry projects, but
only one or two staff positions were assigned to this function.
The government’s neglect of small-scale forestry can partly be explained by
the willingness of NGOs and donor agencies to fill the gap:
• the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific (FSP), the Village
Development Trust (VDT), and the Pacific Heritage Foundation have all
secured donor support for their activities in this arena, concentrating
their efforts in Milne Bay, Morobe, and East New Britain provinces
respectively;
• the NFCAP Landowner Awareness Project has experimented with a
‘participatory model for small-scale timber production and marketing’ in
Gulf Province, as one element in its strategy to demonstrate the
feasibility of different forms of sustainable development (see section
10.2); and
• the Islands Region Environment and Community Development
Programme, funded directly by the European Union, has been promoting
‘village-based ecoforestry’ in West New Britain Province, where large-
scale logging operations have recently been accounting for roughly half
of the country’s raw log exports.
All these interventions have been directed towards the support of small
business groups harvesting logs from the natural forest in their own clan or
10.5 Community and small-scale forestry
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study298
village territories, producing sawn timber with portable or ‘walkabout’
sawmills, and selling it to local or overseas buyers.  Indeed, this type of
enterprise has now become the standard reference point for local
definitions of ‘ecoforestry’ or ‘community forestry’, to the relative neglect of
other activities, like the direct sale of harvested logs to larger sawmills, the
cultivation of village woodlots on deforested land, or even the ‘traditional’
wood-carving industry.
The first reason for this bias is the rapid spread of portable sawmills which
has coincided with the growth of large-scale logging operations since the
mid-1980s.  By the early 1990s, at least 500 of these devices were being
purchased every year (FSP 1995a)78 , and this figure may well have risen
since donors became more active in promoting their use.  While some of the
earlier growth may be attributed to the promotional activities of local
NGOs (especially VDT and FSP), or the munificence of mining companies
and national politicians, most of it was due to the spontaneous enthusiasm
of the buyers.  As a result, villages in all but the most remote corners of the
countryside contain a growing proportion of houses built from slightly
twisted and poorly fitted sawn planks, with roofs (and sometimes walls)
made of galvanised iron.  The number of such ‘plank houses’ is a fairly
good indicator of the relative prosperity of the village, but the very high
cost of transporting building materials means that it is also a function of
physical proximity to the source of supply.  In the less accessible areas,
plank houses are normally funded out of the savings of long-term absentees
employed in the formal sector of the economy, as ‘vacation’ or ‘retirement’
homes, as well as symbols of their social status and continued economic
stake in village life.  In areas with reasonable road access to urban centres,
they are tending to become the norm.
It is not this change in architectural fashion which explains the popularity
of portable sawmills with donors and NGOs.  In their view, the technology
is appropriate because it enables the buyers to do three things:
• exploit their resources without causing significant environmental
damage;
• appropriate the lion’s share of the resource rent; and
• add further value by downstream processing.
Above all, portable sawmills are thought to provide landowners with a
clear, simple and rewarding alternative to the lures of the large-scale
logging companies.
78
 This included a substantial number of Alaskan frames for use with hand-held chainsaws.
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In theory, it is true that a small-scale sawmilling operation can meet all
these objectives (Henderson 1996); but in theory, a large-scale log export
operation could be a model of efficiency, sustainability and distributive
justice.  Practice defies theory, in both cases, because these operations are
subject to a complex, variable and unpredictable set of property relations
and work habits.
It is certainly true that portable sawmills make far less impact on the
natural forest than large-scale logging operations, simply because their
aggregate harvesting levels are so much lower.  On the other hand, it is not
so clear that small-scale operators cause any less environmental damage for
each cubic metre of usable timber which they produce (Sargent and Burgess
1988), and most of them are a long way from meeting the criteria of
‘ecological sustainability’ which overseas donors and buyers would like to
impose on them (Martin 1997).  Secondly, the idea that these are virtuous
examples of ‘community’ enterprise conceals the fact that rural business
development lies firmly in the hands of the individual entrepreneur,
‘supported’ by his (or occasionally her) immediate kin.  Once this fact is
taken into account, there is no reason to assume that sawmill operators pay
a fair price for other people’s trees, or a price which is higher than the
royalties which would accrue from a large-scale logging operation.  And
one of the reasons why small-scale operators may not be able to afford a
fair price is because their profits cannot cover their other costs.
Consider what happens when a portable sawmill is first put to work in a
typical village setting.  The most accessible trees are the first to be cut
down, and there is a sudden increase in the number of ‘plank houses’ in the
village, as the cost of planks is drastically cut.  However, the price which
the villagers are willing and able to pay for these superior building
materials is not enough to cover the full cost of operating the mill, and the
strictly local market is exhausted as soon as the true cost of maintenance
and depreciation begins to dawn on the operator.  Even if these costs can be
carried for a while longer, more labour must now be spent on bringing
fresh logs to the mill, or moving the mill further away from the village, and
the operator may also find that members of other families or clans are
increasingly unwilling sell their trees or grant access to their land.
Furthermore, the cost of transporting the planks to a wider market - even to
the next village - is too high to warrant the effort, since the next circle of
consumers makes the same equation of personal costs and benefits as those
in the original market.  Urban and overseas markets are even harder to
reach, because transport costs are compounded by demands for higher
quality and the need for an entirely different order of managerial expertise
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on the part of the operator.  The moment of economic truth may be
postponed by the application of donor subsidies, in the shape of technical
and managerial support for specific operations, but it is very hard to see
how the domestic market for timber produced by small-scale sawmills in
rural areas can grow substantially without a corresponding improvement
in basic physical infrastructure.
Given the limitations of the domestic market for wet sawn timber, and the
social constraints on the economic viability of what Martin (1997) calls
‘part-time ecotimber producers’, the prospects for further expansion of
ecoforestry in PNG appear to depend on the achievement of some
economies of scale, and improvements in the quality and variety of outputs
directed at the ‘green’ export market, on the part of those producers who
are able to escape these constraints.  This indeed is the main focus of the
subsidies now being provided by the donors and NGOs, whose conception
of ‘medium-scale’ ecoforestry hinges on the development of cooperative
training, marketing and management systems covering groups of ‘full-time’
producers in specific geographical locations.  These arrangements may help
to meet the demands of the overseas ecotimber market, but they face an
uphill struggle to meet the costs of certification (see section 8.10) in a
situation where regional prices for ‘uncertified’ timber have been falling
quite dramatically, and where further changes to the government’s fiscal
regime are now likely to impose a heavier tax burden on this kind of
enterprise.  Furthermore, the widespread failure of cooperative marketing
schemes in the late colonial period does not bode well for the institutional
sustainability of such arrangements in the absence of continued donor
subsidies.
The fact that donors are subsidising this kind of enterprise as a means to
realise their own environmental values, by providing a financial
disincentive for landowners to sign away their timber rights to the NFA,
tends to conceal the fact that big logging operators and small sawmill
operators are not competing for the same markets, and, in many cases, are
not even competing for the same resources.  This is evident from the fact
that some of the most successful of the small sawmill operators are to be
found in existing log export concessions, where they can utilise reject logs
and sometimes get free technical assistance or donations of equipment from
the logging contractors (Sagir 1997).  In this kind of symbiotic relationship,
the small-scale operator could be compared to the small birds which live by
picking the teeth of crocodiles on the Sepik River.  In a wider perspective,
there is no reason to suppose that a major contraction in the large-scale log
export industry, of the kind which is presently happening because of low
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Box 10.7  The social context of part-time ecoforestry
In an examination of five portable sawmill operations that are claiming ‘ecoforestry’ status in south-east
Morobe, it was clear that the mills were used to service local community needs such as the construction
of community buildings, churches, school guesthouses, and so on.  They operated only when materials
were required.  They were not commercial ventures, and were not organised in a way which would
make them commercially viable in the future.  One mill was generating cash income on occasions by
milling high value timber, such as rosewood, and selling it in Lae for K450/m3.  The profits were used to
cover the costs of a club which, on occasion, visited festival sites around the country to put on perform-
ances.  The young men who were members of the club gave their sawmill services free in order to raise
the money to attend these festivals and perform.  Resource owners were paid in timber, not cash, for
lumber extracted from their land.
The use of sawmills only when there is a definite need for cash or materials in a community is a com-
mon story.  It is made possible by the initial donation of capital costs, which removes the necessity to
undertake consistent production to service a loan.  Because the cash costs are relatively small, labour
is donated, and access to markets is limited or information on marketing unavailable, such operations
are not seen by the villagers themselves as an alternative to the income that is generated when their
timber resource is sold to large-scale logging companies.  This is the case even though the mills may
have originally been donated as an incentive to refuse the offers of logging companies.
In a rural community, the demands on people’s time for subsistence needs and for social activity within
the community are high, irregular, and in many cases immediate – such as a death in the village, the
destruction of pig fences, the arrival of schools of fish, and so on.  Even though many villagers have
experienced the time demands and constraints of wage labour while working in the towns, the social
and subsistence demands in the village place such labour in a quite different context.  Nevertheless,
there is considerable potential for the many ‘older’ portable sawmills in these villages to become cash-
generating options, and thus acceptable alternatives to large-scale logging, if they could be brought
into the commercial strategy in some form.  The point to be made is that this type of production is likely
to remain intermittent because of the social context in which the producers operate and the nature of
the sawmill’s history.
Source: Martin 1997
market prices and high domestic tax rates, or which might one day happen
because the government decided to impose a log export ban, creates the
basis for a major expansion of small-scale community forestry.  On the
contrary, it removes much of the incentive for donors to invest their own
funds in supporting this type of enterprise, without creating any new
markets for its products.  The net result might simply be a smaller number
of plank houses located beyond walking distance of a decent road to town.
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Leaving aside the superficial attractions of the portable sawmill as a
‘downstream processing’ device, we might ask why the distribution of
hand-held chainsaws to rural villagers deserves more support from donors
and NGOs than the distribution of shotguns, apart from the fact that most
villagers would prefer to get a shotgun than a chainsaw, because they place
a higher value on hunted protein than on sawn timber.  Perhaps the answer
is that chainsaws (like portable sawmills) are more likely to break down, or
to need spare parts and mechanical expertise which cannot be found, and
this limits the damage which they can cause.  In that case, there would seem
to be another element of bad faith in the promotion of a form of
‘development’ whose main contribution to biodiversity conservation
consists in the absence of economic sustainability.  But it is more likely that
donors and NGOs have promoted the spread of portable sawmills as an
‘alternative’ form of enterprise in the belief that community participation or
control is more important than either the economic or environmental
sustainability of forest exploitation.  Of course it can be argued that their
intervention is justified by the fact that this technology is spreading under
its own steam, and those adopting it therefore need the benefit of sound
advice to raise the economic utility, and reduce the environmental cost, of
their operations.  But there is also a tendency to assume that any advance in
‘social’ sustainability, achieved through the rejection of large-scale foreign
investment, inevitably means a more sustainable resource management
regime all round.  This assumption may conceal a more important point:
that small-scale forestry only makes sense as a single (and probably also a
short-term) ingredient in a more diversified rural development strategy,
whether or not that strategy makes room for large-scale logging.
Small-scale forestry is one of several types of economic activity which
appeal to conservationists because they offer rural communities a chance to
‘realise’ the value of their natural forest resources in both an economic and
an intellectual sense, and might therefore provide a material incentive for
resource owners to resist the temptations of large-scale industrial
extraction.  The assumption normally made here is that rural villagers
already make extensive use of these resources for subsistence purposes, but
where these subsistence values cannot be converted into cash, there is a
preference for short-term rental incomes from the logging which may
10.6 Developing non-timber forest
 goods and services
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damage or destroy them.  The non-timber forest goods and services which
have an actual or potential market value may be divided between two
broad categories:
• First, there is a range of animal and plant species which, like commercial
timber, can be harvested by local villagers, perhaps processed in various
ways at the village level, and then sold in domestic or foreign markets.
We shall refer to these as non-timber forest products (NTFPs).
• Second, there are other forms of ‘rental’ income which can be earnt from
granting outsiders access to forests which are being protected, rather
than exploited, whether those outsiders arrive in the guise of tourists,
scientific researchers, or biodiversity prospectors, or stay at home and
purchase shares in a carbon sink.  We shall refer to these as forest
services.
This reflects the distinction previously made (section 4.5) between ‘direct’
and ‘indirect’ (or ‘non-consumptive’) use-values.
According to the National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 1991:43), the Forest
Research Institute has a responsibility for conducting research on the
‘cultivation, management and utilisation of minor forest products with the
objective of increasing the income of the rural population’, and its staff
have produced occasional papers on this subject (see Saulei 1991).
However, the responsibility for developing markets for either NTFPs or
forest services is scattered between a number of government agencies, and
is not regarded as a major priority by any of them.  This may partly explain
the World Bank’s failure to interest other donors in the idea of funding a
general study of ‘alternative incomes’ from local forest resources (see
section 10.2).  Nevertheless, donor-funded ICAD projects have
encompassed a number of feasibility studies and several practical
experiments in the commercialisation of specific NTFPs, and local NGOs
have tried to develop a wider public awareness of the options (see FSP
1995b).
Much of the debate on NTFPs in PNG fails to acknowledge the significance
of the distinction which most rural villagers make between primary and
secondary forest, and the heavy concentration of subsistence values in the
second of these zones, which is where they practice the art of shifting
cultivation.  To describe this nation of gardeners as ‘tropical forest peoples’
is to overlook the fact that they traditionally made very little use of their
‘big bush’, except as a place in which to go hunting, and the forces of
‘development’ have made further inroads on this limited utility.  That is
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why they commonly fail to see the logging of primary forest as a direct
threat to their subsistence lifestyles.  In most parts of the country, large tree
trunks (over 50 cm in diameter) were not used for building or any other
purpose, and in those coastal and riverine areas where they were used to
make canoes, slit-drums, totem poles or ceremonial masks, they have been
‘devalued’ by the substitution of
metal boats and the abandonment
of traditional ceremonial practices.
In some of these lowland areas,
wild sago palms are still a vital
subsistence resource, but sago
swamps hold no attractions for the
logging industry.  Beyond the flood
plains, most of the trees which
supply food, fuel, or raw materials
for buildings or other local
artefacts are either deliberately
cultivated within the zone of
shifting cultivation or harvested
from garden fallows (Allen et al.
1993-97).  This is also the source of
most of the plant materials used in
‘traditional medicine’ and most of the handicrafts which are now being
marketed as ‘rainforest products’ (Christin Kocher-Schmid, 1997, personal
communication).
The products of the primary forest which village people are best equipped,
by custom and experience, to market as commodities are precisely those
whose exploitation is thought to represent the greatest threat to
biodiversity values within the subsistence sector.  PNG’s first contribution
to world trade, which long predated the first contact with European
colonialism, was the export of bird-of-paradise plumes, and the rapid
growth of this trade in the early colonial period triggered one of the earliest
international campaigns dedicated to the conservation of tropical
biodiversity (Swadling 1996).  The colonial administration responded by
limiting, and finally banning, the export of these creatures, long before
PNG became an independent signatory to the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).  Towards the end of the colonial
period, shotgun licences were also rationed (to a maximum of one per one
hundred people in any local community) in order to combat the general
risk of over-hunting, whether for subsistence or commercial purposes.  At
the time of Independence in 1975, there was still a robust domestic market
PNG’s remarkable diversity of language and traditional
culture, accompanied by wide regional variations in the
experience of ‘development’, mean that it is unwise to make
general statements about community attitudes and
organisation
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in wild animal skins and bird plumes, much of which represented a
continuation of traditional trading relationships between rural
communities, and was not subject to any form of government control.  Since
that time, however, this market has declined substantially, as people have
lost interest in ceremonial decoration.  In many parts of the country, there
has also been a reduction in the volume of hunting for subsistence
purposes, because traditional hunting techniques have been abandoned,
while access to shotguns and cartridges has been further restricted.  This is
not due to any official concern with biodiversity conservation, but to the
growing use of firearms for criminal purposes or for the conduct of
‘traditional’ tribal warfare.  Even in those heavily forested regions where
such abuse is still uncommon, the forces of ‘law and order’ have been
busily confiscating shotguns (often illegally) and refusing to issue new
licences for them, while licences to sell cartridges have also been heavily
restricted, and their price has risen accordingly.  This may be good news for
the creatures of the forest, but only so long as villagers are not therefore
disposed to sell their trees in order to purchase alternative sources of
protein.
Little progress has been made with marketing those NTFPs which might
add some alternative value to the primary rainforest, but for which there is
little or no use in the subsistence sector.  Perhaps the most successful
venture of this kind is the Insect Farming and Trading Agency, sponsored
by the PNG University of Technology, which has pioneered the export of
dead beetles and butterflies.  These exports are now worth more than
K300,000 a year, but there are still less than 1,000 ‘smallholders’ engaged in
the business, and the market may already be saturated (Sekhran 1996).
Furthermore, insect farmers (like crocodile farmers) are better able to satisfy
green consumers and environmental regulators than those producers who
collect the insects from their natural habitat.
The only forest service which has so far fired the imagination and
enthusiasm of rural villagers is ecotourism - or at least the kind of
‘adventure tourism’ in which the adventure partially consists of staying in a
rural village.  Anecdotal evidence suggests a very rapid expansion in the
number of village guest-houses constructed to accommodate such visitors,
which might almost be compared to the ‘craze’ for portable sawmills, but
which is no doubt partly due to the publicity generated by the
government’s Tourism Promotion Authority.  However, there is no evidence
of any corresponding growth in the number of tourists making use of these
facilities, except in those few cases where donors and NGOs supply most of
the visitors through their active involvement in promoting conservation or
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study306
sustainable development in specific areas.  Otherwise, the growth of this
business is constrained by the same problems which afflict the tourist
industry as a whole: ‘the lack of infrastructure, PNG’s high-cost economy,
the cost of air travel to and within PNG, and the perception within key
tourist markets that law and order problems make it a high-risk
destination, are unlikely to be resolved in the medium term’ (Sekhran,
Hedemark et al. 1994:285).
Conservationists have thus been led to conclude that the only two forest
services which can provide a serious material incentive for sustainability
within a reasonable time-frame are biodiversity prospecting rights and
proof of carbon sequestration (Mike Parsons, 1997, personal
communication).  In both cases, however, large question marks loom over
the capacity of rural resource owners to comprehend and participate in the
marketing of such commodities.
FMAs concluded under the new Forestry Act apparently grant the NFA
rights to all ‘forest produce’, meaning all living or dead plant material, but
Timber Permits only grant logging companies the right to harvest timber.
This means that the NFA could theoretically tender the remaining rights to
pharmaceutical companies or international NGOs, or else transfer them to
another government agency, like the DEC, which currently lacks any legal
mechanism by which to acquire such rights through its own agreements
with resource owners.  Neither the NFA nor the DEC presently has the
expertise required to pursue such options, and it is not clear how this
pursuit may be affected by the legislation on intellectual property rights
which the PNG government is obliged to introduce as part of its
commitment to the World Trade Organisation.  Public debate on this latter
question has so far been dominated by those national stakeholders,
including prominent conservationists, whose main concern is to protect the
rights of customary resource owners from any type of foreign exploitation
of their cultural and biological resources.  There is an obvious risk that this
debate will serve to encourage a new version of the resource dependency
syndrome, in which rural villagers come to regard any type of research
undertaken on their territory, regardless of its commercial value, as an
activity for which they ought to receive substantial amounts of
‘compensation’79.  At the same time, while some local entrepreneurs have
begun to enter into contractual arrangements with overseas research
institutes or pharmaceutical companies to collect and despatch samples of
plant materials which might eventually prove to have some commercial
79
 For example, one group of villagers has recently been demanding many thousands of kina in compensation from the PNG
Institute of Medical Research for the blood samples taken by its staff during the course of a study concerned with the impact of
large-scale logging on local people’s health (John Leedom, 1997, personal communication).
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value, there is a risk that resource owners will price themselves out of this
market by assuming that all such materials can yield a fabulous profit for
their collectors, in the same way that they have commonly overestimated
the amounts of money which anthropologists make from publishing books
about their ‘culture’.
The World Bank now takes the view that so-called ‘carbon swaps’, or joint
implementation schemes, are the best way for tropical countries like PNG
to secure substantial financial rewards from the conservation or sustainable
management of their forest resources (Jim Douglas, 1997, personal
communication).  The Bank considers that government agencies, NGOs,
and even landowning communities in PNG could demonstrate the
necessary capacity to preserve or enhance forest resources which would
otherwise be degraded or destroyed.  If and when the DEC is able to
establish the baseline data on national carbon emissions required under the
Global Climate Change Convention, this will make it easier for the NFA to
access carbon offset funds by demonstrating the effectiveness of the
Logging Code of Practice, proving the extent of reforestation within
existing timber concessions, or enlarging the size of conservation areas
under new FMAs.  The Conservation Resource Centre was able to quantify
the carbon sequestration benefits of the Lak Sustainable Forestry Project in
ways which might have satisfied the carbon offset market (Stuart and
Sekhran 1996), but could not secure the local community support required
to translate theory into practice.  The World Bank and other donors are well
aware of the fact that resource owners will need to receive a share of the
financial benefits which accrue from such schemes, but hold the
government responsible for ensuring that these do not amount to a
‘conservation rent’, of the kind which the Prime Minister proposed to the
TFAP Round Table back in 1990, because experience in other countries has
shown that this may simply cause landowners to hold their forests to
ransom (Jim Douglas, 1997, personal communication).  However, resource
owners may find it hard to appreciate the difference between making (and
keeping) an agreement to use their forests more sustainably and an
agreement to be paid for not using them at all, when it is likely that other
organisations will shoulder the management responsibilities, and their own
‘participation’ will again be framed in the established idiom of
‘compensation’.
Amidst all the speculation about the best way for resource owners to realise
the value of a resource which they rarely use, it is important to remember
that the ‘targets’ of this speculation have their own priorities.  People in
areas with high biodiversity values have been suffering from a marked
decline in the quality and accessibility of basic health and education
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facilities, and a corresponding deterioration of economic infrastructure, for
long enough to know that this is not a temporary setback on the path to
progress.  They also have good reason to believe that the path will not be
cleared by the introduction of new opportunities for individual families to
earn additional cash incomes, because of the lack of collective institutions at
the local level which have the capacity to turn personal incomes into public
goods.
A final word of caution must now be added to qualify the many general
statements which we have made about community attitudes and
organisation in the forestry and conservation sector.  PNG’s remarkable
diversity of language and traditional culture, accompanied by wide regional
variations in the experience of ‘development’, ensures that any rule will
have a number of exceptions.  The critical question, for developers and
conservationists alike, is whether the variations between landowning
communities, in their understanding and practice of forest management, fit
some kind of general pattern which might explain or predict their response
to the intervention of outsiders bearing new proposals for the use of their
resources.
In this respect, it worth noting that the donor agencies which have funded a
very substantial volume of research on the physical properties of PNG’s
forest resources through different NFCAP projects have shown very little
interest in funding any comparative study of the cultural attitudes or social
organisation of their customary owners.  Even where projects have been
targeted at specific parts of the country, there has been an initial reluctance
to consider their social context or social feasibility in any detail, and it is
only when they fail, as the Lak ICAD project failed, that this reluctance is
eventually overcome.  This omission is even more remarkable, when one
considers that the NFCAP was initiated so soon after the outbreak of the
Bougainville rebellion, which had already shown the mining companies the
cost of neglecting the local social context of their operations.  Perhaps the
conservationists allowed themselves the luxury of believing that they had
nothing to learn from the experience of the mining industry, because all
‘indigenous rainforest peoples’ should have a natural sympathy with their
own objectives.  Perhaps the donors were keen to avoid any
acknowledgment of regional variation which might undermine the value of
their precious ‘pilot projects’.  Or perhaps they were convinced, by
anecdotal evidence, that this variation could not be construed in any
10.7 The institutional neglect of cultural diversity
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Box 10.8  A carbon swap for PNG?
There is scant understanding within PNG of the linkages between forest disturbance, such as that
caused by conventional logging operations, and the global greenhouse effect.  PNG’s forest vegetation
serves as a carbon bank, storing carbon in plant tissues and fixing carbon dioxide through
photosynthesis.  One effect of forest disturbance is to release greenhouse gases (carbon, methane
and nitrous oxide) into the atmosphere.  Globally, forest degradation and depletion is responsible for
some 22 percent of enhanced greenhouse gas accumulations in the atmosphere (Faeth et al. 1994).
In PNG, logging practices result in high forest biomass mortality - leading to the formation of necromass,
which, on decay, emits greenhouse gases.  However, alternative logging methods, following a strict
code of practice, can significantly attenuate these impacts.  A neat nexus exists between the
objectives of biodiversity conservation and the management of forestry operations to minimise green-
house gas emissions.
A number of  power utilities in developed countries have invested in carbon offset schemes to
compensate for their own greenhouse gas emissions, which might otherwise be penalised by
regulatory controls.  The forestry sector provides a number of investment opportunities for companies
- including plantation development and reduced impact logging schemes.  Offset projects have been
piloted in other countries and have proven that forestry investments provide a cost-effective means of
mitigating carbon release.  Developed countries are moving (albeit slowly) to meet their obligations
under the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and will probably need to impose substantive
policy measures to cap their greenhouse gas emissions.  Under a framework of joint implementation,
savings made through carbon offset schemes might reduce the overall cost burden faced by affected
industries.
The Lak ICAD project made an attempt in 1995 to leverage a carbon swap (Stuart and Sekhran 1996).
A proposal was submitted to a US Government State Department review panel - the United States
Initiative for Joint Implementation (USIJI) - for carbon offset funding to be invested in a proposed
low-impact logging venture, intended to provide an alternative to conventional  logging.  The proposal
anticipated carbon savings of 3.78 million tonnes over forty years, relative to the baseline of
conventional logging, which could potentially have attracted funding of US$2-4 million.
The USIJI - whose endorsement was necessary before private funding could be solicited - gave the
proposal a highly favourable review based on its technical strengths.  However, landowner reluctance
to forego benefits and income captured from conventional logging foreclosed the project initiative,
despite PNG government backing for it.  In PNG, landowner disputes can occur at any time during a
project’s life.  The risk is that landowners will make future land use decisions that compromise the
original investment.  Carbon offset projects must authenticate that carbon savings are indeed being
made.  The difficulty in enforcing long-term dealings with landowners provides an enormous
disincentive to investors.  Unless there is some guarantee that the service, once purchased, will
actually be supplied, investors are likely to shy away from such schemes.
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systematic way, because it reflects the personal qualities of individual
community leaders, whose influence over other community members is
bound to be a transient phenomenon.
In order to canvass the existence of broader social or cultural determinants
of the apparent variations in local community support for conservation or
sustainable management, the National Research Institute has distributed a
detailed questionnaire to three groups of individuals with first-hand
knowledge of specific rural communities in PNG - a sample of professional
anthropologists and other social scientists, a number of fieldworkers
engaged by the local branch of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, and a
group of national university students taking courses in environmental
science.  The survey instrument contained a number of ‘development
indicators’ for each community, followed by a series of open-ended
questions on a variety of ‘forest management issues’, including some which
dealt with gender and generational differences in attitude and practice.
Preliminary analysis of the resulting data suggests that most of the
variation between communities can be attributed to their actual experience
of logging or their exposure to debates about the logging industry through
the mediation of community members with high levels of formal education
(Paul Sillitoe, 1997, personal communication).  In other words, the rural
constituency for conservation is not one which already exists in a natural
state of innocence, but one which is created through the process of ‘resource
development’, as people either learn from their mistakes or get new forms
of knowledge which enable them to hesitate before mistakes are made.
However, formal education does not by any means turn all its beneficiaries
into conservationists, and educated conservationists have very little
leverage outside their own communities.
Despite the proclivity of most PNG landowners to opt for extractive development of their forest lands if
given the opportunity, a small number of communities have bucked the trend.  In Madang province,
landowners from the village of Baitabag have repeatedly spurned offers from timber concerns to log
their forest resources.  These holdings today comprise one of the last repositories of lowland tropical
rainforest in the coastal belt north of Madang township.  And in Collingwood Bay in the Oro province,
members of the Maisin community began, in 1995, to challenge the decision of some village elders to
commit communal lands to timber extraction.
In Baitabag, the leader of the local Didipa clan, Kiatik Batet, made a decision to set aside 300 hectares
of forest for conservation in 1963.  Located close to Madang town, the village is blessed with access to
markets and is already relatively well serviced by social and economic infrastructure.  Villagers also
Box 10.9  Bucking the trend - communities which opt for conservation
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have a source of income from a poultry project.  But other communities in the area, in a roughly
analogous situation, have opted to commit their lands to logging.  What makes Baitabag unique?  In a
word, leadership.  Kiatek Batet has displayed an enormous measure of conservation conviction, seeded
by his father and nurtured by patrol officers in the 1950s (Larry Orsak, 1996, personal communication).
In Collingwood Bay, several members of the Maisin community took the initiative to oppose a logging
concession on their lands.  The anti-logging constituency included individuals domiciled in urban
centres, senior officers in the DEC who came from the area, and a community elder who had himself
witnessed environmental degradation first hand while working at the Panguna copper mine in
Bougainville.
A number of community elders clearly favoured logging, and indicated their preference in a letter to the
NFA which they wrote without consulting many of their fellow clan members, but in connivance with a
prospective logging operator.  This is common practice in PNG; but in this instance their actions did not
go unchallenged.  Claiming that logging would ‘destroy the fabric of their society’, the opponents
orchestrated a media campaign warning the proposed logging company to ‘keep off their land’ while
simultaneously challenging the legitimacy of the ‘rogue’ elders.  Some 80,000 hectares of land have
been excluded from timber harvesting as a result.  A local NGO (Conservation Melanesia), supported
by an international NGO (Greenpeace), is working with the community to define alternative economic
opportunities and establish a Conservation Area.
Thus, in the cases outlined above, conservation commitment was fostered by a few influential leaders.
Whether the apparent determination of these communities to protect their forests will withstand the
test of time remains to be seen, but their actions represent some hope for conservation workers facing
an otherwise bleak situation.  The question is whether the conviction and farsightedness demonstrated
by the leaders in Baitabag and Collingwood Bay can be replicated elsewhere through a process of
education which avoids the risk of paternalism and the pitfalls of project dependency.  A number of
conservation programmes are gambling that it can.
Box 10.10  Young or old - who cares more?
The Maisin (Oro Province)
As far as talk of conservation and development go, I believe that differences are as much related
to education and experience outside the rural areas as age.  Close to a third of the Maisin population
lives in urban areas.  Most have high school education and higher, enjoyed relatively high wages by
PNG standards, and have been exposed in recent years to a great deal of conservation education.  As
jobs have become increasingly scarce, more and more educated people have returned
to the villages and are among the strongest advocates of conservation efforts.  There is a general
consensus that ‘development’ is needed for better schools, medical facilities, churches, and so forth.
However, the consensus I heard repeated over and over again during my stay in the villages in March
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Source: NRI Rural Community Survey data.
1997 was that development must not involve large scale logging, mining or other extractive ventures
(John Barker, 1997, personal communication).
The Kamiali (Morobe Province)
Comments expressing a conservationist perspective were limited to a few of the vigorous village
leaders (‘elders’) in their forties.  These were mostly in terms of avoiding the mistakes of their neigh-
bours, and to a certain extent reflect their observations as to the lack of benefit that those neighbouring
villages received from their partnerships with logging companies.  These ‘elder’ Kamiali said they did
not want their rivers polluted.  A couple of references have been made to preserving the resource for
future generations.  Questions on how future generations might use this forest resource, given the lack
of use of the current generation, were not answered.  Younger men have not expressed opinions in the
‘conservation’ area of the Kamiali ICAD project, but have talked almost exclusively abut the ‘develop-
ment’.  They hold out considerable hope for the small-scale developments in fishing,
servicing the training centre, and ‘guiding’ tourists to bring them cash incomes.  No evidence has been
gathered that there is any deep, or even superficial, conservationist ethic either present or developing.
While village projects, such as a church or residences for the medical orderly and community school
teachers, attract universal support, their participation in cash-generating small-scale businesses or
jobs in training centre construction has essentially been opportunistic.  The latter comment applies
across generations.  For example, the fishing project undergoes periodic collapse because individual
fishermen make decisions to fish by reference to their individual needs for cash, and not the long-term
viability of the project (Ron Martin, 1997, personal communication).
The Kamula (Western Province)
In my view the demand for instant, massive development has increased over the years I have visited
Wawoi Falls.  This is partly because such massive transformations are more likely now than 20 years
ago, when there was no logging company operating in the area and actively seeking to expand into the
Kamula’s country.  Secondly, people seem more influenced now about ideas concerning the year 2000
and the end of the world.  Thirdly, people are more aware now of the discrepancy between village life
and city life, and have essentially watched the region stagnate over the last few years.  Fourthly,
younger men also feel that they need to bring development (logging) quickly so that the older
generation will receive something before they die in compensation for the effort and pain they put into
rearing the current generation.  However, some of the older generation are suspicious of the younger
men’s ability to realise a satisfactory form of ‘development’.  They argue that the new generation, even
though ‘educated’, has ‘ways that are no good’ because they fail to listen to what the ‘village’ people
say to them and fail to adequately explain what they have done while in Moresby.  As one elderly man
explained, when the young men go to Moresby, they are bribed by the company with money, beer and
women, and they sign anything.  Such young men, in the views of their seniors ‘don’t have any strength.
They don’t know hard work.  They don’t like hard work.  They don’t know how to make a garden.  They
just sleep all day and when a plane comes they just run and jump on it’ (Michael Wood, 1997, personal
communication).
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Given the numbers of individuals within each of the stakeholder groups, it
makes no sense to ask what each of these groups has collectively learnt from
a decade of participation in the forest policy process.  We therefore need to
construe the results of the policy process as a number of lessons which might
have been learnt, or the impressions which might have been gained, by the
audience, rather than the actors - or at least that section of the audience which
has a persistent and genuine interest in ‘sustainable forest management’, and
therefore has not fallen asleep during the earlier parts of the play.
What might these ‘sympathetic outsiders’ now regard as the positive or
negative outcomes of the policy reform process in each of the main parts of
the forest policy domain which we have previously identified?  In what
respects would they have to suspend their judgement because the outcomes
still seem to be ambiguous, because it is too early to tell what is or is not
‘working’?  What explanation can be given for these outcomes, and what
conclusions drawn for the further development of the forest policy process?
Since the road to hell is paved with good intentions, our provisional answers
to these questions will highlight the difference between those statements of
policy which have been produced by stakeholders with a vested interest in
the process of policy reform and the changes in actual practice which might
or might not accord with such pronouncements, but which we should still
regard as part of the policy process.
Lessons which might
have been learnt
Lessons for government
Policy should be negotiated and incremental if government lacks the resources and political will to enforce its
provisions, and greater recognition must be given to the problems of achieving popular participation and equity
in rural PNG.
At no stage in the formulation of the National Forest Policy did the government seek to enter into any significant
Box 11.1  Lessons from the Kandrian-Gloucester Integrated Development Project
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negotiations with the forest industry or landowner groups. There was no systematic attempt on the part of
government to assess the position of landowner companies and what oppositional strategy they might invoke.
Equally important, there was no assessment by the government as to its own capability to enforce the Act, and
the likely outcome if it could not.
Government policy rhetoric continually seeks to reaffirm the nation’s commitment to social democratic process,
and plays down the real problems which rural communities have in dealing with participation and equity issues.
The ferocity with which overseas logging contractors set about exporting logs between 1993 and 1994 meant
that landowner companies and government had to reach a rapid agreement if they were to stem the flow of
revenue offshore.  Unfortunately, the questions of participation and equity on which government sought to com-
mence the negotiations proved to be thoroughly intractable in the short term.  With hindsight, the government
would have achieved more by adopting a strategy which sought to work from the common ground - maximising
landowner company and government revenue shares - and then progressively addressed the issues of partici-
pation and equity.  However, such a strategy would have been unlikely to endear the national government to the
aid donors, who were looking for bold political statements to justify their expenditure and to placate vocal interest
groups in their own countries.
Lessons for donors
In the case of the KGIDP, donors and their technical advisers would have been better advised to play the role of
‘honest broker’ and facilitate the process of negotiation between landowner companies and the government.
Donors gave themselves little opportunity to consider the negotiation option.  As enthusiastic proponents of
forestry reform in PNG, they committed extensive resources to its development from the outset.  Had donors and
their technical advisers given more consideration to the difficulties of implementing the Act, and to the oppositional
stance of landowner companies, the prospect of providing support for facilitating the negotiation process may
have been more attractive.  However, donor responses were influenced by the attitudes of international and local
NGOs, whose philosophical foundations were deeply rooted in promoting community participation and social
equity.  Any turnaround on these issues would have been strongly and publicly contested by these groups - a
situation which all donors were keen to avoid.  Furthermore, donor flexibility is ultimately constrained by bilateral
and multilateral aid agreements which dictate that donors give priority to the government agenda.
Lessons for landowners
Landowners who enter into development agreements with unresolved land and resource disputes have little
chance of maintaining group solidarity in the face of conflict with resource developers.
Most landowner companies were formed without due consideration for the membership of the land groups which
they claimed to represent, or for the actual ownership of resources. Had land groups been able to reach agree-
ment between themselves over ownership of the forest resource, and establish common development objec-
tives, their power to negotiate with logging contractors would have been vastly increased. Instead, the relationship
between many landowner groups was typified by mistrust and conflict, some of which had its origins in traditional
clan allegiances and rivalries. Logging contractors, aided willingly or unknowingly by landowner company direc-
tors, were able to exploit divisions within and between these groups to secure maximum advantage.
Source: Simpson 1997
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The litany of scandals revealed by the Barnett Inquiry provided fertile
ground for a substantial group of national stakeholders to initiate a process
of reform which attracted the support, and finally fell under the control, of
donor agencies motivated by wider global concerns about the fate of
tropical forests.  During the fairly brief period in which this process
contained a real sense of national ownership and unity of purpose, it was
possible to mount a full-scale frontal assault on the trenches of the logging
industry and its domestic allies.  Many elements of the reform were mown
down by the enemy’s machine guns, and some were shot in the back, but
several strongholds were taken, and no counter-attack has yet been able to
reclaim them.  Given the losses on both sides, one might conclude that this
form of trench warfare is not the best way to achieve a wider consensus on
sustainable forest management, that ‘being strategic is more important than
being comprehensive’ (Mayers and Peutalo 1995:27).  But because the
nature of PNG’s political system precludes concerted government action on
any front for more than two or three years at a time, there is no time to beat
about the bush.  The policy reformers have marched to the same tune as the
loggers and their allies: ‘Get what you can while you can’ - and then dig in
or beat a quick retreat.
The main piece of artillery covering this assault was the new Forestry Act.
In retrospect, it is quite clear that this piece of legislation grossly
overestimated the capacity of the state to regulate the use of customary
land, and may therefore have weakened the credibility and legitimacy of
such intervention in some quarters.  On the other hand, its most outspoken
critics - logging companies, landowner companies, and radical NGOs - had
very little faith to lose.  Precisely because of its weight and complexity, the
Act has created a large muddy bog between the logging camp and the
bureaucracy.  If it has stretched the NFA beyond the limits of its own
institutional capacity, it has also caused forestry officials to heed Barnett’s
injunction to ‘slow down’ the process of resource allocation, even where
this course of action (or inaction) contradicts their own professional
inclinations.  The risk of heavy regulation is that those abuses which it
targets will be driven underground, where regulators can obtain a more
substantial profit by condoning them.  But the long arm of the World Bank
has so far kept the lid on such irregularities, by constantly piling one
regulation on top of another, sending in another squad of consultants to
ferret around the undergrowth, and using its financial leverage to pin down
the wayward politicians in their foxholes.  This is no way to facilitate any
11.1 Lessons concerning the reform
 of industrial forestry policy
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kind of economic activity, but facilitation was not the purpose of this
exercise.
In the heat of this battle, the definition of ‘sustainable forest management’
was rapidly whittled down to a single number - the annual volume of raw
log exports.  Given the many flagrant breaches of the government’s self-
imposed ‘moratorium’ on the issue of new timber concessions during the
period before gazettal of the new Forestry Act, the strong rearguard action
mounted by the logging industry in defence of agreements made under the
previous legislation, and the surge in world market prices during the peak
of the reform process, red tape alone could not be guaranteed to keep this
number under the magic three million cubic metre mark.  Another weapon
had to be deployed against the loggers on the fiscal front.  The time taken to
implement the new revenue system was not just the result of resistance by
the industry, but was also due to confusion amongst the reformers about
how to design and aim it.
• How could the fiscal regime accommodate wide variations in the quality
of timber resources in different concessions, the costs of operating in
different parts of the country, the relative efficiency of different operators,
and their differential willingness to honour the agreements made with
other stakeholders?
• How could it produce a ‘normal’ rate of profit for ‘reasonably’ efficient
and honourable operators throughout the operational life of logging
projects in so many peculiar physical environments, and then produce an
equitable distribution of the resource rent between the other
stakeholders, which would also provide an incentive for each of them to
appreciate the value of sustainability?
• How could it also achieve the government’s stated goal of encouraging
‘downstream processing’ without offending the World Bank’s free trade
principles by subsidising inefficient local manufacturers?
Experience suggests that these are riddles which have no solution in the
realm of bureaucratic calculation.
In the end, the instrument was blunt and heavy, like the Act.  With falling
world market prices, and an equally dramatic decline in the value of the
national currency, it has been ‘successful’ in driving many operators out of
the forest, at least for the time being, and thus reducing the aggregate level
of log exports, but it is hard to credit the Bank’s claim that a sliding tax on
kina-denominated export values ensures that the order in which they exit is
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inversely correlated with their
long-term contribution to
sustainable forest
management.  At the same
time, those elements of the
new revenue system which
would theoretically divert a
portion of the resource rent
towards the achievement of
this same goal - by way of
‘reforestation levies’ or
‘project development levies’ -
have proven to be equally
contentious and
unsatisfactory, for the simple
reason that the NFA is
unwilling or unable to
establish the kind of working
relationships with other
stakeholders that would allow
such monies to be spent.
The reformers would not have
been obliged to place so much
emphasis on implausible
connections between log
export tax rates and
sustainable forest
management if they had made
more progress with the
planning instruments
envisaged by the new Forestry
Act.  A ‘national forest plan’ could never be more than a statement of
national government intent to allow logging companies to harvest or export
certain volumes of raw material, unless it could somehow be grounded in a
‘rational’ process of decision-making at the provincial or local level, and no
such groundwork is evident in the National Forest Plan which finally
emerged from the statutory process of consultation with other stakeholders.
The critical mistake made by the designers of the Act was to conceive
Provincial Forest Plans as land-use maps, rather than land use strategies.
This fault may have been encouraged by the long-standing requirement for
logging companies to produce forest working plans, which are indeed a
A logging road through standing forest. The architects of the new
Forestry Act made the mistake of thinking that provincial forest
planners could impose land use maps on customary resource
owners
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combination of maps and timetables, within their timber concessions.  If the
government and its advisers had paid more attention to the fact that
logging companies are unwilling or unable to follow their own harvesting
plans, then they might have recognised the futility of attempting to produce
comparable plans over much wider stretches of customary land, whose
multiple owners had not yet made their own land use decisions, or might at
any time reverse those previously made.
This is not to deny the real sense of enthusiasm with which some groups of
provincial stakeholders tackled the task of establishing Provincial Forest
Management Committees and imagining Provincial Forest Plans.  The
provinces now harbour a check on the abuse of ministerial power at the
national level which is not necessarily dependent on the abuse of political
power at another level, because a unified National Forest Service can now
play both ends against the middle, and the middle ground is occupied by a
variety of local stakeholders.  However, PFMCs are really little more than
timber permit allocation committees, and can hardly sustain the illusion
that they are land use planning committees unless they become an integral
part of a much broader process of policy reform in both provincial and
local government.  And on this latter score, the new Organic Law has
promised far more than it has so far delivered.
Having learnt the futility of physical planning in such a disjointed political
environment, the reformers have understandably developed a more specific
obsession with measurable standards of ‘best practice’ in the forest
industry, and with the nuts and bolts of monitoring corporate behaviour.
Hence the Logging Code of Practice and its bureaucratic offspring.  But this
form of regulation seems not only to require a level of collaboration from
‘the enemy’ which is excluded by the adversarial approach to policy
reform, but also to place further question marks against the state’s capacity
to orchestrate the process.
This dilemma is highlighted by the first, and so far most successful,
experiment in monitoring the performance of the logging companies under
the new policy regime, which was the log export surveillance system
initiated in 1994 with financial assistance from the European Union.  By
‘outsourcing’ this function to a private contractor (SGS), the National Forest
Service clearly conceded the limits of its own capacity, but also created a
space within which the log exporters could and did welcome the
opportunity to prove that they were no longer (if they had ever been) guilty
of the transfer pricing documented by the Barnett Inquiry.  The question is
why it took the government and the donors so long to recognise the value
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of such contractual arrangements, and which other elements of the reform
process might have been expedited by a more flexible, and less heavy-
handed, approach to the business of industrial regulation, and a more
concerted effort to build a wider policy consensus, rather than simply
strengthen the institutions of central government.
PNG’s official conservation policies are constructed around the
establishment of a representative system of protected areas.  The legal and
institutional mechanisms established to pursue this goal have proven to be
unwieldy and ineffective.  Terrestrial biodiversity values are almost entirely
confined to customary land, and there is no prospect of this land being
alienated by the state for purposes of conservation.  During the first decade
of its existence, the DEC was even unable to develop a method of
communicating with customary landowners which had any significant
effect on their resource management decisions.  With the inception of the
NFCAP and PNG’s later ratification of the Biodiversity Convention, the
government was able to obtain substantial donor support for an effort to
change this state of affairs, by reforming the legal and institutional
framework of conservation policy, and by opening new channels of
communication between the DEC and other stakeholders.
This effort has only met with limited success.  No changes have yet been
made in the relevant legislation.  Those which have been mooted are unable
to address the fundamental problem which arises from widespread popular
ignorance and distrust of the many legal innovations made in other policy
domains.  Amongst these other innovations, the provincial and local
government reforms have cast a fresh cloud of uncertainty over the powers
and functions of the DEC.  The political weakness of the Department has
previously been associated with a very limited capacity to enforce those
laws and regulations for which it is responsible, and this association seems
set to continue, whether or not the laws and regulations change.  Those
donors who have invested heavily in strengthening the DEC have reason to
wonder if they are flogging a dead horse.
Nevertheless, the reform process has served to enlarge the national
conservation constituency, to promote the exchange of ideas amongst its
11.2 Lessons concerning the reform of
 forest conservation policy
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members, and to create a common understanding that government alone
cannot do much to realise their aims.  Many DEC officials now subscribe to
this consensus, and some have resigned to take up new careers in the NGO
community.  Those who remain now have a much wider range of informal
contacts with other conservationists, aside from their former colleagues,
and these help to compensate for the continued lack of institutional
mechanisms for more effective collaboration between the DEC and rest of
the conservation lobby.
The search for such mechanisms has mainly been conducted through the
Conservation Resource Centre and its various experiments with the ICAD
process, as well as the process of consultation which eventuated in the
Biodiversity Country Study.  These activities have struck new chords
between scientific and managerial perspectives on the conservation
business, and have facilitated new partnerships between national and
international NGOs and multilateral donor agencies.  On the other hand,
the limited duration of external funding for the BCRMP has left a big
question mark over the government’s willingness and ability to sustain
such relationships, or even play an active part in their continuation.
Insofar as the government continues to regard the DEC as the main
instrument of its involvement, the utility of the ICAD concept is seriously
limited by the simple fact that this Department is not a development
agency, and recent attempts to strengthen it have only served to underline
this fact.
Even if the DEC is stripped of any official role in the establishment and
management of new conservation areas, and merely regulates the process
by which they gain official recognition, there is still a question mark over
the success of existing ICAD projects in achieving their primary purpose,
which is to provide resource owners with the motivation and capacity to
pursue forms of ‘development’ which are at least consistent with the
maintenance of biodiversity values.  In many parts of the country,
landowners still exhibit a preference for rental incomes from the large-scale
exploitation of their natural resources, and therefore take a dim view of the
opportunity costs of ‘conservation’.  Where ICAD project proponents have
tried to compete directly with logging companies for control of the same
tract of forest, they have only met with limited success, and it is hard to say
what general lessons could be drawn from their few local victories.  Where
such competition is avoided or postponed, it is even harder to determine
the long-term value of any bargains struck with resource owners.  Perhaps
the most important lesson to be learnt from this variety of local
experiments is that forest conservation policy will not get very far unless it
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is integrated with resource development policies at several points between
the level of the local community and the level of the global convention.
Developments in the forest policy process from 1987 to 1992 did not reach
very far outside the pages of the national press or the corridors of power in
Waigani.  It is true that Justice Barnett made trips to the provinces, that
NGOs engaged in a variety of ‘awareness’ activities, and that one
provincial government tried to challenge the powers of the Forests Minister.
By and large, however, the ‘voice of the landowner’ could only be heard
indirectly, through the representations made by nearly all the other
stakeholders whose stakes were already planted in Port Moresby.  Since
1992, donors and NGOs have opened up a more substantial ‘popular front’
through a variety of relationships with specific rural communities which
are directed towards the goals of forest conservation or sustainable forest
management.  However, the government’s vague endorsement of these
moves has not been accompanied by a series of specific innovations in
formal policy which could be directly compared with the corresponding
transformations of stakeholder relationships.  The vision of community
participation contained in the new Forestry Act is limited to the requirement
that landowners be ‘incorporated’ before they transfer control of their forest
resources to the state, and no-one can readily tell what vision of community
participation is contained in the DEC.  Cross-sectoral policy initiatives, like
the Village Services Programme, the National Sustainable Development
Strategy, or even the new Organic Law, have not so far made any discernible
impact on the way that such visions are constructed in specific sectoral
policy domains.
The history of the NFCAP Landowner Awareness Project illustrates the way
in which the shape of community participation in the forest policy process
has been influenced by fortuitous changes in relationships between donor
agencies, government departments, and local NGOs.  All donor-funded
interventions in this aspect of the forest policy domain could be described
as creatures wandering in search of a place where the values of
participation and sustainability will be reconciled in practice, as well as in
theory, and the good news can then be broadcast to the rest of the world.
The haphazard nature of this search is partly due to the frequency of
11.3 Lessons concerning the reform of
 community participation policy
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collisions between the Western image of ‘indigenous tropical rainforest
peoples’ and these indigenous peoples’ yearning for ‘development’.  Having
bumped their heads on this particular contradiction, conservationists in
PNG should by now have abandoned the assumption that customary
landowners have a ‘natural’ interest in the conservation or sustainable
development of their forest resources, that local communities are dependent
on ‘rainforest products’ to meet their subsistence needs, or that outsiders
can empower rural villagers by simply raising their ‘awareness’.
The basic mistake of the policy reformers was to believe that beautiful
human flowers would blossom in the Melanesian forest, once the curtain of
corrupt community leadership had been pulled aside.  Those who cast
landowner company directors as the small-time villains of the policy
process had failed to notice that many rural communities have a long
history of resistance to the values of ‘democracy’ and ‘accountability’ which
well-meaning Europeans have sought to impose upon them, and have
preferred a form of ‘charismatic’ leadership which is not based on the
abstract equality of many small ‘customary’ groups supported by the
institutions of the state, but which promises to overcome their traditional
state of mutual isolation by some extraordinary venture into the unknown.
When the goods are not delivered, the support evaporates, and what had
Wood carving, Sepik river village. Wood and other forest products are used as raw materials for
the handicraft trade, which may be worth about US$300,000 a year
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been a social movement stands condemned as nothing but a ‘cargo cult’.
But when delivery depends on the assistance of some outside agency, then
feelings of dependency are reinforced.  And since the local leaders who
depend on such assistance also often fail to meet the expectations of their
followers, their prestige is no less vulnerable to the rising tides of
disillusionment.  Where rural society is already populated by the ghosts of
past ‘community developments’, villagers are understandably sceptical of
new schemes which they cannot even call their own.
If the policy reformers have now learnt that customary landowners do not
possess an instinctive preference for either conservation or democracy,
they should also have learnt that outsiders do not possess the capacity to
impose any conception of the ‘public interest’ on the decisions which
landowners privately make about the use of their natural resources.  But
the proponents of this public interest have not helped their own cause by
adopting a compartmentalised approach to the problem of raising the scale
of cooperation, and fostering the values of citizenship, within or between
traditional political communities.  Resource owners have good reason to
complain that a set of special-purpose representative bodies, covering a
series of ‘development zones’ whose boundaries fail to coincide, are bound
to become engaged in forms of political competition and conflict which
negate each of their special purposes.  At the end of the day, some form of
local-level government will have to develop the capacity to represent a
local version of the public interest in matters of natural resource
management, or else there will be no sustainable capacity at all.
This does not mean that resource owners can make no progress towards
the goal of sustainable forest management until they have achieved certain
forms or levels of community organisation.  Government agencies, donors
or NGOs can offer various ‘interim arrangements’ which enable or
encourage local groups to resist the blandishments of logging companies
or exert some more positive control over their behaviour.  But they also
need to acknowledge the probability of a very high rate of failure in the
outcome of such experiments, not only because of the familiar structural
obstacles to economic or commercial innovation in rural areas, but also
because the regional diversity of local custom and practice requires the
continual reinvention of wheels to fit the vehicles of such innovation.
While policy makers conspire to overlook such diversity in their search for
general solutions to global or national problems, rural villagers display
their ignorance of formal policy, alongside their lack of technical capacity,
as if these were methods of insulating their economic autonomy from
external interference.
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In this case, patience is the order of the day.  One final assumption which
the policy reformers should now be able to abandon is that high rates of
population growth, or the ‘revolution of rising expectations’, in rural areas
pose an immediate threat to the sustainability of natural forest resources.
Generally speaking, subsistence farmers are responding to population
pressure through the intensification of existing land management practices
rather than a constantly increasing encroachment into ‘primary’ forest (see
section 3.2).  And despite the readiness of many resource owners to consign
their primary forest resources to logging companies, they are quite well
able to constrain the process of extraction by making ‘impossible’ demands
on the developers, and thus defeating their own desire for unsustainable
development.  The critical question here is what local communities expect
to get, what they have actually received, and what lessons they are learning,
as a result of their ‘participation’ in specific aspects of forest policy or
specific forms of forest exploitation.  The widespread deterioration in rural
living standards over the last decade is a lamentable, and much lamented,
fact of life, and one which goes a long way to explain the current pattern of
local resistance to anything which smacks of ‘policy reform’.  If resource
owners are learning that government agencies and resource developers, or
even donors and NGOs, are not going to present them with a ‘free’ solution
to this problem, then they should be moving further down the road to self-
reliance.
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Powers over policy
In this section we take each of our ‘six characters without an author(ity)’,
and ask how each of these characters, and each of the actors who play these
parts, in the conception and pursuit of their own interests, might create
positive or negative outcomes for the quality of their social and natural
environment, firstly for the needs of other characters and actors, and
secondly for that part of the scenery which is covered by forest.  But we
must also concede that our own capacity to answer this set of questions is
not inherently superior to that of the other characters and actors in the play.
Like the rest of the cast, we do not possess an all-encompassing knowledge
of the wants, needs, aims and methods of all the other stakeholders in the
policy process - we can only present a range of possible interpretations, or
snatches of dialogue in which these stakeholders communicate such
knowledge to each other.
In order to represent the future distribution of benefits between our various
characters and actors as a form of dialogue, as an interactive process, we
believe that it is necessary to subordinate the question of ‘who gets what’
(especially money) from the process of ‘resource development’ to the
question of how these characters and actors gain or lose power to influence
the direction of the policy process.  But in order to tackle this second
question, we also need to recognise that ‘power’ is not (like money) a single
negotiable object.  Instead we distinguish four different types of power:
• positional power, which is the capacity to secure the sympathy and
support of other stakeholders, on the assumption of some common
interest;
• bargaining power, which is the capacity to extract resources or concessions
from other stakeholders, by some combination of force and persuasion;
• executive power, which is the capacity to meet the needs and demands of
other stakeholders, thus increasing one’s authority over them; and
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• managerial power, which is the capacity to control the productive
activities of other stakeholders, and thus to determine the quantity and
quality of their outputs.
Since each notional group of stakeholders is internally divided, like a
character played by several actors whose own attitudes and interests may
be quite diverse, we can also distinguish between external forms of power,
which are exercised by one group of stakeholders over other groups of
stakeholders, and internal forms of power, which are exercised by some
members of a stakeholder group over other members of the same group.
The order in which we shall analyse the powers of our six main characters
reflects our own assessment of their relative ‘weight’ within the policy
process, which means the sum of all their influences over the direction of
that process.  This assessment was initially reflected in the title of this study,
which gives a certain priority to the influence of loggers, donors and
resource owners over that of politicians, bureaucrats and NGOs.  We now
reflect a little further on the size and shape of the contribution which each
character makes to the plot, in order to reveal the ways in which the overall
‘balance of power’ leads to a sort of stalemate.
PNG’s forest-owning communities possess a considerable amount of
external positional power, because their ownership of ‘natural’ forests with
high biodiversity values enables them to secure the sympathy and support
of other stakeholders with an interest in biodiversity conservation and
sustainable forest management.  However, this support is partly based on
the highly questionable assumption that members of these communities are
‘naturally’ or ‘traditionally’ inclined to share this interest.  If their actions
show that this assumption is false, they will lose some of this power.  For
example, if they persist in allowing or demanding the degradation or
destruction of their forests by the logging companies, then the donors will
lose interest in funding conservation projects which require the
collaboration of local communities.
At the same time, the external positional power of any particular
community which does exhibit a preference for the conservation or
sustainable management of its forest resource is limited by the sheer
number of forest-owning communities, and the lack of information
available to other stakeholders about the variation between them.
12.1 The powers of resource owners
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Furthermore, this kind of power is closely related to the sheer extent of the
environmental damage which occurs in particular areas, and this means
that communities demanding compensation from mining companies find it
much easier to secure national and international support for their cause
than communities which seek to resist the negative effects of selective
logging practices.
PNG’s forest-owning communities also possess a good deal of external
bargaining power, which is primarily based on the simple fact of
ownership, and there is no immediate prospect of this power being
diminished by the capacity of other stakeholders to remove forested land
from customary tenure, or even to impose new rules and regulations on the
way that customary owners utilise their property.  This external bargaining
power is typically manifested in the continual escalation of compensation
demands made on both mining companies and logging companies, and
also in the growing share of the resource rent which local communities are
able to secure from the national government’s own tax revenues.  The
exercise of such power leads to a contradiction.  On the one hand, as local
communities secure an increasing share of the material benefits of resource
exploitation, they have an additional material incentive to permit the
exploitation of those resources which have not yet been extracted from their
land.  On the other hand, their success reduces the capacity of the
government to regulate the process of exploitation, and the extent of the
demands made on the developers eventually reaches the point at which it
constitutes a disincentive to further investment.  In this respect, the
desperation for development is ultimately self-defeating, but if it thus
serves (unintentionally) to slow down the process of environmental
degradation, it also intensifies the level of conflict between different groups
of stakeholders.
Local communities have some external managerial power, which is closely
related to their external bargaining power, but this is limited to their
capacity to reduce the productivity of the companies working on their land,
mainly through acts of sabotage, intimidation of company personnel,
production stoppages, and so forth.  In their capacity as company
employees, community members are inclined to limit the duration and
intensity of their own work because they are aware of the bargaining power
which stems from their access to subsistence resources.  Local communities
are not able to exercise the same kind of managerial power over public
servants, because the latter do not normally need (or even want) to have
access to their land.  This is one of the factors which encourages community
members to complain about the services (or lack of services) which
government provides, and thus to believe that logging and mining
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companies have greater executive power than either politicians or public
servants.
Local communities themselves have very little in the way of external
executive power.  Their own capacity to meet the needs and demands of
other stakeholders is primarily constrained by the lack of all forms of
internal power.  What this means, quite simply, is that most community
leaders have great difficulty in uniting all community members in the
pursuit of a common interest.  Community leadership is normally
fragmented and contested, as communities are internally divided by a wide
variety of social and cultural boundaries.  Commercial exploitation of a
community’s natural resources often exaggerates and intensifies these
internal divisions, thus ‘disempowering’ the community, but this can
paradoxically add to the community’s external power, since no other
stakeholder is able to command unanimous community support, while all
other stakeholders are able to command some community support, and the
community therefore gives the appearance of playing both ends against the
middle.  Conflict between these other stakeholders over the management of
the community’s natural resources thus comes to reflect and reinforce the
conflict between different sections of the community.  This can sometimes
lead to a sort of stalemate, in which the process of ‘development’ is
effectively blocked, despite the stated wishes of most (or even all)
community members, because they cannot reach agreement on the way it
should proceed.  But it can also lead to a net increase in the total quantity of
material benefits which accrues to the community, as other stakeholders
keep competing for majority support.
There is not a great deal of evidence which would enable us (or anyone
else) to say which sections of which communities might generally be
expected to support the conservation or sustainable development of their
forest resource.  This is partly because community members who seem to
hold these values are primarily interested in opposing other members who
currently hold other values, or else in ‘flattering’ other stakeholders by
reflecting their own stated interests.  Hence the lack of ideological
consistency or commitment which is so characteristic of both local and
national politics.  Hence perhaps the lack of interest which donors have so
far shown in funding the type of research which seeks to link specific
ideologies to specific sections of society.  But this means that donors and
NGOs have very little idea of how to tailor their own pursuit of sustainable
forest management to fit the social conditions prevailing in different parts
of the country.
What evidence we do have suggests that the more highly educated
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members of local communities are more likely to maintain a consistent
stance in favour of conservation or sustainable development than
community leaders whose authority is grounded in customary knowledge.
Although there are a few communities in which customary leaders have
maintained this kind of interest over time, and have even been able to wield
sufficient internal power to put their values into practice, the general
tendency is for the younger generation to wield a growing influence over
decisions about resource management, and for education to be an
increasingly important foundation for the exercise of such influence.
Environmental values are already quite well entrenched in the formal
educational curriculum, though there is still some scope for improvement
on this score, and the continued growth in the overall size of the educated
elite promises a gradual but positive shift in the balance of public opinion.
However, other stakeholders should not place too much faith in this
process of enlightenment.  Firstly, there is a risk that the urban section of
the educated elite will become progressively more detached from the
politics of resource management in specific rural communities.  This risk
does not presently seem very great, because Papua New Guineans spend
such large amounts of time and money travelling back and forth between
town and village, and this pattern of circular migration is associated with
the periodic attempts of educated urban community members to win rural
seats at national elections.  More problematic is the fact that this educated
elite continues to manifest the ideological inconsistency which has
previously been described, for there is no shortage of educated individuals,
inside and outside of the national parliament, who are more than willing to
do questionable deals with logging companies.  And a further problem
arises from the fact that those rural communities with the largest numbers
of highly educated members are generally those whose forests have the
lowest conservation values, for the simple reason that high conservation
values are associated with low population densities, and low population
densities are associated with limited access to social services and limited
opportunities for any form of economic development which would not
entail the extraction of natural resources.
It may be thought that those communities which do opt for the large-scale
exploitation of their forest resource by foreign logging companies will learn
their own collective lessons from the experience of environmental
degradation, and if their forest is left to regenerate, will be less willing to
repeat this experience at some future date.  It may likewise be thought that
communities can learn such lessons from the experience of their
neighbours, and thus come to appreciate the values of conservation and
sustainable management without having to learn them the hard way.  But
the available evidence suggests that this kind of learning process is often
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obstructed by the desperation for ‘development’ and the kind of
parochialism which assures each community of the superiority of its own
external bargaining power, and therefore the capacity of its leaders to do
better deals than those which have been done before or done elsewhere.
Since it is men, rather than women, who do the deals which lead to
unsustainable forms of forest exploitation, it might be thought that female
community members have an interest in more sustainable alternatives,
especially because rural women spend a lot of time collecting water and
washing clothes in the streams and ponds which are liable to be damaged
by large-scale logging operations.  But there is very little prospect of a
Chipko movement emerging in PNG, because trees are so widely regarded
as symbols of masculinity, and women themselves concede that forest
management is men’s business, thus excluding themselves from public
debate on this issue.  Women are only likely to intervene in their capacity as
members of the educated elite, where their views reflect their level of
education rather than their gender.
How can those local communities, or sections of communities, which do
oppose unsustainable forms of forest exploitation increase their own
external and internal power to influence resource management decisions at
the local or national level?  Given the questionable legality of many of the
agreements which currently allow large-scale logging operations to
proceed, and the relative neutrality of the judicial system, the first answer
would be that they need stronger legal representation.  There are two
problems here.  Firstly, there is a very serious shortage of altruistic lawyers
in PNG (as in other parts of the world), and national politicians are
increasingly reluctant to allow foreign lawyers to participate in PNG’s legal
proceedings, partly because they have some reasonable concerns about
national sovereignty, and partly because they do not wish their own
behaviour to be subject to more penetrating legal scrutiny.  Secondly, where
‘dissident landowners’ are driven into the arms of resident commercial law
firms, they commonly find that the financial costs of litigation reduce their
own internal executive power to an extent which exceeds the external
bargaining power which they obtain through their access to the courts.  At
the end of the day, their own financial resources are no match for those of
the logging companies ranged against them, and their bargaining power is
further diminished by the capacity of relevant government agencies to
protect their own interests by obfuscation and delay.
A second form of empowerment is the process of land group incorporation
which is recommended in the resource acquisition procedures set out in the
new Forestry Act.  But this path also contains a number of significant
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obstacles.  Firstly, the proponents of land group incorporation tend to
assume that unsustainable forms of forest exploitation are promoted by a
small minority of community members, against the wishes or interests of
the majority, and that new forms of community organisation will reduce the
external and internal power of this deviant minority.  Given the dynamics
of community politics and the widespread culture of resource dependency,
this assumption is questionable.  Secondly, the process of land group
incorporation, as envisaged and promoted by the government, requires a
great deal of work to be done by stakeholders outside of the community,
and since the government does not have the resources to undertake most of
this work, much of it devolves upon the developers, whose own interests
then come to the fore.  Finally, bureaucratic initiatives to include this
process in the renegotiation of existing forestry projects have been thwarted
by the same lack of resources, and a corresponding lack of interest on the
part of other stakeholders.  If there is no concerted action on the part of
other stakeholders, local communities do not have the capacity to carry out
this process on their own account.
A third form of empowerment embraces a range of techniques, like
‘participatory rural appraisal’, which NGOs and donor-funded government
agencies have been using to promote concepts of self-reliance, democratic
decision making, and sustainable resource management, amongst the
membership of selected rural communities.  The main problem with these
techniques is their tendency to either assume the inherent superiority of
moral over material incentives, and thus to be obstructed by local desires
for the tangible material benefits of ‘development’, or else to offer
alternative forms of economic enterprise whose own sustainability is open
to question.  Furthermore, the proponents of these techniques often make
appeals to ‘local custom’ or ‘local knowledge’ in ways which lay them open
to the risk of seeming to patronise community leaders who understandably
believe that Western knowledge is the key to economic growth.
If it is accepted that most members of landowning communities have an
understandable need for reassurance that the economic alternatives to
unsustainable forms of forest exploitation are themselves sustainable, and
will produce substantial material rewards within a relatively short period
of time, then it is necessary to consider the relative prospects of three
distinct forms of alternative development - small-scale forestry (using
portable sawmills), the marketing of non-timber forest products, and the
expansion and diversification of small-scale agriculture.  It is also necessary
to take account of the high levels of scepticism which already exist in many
rural communities because of the failure of previous economic experiments
promoted by outside agencies.  The problem here is that other stakeholders
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tend to conceive this choice of ‘alternative development options’ in terms of
their relative economic feasibility, assuming that landowners either have all
the skills or none of the skills required to make them work.  In practice,
their feasibility depends on the relationship between local forms of
indigenous knowledge and specific forms of technical innovation.  Under
current market conditions, the creative powers of indigenous knowledge
are heavily concentrated in the field of agricultural (or rather horticultural)
innovation.  This means that most villagers can travel much faster along the
road to self-reliance by selling agricultural products than by selling ‘forest
products’, although some so-called ‘forest products’ turn out to be the by-
products of existing cultivation regimes.
The economic question posed for the proponents of sustainability is
whether their own resources are best invested in developing new ways for
local resource owners to exploit a forest resource which they had not
previously exploited at all, or in supporting those productive activities in
which the resource owners already have the greatest capacity to secure
higher returns from their own labour.  A sensible answer requires an
appreciation of the fact that most Papua New Guineans are traditionally
‘garden peoples’ rather than ‘forest peoples’.
Whatever the ultimate aims of other stakeholders, it is unlikely that there is
any single form of empowerment which could be said to constitute the
ideal learning curve for the majority of landowning communities in PNG.
Those who propose that ‘custom’ is the only way to define the local public
interest (e.g. Taylor 1997) must not only recognise the diversity of local
custom, but also the diversity of the local ‘development’ experience.  The
overall process of national ‘development’ is not reducing the diversity of
this experience in ways which could be taken to encourage the formation of
standard models or methods of community empowerment.  For this reason,
there soon comes a point at which it no longer makes sense to speak, in
general terms, about the powers of resource owners, and where different
communities must be allowed to go their own separate ways - as indeed
they will.
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Box 12.1  Lessons learnt by resource owners in negotiation
of the Makapa logging project, Western province
Source: Wood 1997
Landowners in the Makapa area, particularly in the southern villages, have watched their region
undergo a process of stagnation over the last fifteen to twenty years.  At the same time, there is a
widespread concern with the meaning of the year 2000, which is thought to be associated with
apocalyptic events, including the end of all current property relationships and the return of Christ.  The
logging project is seen as one vehicle that will quickly shift people into modernity and its associated
wealth before the year 2000 has its effect.  An equally significant basis of local support for logging was
the proliferation of ‘landowner’ companies which provided large numbers of men with access to
unprecedented wealth, prestige, and influence, by bringing these men into regular contact with
developers and the often unstable networks of elite and bureaucratic power.
Yet, despite this expansion of practical knowledge of modernity, Port Moresby, and PNG’s forestry
sector, the landowners have so far been unable to create any organisation that represents their unified
interests.  Given the pre-existing divisions amongst the landowners, and the intense competition among
men for senior positions in landowner companies, such an organisation was perhaps unlikely to have
been successful, but the landowners have been further divided and destabilised by competing logging
companies who do not necessarily require strongly unified and independent landowners.  Rather,
each potential investor is interested in maintaining patron-client ties with a small group of ‘representa-
tive’ landowners who are fundamentally dependent on the investor for further funds and resources.
Landowner company board members and directors who find themselves in this position are unlikely to
always represent the views and interests of the wider community.  This point is not lost on other
landowners, who often bitterly criticise directors for tricking the ‘ground people’ by doing deals in Port
Moresby without telling them.  The result is that the ‘ground people’, even when overtly supporting a
particular logging company, are highly suspicious of the directors of its associated landowner
company.  Partly because of such criticisms, some men holding senior positions in a landowner
company rarely leave Port Moresby, and consequently have little direct contact with people at the
village level.  Such divisions within factions further contribute to the sense that, in the village, no-one
really knows what is going on, apart from the often hidden pursuit of self-interest.  The government did
not intervene or in any way regulate this process.  It simply refused to recognise the legitimacy of any
of the feuding landowner companies, but by failing to intervene, it facilitated, by default, the
landowners’ transformation into competing and highly unstable factions which were organised and
funded by potential investors.
Many landowners still have no real understanding of the transaction which they were entering into
when they signed the initial TRP agreement.  They believe that, since they own the land, all their
possessory rights in the trees are still active.  People also think that they will be able to ‘try out’ any
logging company that comes on to their land, and that, if they are not happy with its operation, they will
be able to send it away.  Embedded in this view is the belief that they still control access to the
resource, and that they have the capacity to negotiate terms and conditions as the project develops.
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Local people learned that landowners who collaborated with Sovereign Hill (the logging company)
were temporarily empowered in their relationships with other villagers.  Since the logging contractor
was obliged to recognise their land claims when they were granting access to their forests, they
acquired a greater capacity to decide how land was to be used.  They found that it was easier to put
land into the logging project than it was to withhold it, yet they eventually lost status and wealth as their
kinsmen contested the legitimacy of their land claims, demanded a share of their logging incomes, and
spread rumours about them cutting ‘private deals’ with Sovereign Hill.  Similarly, while collaboration
with Sovereign Hill initially empowered the executives and directors of WongWong (the landowner
company), they ultimately lost authority, and became increasingly alienated from their constituents and
kinsmen, amidst the accusations and rumours that they had been ‘bought off’ by Sovereign Hill.
At the same time, the material interest which many landowners had in the outcome of the logging
operation involved many of them in a quest for increased literacy and knowledge of the law.  On the
other hand, other powerful actors, from WongWong executives to forestry officials, put up many
obstacles to their quest for an understanding of their legal rights and the various contracts which they
had purportedly signed.  Despite these handicaps, it seems that knowledge about forestry and
corporate law, the conduct of business, and the behaviour of overseas companies has increased as
a result of their experience.
Forestry policies debated and formulated in Port Moresby were ultimately of little relevance to resolving
the specifically local problems of the LFA.  Instead, logging proceeded as a function of the temporary
balance of allegiances between the jumbled ‘class’ of customary landowners and Sovereign Hill.  The
former easily divided themselves into factions which took up temporary positions in either facilitating or
blocking Sovereign Hill’s access to local forests, depending on their contingent political alliances.
The most important arena for future action in the practice of forestry management in PNG is not to be
found in the formulation of additional policies, laws, and institutions at the national level.  Instead, the
challenge ahead is to foster forms of social organisation and political culture, at the local level, which
can more effectively safeguard the interests of local communities, rather than just advancing the
agendas of aspiring politicians or big men.  The point here is that the forces of regionalism and
nationalism are both weak in PNG.  One of the most important consequences of this weakness is that
foreigners with capital can (whether intentionally or not) easily manipulate struggles between local
factions for their own benefit.  These local-level power struggles then result in a multitude of negative
social, economic, and environmental consequences.  Meanwhile, the lion’s share of the benefits
derived from log exports accrues to the national government and foreign capital, while local actors
merely fight over the patronage offered by overseas logging companies in return for their political
loyalty.
Box 12.2  Lessons learnt by resource owners in the
Hawain Local Forest Area, East Sepik province
Source: Leedom 1997a
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Large-scale logging companies are not by any means the only private
companies with a demonstrable stake in the national forest policy process.
The ‘forest industry participants’ registered under the terms of the new
Forestry Act include landowner companies, forestry consultants and
furniture-makers, while there are many ‘non-participants’ whose interest
stems from their use of forested land for other purposes, such as mineral
extraction or commercial agriculture.  However, the title of this study does
serve to underline the dominant role of the logging companies in the public
profile and economic foundations of the ‘forest industry’, and we propose
to consider the substance of their power by comparing it with that of the
mining and petroleum companies which have an equally substantial stake
in the business of natural resource extraction, rather than that of the other
‘forest industry participants’ whose own powers are more limited and
whose interests are highly varied.
The external positional power of the private sector as a whole, its capacity
to command public sympathy for its position within the national policy
process, is limited by the gulf which still separates the ‘spirit of capitalism’
from the value-system of modern PNG society.  This is evident in the
peculiar connotations granted to the word ‘business’, and also by the
‘ideology of landownership’ which has previously been described.  The
multilateral financial institutions are naturally keen to promote the values
of market competition and capital accumulation under the rubric of
structural adjustment, and are therefore sympathetic to those private sector
representatives who routinely complain of their inability to sway debates
on public policy.
In the forestry sector, however, this element of sympathy has been greatly
reduced by the oligopolistic structure of the log export industry, and by
those ‘Asian’ business practices which appear to lack the transparency
favoured by the global advocates of level playing fields.  Because of this
lack of transparency, it is hard to say how much sympathy and support the
big logging companies are able to obtain from each other, although they
certainly present a united public front through their spokespersons in the
FIA, and they have powerful backing from the Japanese trading companies
which still dominate the regional raw log trade.  Public perception of the
‘log export cartel’ as a distinctive business community therefore seems to
be warranted, yet fails to take account of the mutual support networks
which operate within different ethnic segments of the resident ‘Asian’
business community as a whole.  These ethnic divisions are normally
submerged in a form of public debate which tends to regard ‘European’ and
12.2 The powers of the private sector
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‘Asian’ business elites as two horns in a devilish national dilemma.  The
demonisation of the log export industry thrives on a mood of public
disquiet about the ‘Asianisation’ (or Malaysianisation’) of the national
economy.  The proponents of forest policy reform have played on these
fears in ways which threaten to frame the policy process as part of a global
struggle between Western heroes and Oriental villains for control of an
innocent Melanesian soul.  The public reticence of the resident Asian
business elites, inside or outside the forestry sector, follows from their
recognition of a simple fact of life - that public policy debate in PNG is
dominated by the masters of the English language.
This does not mean that the logging companies have given up the battle for
public opinion.  During the heyday of forest policy reform, from 1992 to
1994, their position was ardently defended - or at least covered - by the
directors of the landowner companies with whom they had business
dealings, some national politicians were persuaded (without too much
difficulty) to join the chorus of protest, and Rimbunan Hijau caused a minor
public uproar by founding a second English-language daily newspaper (The
National) which looked as if it might function as a propaganda sheet for the
log export industry.  In retrospect, however, it seems that this burst of
‘public relations’ was a gambit prompted by the sudden loss of other forms
of power, and the captains of this industry would even prefer to have
friends in high places who do not trumpet their true allegiances to a
sceptical public audience.  The reputations of their noisier supporters were
too readily dismantled, both in the ‘independent’ local media and by
Australian investigative journalists.  The log exporters have since relied
primarily on the FIA (and its English-speaking executives) to present their
contributions to public policy debate in the shape of full-page press
advertisements and letters to the editors of all the national newspapers.
The World Bank can normally rely on friendly local journalists and NGOs
to put the case for the opposition.
Outside of the forestry sector, there are certainly very few private sector
organisations which are prepared to voice public support for the log export
industry.  The big mining and petroleum companies, despite the
oligopolistic structure of their own industries, are all domiciled in English-
speaking countries, have no business dealings with the logging companies,
and like to portray themselves as good corporate citizens wedded to the
same values of transparency as the donor agencies which are funded by
their home governments.  From their point of view, the log export industry
gives foreign capital a bad name.  In order to distance themselves from its
‘Oriental’ qualities, they have emulated the example of the World Bank by
attempting to establish greater mutual understanding with those
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environmental NGOs
which are their most vocal
critics, thus forming a
loose ‘Western’ alliance of
strange bedfellows.  In
contrast to the Sino-
Malaysian or Japanese
logging companies, they
have also been forced to
defend their
environmental records
against close public
scrutiny in their countries
of origin, and have
therefore invested heavily
in forms of ‘greenwash’
designed to enhance their
positional power at a
global level.
And yet these lumbering
giants of the national
economy have not done
much better than the log
exporters in the public
opinion stakes.  The
trouble is that they are big
and they are foreign -
much bigger, and not
much less foreign, than the Asian logging companies which they affect to
despise.  And in the case of hard-rock mining companies, they also make a
mess.  For each of the many newspaper stories which document their good
citizenship, and thus testify to the power of the corporate press release,
there is another which documents the countervailing hostility of some other
stakeholders in the mineral policy process.  The mining and petroleum
companies have their own supporters in Parliament, just as the logging
companies do, but their political support is no less fickle, since elected
politicians know that more political capital can normally be made by
attacking resource developers than by defending them.  And that is also
why the local NGOs remain recalcitrant, at least in public, even if they
recognise the need for tactical alliances with more progressive sections of
the business community.  The one point on which the mining and
petroleum companies have demonstrably scored a goal for their own
Logging companies do not exercise much control over the
work practices of local employees
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progressive reputation is in the appointment of outspoken and respected
members of the national elite to their boardrooms and senior executive
positions.  The logging cartel has no such national voice to support it from
within.
Despite the divergence of corporate strategies and tactics, foreign resource
developers also face similar constraints in the exercise of other kinds of
power within their respective policy domains.  While mineral resources are
legally the property of the State from the outset, and the State must
purchase rights to forest resources from customary landowners before it
can pass them on to a third party, all developers are obliged, in practice, to
bargain with government agencies and landowning communities
throughout the period in which they seek access to such resources.  All
developers are likewise limited in their capacity to use force in order to
secure those rights of access which the State has granted them.  They have
found, to their cost, that any overt deployment of state power - in the shape
of a police riot squad, for example - is liable to provoke acts of physical
retribution against the developer which the government has no lasting
capacity to control, and which may even be organised or promoted by local
politicians and NGOs.
Perhaps the most important difference in the relative bargaining powers of
logging, mining and petroleum companies stems from the physical quality
of their investments in time and space.  Unlike mining and petroleum
companies, whose major investments are tied to particular physical
locations for long periods of time, logging companies can shift equipment
and personnel from one place to another at relatively short notice, both
within and between their concession areas.  This means that the bargaining
power of the logging companies is enhanced by their capacity to make false
promises, and later threaten to close down their operations when these
promises have clearly been broken.  In this case, their bargaining power is
grounded in their capacity to use ‘divide-and-rule’ tactics on scattered
groups of resource owners, and the process of forest policy reform has not
yet made much impact on this kind of power.  On the other hand, the
reform process has made a much bigger, albeit belated, impact on their use
of similar tactics to ‘persuade’ politicians and bureaucrats to let them keep
the lion’s share of the resource rent collected from their log exports.  In this
case, the bargaining powers of the World Bank and other donors have
persuaded the national government to adopt a fiscal regime, and a set of
transfer pricing controls, which forces the log exporters to accept a ‘normal’
rate of profit as one condition of their investment.  In this case also, the
loggers now find themselves in the same boat as the mining and petroleum
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companies.  They must try to rationalise their production methods in order
to safeguard their profit margins.
The executive powers of resource developers are limited by the variety, size
and persistence of the needs and demands which are voiced by resource
owners and their political representatives.  Mining and petroleum
companies certainly spend a great deal more than logging companies on
‘benefit packages’ for local communities in their respective spheres of
operation, although the differential is reduced if it is calculated as a
proportion of operating costs or gross revenues.  And yet, however much
they spend on benefits in cash or kind, the developers find that it is very
difficult to secure a proportional increase in their authority over the
recipients, primarily because the Melanesian ‘gift economy’ is designed to
produce a situation of material equivalence between the transacting parties,
and local landowners cannot get enough ‘hand-outs’ to achieve this goal,
precisely because they can never afford to make a return payment to their
benefactors.  Developers therefore tend to conclude that they are dealing
with manifestations of greed and ingratitude, and what they spend on
‘community relations’ becomes a ransom which is necessary to avoid the
risk of further conflict.  The size of this ransom reflects the government’s
own inability to satisfy the aspirations of local communities.  Where the
mining and petroleum companies provide the infrastructure, goods and
services which should have been a government responsibility, they now
recoup a portion of their spending in the shape of tax concessions.  The
logging companies have generally been more flexible and less accountable
in their risk avoidance strategies, but if they have thus gained more control
of their own local supporters through the judicious distribution of material
rewards, they have not been able to persuade the forest policy reformers
that their capacity to build public roads matches their capacity to purchase
private loyalties.
The networks of personal loyalty through which the logging companies
prefer to operate, whether in the local or the national arena, are sometimes
described as a set of ‘patron-client’ relationships.  But who are the patrons
and who are the clients?  Dauvergne’s (1997) study of timber politics in
Southeast Asia describes the logging company bosses as the clients of
powerful political patrons, on whom they are dependent for the grant of
lucrative timber concessions.  But domestic critics of PNG’s logging
industry tend to reverse this relationship, describing landowner company
directors, national and provincial politicians, and some forestry officials as
clients of the logging company bosses, whose executive power is thus
assumed to be greater than their own.  Recent academic commentators have
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hedged their bets by writing about ‘smart alliances’ between loggers and
politicians (Majid Cooke 1997a), which became ‘defensive alliances’ in the
context of donor-driven policy reforms (Wood 1997).  It is certainly true
that PNG’s open political system is one which does not allow many of its
leaders to accumulate and entrench their executive power to anything like
the extent which is possible in countries like Indonesia or Malaysia.  But
in this case, we are not simply dealing with a differential balance of power
between separate groups of stakeholders; we are dealing with differential
perceptions of relationships which rarely last very long, and whose
instability is the critical factor which prevents most of the players from
manipulating the ‘system’ to their lasting advantage.  Since the political
arena is overcrowded and unpredictable, small balloons of power are
always being punctured, friends soon become enemies (or vice versa), and
past favours may never be reciprocated.
By overestimating the executive power of the log export industry, its
critics have also exaggerated its managerial power.  Like other resource
developers, the loggers can obviously exercise some control over the work
of their contractors, suppliers and debtors, but politicians and landowners
like to insist on their own share of backward linkages, and the discipline
of the market-place is then overlaid with a measure of political constraint
and the usual dose of political uncertainty.  Mining, petroleum and
logging companies could all be said to ‘patronise’ local landowner
companies, in one way or another, but if it is true that logging companies
have frequently exploited these institutions for their own benefit, the
management of landowner companies has just as often defied the best
efforts of business development staff employed by the mining and
petroleum giants.  In their efforts to control the work of the bureaucracy,
logging companies may persuade some public servants not to do their
jobs, while mining and petroleum companies may sometimes do their jobs
for them, but the public sector generally presents itself as a slow-moving
or immovable object, especially when donor agencies and private
companies are pushing it in opposite directions, as they have been doing
in the forestry and conservation sector.  In this policy domain, the ‘work’
of politicians has been subject to the same countervailing pressures, which
is one of the reasons why some logging companies have sought to evade
the forest policy stalemate by pretending that they are not in the business
of logging at all.
Internally, the logging companies face additional problems of managerial
control which receive very little publicity, but which make it harder for
them to meet the World Bank’s stringent demands for greater operational
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efficiency.  Unlike the mining and petroleum companies, their workforce is
scattered across the countryside, and not amenable to rigorous supervision
or tight operating schedules.  The racial and linguistic barriers between
Asian and Melanesian sections of the workforce are a constant source of
conflict and misunderstanding, especially where Asian field staff seek to
control the work of local landowners (see Box 12.3).  Staff turnover rates are
correspondingly high, the skill composition is corresponding low, and
training schemes are only found in large and long-established operations.
Generally speaking, the larger the concession area, and the longer its period
of operation, the more likely that a reasonable set of work practices will
have been put in place, and some serious effort directed towards the goal of
sustainable forest management.  Although one company (Rimbunan Hijau)
controls more than half the country’s total log exports, there is little
evidence to suggest a uniform standard of management in its various
concessions.  At the same time, the big logging companies cannot afford to
expose their management problems to public scrutiny, since this would
grant another hostage to fortune - or at least to the World Bank.  As a result,
the problems of operational management are concealed beneath an abstract
debate about the merits of the new forest revenue system, in which both
sides repeatedly accuse each other of bad faith, and where each example of
the economics of a single logging operation seems to represent the best or
worst of what is possible.
When the log exporters claim that rising taxes, rising front-end costs and
falling export prices have reduced their profit margins to the point where
they are literally being driven out of business, they imply that log export
prices are subject to the laws of supply and demand in a free world market.
Yet the history of transfer pricing and business relationships in the regional
raw log trade shows why the World Bank can call their bluff.  Whatever the
export price may seem to be (when transfer pricing is substantially
controlled), the log exporters are primarily constrained by the need to
maintain the export volumes promised to the trading companies who are
their real ‘patrons’ - to the extent that exports are allowed.  The price will
simply be adjusted to facilitate that flow - so long as the importers need to
have the logs.  Meanwhile, the uncertainties of the physical and political
environment substantially detract from the pursuit of sustainable forest
management as a matter of corporate self-interest.  The logging companies
rush to recover their front-end costs for the same reason that the mining
companies engage in ‘high-grading’ extraction strategies.  As a result, the
values of sustainability can only be imposed by forms of bureaucratic
regulation which then become an extra disincentive to investment.
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Counting the cost of machinery and equipment, the construction and maintenance of infrastructure, and
upholding landowners’ good will, logging is a high-risk business.  Moreover, regardless of alliances
made with landowners, politicians and others, good networking alone does not convert trees into
profits.  Knowledge of the forest is important.  Unless logging companies are prepared to undertake
vigilant surveys themselves, they may have very little idea of what ‘their’ patch of forest may yield.  It
is frontier territory, where one may strike gold or oil, but luck has a lot to do with it as well.  The survival
of logging companies is therefore driven by the urgent need to recover front-end expenses or sunk costs.
While the cost structure of machinery, parts, and maintenance may be relatively inflexible because it
represents the cost of ‘dead labour’, infrastructure costs and landowner fees may be more amenable to
manipulation.  The flexibility can be seen in the frequently sub-standard quality of logging roads and the
various means and degrees by which landowner companies are manipulated or exploited in order to
save costs.  Niugini Lumber has been found in breach of government logging standards on a number of
occasions since the start of its operations in Lak.  Operations were suspended for six months in 1993 for
non-compliance with permit conditions and for severe environmental degradation. Operations were
again suspended in February 1995, and this time the list of transgressions included irregularities in the
construction of a log pond, the poor quality of snig tracks causing unnecessary damage, the poor
standards of road construction and drainage, and excessive damage to residual tree stands. These
irregularities seem to indicate poor engineering standards, but a key factor would have been the speed
at which logging was done. The resulting problems have been aggravated by the poor quality of
technical staff available to supervise field workers.
Field staff are mostly technicians - surveyors, accountants and foremen.  There are no foresters among
the staff at Lak.  The field staff are expected to cope with very complex work and social situations in a
country with which they have little familiarity, but they have been given little preparation in human
resource management.  Malaysian field staff were thus expected to deal as best they could with a local
labour force whose members might not have any previous experience of regular wage labour, yet their
authority was limited.  The company’s head office in Port Moresby took all major decisions regarding the
application of inducements (whether carrots or sticks) to local workers, landowners, and decision
makers at provincial and national levels.
Although local men were very keen to secure employment with Niugini Lumber because of the
fortnightly pay packet, they were in no hurry to accept the discipline of wage labour, whose negotiation
therefore became a serious business.  Workers have often spent the better part of the day, between the
times of checking in and checking out, engaging in activities unrelated to their work, like gossiping.
There has also been a high level of absenteeism.  Such resistance to the discipline of wage labour was
clearly connected to the confidence which workers derived from their status as landowners.
Under conditions of chronic uncertainty, company staff must constantly reinforce their relationships with
timber workers who may also be landowners, but their capacities and their techniques for doing so vary
Box 12.3  Logging in practice: management problems in the Lak area,
New Ireland province
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Donor agencies have acquired a stake in the reform process which clearly
reaches beyond the national constellation of stakeholder relationships.
Northern governments and multilateral agencies have developed their own
interest in the management of ‘tropical rainforests’ for domestic political
reasons which are not well understood or appreciated in those tropical
countries whose rainforests are supposed to benefit from the application of
foreign aid.  At the same time, the shape and size of the Northern ‘aid
industry’ has been subject to other kinds of domestic political pressure
which are equally opaque to many of its intended beneficiaries.  Aid
budgets have contracted in the face of doubts about the overall
effectiveness of foreign aid, aid agencies have sought to define their ‘core
business’ in regional and sectoral terms while ‘outsourcing’ more of their
activities to private companies and NGOs, and donors have been more
inclined to subject their grants and loans to conditions of ‘good
governance’.
In this last respect, it may seem that donors are seeking to enlarge their
powers over policy in those countries and sectors in which they do
business.  On the other hand, those aid agency officials who have a vested
interest in one country or one sector are under greater pressure to justify
this interest against competing interests within the same agency, in what is
frequently a hostile domestic political climate.  While the ‘donor
community’ may seem to be making a concerted effort to drive PNG’s
forest policy process along a pre-determined path, the actions of its
representatives are silently constrained by their battle against the forces of
‘donor fatigue’ within their own organisations and political constituencies,
and their room for manoeuvre is correspondingly reduced.
It is fairly clear that the World Bank’s interest in PNG’s forest policy process
with their personalities.  One of the Malaysian field staff at Lak told me that ‘timber workers look upon
the logging company like god’, but they do not make sacrifices to the deity.  A former operations
manager was said to have adopted a policy of ‘bending with the wind’ - providing financial or other
assistance as and when requested.  According to the current operations manager, ‘he thought he was
Jesus Christ’, but he was soon recalled by head office and now languishes in happy anonymity back
in Sarawak.  Another manager fell victim to attacks of anxiety after being subjected to physical
violence by timber workers on a couple of occasions, and he was also flown home.
Source: Majid Cooke 1997a
12.3 The powers of donor agencies
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has been driven by the belief that donors can exert greater collective
leverage over this process than could be achieved in any of the other
countries in the Asia-Pacific region which still have so much natural
rainforest available for conservation or sustained yield management.  In
other words, the donor dollar ought to save more trees in PNG than it can
save in larger countries, where the leverage is limited, or smaller countries,
where the trees are not so plentiful, or many countries (large and small)
which have already lost a larger proportion of their natural forest resources
through past mismanagement.  The Australian dollar is especially
significant in this respect, because the total value of Australian aid to PNG
still exceeds 20 per cent of the PNG government’s total revenues, and
although the size of this benefit package diminishes with each passing year,
an increasing proportion of it is tied to specific sectoral development
programmes, as the element of general budget support is phased out.
When AusAID (then AIDAB) established a new set of sectoral priorities in
1993, the forestry and conservation sector was not given a very high
priority, mainly because a number of other donors had already made
substantial funding commitments to the NFCAP.  But the sheer size of the
total Australian aid package means that its forestry and conservation
component greatly exceeds that of any other single donor.  At the same
time, some of PNG’s other bilateral benefactors (the United Kingdom, the
United States, and now Germany) have decided to quit the Melanesian
scene, so that aid from these sources will henceforth only make an indirect
appearance through their contributions to multilateral institutions or those
NGOs which retain some kind of stake in Melanesian forest management.
What this means, in effect, is that the main feature of donor leverage over
the national policy process is a sort of double act between AusAID and the
World Bank, where each relies on the other to exert specific forms of power,
while other donor agencies play walk-on parts and keep their exit options
open.  The Bank functions as a broker, selling specific parts of the national
policy process to these minor actors, while selling the prescriptions of a
‘global’ donor community back to the PNG government.  This helps to
reduce the friction generated by Australia’s use of tied aid to fund a small
army of Australian consultants, whose ‘advice’ to the PNG government is
readily construed as a form of neo-colonial domination.  Australian tied aid
gravitates towards the implementation of ‘institutional strengthening’
projects because these hold little attraction for other donor agencies with
lower levels of commitment to the more intransigent problems of
governance in PNG.  At the same time, the Australian government has
asked or allowed the Bank to administer that part of its aid programme
which is dedicated to strengthening the hand of local NGOs in the forest
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policy process, because it acknowledges the Bank’s need to secure wider
public support for the conditions imposed on the PNG government under
the Structural Adjustment Programme.  The Bank polices macro-economic
policy, while AusAID strengthens the Police Department.  Such is the
agreed division of responsibilities.
Considerations of national sovereignty and international diplomacy make it
hard enough for donors to muster positional power within the recipient
country, but the domain of forest policy in PNG is fraught with additional
problems which stem from the intensity of political conflict between
resident stakeholders.  While the smaller donor agencies can afford the
luxury of dealing with specific groups or institutions, and all donors can
generate publicity for their assistance to disadvantaged sections of the
national community, the two Big Brothers are too big to avoid being seen to
take sides in this national policy contest, yet do not have the executive
power to satisfy the expectations and demands of all the protagonists, and
are therefore bound to make enemies in several quarters.  The World Bank
in particular, in its role as the global policeman, attracts the same kind of
hostility as the other ‘multinational monsters’ which are supposedly
responsible for pillaging the natural wealth of paradise.  The Bank has
therefore tried to appease those sections of the local NGO community
which are responsible for articulating such fears, firstly by offering
financial support for their practical contributions to conservation or
sustainable development, and secondly by wrapping the latest Structural
Adjustment Programme in the strings of progressive forest policy.  This
strategy appears to be warranted by the Bank’s previous success in winning
the qualified support of many international NGOs (especially those based
in Washington), but is also partly motivated by its growing impatience with
the national government’s lack of executive and managerial power over the
policy reform process.  For this latter reason, it carries the obvious risk of
alienating those members of the political and bureaucratic elite who doubt
that NGOs, for all the noise they make, have any greater capacity to satisfy
popular demands for ‘development’ of any kind.  And if the Bank believes
that pressure from the local NGO community will somehow persuade the
log export industry to clean up its own act, the log exporters still seem to
regard the Bank’s courtship with the NGOs as proof of the bad faith which
deploys the values of ‘environmental management’ as a disguise for the
defence of Western commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and an
implicit attack on the merits of the national government’s ‘Look North’
policy.
Meanwhile, the radical wing of the local NGO community has been equally
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suspicious of the Bank’s true motives, because its members are well aware of
the Bank’s opposition to some of their favoured policy measures (especially
the imposition of a log export ban), and they continue to air their suspicions
in public because their populist political philosophy would otherwise be
compromised.  Any public reconciliation with the Bank would seem to
contradict their long-standing campaign against the twin devils of Land
Reform and Structural Adjustment.  When this campaign reached its height in
1995, some rural villagers were apparently persuaded to believe that the Bank
was not only attempting to sell their land from under their feet, but was also
‘responsible for the influx of Asian logging companies into the country
because it wants the PNG government to repay its loans quickly’ (Sagir
1997:144).  And if the radical NGOs have not already done enough to damage
the Bank’s reputation with the mass of rural resource owners, there are plenty
of fundamentalist Christian preachers who portray it, literally, as the
instrument of a Satanic ‘one world government’ whose installation heralds
the Millennium (see Stewart and Strathern 1997).  The finer points of forest
policy are no match for the Mark of the Beast.
Those donor agencies (including international NGOs) which attempt to
influence forest policy at the local level, by dealing directly with rural
communities, therefore have some reason to avoid any statement of sympathy
for causes espoused by the World Bank, even if they are constrained from
joining in its condemnation.  If they cannot derive their positional power from
some higher authority, be it the World Bank or the national government, their
executive power is limited by competition from resource developers and
religious organisations.  On the one side, the developers offer substantial
material rewards for very little effort.  On the other side, the churches offer
social services and spiritual redemption.  What else can donors offer which
the people really want?  When they offer ‘Integrated Conservation and
Development’, they propose alternatives to ‘unsustainable’ development
which may be unsustainable themselves, run the risk of raising expectations
which cannot be satisfied, and expect the resource owners to appreciate that
unexploited forests are equivalent in value to the money which the donors
spend on the administration of their own activities.  It is hardly surprising
that the recipients of such ‘aid’ are often led to wonder whether their
benefactors are bargaining with peanuts or practising a form of exchange
which makes no economic sense at all.  If donors therefore find it hard to
build up their own executive power at the local level, because they appear to
spend more money on the satisfaction of their own material needs than on
meeting the ‘unrealistic’ demands of the ordinary villager, they will sooner or
later find that they also lack bargaining power with those other stakeholders
who compete for the villager’s attention and respect.
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The main reason why donors have been driven to deal directly with rural
communities, however strange those dealings may become, is that they
have begun to question the utility of dealing with the State.  It is true that
donors became engaged with the recent round of forest policy reform as a
result of the national government’s request for assistance from the World
Bank in 1989, that the vast bulk of the funds which donors have since
committed to the cause of sustainable forest management in PNG has been
directed through government channels, and that much of it has been
directed towards the reform of government institutions and practices.  But
the reform process became a donor-driven process, and the donors have
been driving it away from the State, because the State appears to lack the
executive and managerial power to sustain the implementation of a
coherent policy agenda which matches the donors’ own sectoral objectives.
What this means is that the donors’ own executive power over the national
government is limited by the variety and mutual inconsistency of
ministerial demands on the overall pattern of government expenditure,
while the government routinely fails to ‘absorb’ a substantial proportion of
the grants and loans which donors have made available to meet these
demands, because the bureaucracy is unable to make the commitments
necessary to release these funds.
This lack of ‘absorptive capacity’ limits the bargaining power of the donor
agencies on both sides of the aid relationship, since providers and
beneficiaries are both liable to conclude that the game is not worth the
candle.  If the government cannot secure the results for which the donors
wish to pay, the donors must then decide whether to purchase more
managerial power over the government itself, by ‘strengthening’ those state
institutions which are responsible for relevant aspects of policy, or to by-
pass the state altogether, or even to by-pass the country.
The trouble with institutional strengthening projects, as AusAID endlessly
discovers to its cost, is their tendency to create unsustainable enclaves of
alien luxury within a poverty-stricken state apparatus.  Money appears to
be well spent by the well-heeled ‘advisers’ in well-furnished offices, but
once the project is successfully completed, the resentment of their national
counterparts gives way to a sense of relief, and normal work resumes.
While AusAID champions the virtues of downsizing, outsourcing,
flexibility and user-friendliness, PNG’s public service remains stubbornly
faithful to the old-fashioned values of the Australian colonial
administration, which Brunton (1996) describes as the ‘legacy of
bureaucratic feudalism’.  Local NGOs appear to possess the virtues which
the public service is not yet prepared to accommodate, but may possess
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them in an abundance which even the donors find difficult to tolerate.  While
the number of local NGOs active in the forestry and conservation sector has
expanded to fill a greater part of the space made available by the promise of
additional donor funding, their own absorptive capacity is restricted by their
tendency to resist the development of organisational structures which would
make them more accountable to donor agencies, and more ‘professional’ in
the business of project implementation.  The donors therefore find that it is
no easier to exercise managerial power over local NGOs than over
government departments, but in this case the problem lies in a deficiency of
red tape rather than a surfeit of it.
In the final analysis, however, the power which donors exercise over the
forest policy process does not depend on the executive or managerial
capacities of local NGOs, but rather on the fiscal crisis of the State.  It was the
fiscal indiscipline of the Wingti government, from 1992 to 1994, which
provided the World Bank with the leverage required to prevent the Chan
government from reversing the progress already made in the rationalisation
of the forestry sector, and force it to impose the new fiscal regime which
transformed the distribution of resource rent derived from the log export
industry.  And this use of the Bank’s bargaining power, within the context of
structural adjustment, reveals the central paradox of the aid relationship -
that the continued exercise of such power depends on the continued crisis of
governance which the donors are supposedly attempting to resolve.
When Papua New Guineans talk about the powers of politicians, their
normal point of reference is now the National Parliament, with its array of
Ministers, Vice-Ministers, Shadow Ministers, Provincial Governors, and
backbench MPs.  Prior to passage of the new Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local-Level Governments in 1995, there were no Provincial
Governors in the National Parliament, because each of the nineteen
provinces had its own elected assembly, headed by a Provincial Premier, with
a similar division of roles and responsibilities to that found in its national
counterpart.  In dispensing with these elected assemblies, the new Organic
Law seems, at first sight, to have effected a very substantial reduction in the
total number of politicians, by eliminating the ‘provincial politicians’
altogether, and leaving ‘national politicians’ to exercise a new measure of
power over the administration of provincial affairs.  However, this apparent
concentration of power is belied by some further considerations:
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• Firstly, the reconstructed provincial assemblies now include a number of
elected local council presidents and some appointed members, who may
now be seen to qualify as ‘provincial politicians’ in their own right.
• Secondly, the new connections established between the provincial and
local levels of government may mean that all elected local councillors
will henceforth be seen as ‘local politicians’, where they were previously
more likely to be classified as ‘community leaders’.
• Thirdly, the new set of legal and institutional relationships between the
national and provincial levels of government has only served to intensify
the competition for a seat in the National Parliament, so that each elected
MP must now deal with a larger number of former politicians or would-
be politicians who are either disputing the results of the last election or
planning their campaign for the next one.
If the word ‘politician’ were used in the much broader sense, to include all
those living individuals who have ever contested a national or provincial
election, as well as those who have recently contested a new round of local
government elections, then the membership of this ‘stakeholder group’
would increase quite dramatically, from just over one hundred to well over
ten thousand.
Nearly all the individuals in both the smaller and the larger category would
certainly count themselves as resource owners in their own right.  Most of
them have been government employees at some stage in their careers, even
if they were obliged to give up their positions in the public service, at least
temporarily, in order to stand for election.  Many are now employed in the
‘private sector’ (including the NGO sector), including those who were
formerly public servants.  But few of them would qualify as ‘traditional’
community leaders, because electoral contests of all kinds are nowadays
regarded as the happy hunting ground of the country’s ‘educated elite’,
whose members have completed at least ten years of formal schooling.
Given the high rate of occupational mobility, the intensity of political
competition, and the rapid fluctuation of political fortunes, no clear
distinction can be drawn between the country’s political, bureaucratic and
business elites.
The very large number of ‘failed politicians’ or ‘would-be politicians’ who
are currently excluded from the National Parliament play a significant role
in limiting the powers of the ‘real politicians’ who have temporarily gained
entrance to it.  Nearly all MPs have been elected with a minority of the
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votes cast in their respective electorates, and very few can claim to
represent a wider national constituency through their membership of a
political party, since political parties are little more than parliamentary
factions competing over the allocation of government ministries.  Whatever
position an MP takes on matters of public policy, his enemies will claim
that he is either catering to the demands of a very narrow local constituency
or has been surreptitiously ‘captured’ by an equally small group of wealthy
stakeholders with a vested interest.  The distribution of political support for
the log export industry is a clear case in point.
Despite the limits thus placed on the positional power of MPs, the
weakness of political parties and the chronic lack of Cabinet solidarity
appears to enhance the bargaining power and executive power of
individual MPs, especially government ministers and provincial governors.
The recent history of forest policy is littered with erratic decisions by
ministers, vice-ministers and acting ministers, with or without the
agreement of their Cabinet colleagues, which are frequently at variance
with the laws, regulations and procedures to which the government is
formally committed, and which have normally had the effect of granting
special favours to specific logging companies.  Such political decisions are
not the sole preserve of the Forests Ministry, but have also been made by
the holders of other portfolios, such as Finance, Agriculture, or Trade and
Industry.  At the same time, provincial governors and other MPs from the
same province have made occasional attempts to control or undermine the
deliberations of Provincial Forest Management Committees in order to
effect their own ‘special deals’ with individual developers.  Indeed, the
sheer number of individual MPs who have been able to influence the
development of a specific forestry project within a short period of time has
tended to limit the executive power which each one can exercise, since they
are rarely acting in concert, and often acting at cross purposes.  As these
conflicting decisions are routinely exposed to public scrutiny through the
mass media, the yawning gap between formal government policy and
personal political practice reinforces the lack of public faith in either policy
or politicians.
Many national politicians seem to feel that they have little choice but to use
their own bargaining power with developers in order to satisfy demands
for ‘development’ within their own electorates.  To satisfy these same
demands, they also bargain with each other to secure greater personal
control over the state’s own purse strings, thus increasing the proportion of
public spending which can be represented as an act of personal generosity.
And in order to satisfy the demands of their own supporters within the
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ranks of the educated elite, many of them look to create new paid
positions, or redistribute existing posts, in any branch of public
employment where they can exercise some influence.  However, this
exercise of executive power is rarely accompanied by any corresponding
increase in their managerial power.  Where MPs divert public revenues
into pet projects, rather than their own pockets, these are not properly
planned, monitored or evaluated, and seldom prove to be sustainable.
And when ministers or governors can persuade their colleagues to
approve a new round of political appointments in government
departments or statutory bodies, they provoke a new round of bureaucratic
resistance to ‘political interference’, and new incentives for frustrated
public servants to seek an alternative career in politics.  Such actions are
part of a vicious circle through which politicians justify the exercise of
greater personal executive power by reference to the failings of a
bureaucratic system whose own powers are diminished by the same
exercise.
This is not to imply that PNG’s ‘crisis of governance’ is so severe as to
present any immediate threat to the institutions of parliamentary
democracy, or to prevent national politicians from reforming their political
system in ways which will facilitate a more coherent approach to matters
of public policy.  There is evidence to suggest that a growing proportion of
the votes cast in national elections, especially in the urban and regional
electorates, are being cast in the direction of candidates who promise to
clean up the government’s act rather than distribute instant material
rewards to their personal supporters.  With each rotation of the electoral
cycle, it is possible to discern an increase in the proportion of MPs whose
commitment to reforming specific policy domains, commonly based on
their prior work experience, offers some kind of defence against the private
temptations of public office.  There is no prospect of this group turning
itself into a single political party, but they are still liable to support reforms
to the electoral system - like the adoption of preferential voting - which
will enable more candidates to broaden the basis, and raise the level, of
their appeal to the electorate.  In those areas where sustainable forest
management - or rather the lack of it - is a major political issue, candidates
who can win votes in many parts of the electorate are more likely to
oppose destructive logging practices which benefit a few people at the
expense of the majority.  But even under the present system, where the
politics of the parish pump and pork barrel still determine electoral
outcomes in many rural areas, MPs who support destructive logging
practices can still be thwarted by their many local opponents, including
those who would agree that logging is the only option for ‘development’,
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study352
because there is no way for one developer and one MP to satisfy the
competing demands of so many local community leaders who aspire to be
politicians in their own right.
If politicians can accidentally limit the incidence of unsustainable
development in the act of competing for control over the distribution of its
immediate benefits, public servants can achieve the same result through
their acts of passive resistance to political interference in their respective
policy domains.  The fear of political interference appears to justify the
rigid bureaucratic adherence to sundry sets of rules and regulations, even if
it does not excuse the combination of apathy and arrogance which tends to
infect the process of communication between public servants and the public
whom they are supposed to serve.  Given the number of public servants
who harbour private ambitions for a political career, there is a certain irony
in their complaint that ‘politics’ is what prevents them from meeting the
public demand for an improvement in the quantity and quality of ‘services’,
but there is also some truth in their conception of ‘civil society’ as an arena
in which all other stakeholders are engaged in a perpetual struggle to rip
up the body of the State.  Politics in PNG fits Migdal’s model of ‘dispersed
domination’, in which ‘neither the state (nor any other social force)
manages to achieve countrywide domination and in which parts of the state
may be pulled in very different directions’ (Migdal 1994:9).  The masters of
red tape may thus regard their own struggle against these centrifugal
tendencies as the main reason for their employment.
Although it may seem that bureaucrats are engaged in a constant struggle
with politicians over the allocation of scarce government resources, where
the dictates of public policy are opposed to the trade in personal favours,
the competition amongst the politicians themselves is duplicated
throughout the executive arm of government.  As the whole state apparatus
is continually ‘restructured’ to suit the proprietorial claims of individual
ministers in unstable coalition governments, and politicians still trample
across the current set of institutional fences which separate one policy
domain from another in their constant search for additional executive
power, the officials in each ‘bit of state’ compete to obtain the maximum
personal benefit from each rearrangement of the institutional furniture, and
keep their distance from each other by constantly mending the fences which
the politicians like to break.  At the same time, within each of these isolated
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‘bureaucratic communities’, a further division arises between those who see
some immediate advantage in serving the politician of the moment, and
those who prefer to wait for a more congenial political master, and thus
serve Father Time or the ‘public interest’.  But these are not the only options
open.  Some officials are transferred from one agency to another when they
get promoted by a newly appointed national minister or provincial
governor, normally as a result of some prior personal connection; some
resign in the normally vain hope of realising their own political ambitions
with the approach of the next national election; and others simply defect to
the private sector in the search for more rewarding occupations.  The best
and brightest tend to move on; the rest keep serving time.
The continual circulation of agencies and personnel limits the exercise of all
forms of state power, not only the external powers of the government as a
whole, but also the internal capacity of the state to function as a single
stakeholder with a coherent and consistent position within any given policy
domain.  However, these limitations are unevenly distributed between
different government departments, and more especially between the
different levels of administration, from what Migdal (ibid:16) calls the
‘commanding heights’ and the ‘central offices’ down to the ‘dispersed field
offices’ and the front-line ‘trenches’.  In PNG, the commanding heights of the
bureaucracy are occupied by the Departments of the Prime Minister, Finance
(now Treasury), and Personnel Management, which are either responsible
for the overall coordination of national government policy or administer the
distribution of human and financial resources between the competing
demands of government ministers, line departments, and provincial
authorities.  This is the level at which bureaucrats and politicians play for
really high stakes, as reflected in the fact that a new Secretary of Finance is
appointed almost every year.  Officials in these central departments also
engage in the continual invention of new structures and practices which are
intended to impose greater financial discipline on the rest of the
bureaucracy, and thus possess a kind of negative bargaining power which is
manifested in the refusal to release resources to those agencies which cannot
meet the latest standards of accountability.  This kind of power has been
reinforced by the conditions attached to the latest Structural Adjustment
Programme and by some of the financial provisions in the new Organic Law
on Provincial Governments and Local-Level Governments.  As a result, the lower
levels of the government hierarchy appear to have even less bargaining
power, and therefore less executive power, than they had even under the old
system of provincial administration, and there is no guarantee that they will
develop the new forms of managerial power required to reverse this second
vicious circle.  At the lower levels of the hierarchy, in provincial and district
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offices, there remains a great deal of regional variation in the distribution of
power between public servants and other stakeholders, but the common
problem is that bureaucratic communities at these levels are too small to
resist the forces of ‘political interference’ in the same manner as the central
government agencies in the national capital.
As a result, the powers of the bureaucracy are dissipated well before they
reach the level of the village, especially in the most ‘backward’ parts of the
country, which also happen to include most of the areas with large volumes
of commercially attractive timber in their forests.  Front line government
officials can rarely get their hands on the very substantial travel allowances
stipulated under the Public Service General Orders, which they regard as
reasonable compensation for the noxious task of spending time in any
village but their own.
The transformation of the old Department of Forests into the new National
Forest Service is an example of that process of ‘corporatisation’ which the
donor community has persuaded the national government to undertake as
a means of enhancing or restoring the bureaucratic powers which are
threatened by erratic ministerial behaviour.  During the first two years of its
existence, from 1992 to 1994, forestry officials at all levels of the hierarchy
showed a greater willingness and ability to regulate the log export industry
through their dealings with existing permit-holders (see Nen 1997, Wood
1997).  The reunification of national and provincial offices within a single
corporate body, with the simultaneous introduction of an intermediate
regional level of administration, also bolstered the internal managerial
power of the senior staff, while the generosity of the donors permitted an
improvement in their general working conditions, and a flow of additional
resources to the lower levels of the hierarchy, which reduced the temptation
to seek alternative employment.  However, some aspects of this process of
empowerment proved to be rather fragile when the bureaucratic reformers
could no longer rely on the support of a reforming minister, and were thus
driven back to the trenches of passive resistance.  Their defences are no
longer shored up by an elite squad of donor-funded technical advisers, and
their maintenance now seems to depend on the World Bank’s
conditionalities.
Even if the process of corporatisation enables the bureaucrats to keep the
politicians at a safer distance, at least for some period of time, it does
nothing to reduce the isolation of a statutory body from other bureaucratic
agencies, or from other stakeholders with a legitimate interest in its own
policy domain.  Although the reformers originally expected the NFA to
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finance its own operations out of the income generated by the new forest
revenue system, the Finance Department has consistently thwarted such
ambitions, and budgetary allocations to the Authority are therefore still
subject to some political manipulation, as evident in the World Bank’s
insistence that they not be cut too far.  On the other hand, the Bank itself
now seems to doubt whether donor interventions have made a lasting
impact on the capacity of the National Forest Service to deal effectively
with resource owners and logging operators at the local level, whether
through the production of Forest Management Agreements, the policing of
Timber Permit conditions, or the distribution of royalties and levies.  For all
these reasons, it would be hard to conclude that the National Forest Service
has achieved any discernible increase in its positional power with other
stakeholders in the forest policy process, or that such a change would
eventuate if the process of corporatisation were to be taken further.  The
‘castle in the forest’ just has thicker walls.
While donors regarded the partial corporatisation of the forestry
bureaucracy as one of the cornerstones of the policy reform process, they
have not shown any corresponding enthusiasm for transforming the status
of the DEC.  Despite the talk of fostering an ‘entrepreneurial culture’
through the implementation of the DEC Strengthening Project, the
Department continues to lack the bargaining power which would be
necessary to any form of entrepreneurial behaviour.  Its only significant
contribution to national government revenues derives from the issue of
Water Use Permits, and this licensing function is now being sought by
provincial authorities under the terms of the new Organic Law.  The
Finance Department still tends to regard the DEC as a waste of scarce
government resources, and this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, because
the DEC has never managed to obtain either the budgetary allocation or the
operational capacity required for the enforcement of environmental
regulations and effective management of conservation areas.  This means a
further lack of bargaining power with the logging companies which breach
these regulations as a matter of course, and a corresponding lack of
executive power to satisfy the demands of the forest conservation lobby.
Although the DEC Strengthening Project has resulted in a new
departmental structure which promises an improvement in front-line
capacity through the creation of a Field Services Division, and the
Conservation Resource Centre has taken a lead in performing expensive
experiments with ICAD methodologies, it is not clear how either of these
donor-funded interventions will change the long-term balance of power
between the Department and other government agencies.
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Given the current limitations on the power of those sections of the
bureaucracy with a primary mandate to deal in the domain of forest policy,
the problem is to decide:
• which of these limitations are to be overcome by projects designed to
enhance the capacity of these bureaucratic institutions; and
• which will be more effectively overcome by shifting the relevant
responsibilities to other government agencies, private companies, or
NGOs.
Since corporatisation and privatisation have received general endorsement
in recent government policy statements, one might infer that government
agencies should only assume responsibility for those activities in which
they have a proven record of effectiveness or for which there are no
alternative agencies willing and able to undertake the task.  However, the
bureaucrats have some reason to believe that the process of ‘outsourcing’ is
an open invitation to new forms of political interference or political
corruption, and are highly sceptical of donor-funded projects which
purport to strengthen the capacity of NGOs or private companies to do the
work of government.  Their scepticism is partly rooted in their direct
experience of those institutional strengthening projects which are carried
out by consulting companies under contract to donor agencies.  Even in
respect of those responsibilities which are (for better or worse) retained by
government, a similar dilemma arises over the relative capacities of
different government institutions.  For example, it is not clear whether the
cause of community participation in the forest policy domain is best served
by strengthening the front-line capacities of national departments or
provincial authorities, or by strengthening the autonomous management
capacities of local-level governments.  These questions should still not be
allowed to obscure the larger (but more difficult) question of how
bureaucratic agencies of all kinds can develop a recognition of their own
limitations, and a corresponding capacity to develop mutually beneficial
contractual relationships with other stakeholders, including the resource
owners who rarely even know the rudiments of public policy regarding the
‘development’ of their resources, and certainly cannot keep pace with the
continual renovations being made to the bureaucratic edifice of rules and
regulations.
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Box 12.4  The role and problems of bureaucratic regulations
The enforcement of development controls, especially licence and permit conditions and environmental
approvals, increasingly brings the state into competition with landowners and developers.  Sometimes
landowners request assistance from the state to enforce conditions; sometimes they are allied with the
developer in seeking to undermine them.  In either case, the state’s inability to enforce the regulations
it has laid down undermines its capacity to do so in the future.
The reasons for poor enforcement are complex and interrelated.  To begin with, the bureaucracy has
little or no experience of prosecuting regulatory offences.  There is no pre-Independence legacy of
knowledge about how to prosecute for breach of environmental plan conditions.  Indeed, the state
appears to have some difficulty securing convictions in relation to criminal matters, in relation to which
it has considerable experience.  Problems with prosecutions include lack of adequate records to
establish proof of facts on which the conviction would be based, lack of expert evidence, and lack of
detail in the legislation about how, by whom, and in what court prosecutions should be commenced.
Regulatory systems are also inadequately entrenched.  Inadequate monitoring, poor record keeping,
tolerance of breaches, and confusion about what the conditions actually are have contributed to
bureaucratic inertia, so that it is difficult to determine which breaches are most serious, and whom to
prosecute first.  Much of the administrative resource available is absorbed in maintenance of the
regulatory system itself – answering correspondence from approval holders and reviewing new
applications for approval - rather than in monitoring and enforcement activities.
Enforcement in most regulatory systems depends largely on the willingness of those to whom laws
apply to obey those laws.  In the case of large multinational foreign companies, there are usually
considerable persuasive influences for them to submit to the regulatory system.  The risk of adverse
publicity outside PNG is too great to engage in outright disobedience of environmental conditions.
However, where the rules of behaviour are ill-defined or ambiguous, there is often room for manoeuvre
or renegotiation of the conditions of environmental approval.  In the case of companies which are not
vulnerable to public censure at home, confusion and overlap between different development approvals
can provide large loopholes.  Officials sometime purport to relax conditions of ministerial approvals by
letter, and companies rely upon these to justify non-compliance.  While the government may well
succeed in any action to enforce those conditions (on the basis that the official acted outside his power),
the company only needs to arm itself with the basis for a half-credible argument justifying their default
in order to fend off local criticism.
If the threat of prosecution for non-compliance were a real one, permit-holders and approval-holders
might take more care to ensure that they were legally, and not just apparently, acting in compliance with
conditions.  But, as there has never been a successful prosecution under the Environmental Planning
Act, they can assume that they are unlikely to be prosecuted as long as the breach is not outrageously
flagrant.
Source: Whimp 1997
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The distinction which we have drawn between the radical and pragmatic
wings of the national NGO community may be construed in terms of the
search to establish two different kinds of power within the forest policy
process.  The more radical members appear to be mainly interested in the
accumulation of positional power, by mobilising broad public support for a
specific position within that process through various forms of advocacy,
while the more pragmatic members appear to be more concerned with the
development of their executive power, by addressing the needs and
demands of resource owners for specific types of assistance or advice.  In
practice, most NGOs are seeking both kinds of power, and in theory, most of
their members are liable to deny that they are seeking any kind of power
which they can call their own, rather than that of their notional grassroot
constituents. NGOs do not form a natural ‘cartel’, in the same way that log
exporters or even donor agencies do, because they are not all ‘selling’ the
same kind of product.
The separation of an ‘NGO position’ from that of the churches and other
elements of ‘civil society’ (journalists or scientists, for example) is itself a
somewhat artificial result of the way in which the donor community has
contrived to insert this position into the forest policy process.  The internal
and external relationships of the ‘NGO community’ are quite different in
other policy domains.  In the domain of ‘law and order’ policy, for example,
the focus of advocacy shifts from the depredations of resource developers to
the repressive instruments of state power, and there are few points of
common interest between the advocates of ‘human rights’ and those church
agencies which run juvenile detention centres or wage public battles against
drug abuse.  In the ‘softer’ domains of health or gender policy, the overall
level of antagonism between stakeholders is generally much lower, and the
voice of radical advocacy is hardly even heard.  Even in the domain of
mineral policy, which resembles forest policy in highlighting the contest
between the custodians and developers of a natural resource, the presence of
local NGOs has been accomplished under quite different conditions, since
they are not bargaining their way through a second contest between
developers and donors.  In the mineral policy process, it is harder to
distinguish the role of NGOs from that of local and national politicians who
also jostle to present the grievances of a few landowning communities
directly to the mining and petroleum companies, which then seek to
accommodate all these power-brokers within a ‘stakeholder forum’ which is
managed by their own specialists in corporate and community affairs.
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In the forest policy process, by contrast, the NGOs have a more distinctive
role as the brokers between a large mass of rural resource owners with a
lower public profile and an equally nebulous ‘global community’ whose
local interests are managed by the representatives of donor agencies.  In
this domain, the NGOs do not even talk to the developers - a point which
sets them apart from many politicians and landowner company directors,
with whom they must compete quite vigorously for the honour of claiming
to represent the true soul or real interest of the masses.  As a result, the
forest policy process features a lot of strange talk about the correct method
of achieving ‘landowner representation’ on sundry boards and committees,
as if it were possible to distinguish ‘landowners’ from the wider body of
‘citizens’ in matters affecting the management of customary land.  At the
same time, the radical NGO position has a two-faced quality which adds
another element of confusion to the policy process: those who sell donors
the image of landowners as natural conservationists are also selling
resource owners the image of donors as foreign imperialists.  Beneath the
global green agenda lurks a parochial xenophobia.
Most of the international NGOs with a stake in PNG’s forest policy are
reluctant to endorse the radical versions of dependency theory espoused by
some of their local counterparts.  The conflict between global and local
priorities may therefore reflect a greater divergence of interest within the
local NGO ‘community’ itself, between those who like to bite, and those
who are content to lick, the foreign hands that feed them.  If the biters still
get fed, even by the likes of the World Bank, this seems to imply that the
relationship between NGOs and donors is a marriage of convenience which
is forced upon both parties by their common disaffection with the powers
of bureaucrats and politicians, as well as their common antagonism
towards the log export industry.  The question is whether the local NGOs
can simultaneously meet the needs of rural resource owners and satisfy the
donors that the net result is better local management of natural resources.
Where donors acknowledge their own inability to ‘strengthen’ the
institutions of government, they can hardly expect the government itself to
strengthen the capacities of local NGOs, and are therefore driven to regard
this task as one of their own responsibilities.  But donor intervention in the
work of local NGOs adds further tension to a difficult relationship, since
there are few, if any, local NGOs which are willing and able to design and
manage donor-funded ‘projects’ in a way which satisfies the methods of
evaluation and the standards of accountability adopted by the funding
agencies.  When the source of funding is a bilateral agency like AusAID, the
design and evaluation of local NGO projects is primarily intended to
reinforce the donor’s positional and executive power with its ‘own’ NGO
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community rather than develop or transform the managerial powers of its
PNG counterpart.  But if this means a lowering of the standards imposed on
the performance of local NGOs, it may still have a negative effect on their
executive capacities, because the needs of their own ‘clients’ are liable to be
ignored.
If the bargaining power which local NGOs can exercise with the donor
community rests on the assumption of government corruption or
incompetence, at least in the domain of forest policy, their bargaining
power with the government is correspondingly reduced by the fact that
national politicians and bureaucrats alike tend to regard the NGOs as their
competitors, whether in their ‘political’ capacity as tub-thumping populists,
or in their ‘bureaucratic’ capacity as the providers of alternatives to
inadequate government services.  The radical wing of the NGO community
would have more bargaining power with the politicians if it could
undertake to deliver a certain proportion of the popular vote, but this
capacity was not much in evidence until the last national election.
Although some of its members and supporters have now been elected to
Parliament, it is not at all clear that any of them currently ‘represents’ a
radical constituency within the forest policy process.  On the other hand,
those bureaucrats who believe that the government’s executive failures are
the result of political interference, rather than administrative incompetence,
now have fresh evidence to support their claim that NGOs - at least the
radical variety - are simply public speaking platforms for the latest breed of
politician.
The mere fact that NGOs are obviously more ‘political’ animals in some
policy domains than in others goes some way to explain why the
bureaucrats in the rather ‘unpolitical’ Department of Home Affairs have
been unable to come up with an official ‘NGO policy’ which commands
widespread support for a more productive partnership across the board.
The institutional mechanisms through which the churches presently deliver
a wide range of social services on behalf of the government do not provide
appropriate models for a mutually acceptable division of responsibilities
between relevant government departments and NGOs engaged in the forest
policy process.  It is not hard to understand the reluctance of the NFA to
share power with NGOs which have a mission to expose political and
bureaucratic corruption in the log export industry, but the DEC has hardly
got much further in developing contractual relationships with NGOs who
seem to share its own objectives, and do not represent an obvious threat to
its reputation.
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Government officials may have less reason than donor agency
representatives to overlook the limited managerial capacities of local
NGOs, and more reason to believe that NGOs are overstating their capacity
to do the work of government in order to mobilise additional public
support for their criticism of official policies and practices.  At any rate, the
result is another vicious circle, wherein local NGOs are unable to establish
themselves on an equal footing with government agencies unless they first
agree to submit themselves to a series of ‘capacity-building’ exercises which
threaten their own sense of mission and make them feel that they are mere
tools in the pursuit of some larger corporate or bureaucratic purpose.  The
further development of contractual relationships between some of the more
pragmatic local NGOs and other stakeholders in the forest policy process -
whether they be government agencies, donor organisations or private
companies - is likely to open up another split within the NGO community,
between those members who are willing to take on the opportunities and
risks of corporatisation and those who firmly adhere to the belief that
‘small is beautiful’, and either retain more limited ambitions to deliver
specific forms of assistance to particular communities, or else prefer to
function as professional critics and campaigners.
Strategic directions and political realism
• It is more important that a NFAP be strategic than attempt to be fully comprehensive. Likewise, the
participation of NGOs should not be expected in all areas.  It may be legitimate for governments to
start with a concentration on government roles alone, before going on to a wider, participatory
process.
• Criteria need to be developed for determining the types of NGOs, and other bodies, which should
participate.  NGOs may have to prove their credibility before they are taken into account.
• Forestry rarely gets high up a central government agenda.  Participants in a NFAP should know how
far up the decision-making ladder their deliberations are likely to reach.
Communication and information
• An information and communication strategy is needed for a two-way process of education and
consultation to develop between the NFAP and the public.
• Government agencies and NGOs need information about each other’s objectives and working
practices, and training to adapt to these in joint fora.
Appropriate policy, agreements and institutions
• The rights and responsibilities of the NGO-Government relationship in the NFAP should be defined
through consensus, and formalised in writing and/or actions.  A procedure for reconciling possible
Box 12.5  How to develop constructive partnerships with NGOs in a National
Forestry Action Plan
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points of disagreement in the pursuit of common goals should also be developed.
• NGOs need a forum to meet and coordinate approaches to the government and private sector.
• A core planning agency of government is preferable as the lead NFAP agency - to provide strategic
coherence and to nurture the participation of NGOs and others.
Participatory approaches and capacity
• Local expertise in participatory methods, communications, education and media activities should be
identified and consulted early in a NFAP process and goals set for long-term strategy towards adap-
tation and institutionalisation of participatory approaches in the development of ‘new professionals’.
• Based on an independent review of capacity amongst NGOs, a capacity needs assessment should
be made and indicators of development, participation, representativeness, accountability and
capacity developed with NGOs.
Catalysts for the process and learning environments
• NGOs with recognised capabilities may help with early participation in NFAP processes and in
starting to develop the links between top-down and bottom-up processes.
• Coordinators of NFAPs need to be able to deal with more devolved directions and complexity of
process and “NGO specialists” should be included in programmes of core technical support for
NFAPs.
• Frameworks for judging the achievement of progress should be developed and early phases of the
NFAP should be assessed with all participants and an early round of adaptation should take place
before spreading the programme.
A phased approach with adequate resources, skills and time
• Phasing the process can slow the rate of raised expectations and development of conflicts and allow
them to be better met and dealt with.
• Early priority should be given to supporting small NGO projects to develop confidence amongst NGO
partners and to demonstrate particular approaches.
• Higher investment will be required in the early phases of a NFAP which involves NGOs and others;
experience shows that in time this becomes more cost-effective.
Source: Mayers and Peutalo 1995
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If each national election heralds a new act in the forest policy drama, as
well as all the other ‘shows’ which go to make up the national policy
process in PNG, we may now consider how the latest act in this drama is
shaping up in the wake of the national election held in June 1997.  Has the
reform process finally run out of steam?  Are there signs of change in the
balance of power between the various stakeholders?  Who now cares about
sustainable forest management, and what might they do to promote it?
And what forecasts can now be made about the ‘medium-term’ directions of
the forest policy plot?
Forest policy was not a major campaign issue in the 1997 national election,
except perhaps in those electorates where some of the candidates could
grind their axes on the impact of existing logging operations or the
allocation of prospective timber permits.  Even the impact of structural
adjustment was thoroughly eclipsed, as a topic of national political debate,
by the so-called ‘Sandline mercenary crisis’, which resulted from the
government’s decision to engage a British ‘security’ company, Sandline
International, to undertake a ‘surgical strike’ against the rebel forces on the
island of Bougainville.  When the mercenaries arrived in PNG in March,
they were promptly arrested and ejected by the Defence Force, whose
commanding officer, General Singirok, then demanded the resignation of
the Prime Minister, while civilian demonstrators took to the streets of the
national capital to join in the protest.  Foreign journalists were attracted by
the scent of a military coup, but the crisis was defused when Singirok
agreed to accept his own dismissal on condition that the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister, and Defence Minister also volunteered to step aside
for the duration of a Commission of Inquiry into the circumstances of the
The next act
in the play
13.1 The new government
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mercenary contract (see Dinnen et al. eds. 1997).  Although the Commission
found no evidence to warrant further judicial action against the three
politicians, and they returned to office before the election took place, many
of the candidates challenging for seats held by members of the ruling PPP-
Pangu coalition used the Sandline affair to illustrate their own charges of
corruption and incompetence.
It is hard to say what impact this argument might have made on the actual
distribution of votes in June, but the Prime Minister and Defence Minister
both lost their seats, both coalition parties returned to Parliament with a
considerably smaller number of elected members, and some of the newly
elected ‘Independent’ candidates had been amongst the more vocal
supporters of General Singirok’s act of ‘mutiny’.  It was widely expected
that this group of Independents would join forces with the members of
parties previously in opposition to the Chan-Haiveta coalition to form a
new government untainted by the Sandline legacy.  However, this
arrangement foundered on the question of whether Michael Somare, the
‘father of the nation’, or Bill Skate, the leader of the People’s National
Congress, should be the new Prime Minister, and Skate’s supporters,
including most of the Independents, decided to take out their long spoons
and sup with the ‘devils’ in what remained of the former ruling coalition.
Despite this compromise, the new government is not thought to be as well-
disposed towards the log export industry as its predecessor.  Sir Julius
Chan’s personal defeat means that the loggers have certainly lost one of
their most powerful allies in Parliament, and his replacement, Bill Skate,
appears to have no personal stake in any timber concession, because he
represents an urban electorate.  The former Forests Minister, Andrew Baing,
was able to retain his own seat, and took over the leadership of the People’s
Progress Party, but was unable to secure anything more impressive than the
Agriculture and Livestock portfolio in the new Cabinet, and was then
ejected from the ruling coalition.  The new Forests Minister, Fabian Pok, is
one of the newly elected Independent candidates, and like the Prime
Minister, he represents an electorate in which the loggers have no interest.
The World Bank seems to regard the composition of the new government as
a window of opportunity through which some further progress can be
made with the process of forest policy reform.  The local NGO community
is rather more sceptical, since most of its members have long since decided
that no politician can be trusted.
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In the latter part of 1997, massive forest fires did far more damage to PNG’s
forest resources in a matter of weeks than the logging companies have
managed in ten or twenty years.  The severity of the drought caused by the
El Niño weather pattern has been a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition
of this conflagration.  And the ‘resource owners’ who have lit these fires are
not engaging in a traditional land management practice.  The main ‘cause’
of the conflagration is the abundance of modern combustible materials in
the hands of irresponsible individuals (many of them probably children
playing with matches) and the absence of traditional or modern social
institutions which can control or sanction their behaviour.  Although the
coincidence of dry weather and volcanic eruption has undoubtedly caused
previous incidents of catastrophic forest loss in some parts of the country,
and the volcanic soils created by these events have subsequently nourished
some of the country’s ‘richest’ stands of natural timber (which now act as
natural magnets to the logging industry), the latest round of destruction has
enveloped many high-altitude areas which have not been subject to such
natural catastrophe for a very long time.
The impact of the drought on both the commercial and subsistence sectors
of the national economy has already been severe.  The Ok Tedi copper mine
was forced to cease operations for several months because the level of
water in the Fly River was too low for barges to reach the port of Kiunga.
Production at the Porgera gold mine was also interrupted by the loss of
water required for its milling operation.  The output of cash crops in many
parts of the country has fallen markedly, and cannot be expected to regain
normal seasonal levels for at least a year.  The supply of food crops has also
diminished, especially in highland areas, where the staple sweet potato
crop has been affected by widespread frost as well as drought.  The
combination of drought, frost and widespread forest fires has also fuelled
the millenarian fears and fantasies which were already spreading through
the countryside.
The forest policy process has not been directly affected by this turn of
events.  With one or two exceptions, forest fires have not caused any
significant damage to operational timber concessions, since they have
mainly been confined to higher altitudes.  Dry weather otherwise makes life
easier for logging companies, and is not amongst the list of hazards which
are said (by industry spokesmen) to threaten the economic future of the log
export industry.  The critical question is whether the national government,
faced with a drastic decline in its projected revenues from mineral and
13.2 The latest weather
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agricultural exports, and the additional cost of emergency drought relief
programmes, will now make financial concessions to the log export
industry and try to speed up the allocation of new timber permits as part of
a desperate attempt to balance its own books.
Even before the impact of El Niño began to be felt, the national government
had already asked the World Bank to organise another package of loans
under the Structural Adjustment Programme.  This package, worth 50-100
million US dollars, was primarily required in order to tide the government
over a period of general fiscal reform, which involves the introduction of a
Value Added Tax and the simultaneous reduction of import duties in
accordance with the dictates of the World Trade Organisation.  The need has
now been magnified, not only by the impact of the drought on the national
economy, but also by the falling price of three major export commodities -
oil, gold, and raw logs - and by the government’s decision to postpone the
introduction of VAT for another year, pending further discussion of its
economic consequences.  As a result, the Bank has now made a further
appearance on stage in its role as a godfather and ghost-writer,
pronouncing upon the virtues of the policy statements uttered by the
Minister for Finance in a budget which sounds as if it was written by the
Bank’s officials.  The government therefore has little room in which to make
new concessions to the log export industry, unless the Bank can be
persuaded to agree.
It does seem that the log exporters have fallen on hard times in the period
since the national election, not because of any change in government policy,
nor because of the unusual weather, but because of a dramatic reduction in
prices for processed and unprocessed timber in their Asian export markets.
This is partly due to the financial problems afflicting the national
economies of Southeast Asia, and partly due to the continuing stagnation of
the Japanese construction industry, as well as the long-term trend for
Japanese builders to use alternative raw materials.  Several log export
operations in PNG have been scaled down or suspended as unsold stocks
of logs are piling up, and export prices barely cover the cost of
production80.  The FIA has therefore cranked up its campaign against the
forest revenue system, demanding a substantial reduction in export taxes,
opposing the introduction of the Project Development Levy, and joining in
the lobby against the introduction of VAT.  But the Bank has so far turned a
13.3 More structural adjustment
80
 At the time of writing, average prices have fallen below US$60/m
3
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resolutely deaf ear to the industry’s cries of distress, and has preferred to
engage local NGOs in debate on the wording of a new set of sustainable
forestry conditions to be attached to the next structural adjustment loan.
This debate has not produced a consensus between the Bank and the NGOs,
but the Bank is clearly reluctant to relax any of the conditions attached to
the previous loan until the economics of the industry have been studied in
greater detail by three separate teams of consultants, whose final reports
are due for completion in May 1998.
The Bank’s grip on national forest policy has potentially been tightened
even further by the new government’s request for additional donor support
to address outstanding problems in the forestry and conservation sector.
These problems have also been subject to discussion between the Bank and
local NGOs, as well as with other stakeholders, and the Bank has already
persuaded the GEF to contribute 17 million US dollars to a new Forestry
and Conservation Project whose total value is currently estimated at 59
million dollars.  This could be seen as a further extension of the NFCAP,
except that it has been designed as an integral part of the Structural
Adjustment Programme, so that other parts of this larger package will be
dependent on the national government’s commitment to further reforms in
the domain of forest policy.
This project has four components:
• The provision of additional financial support for the Conservation Trust
Fund, whose establishment has been one of the objectives of the
Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management Programme,
accounts for 61 per cent of the project’s total value, and for most of the
support obtained from the GEF.
• The provision of technical assistance for the transformation of the DEC
into an Environmental Protection Authority is worth 10 per cent of the
project’s value, and could be seen as a continuation of the DEC
Strengthening Project.
• The component dedicated to ‘sustainable natural forest management’
takes up 17 per cent of the project’s funding, and features the
engagement of an independent body to audit or monitor the ‘front-line’
13.4 The new donor package
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dealings between officers of the National Forest Service and other
stakeholders, primarily the resource owners and the logging companies,
and publish the results of its investigations.
• A separate component dedicated to ‘landowner forest decision-making’
takes the final 12 per cent of the project’s total funding, and involves a
variety of measures intended to encourage resource owners and their
representative organisations to opt out of proposals for unsustainable
development.
The Trust Fund appears to be regarded as a method of paving the way, both
financially and institutionally, for PNG to take advantage of the growing
market for carbon offset schemes under the Climate Change Convention.
The demand for more light to be cast on the activities of the National Forest
Service seems to have arisen from the shared concern of local NGOs and
donor agencies that some forestry officials are still hiding skeletons in their
closets, and no amount of rules and regulations will suffice to root them out
unless they are accompanied by new forms of transparency and publicity.
It is still unclear whether the supporters of this proposal would agree for
the auditing function to be contracted to a private company, in the same
way that the task of log export surveillance has already been contracted to
SGS, but some local NGOs see no reason to exempt the work of SGS staff
from the scope of the audit.
The Bank has asked the logging companies to demonstrate their own
commitment to sustainability by making voluntary contributions to the cost
of this new ‘forestry inspectorate’, whose functions might be extended to
include the training, as well as the policing, of their field staff, and thus
raise the efficiency of their operations.  The response has been less than
enthusiastic, given the Bank’s apparent determination to maintain the
impositions of the current revenue system.  But the proposal is consistent
with efforts currently being made by the Bank’s President and other senior
executives to persuade the captains of the logging industry, at a regional
and global level, that their own long-term interests are best served by
making some judicious concessions to their critics and staking a claim for
the benefits of self-regulation.  The success or failure of these efforts will not
be decided in PNG.
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Let us now resort to our clouded crystal balls, and contemplate the
prospects for sustainable forest management, or for policy outcomes which
somehow work for the mutual benefit of forests and people, over the course
of the next decade, or the period which is expected to end with the national
election scheduled for 2007.  This is a hazardous exercise in a country
where all stakeholders normally find that their best-laid plans come
unstuck within a year or two, and many therefore give up planning
altogether.  We must therefore make allowance for a number of alternative
outcomes, each of which may be seen to represent a different combination
of economic, ecological and institutional forms of ‘sustainability’ - or the
lack of it - and a different transformation in the ‘balance of power’ between
the various stakeholders in the policy process.
We propose four visions or scenarios:
• The first, which we shall call the ‘resource dependency scenario’, is one
in which the commercial exploitation of natural resources will account
for a constantly increasing share of the country’s economic output and
international trade, and in which the balance of power will determine
and reflect the continuing struggle over the distribution of resource rent
within a ‘nation of rent-collectors’.  While politicians, bureaucrats and
resource owners may pocket different shares of the resource rent which is
realised in different economic sectors, they will not pocket enough
between them to deter the developers from making further investments
in the process of extraction, and most of them will lapse further into the
parasitic ‘handout mentality’ which most of them will also lament as the
greatest threat to their national culture.
• The second, which we shall call the ‘structural adjustment scenario’, is
one in which an escape from the resource dependency syndrome is
engineered by a series of institutional reforms, masterminded by the
World Bank, that will open up the national economy to new kinds of
productive investment, revitalise and diversify the domestic market, and
shape the state into something more like a lean and mean machine than a
dysfunctional pork barrel.  Under this scenario, a new kind of civil
society will develop an entrepreneurial culture which gradually but
steadily displaces the parasitic culture of resource dependency.
• The third, which we shall call the ‘self-reliance scenario’, is one in which
a growing proportion of the national population, or at least the rural
13.5 Long-term prospects: four scenarios
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population, concludes that there is nothing to be gained from large-scale
foreign investment in any sector of the economy, least of all in those
which export natural resources, and is able to restrict the opportunities
for such investment.  In this vision of the future, the ‘traditional’ virtues
of small-scale production will be rediscovered or reinvented, a nation of
would-be rent-collectors will turn (back) into a nation of gardeners,
artisans and petty traders, the village will reassert its ascendancy over
the town, and the parasitic institutions of the state will wither away for
lack of revenues and popular support.
• The fourth, which we shall call the ‘collapsing state scenario’, is the one
which has featured in the dire predictions of many expatriates since
before the time of national independence, and for which the Bougainville
rebellion has recently provided a case in point.  This scenario also
involves a dramatic reduction in large-scale foreign investment, but one
which is brought about by a radical crisis of governance, a wholesale
breakdown of ‘law and order’, and an outbreak of civil strife between
different sections or factions of a population which has no choice but to
abandon a wide range of economic activities in the search for personal
security.
We do not propose to assess the relative plausibility of these four scenarios,
except to say that the balance of probabilities appears to favour the first of
them, simply because this represents the continuation of current trends,
whereas the other three all represent radical departures from them.
However, this point must be qualified by the observation that current
patterns of resource dependency promote a form of uneven development
which continually opens up new divisions between different parts of the
country, as these prove to contain different types and amounts of
extractable natural resources, and the government struggles to contain
these divisions within a single national policy framework.  This is another
lesson of the Bougainville rebellion, which rapidly transformed the
country’s leading mineral province into an economic backwater and a
political disaster zone, while incidentally provoking the national
government to create an entirely new system of provincial and local
government throughout the country.
How should we locate the prospect of sustainable forest management
within these broader visions of the future, whether at the national or local
level?  To answer this question, we need to assess the likelihood of some
specific changes in the current relationship between forests and people, and
then consider whether and how these changes might be part of a departure
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from the resource dependency syndrome, and thus contribute to the
realisation of one of the other three development scenarios which we have
just depicted.
First of all, we must consider the likelihood of a change in the size, the
shape, and the operational practices of a large-scale log export industry
based on the selective logging of natural forests.  The loggers say that they
are being driven out of business by the combination of high costs, high
taxes, and low market prices.  The World Bank maintains that high costs are
partly due to waste and inefficiency, and the fiscal regime has been
designed to drive the least efficient operators out of the market, leaving the
rest to make a reasonable profit when market prices rise again.  The loggers
and the Bank seem to agree that a large-scale log export industry based on
the selective logging of PNG’s natural forests can be ‘sustainable’, in the
sense that natural regeneration will allow a certain volume or value of
13.6 Business as usual?
Arguments rage on about the relative shares of revenue collected by loggers, government and resource
owners, and about whether such shares actually bring the ‘development’ that all desire
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commercial timber to be extracted from the natural forests for an indefinite
period.  The Bank subscribes to this definition of ‘sustainability’ because it
believes that large-scale logging adds more ‘value’ to the natural resource
than any other economic activity which could presently replace it, and if
the forests are not valued through their exploitation, their owners will have
more incentive to get rid of them altogether, and use the land for an entirely
different purpose - especially for agriculture.  The loggers, on the other
hand, have little incentive to care whether their operations are sustainable
or not, since they cannot be sure of gaining access to any part of the
national resource for long enough to reap the benefits of natural
regeneration, and their pronouncements on the subject of sustainability are
therefore suspect.  Knowing this, the Bank attempts to nail them down with
rules and regulations, hoping that they will eventually learn to regulate
themselves in order to avoid the cost of battling the global forces of
enlightenment.  Amongst the local forces of enlightenment, however, there
are many conservationists who say the industry will never be
environmentally sustainable, and should therefore be regulated out of
existence through the imposition of a log export ban.  While the Bank
believes that an efficient log export industry has some role to play in the
structural adjustment scenario, the proponents of a log export ban believe
that its elimination is essential to the self-reliance scenario.
Let us assume, for the moment, that national forest policy proceeds in the
general direction advocated by the World Bank, primarily because there is
no significant change in the balance of power between the various
stakeholders in the policy process.  Can we then detect some combination
of moral and material incentives, consistent with this general policy
framework, which is likely to raise the overall operational efficiency, or
reduce the negative environmental impact, of the logging companies which
presently dominate the log export industry?  It is hard to predict the
pattern of demand in Asian markets, except to say that Japanese
consumption will probably decline, while exports to the People’s Republic
of China, either directly or through various Southeast Asian intermediaries,
may provide an alternative outlet.  In this context, it is hard to see how
international agreements to certify the sustainability of tropical timber
production will make much impact on the major players in the local
industry.  At the same time, the Bank’s appeal to the virtues of self-
regulation is unlikely to sway those operators who know that they can get
away with being less efficient, paying lower taxes, and collecting bigger
profits in other tropical countries.  If the Bank is able to ensure the
maintenance of the current fiscal regime, the local industry will almost
certainly contract, and Washington will shed no tears, since this will show
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that ‘market forces’ can help to achieve the result envisaged by supporters
of an outright ban on log exports - which the Bank regards as an anathema.
On the other hand, despite the Bank’s prognostications, it is not at all clear
that the least efficient operators will be the first to go, since operational
efficiency is not the key to economic viability in this particular industry.
Production costs and profits vary with the uneven and unpredictable
qualities of the natural resource, but more importantly perhaps, with the
size of the ‘compensation package’ which loggers are forced or obliged to
deliver to local resource owners and other stakeholders.  Under these
circumstances, those companies which make a serious effort to provide the
material benefits specified in their harvesting contracts, or to limit the
damage which they cause to the natural environment, will be the first to
feel the pinch.  Economists may continue their search for the Holy Grail of
financial incentives which will cause the loggers to raise their standards of
forest management without reducing their rate of profit, but level and
transparent playing fields must finally be constructed on the ground which
really exists, and not in the realm of Washingtonian fantasy.  Given the
nature of property relations in PNG, each attempt to tighten the screws of
financial and bureaucratic regulation has the paradoxical effect of creating
Watching the logs pass by, Transgogol, Madang Province. If the World Bank is able to ensure the
maintenance of the current forest revenue system, the local log export industry will almost certainly
contract in the near future
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new opportunities for local gatekeepers to collect their ‘customary’ entry
fees on backdoor dealings.
If economic instruments alone are unlikely to raise the performance of the
players already on the playing field, but only make some of them less
willing to play, does the present direction of industrial forestry policy offer
any other prospects for a change in the shape and size of the national forest
industry?  There is some prospect for the entrance of new players with a
vested interest in demonstrating the principles of sustainable forest
management through various forms of ‘low impact logging’ on timber
permits issued through the current resource allocation process, but we do
not fancy their chances of turning a profit under current market conditions,
within the present policy framework, unless they obtain some special
favours from the donor community.  A similar distortion of market forces
would also be required for the development of a large-scale processing
industry, whether its products were destined for export or domestic
consumption, and there are very few proponents of sustainable forest
management who believe that their own aims would be achieved by this
kind of subsidy.  It is perhaps more likely that resource owners will
continue to ascend the learning curve which leads to a greater measure of
control over the allocation and exploitation of their own resources, and a
greater interest in their sustainability, but it is not so clear that this form of
empowerment would be consistent with the maintenance of a large-scale
log export industry in its present form.
Within the present policy framework, and with the present mix of attitudes
and incentives, it is rather less likely that resource owners will rapidly learn
to appreciate the benefits of resisting any large-scale exploitation of their
forest resources for the sake of simply conserving their biodiversity values.
Insofar as donors continue to fund a variety of ‘alternative’ forms of
development which are intended to meet some of the opportunity costs
involved in the establishment of a nationwide system of protected areas,
there will be no shortage of communities willing to take their money and
advice, for the simple reason that something is better than nothing, and
many communities in the most remote parts of the country have not yet
faced a real choice between sustainable and unsustainable forms of forest
use.  The conservationists have not done so well when they have chosen to
battle the loggers over the same piece of turf, and some of their victories
have proven to be hollow when resource owners have shown themselves to
be more interested in exchanging one logging company for another, rather
than turning their backs on the whole industry.  If the log export industry
does stagnate or contract, the conservationists will have more opportunities
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to ply their wares without the need to engage in such battles, but the return
on their investment may then prove to be a new form of resource
dependency, rather than a route to self-reliance, because their versions of
‘development’ will still need to be subsidised to an extent which barely
conceals their role as conservation rents.
The donor-driven policy process is still being driven along the path which
was mapped out for it at the inception of the National Forestry and
Conservation Action Programme.  Although some NFCAP projects have
long since been completed, and others are shortly due to vanish from the
stage, the pursuit of sustainable forest management is not immediately
threatened by the onset of ‘donor fatigue’.  So long as this pursuit is
entrenched in a set of global institutions which maintain their own vitality,
PNG’s forest resources will doubtless continue to attract a level of global
interest which reflects their diverse range of values.  On the other hand,
within the national political context, forest policy is not the hot topic which
it was five years ago, in the aftermath of the 1992 national election and the
Rio Earth Summit which coincided with it.  Our characters still march
around the stage, making speeches and gestures in abundance, but they
repeat themselves too much, and the action fails to develop the plot.  If
forest policy slips further down the national political agenda, we may have
seen the end of one play, and not know how long we have to wait before we
see another one begin.
If we are thus led to conclude that the national forest policy process evinces
a condition of stalemate between the major stakeholders, where each has
just enough power to prevent the others from securing their objectives, the
prospect of a major redirection of this process would appear to depend on a
more substantial change in the balance of power, and one which originates
in other policy domains - at a global or local level, perhaps, or in other
sectors of the national economy, or in wider social and political upheavals.
First of all, we may consider the possibility and the consequences of a very
substantial change in the size and power of the log export industry.  Some
analysts might argue that its size and power have grown substantially, even
through the most recent period of policy reform, to the point where the FIA
is now able to impose its own definition of ‘sustainable forest management’
on a government which is desperate for ready cash, and that the industry’s
13.7 Bigger pictures, other movies?
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present cries of pain are a smokescreen behind which it hopes to secure the
allocation of a new raft of timber concessions in anticipation of a future
upturn in the regional raw log market.  This argument neglects the fact that
most of the recent expansion has been based on the exploitation of timber
permits issued before the gazettal of the new Forestry Act in 1992, and those
operators who are still intent on the acquisition of new resources have been
forced to resort to a variety of ‘special deals’ which are not only open to
multiple challenges by other stakeholders, but also have the effect of
dividing the log export industry against itself.  The industry’s strenuous
efforts to amend the legal and fiscal framework of its operations, in order to
avoid the necessity for such backdoor dealings, have been largely
unsuccessful, and we do not anticipate a shift in the balance of power
which would cause them to bear any more appetising fruit in the near
future.
In our view, it is far more likely that the industry will experience a
substantial contraction over the next five years, primarily because the
World Bank and other donors will be obliged to recognise (if they have not
recognised already) that there is no framework of regulation which can
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Logging camp, New Hanover. The revitalisation of state power will depend on a generational shift in
attitudes and practices at all levels of society
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produce a more ‘sustainable’ version of the industry, with its present
harvest volumes, and any major concessions to the industry’s complaints
about costs and profits will therefore provoke a backlash from Western
environmental lobbies.  At the same time, previous donor interventions
have produced a domestic opposition to the log export industry which,
although made up of several disparate and often disorganised elements, is
now well entrenched in its various positions.  On the other hand, we do not
agree with the optimistic assessment of those who believe that alternative
commercial values will rapidly be realised from the natural forest resource
to fill the economic gap left by departing loggers.  In which case, there is
obviously some risk that the resource will be undervalued to the extent of
inviting the encroachment of other forms of land use - especially the
territorial expansion of large or small scale agriculture.  However, we do
not subscribe to the Bank’s fears on this score, because these appear to be
based on a misconception (or perhaps on wishful thinking) about the nature
of local property relations.  There is very little evidence to support the
widespread assumption that rapid rates of rural population growth are
already causing such encroachment, though they might eventually do so in
some areas, and the prospect of converting major tracts of customary land
to large-scale agricultural estates is little more than a pipedream - albeit one
which does hold some appeal for the less respectable branches of the
logging industry, and has served to exercise the economic imagination of
sundry politicians.
If we are to witness a major transformation in the shape of the national
economy, and especially in those sectors which exploit the country’s natural
resources, it is most likely to involve a significant expansion of the oil and
gas industry, perhaps also the fishing industry, with a parallel decline in the
hard-rock mining sector, and an agricultural sector which largely retains its
present shape and size.  There is some possibility that global discussion of
greenhouse gas emissions will result in a moratorium on further oil and gas
exploration, but we doubt whether this will eventuate in the course of the
next decade.  PNG’s proven oil and gas reserves are still expanding quite
rapidly, while hard-rock mining companies are lowering their exploration
profiles because of the slump in gold and copper prices, and a recognition
that their operations have a mixture of physical, economic, political and
social impacts which are causing acute discomfort to risk assessment
specialists.  One consortium of oil companies has recently been
investigating the feasibility of a liquefied natural gas project whose capital
cost would be greater than that of all previous mining and petroleum
projects put together, and whose exports (to China or Korea) would account
for as much as 40 per cent of GDP.  The size of this gamble suggests that the
general trend in the mining and petroleum sector is to scale up or scale
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down, and the first option is one which the oil companies alone are willing
and able to take.
The oil and gas industry makes much less of a mess than the hard-rock
mining industry, and is willing to spend a lot more money on the quest for
environmental respectability.  The revenues which might flow from a major
expansion of this industry would certainly dent the economic reasoning
behind political attempts to commit any more of the country’s forest
resources to the hazards of large-scale logging, and the oil companies could
reasonably be expected to exert greater influence as benign stakeholders in
the forest policy process.  However, this kind of development offers no
prospect of escape from the resource dependency syndrome, and if there is
no parallel improvement in the executive capacities of the State, it can only
serve to exaggerate the regional inequalities which already threaten a major
crisis of governance.  And if it serves to restrict the motivation for self-
reliance in all parts of the country, it will not serve to diminish the number
of politicians and resource owners crying out for some alternative form of
rental income - whether from logging, conservation, or the defence of
‘intellectual property rights’.
Might there be some corresponding change in global policy imperatives
which brings about a radical redirection of national forest policy, whether
or not the country’s economic fortunes are still locked up in some version
of the resource dependency scenario?  Perhaps the World Bank and other
members of the donor community will abandon the rather hollow pretence
that their own structural adjustment scenario is consistent with the many
market distortions which they have to support in order to demonstrate
their parallel commitment to sustainable forest management.  If the PNG
government swims out of its fiscal troubles on a tide of oil and gas
revenues, they might even see the logic of a log export ban, and thus win
new friends amongst the radical NGOs, but in the unlikely event that
current economic orthodoxies could be sacrificed so blatantly, their own
grip on official government policy might no longer be strong enough to
keep the politicians in line.  The view from Washington appears to be that
PNG now has the chance to find a whole new market for its forests in the
rapid growth of carbon offset schemes, and ‘only’ needs to build its
institutional capacity to take advantage of the offers made by messy
Northern industries.  But PNG’s ability to profit substantially from this
particular form of world trade is not only dependent on the managerial
capacities of the national government, which are slender enough, but on a
wholesale transformation of indigenous property relations, which is
beyond the global reach of any donor, as the Bank should know from its
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experience.  A donor-driven policy process is one which may only serve to
expose the widening gulf between policy and practice as it lumbers from
the realm of international conventions to the realm of local politics.  And
nowhere is this fault in the transmission line more evident than in the case
of PNG.
Will various fractions of the national elite develop a new kind of solidarity
and determination to bend the policy process to their own ‘political will’,
and thereby reveal a new capacity to either facilitate or defy the
prescriptions of the donor community?  And how would their
empowerment be manifested in the realm of local politics, where the
tragedy of the state is grounded in the constant fragmentation of the public
interest and the roller-coaster ride which leads from one election to the
next?  A grandiose gesture, like the imposition of a log export ban, might
well appear to be the best test and signal of their collective determination to
turn over a new leaf in the forest policy domain, but if a national
government were to adopt this measure in the hope of creating new jobs in
plywood and furniture factories, or creating new opportunities for national
business development, the result would almost certainly be disappointing.
Nor is it clear why forest policy should play a leading role in struggles to
resolve the nation’s crisis of governance, when efforts to rebuild a
collapsing state are almost bound to focus on the political foundations of
that edifice, rather than one of its various rooms.  Indeed, one of the main
arguments in favour of a log export ban is the government’s failure to
manage the log export industry in a transparent and effective manner, and
this argument would evaporate if the government’s wider failings were to
be rectified by the emergence of a new regime in the commanding heights.
In our view, the revitalisation of state power is unlikely to proceed any
more rapidly than the regeneration of a logged-over forest, because it will
depend on a generational shift in attitudes and practices at all levels of the
national society.  This means that we do not anticipate a substantial
improvement in the production and implementation of national
government policies over the next five or ten years, whatever the specific
target of those policies might be.  The continual concoction of quick-fix
solutions to long-lasting problems is more likely to reflect a further
dissipation of central authority than to mark the progress made in its
assertion of control over the policy process.  The true test of progress made
in the direction of a distinctive and effective national forest policy, which
can straddle the gulf between global and local imperatives, will not be
found in the raising or lowering of incentives to make alternative uses of
tropical timber, but in the far more fundamental changes made to methods
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of determining the use of customary land.  There are no quick-fix solutions
at this bottom level of the forest policy domain.  But if there are no long-
term solutions either, then it is pointless to contemplate the economics of a
choice between selective logging, plantation forestry, large-scale
agriculture, carbon sequestration, or any other possible component of an
integrated land use strategy.  This is the steep and hazardous track which
has to be taken, but even a progressive national elite will not get very far
along it until they can make the right connections between the concept of
‘land reform’, the development of new forms of community organisation,
and a basic shift in the moral basis of ‘landowner politics’.
In the final analysis, hot air generated at the global or national level will not
induce a fundamental change in the practice of forest management unless it
blows through the brains of rural resource owners.  Many of these brains
are presently filled with millenarian fears and expectations which leave no
room for any consideration of ‘sustainability’.  If the world has not come to
an end by January 2000 or January 2001, the time will be ripe for many
resource owners to radically rethink their conception of ‘development’ as
they contemplate the prospect of another national election in June 2002.
Present trends would seem to indicate that they are more likely to lose all
faith in the political process than to abandon their hopes of salvation from
the sale of their natural resources, but these hopes are likely to be
disappointed if government institutions then lose the capacity to attract
additional foreign investment, and the economics of resource dependency
no longer produce a favourable bottom line for multinational corporations.
The seeds of local self-reliance may then be planted in the ruins of a
collapsing state, but may not flourish in conditions of political anarchy.
Loggers, donors and resource owners 381
Let us now return to the aim of this study: to review the issues which have
arisen from the process of policy reform over the last ten years in order to
assess the feasibility of achieving a form of policy that works for the forests
and people of PNG.  One way of concluding this study  would be to make a
list of ‘recommendations’ to some notionally enlightened audience, of the
kind which consultants typically make to their clients, on the assumption
that this audience may act like a benign philosopher-king who is both
willing and able to translate these recommendations into actions which
really do ‘improve the sustainability of forest management and optimise
stakeholder benefits’.  Our portrait of stakeholder relationships in PNG’s
forest policy process suggests that this kind of response would have to be
directed to the donor community and whatever national constituency
shares its concern with the values of sustainable development.  In that case,
our conclusions would follow the well-trodden path which leads to an
assessment of the relative effectiveness of different forms of aid - whether,
for example, money spent on ‘strengthening’ PNG government institutions
might better be spent elsewhere, perhaps even in another country, or how
the design of specific ‘projects’ might be improved in light of the lessons
learnt from previous endeavours.  In that case, the final act in the script of
our national policy process would feature the pronouncements of a deus ex
machina, to which the other characters would hopefully pay homage.
Will our national stakeholders rise to the challenge of the World Bank’s
wise counsel and plunge their stakes through the heart of the log export
industry, driving off the misguided landowners whose loyalty has been
purchased by the vampire, releasing the Melanesian peasantry from their
fearful oppression, and saving the Green ladies of Europe from their worst
nightmares?  Count Dracula, we may recall, could not have been destroyed
unless his human enemies had been united in their efforts, bound by
mutual trust and understanding, as well as their respect for the arcane
knowledge of a Dutch Professor.  But it is hard to see such solidarity
Common ground:
a stake in the heart
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amongst those members of PNG’s ‘educated elite’ who hold some stake in
the domain of forest policy.  The foreign accents of the World Bank are no
less suspect than those of the Forest Industries Association, but nationalism
is not the main obstacle on the path to sustainable development.  On the
contrary, it is the deeply fragmented and hotly contested nature of the
national or public interest, where the policy process comes to resemble the
looting of a supermarket, and where the stability of the ‘system’ resides in
the shared belief that you should ‘get what you can while you can’
(Simpson 1997) and the realistic expectation that the police will not arrive
in force until the business is complete.
Of course, the ‘wise men’ of the World Bank do not really want to banish
the loggers to another kingdom, only to make them more ‘efficient’ players
on the famous level playing field, and our national elite would have good
reason to ignore the Bank’s advice if they agreed amongst themselves that
large-scale logging is the business of the devil, and acted on this shared
assumption.  But where there seem to be the makings of a national
consensus - on the wickedness of foreign exploitation, the virtues of self-
reliance, or the benefits of downstream processing - these make little or no
detectable impact on the actual allocation of resources in a resource-
dependent national economy, and therefore look like ritual postures in an
empty masquerade.  Whatever the logging companies might be doing to the
scenery, they alone are not responsible for draining the blood from the body
politic, except perhaps in the fevered imagination of those who believe that
forest policy is the key which unlocks every door in the crumbling castle of
the State.  Accusing fingers may be pointed at them, but the whole action of
our play seems to revolve around a small forest of accusing fingers, where
all the characters speak loudly in their declarations of each other’s villainy,
and none is willing to admit that others act on any principle except self-
interest.  Which may lead us to conclude, as many Papua New Guineans
do, that ‘politics’ is the real devil of the piece.  And who will put a stake
through the heart of that?
The real problem here is to establish the common ground upon which to
develop a wider coalition of interests and individuals whose members
share a common understanding of the principles of sustainable forest
management, a common desire to secure the best possible mix of public and
private benefits from the application of this understanding, and a collective
capacity to make this application work in practice.  This kind of ‘policy
community’ will not simply arise from the invention of new committees,
boards, trusts, or other structures for the maintenance of dialogue between
our six main characters.  The plot will neither thicken nor make any
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progress just because the stage designers change the sets.  The substance of
the conversation and the action has to be the focus of the effort.  As Papua
New Guineans would say, the problem is to ‘find the road’, by subjecting
policy positions to a set of trials or experiments which will reveal who
speaks the truth, whose actions speak louder than their words, and what
those actions actually mean.  As Americans would say, the problem is to
build more reality checks and feedback loops into the policy process, so
that it becomes an iterative, incremental and adaptive learning process
rather than a colourful but static charade.
The trials or experiments envisaged here are of three main types, because
they have three different aims:
• to sort out the relationship between the actors and their masks;
• to sort out the relationship between forest policy and other policy
domains; and
• to sort out the relationship between ‘policy-makers’ and resource
owners.
In each case, however, the ultimate goal is to achieve a wider ownership of
‘policy that works’.
Our six characters without an author are not real people at all.  They are
only roles, or groups of roles, which real people are called upon to play
when they get mixed up in the forest policy drama.  No stakeholders
become the heroes of sustainable forest management just because they wear
the right mask on the night.  Behind each mask, there are some people with
a genuine commitment to sustainability, and many others without one.  But
who can tell the difference, and by what means?
While they remain behind their masks and strut around the public stage,
each group of actors works to maintain a united front, concealing the
existence of moral or political divisions in their ranks, and imputing all
forms of wickedness to one or more of the other characters.  But in the
dressing rooms backstage, most actors will concede that there are some
good people in the other camps, and some whom they would rather not
have in their own.  Even members of the radical NGO community will be
reminded of Judge Barnett’s distinction between the responsible logging
14.1 Flesh and blood
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companies and the rip-off merchants, while forest industry representatives
will agree that they have ugly ducklings in their log pond, and would like
to find a way to get them out.
It is easier for the foreign actors in the play to establish this kind of
communication behind the scenes than it is for their national counterparts.
Most of them enter the policy process through possession of some relevant
technical expertise which can then form the basis of their mutual
assessment.  More importantly, perhaps, most of them have neither the
opportunity nor the desire to play the parts of the resource owner or the
politician, and are thus excluded from those sections of the policy domain
in which the national elite is most thoroughly divided against itself.  On the
other hand, those members of the national elite who do possess a genuine
commitment to better forest management should find some ground for
mutual understanding in the fact that most of them are resource owners in
their own right, many of them have experience of playing at least three of
the main parts in our play, and all of them face the problem of
accommodating a surfeit of ‘foreign experts’ in this policy domain.
The number of well-educated Papua New Guineans who could be said to
form the core of a national constituency for sustainable forest management
is still very small.  Even those members of the educated elite who claim
some special interest in forest policy are inclined to regard most of the other
members as an assortment of opportunists, hypocrites and villains, since
any interest in ‘policy’ appears to be the pretext for a movement into
‘politics’, and ‘politics’ explains the fact that policies don’t work.  These
suspicions are voiced, both onstage and offstage, through the division of
elite opinion between technocratic and communitarian policy perspectives.
The technocrats believe that the most progressive resource owners are also
members of the educated elite, while the communitarians maintain that
landowning communities already possess the customary knowledge
necessary for sustainable forest management.
• The technocrats believe that sustainable development of natural
resources cannot be achieved without effective government control over
their utilisation; while the communitarians maintain that government
interference is more of a hindrance than a help.
• The technocrats believe that foreign investment in large-scale timber
harvesting and log exporting operations can make a positive
contribution to national development if it is properly regulated and
efficiently managed; while the communitarians maintain that foreign
logging companies are the epitome of evil.
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• The technocrats doubt the integrity of the communitarians, because the
communitarians sound like politicians, and politicians do not practice
what they preach; while the communitarians doubt the integrity of the
technocrats, because the technocrats sound like the World Bank, and the
World Bank is an agent of imperialism.
Since these are contrasting perceptions of the relationships between the
main characters in the play, they tend to be attributed to those characters, as
their perceptions, rather than to individuals who can play several parts, and
often do.  As a result, the business of bridging the gap between the ‘top-
down’ thinking of the technocrats and the ‘bottom-up’ approach of the
communitarians is construed as an extension of the ritual encounters
between the World Bank and the local NGOs, where the Bank persuades the
national bureaucracy to assume its own technocratic role in such
engagements, and thus creates a new form of institutional mediation within
the national policy process.  But the national technocratic constituency is
not to be confused with the upper echelons of ‘relevant’ government
departments, nor with those members of the national elite who share the
Bank’s policy perspectives, and those NGOs with a vested interest in forest
policy do not monopolise, or even share, the core of a communitarian
position.  Many bureaucrats are closet communitarians, and there are even
some members of the NGO ‘community’ who lean towards the technocratic
viewpoint.  Both perspectives can be found among those members of the
national elite who belong to the ‘private sector’, as well as those who sit in
Parliament, and even among the ranks of those resource owners who do not
qualify for membership of the elite.  They are simply two poles in a single
spectrum of national consciousness.  Many individuals manage to think
both ways at once, or change their views as they change their roles or drop
their masks as they leave the stage, and that is why they sometimes come
across as hypocrites or opportunists.
In order to nationalise or localise the forest policy process by developing
new forms of dialogue between these two policy perspectives, it is not
sufficient for donors to ‘strengthen’ those central government agencies, like
the National Planning Office, which are mistakenly thought to epitomise
the technocratic perspective, and then go round to the other side of the
negotiating table and invest in the capacities of environmentally friendly
NGOs which are mistakenly thought to represent the pure embodiment of
the communitarian position in the countervailing force of ‘civil society’.
The reinforcement of vested interests will not create a wider ownership of
policy, and if it depends on donor funding, it is unlikely to reduce the
reliance of those interests on foreign expertise.  The priority for policy that
works is to develop the quality and variety of negotiations between existing
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stakeholders, both national and expatriate, in their official and private
capacities, in a way that creates new partnerships and new stakeholders.
The key to such dialogue is the production and evaluation of claims about
things that work and things that don’t.  Let us say, for example, that official
representatives of the log export industry, or any other people who have
some right to be taken seriously on this matter, claim that a specific large-
scale logging operation should be regarded as a model of best practice
under local conditions, or that a specific landowner company exemplifies
the best way for landowners to deal with logging contractors in the pursuit
of sustainable development.  The masked dancers in the formal policy
process may accept or reject such claims on the basis of their prior
‘knowledge’ of the role played by all logging companies or landowner
companies in that same process, but this will only serve to prolong the
dialogue of the deaf.  In order to apply the principle of ‘putting up or
shutting up’, the participants will have to find some way of simultaneously
publicising and adjudicating claims of this sort, by producing evidence
rather than recycling assumptions.  The common ground will then take the
shape of a route map which enables competing claims to travel from the
office or the conference room to the village or a patch of forest and back to
the pages of a national newspaper or the image on a reel of film.
While the ‘ground-truthing’ of claims made by and about specific groups of
actors already engaged in the forest policy process may serve to strengthen
the bonds of common ownership or shared responsibility within an existing
policy network, it will not extend the outer limits of this network unless the
route map which is used in the evaluation of such claims includes some
paths which lead out of the forest, into other sectoral policy domains, and
back again.  In this case, the onus seems to fall upon the technocrats to
demonstrate the benefits of integrating separate sectoral policies, plans and
programmes at different levels of administration.  But here again the risk is
to assume that technocrats are bureaucrats whose job is to produce a script
and then persuade the other characters on stage to follow their instructions.
Even within the forestry and conservation drama, such claims to
authorship are constantly defeated by the plot.  The National Forest Plan
ought to look like an integrated land use plan, but actually looks like the
14.2 A stake in the ground: integrated
 land use strategies
Loggers, donors and resource owners 387
Emperor’s New Clothes, while the
National Conservation Strategy
has not even been shown to the
audience.  How then should we
expect our script-writers in the
central corridors of the state to
produce a National Sustainable
Development Strategy, or any
other work of art, which will serve
to control the motions of
stakeholders in several different
policy domains, when the
fundamental fact of life is that the
ground on which they build their
grand designs is barely subject to
effective government control.
This is not to deny the possibility,
or even the necessity, of
constructing a National
Sustainable Development Strategy
which reflects the country’s
commitment to Agenda 21 - only
to question the manner of its
construction.  Castles built on sand
(or in the air) will never be
sustainable.  Multiple land use
plans which look like maps of
customary land, at any level of
administration, can only be works
of fantasy if they do not result
from the progressive integration of
negotiations between landowners, developers, and other stakeholders in
specific sectors and specific areas.  Another kind of map is needed for this
latter purpose - one which shows the links between decision-making
institutions, rather than the boundaries between alternative ‘developments’
of physical resources.  The integration of decision-making institutions, at
both the centre and the margins of the forest policy domain, means building
three different types of bridge:
• between the use of large areas of customary land and small areas of
government (leasehold) land;
Development options are often thought of as alternative
weapons in a battle to exploit the same physical resource,
but development strategies which combine different scales
of enterprise across sectoral boundaries, such as mixing
large scale agriculture with small scale forestry, are largely
unexplored as yet
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• between the values of large and small scale forms of land use or resource
development; and
• between the protection of public interest and the promotion of private
initiative (including the initiatives of NGOs).
Those who think that all three goals can be accomplished in a single master
plan will only find that they have organised the blueprint for a traffic jam.
Within the realm of industrial forestry, decisions made about selective
logging or reforestation on customary land bear virtually no relationship to
decisions made about the disposition of forest plantations on leasehold
land, even though it is widely recognised that the economics of
downstream processing would be greatly improved, and incentives to
exploit the natural resource could be substantially reduced, if more land
were made available for private investment in plantation development.  But
this option also belongs to the realm of fantasy, because customary
landowners and potential investors both believe (with good reason) that the
government no longer has the capacity to secure and manage additional
leasehold land for their mutual benefit.  This problem is not unique to the
forestry sector, and can barely be addressed, let alone resolved, in the
formulation of sectoral development policies.  The same obstacles prevent
the acquisition of additional land for large-scale agricultural projects or
national parks.  Amongst the many government agencies which have some
stake in the borderline between leasehold and customary land, there is not
even a semblance of agreement about where this boundary actually lies, let
alone a concerted strategy for moving it in one direction or another.  The
Land Mobilisation Project has been typical of donor-funded institutional
strengthening projects in dealing with the symptoms of bureaucratic
incompetence without due regard for the conditions under which other
stakeholders will subscribe to new forms of transparency in land
transactions of all kinds.  Hence the widespread popular resistance to
anything which smacks of customary land registration, despite the fact that
landowners in many parts of the country recognise the need to formalise
their titles and their land use options in some systematic way.
Yet the government sidesteps the land policy logjam by conjuring with
sector-specific schemes for dealing in the use rights to particular resources,
proving by default its inability to integrate the uses of the land which has
already been removed from customary tenure.  Forest Management
Agreements are a case in point.  It is hardly surprising that forestry officials
are unable to produce a Development Options Study in consultation with
customary landowners when the main purpose of their engagement is the
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acquisition of specific rights to harvest timber.  Where technocrats in
government are unable to breach sectoral barriers in order to integrate their
land use strategies, the only integration which occurs results from the
creation of separate ‘spheres of influence’ by the developers of specific
resources, wherein they are finally driven to formulate their own multiple
land use strategies by reconciling their own business imperatives with the
unavoidable and unpredictable demands of local communities.  The
histories of the Gogol timber project, the Hoskins oil palm project, and the
Ok Tedi mining project reveal the many problems which arise from this
kind of ‘planning’ in different economic sectors.  But few lessons are learnt
or applied as a result of these experiments, even within a specific sector,
because there are no institutional mechanisms through which the feedback
circuits could be closed.
Within the realm of industrial forestry, technocrats and communitarians are
both inclined to think of bulldozers and portable sawmills as weapons in a
battle to exploit the same physical resource.  Within the corridors of the
NFA, this impression is reinforced by the relegation of small scale forestry
to an item under ‘any other business’ - a toy for NGOs to play with while
the big boys get on with the main game.  But for those who can see the
potential merits in such an exercise, there is no shortage of avenues for
combining different scales of enterprise, not only in the harvesting and
milling of timber, but also in other forms of forest management, from
monitoring to reforestation.  To give but one example, the establishment of
small-scale woodlots or tree plantations by local landowners may only
prove to be a viable form of economic activity if it is undertaken as one of
the conditions imposed on a large-scale logging operation.  If the concept of
‘agroforestry’ could be rescued from its recent abuse by some of the more
disreputable players in the log export game, then it would show the way to
more examples of such symbiosis.  It is not just a question of seeking out
different mixtures of large and small scale forestry, but of mixing large scale
agriculture with small scale forestry, small scale agriculture with large scale
forestry, large or small scale forestry with small or large scale conservation
projects, and so forth.  The government alone is unlikely to construct such
linkages by means of formal policy unless other stakeholders are willing
and able to test and publicise their viability.
It is hard to see how further progress can made in the integration of land
use strategies unless there is a wholesale realignment of relationships
between the government, the private sector and the NGO community.  The
corporatisation or privatisation of various ‘bits of state’ may well satisfy
the World Bank’s vision of ‘subsidiarity’, but subsidiarity without
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transparency may do little to improve the legitimacy or efficiency of the
organisations which result from this process.  Quite clearly, all stakeholders
should be doing more of what they do best, and less of what others do
better, but the key element in the formation of a new policy community is
public scrutiny of who is doing what.  There is no reason to suppose that
the elements of a new ‘civil society’ will be less secretive or devious in their
behaviour than old-fashioned bureaucrats, especially if they operate in a
political culture which is riddled with rumour and suspicion.  Indeed, they
are most unlikely to do so unless the government can prove its own
commitment to police a reasonable set of rules for the development of land
and natural resources.  The technocratic guardians of the public sector
Project Cycle must retain the final responsibility for project impact
assessment, monitoring and evaluation, as well as the establishment of
sectoral targets, benchmarks and guidelines.  But they need the support of
other stakeholders in order to exercise these responsibilities in ways which
are seen to be fair and efficient, and this support will not be forthcoming if
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East Sepik villagers with their ‘social map’.  New contractual relationships or working partnerships
between existing organisations should match the specific needs of different landowning communities with
the specific capacities which different service-providers can offer
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the process of bureaucratic regulation becomes an obstacle course which is
primarily designed to enhance the bargaining power of government
officials, or protect them from various forms of ‘political interference’.  The
process must be justified as the pursuit of a wider public interest, which
counteracts the current tendency to privatise the benefits, and socialise the
costs, of resource exploitation.  To gain wider public acceptance of their
own role in this pursuit, the technocrats in government will have to give
away the pretence to executive powers which they do not possess.
Once government allows that private companies and NGOs have roles to
play in the development of integrated land use strategies, then private
companies and NGOs should find more common ground in this pursuit,
where technocratic and communitarian perspectives can be reconciled
through the development of new working relationships rather than formal
policy pronouncements.  What is needed here is not the token gesture of an
‘NGO liaison desk’ in one or other government department, but official
land use policies which provide a clear mandate for ‘outsourcing’ a wide
variety of executive functions to an equally wide variety of ‘non-
government’ organisations, in a manner which encourages these
organisations to develop a common vision of their mutual responsibilities
and separate specialities.  This kind of devolution is already happening in
the private sector, as big companies narrow the definition of their ‘core
business’ and multiply their contractual relationships with smaller ones.
Where government departments and resource developers agree to an
arrangement by which the latter develop integrated land use strategies
within an area of influence which is protected by the former, the work of
integration should then be relayed to a mixture of consulting companies
and NGOs who share a common interest in breaking down the barriers
between sectoral policy domains.  The net result is to enlarge the size and
influence of the ‘non-government’ policy community in each of these
domains.
Without some common ground between the technocratic and
communitarian perspectives, which is so obviously lacking in the forest
policy domain, a distinction must still be drawn between:
• the design and implementation of integrated land use strategies at the
‘project’ level and at higher levels of levels of administration; and
14.3 Binding policies to places
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• the facilitation of productive dialogue between small groups of resource
owners and other stakeholders with an interest in the use of their
resources.
Quite obviously, these two kinds of activity cannot and should not be
carried out in isolation from each other, but the conditions do not yet exist
in which they can be treated as two steps along the same path, or two legs
of the same animal.  Their isolation must be overcome by progress
separately made on two fronts.  If the technocrats are charged with
demonstrating progress on the first front, the communitarians bear an
equivalent responsibility for demonstrating progress on the second.
There is widespread agreement on the need for an institution or set of
institutions which can help resource owners to make the ‘right’ choices
about the development of their natural resources.  However, if a new type
of national planning agency is not the answer to the problem of producing
integrated land use strategies, it is certainly not the answer to this second
problem, which demands an even greater measure of flexibility to
accommodate the diversity of local conditions prevailing in the country.
The national government has made a variety of efforts to transform its
‘front-line’ relationship with rural communities, either by setting up new
‘bits of state’ or by reconstructing the roles of those which already exist.
Within the realm of industrial forestry, such initiatives have been
concentrated on the resource acquisition process and on mechanisms for the
distribution of resource rent.  Other economic sectors possess their own
variations on the theme of state-sponsored community participation in the
process of resource development, while the Village Services Programme
and the subsequent reform of local-level government under the new
Organic Law have offered broader institutional solutions to the same
problem.  The sheer number of novel institutional structures which descend
from the heavens, like Mosaic tablets, upon the heads of unsuspecting
villagers may be one reason why they fail to take root in the soil.  But the
main reason is that they do not descend at all, or if they do, they lack the
form and function which their designers had bestowed on them.  The root
problem is a lack of executive and managerial capacity in the lower reaches
of the state apparatus, which is compounded, rather than alleviated, by the
process of institutional innovation.  The bottom line is quite simple: if basic
services are not delivered to rural communities in a manner which fosters
their own self-reliance, then formal policy will become increasingly irrelevant
to local practice.  Given the varieties of local practice, this gap cannot be
papered over with new organisation charts, duty statements, or manuals of
procedure floating through the corridors of the National Castle.
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Mechanisms are needed to simultaneously publicise and adjudicate competing claims about
sustainable development options, by producing evidence rather than recycling assumptions
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What is required, in this case, is a fundamentally flexible method of
patrolling the interface between the village and the state, between resource
owners and ‘policy makers’, which uses and empowers those groups of
actors who specialise in adapting the dictates of public policy to the
variable needs of rural communities, or in articulating these needs in ways
which can transform those dictates.  The mistake here is to assume that
those actors who have been somewhat artificially gathered behind the
‘NGO mask’ in the forest policy drama possess a natural monopoly on this
kind of activity.  They do not have the numbers necessary for the task.  To
widen the network of ‘community change agents’ envisaged in the NFCAP
Review (Taylor et al. 1994:10), it is necessary to include a variety of other
actors with a stake in rural community development - church workers and
social scientists, some of the staff and consultants employed by resource
developers and donor agencies, as well as those government employees,
such as primary school teachers, who still work in immediate proximity to
the ‘grassroots’.  Above all, it is necessary to remember that state-sponsored
or donor-sponsored schemes for developing ‘landowner awareness’ or
‘landowner capacity’ can easily fail to accommodate the role of the much-
derided ‘wantok system’ as the most effective general-purpose mechanism
for transferring goods, services, skills and information between members of
the national elite and their ‘country cousins’.  If rural communities cannot
rely on their most educated members to provide the kind of leadership
which leads in the direction of sustainable resource development, then
outsiders of any description are unlikely to make much of an impact.
Although there has been a lot of talk about the need for something like a
‘Landowner Resource Development Support Agency’81, and the steps now
being taken to establish a Conservation Trust Fund could be seen as steps in
this direction, it is hard to see how any one national organisation, with a
specific form of stakeholder representation, could have the flexibility
required to address the full range of community needs, even in respect of
the development of a single natural resource.  The history of NANGO
suggests that the NGO community alone would have trouble enough in
developing such an institution on their own account, even without the
presence of additional stakeholders.  The history of the Village Services
Programme casts a similar shadow across proposals to construct new forms
of inter-departmental collaboration in the government’s own efforts to
establish new forms of community participation in resource development.
And the history of the National Youth Movement Programme contains
another warning for the designers of a centrally administered Conservation
Trust Fund, for if landowning communities or NGOs are encouraged to
81
 This particular designation was originally coined by the World Bank
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Taylor (1997) describes how PNG forest sector reforms have faltered over the issue of control of forest
resources on customary land.  The state has shied away from implementing reforms that challenge
the right of landowners and landowner companies to manage and exploit these resources as they see
fit.
Where custom can divine the local public interest, it displaces the need for state intervention.  Given
custom’s resilience and pervasive influence, the state should be cautious in assuming its demise.
Emerging institutions such as landowner companies should not be dismissed as aberrations of custom
simply because they are not egalitarian, whether judged against fantasies of how custom once
operated or against introduced ideals of participatory democracy.  Where custom seems to be failing,
the state should not presume that it can do what custom cannot.  The state’s inability to deliver serv-
ices and leadership to remote forest areas is what sparked the rise of landowner companies in the first
place.
The state can legitimately claim a role in balancing local interests with the national interest, although
the forestry experience suggests that it lacks the political confidence and enforcement capacity to
impose its will over customary land.  Negotiated resolution of national and local interests would seem
to be a more realistic and sensitive approach.  Only through negotiation, with all its perils to novice
participants in the timber industry, can landowners hope to achieve the capacity to protect their
interests in the long term.  The alternative of unilateral state regulation leaves landowners exposed to
the dictates of ministers who lack accountability beyond their own electorates, and urban bureaucrats
who tend to favour national or provincial concerns over local ones.
These conclusions suggest that the state should abandon nationwide land-use zoning through forest
classification, statements of provincial allowable cut, and inflexible statutory controls over distribution
and investment of the landowners’ share of logging revenues.  These reforms are all based on the
flawed assumptions that the state is the best judge of the public good and can readily enforce its will.
Environmental protection, sustained yield, and revenue distribution objectives should, instead, be bal-
anced against conflicting interests through project-specific negotiation.  For new projects, the state,
landowners, and logging companies could rely on forest management and project agreements to set
the terms on which logging is conducted.  If the state is less absorbed in nationwide planning and
policing work, it should be more able to resource the conduct of development options studies and
scrutiny of environmental plans, such that they serve as useful components of the negotiation process.
The state could also take steps to improve the bargaining strength of landowners, without attempting
to bargain on their behalf.  Measures to strengthen landowner negotiation capacity could include:
• publication of model contract provisions;
• legislation providing for court review of manifestly unfair contracts;
Box 14.1  The role of custom and the role of government
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compete for access to a fabled pot of gold, the result could well be an
outbreak of spurious ‘projects’ which only serve to reinforce the culture of
resource dependency which represents the antithesis of genuine self-reliance.
All organisations, both inside and outside the walls of government, which
are formally involved in the planning, administration, or practice of
commercial resource development or professional resource conservation on
customary land are enjoined, by self-interest as much as anything else, to
facilitate and respond to the needs and interests of landowning communities,
including the basic need for communities to make their own choices in a
manner which gains the maximum consent of their members over the
longest possible period of time.  In many cases, corporate cultures and
institutional climates will need to change before such bridges can be built to
last.  But will the necessary change result from the establishment of another
organisation with this as its special brief?  What is surely required is a series
of new contractual relationships or working partnerships between existing
organisations, or between networks of individual stakeholders, which will
test out new criteria for matching the more specific needs of different
landowning communities with the specific capacities which different
service-providers or facilitators can bring to bear on particular development
issues in different parts of the country.  This is indeed a matter of adapting
policies and practices to places where they work, rather than composing
novel structures in a central place.
There is no shortage of previous experiments on the part of external
organisations attempting to secure specific forms of community
development, and the relative success of these experiments (albeit in
particular areas or sectors) may be taken as a guide to the feasibility of
repeating them.  For example, there are lessons to be learnt from the
experience of mining and petroleum companies in promoting local business
• redirection of government planning and enforcement resources to landowner capacity
strengthening;
• finance arrangements where landowners can borrow against future income to pay for preliminary
investigations and professional advice; and
• founding a non-government negotiation service for landowners (perhaps funded by international
donors).
However, in any system where the use and management of forest resources is resolved through
negotiation, landowners will ultimately have to look after themselves.  In the end, they will be negotiat-
ing against the state.
Source: Taylor 1997
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development, since they have a statutory obligation to make the effort and
they possess the resources required to make expensive mistakes.  For these
lessons to be applied effectively in the planning process, it is necessary to
commission or conduct separate reviews of projects or activities which have
been directed towards each particular need which is under consideration.
Another criterion which can be applied in the design of community
development initiatives, and indeed in the actual process of negotiation with
communities, is the concept of what is culturally appropriate - the Papua New
Guinean or Melanesian Way.  In this case also, it will be always necessary to
focus attention on some particular need or purpose if this is to be a useful
criterion for planning purposes and not simply a pretext for some discourse in
political philosophy.  For example, the Melanesian principle of reciprocity (or
some local version of it) can be refined to strike an appropriate balance
between commercial credit arrangements and the grants or ‘handouts’ which
are now widely regarded as a disincentive to genuine community
development.  However, the more immediate problem is to develop an
institutional framework within which this sort of balance can be struck.
By way of conclusion, we are led back to the distinction which is often drawn
between the ‘weakness of the state’ and the ‘strength of civil society’ in
countries such as PNG.  For this contrast to assist in our understanding of
national forest policy, it has to be conceived as a bundle of three basic
contradictions in the organisation of the policy process:
• Firstly, there is the contradiction between the pursuit of economic growth
and national participation as central policy objectives, where economic
growth appears to depend on substantial foreign investment in the
exploitation of natural resources, but where the spirit of capitalism is
confronted with an ideology of landownership which defies the rationally
organised pursuit of sustainable development.
• Secondly, there is the contradiction between a widespread popular
obsession with the pursuit of personal political power, and all the honorific
trappings which accompany its acquisition, and an equally widespread loss
of faith in the power of government to produce the social and economic
development which is just as widely desired.
• Finally, there is a contradiction between the production of increasingly
14.4 Between planning and perversity
 Policy that works for forests and people: Papua New Guinea country study398
elaborate plans for reconstruction of the whole political economy and the
perversity of actual policy outcomes, which only achieve the aims of
planners and policy makers through the deliberate or accidental refusal of
other stakeholders to follow their grandiose prescriptions.
Whether we think of these as contradictions within the forest policy process,
or within and between a wider set of policy domains, their existence at the
interface between state and society is sufficient reason for us not to conclude
this study with advice on the best way for the nation’s power-brokers to
proceed with plans for sustainable forest management in such an
unpredictable and uncontrollable environment.  We might even be tempted to
propose that most of our stakeholders will only ever do the right deed for the
wrong reason, limiting the degradation of their forest resources through the
extent of their mutual jealousy and suspicion, the tangled web of rules and
customs governing their interaction, and the general excess of expectations
and demands directed at developers.  On the other hand, the trouble with
perversity as a condition of sustainability is that it fails to offer any hope of
an improvement in the quality of people’s lives.  The celebration of an
accidental cultural resistance to
‘rational’ but unsustainable
exploitation of the country’s natural
resources may well suit the taste of
those scholars who believe that ‘policy’
is nothing but a modern form of ritual
or magic, but it cannot satisfy the
search for moral and political
imperatives which are essential to the
building of a new relationship between
social institutions and physical
resources.  A new form of civil society will never be created by the little gods
who sit on the commanding heights of mountainous bureaucracies, but it can
and will develop through changes in the form and substance of dialogue
between stakeholders in each of several policy domains.
In the forest policy domain, we advocate a path between planning and
perversity, in which the dialogue develops through the making and testing of
claims to productive innovation, and the continual reinforcement of feedback
loops between local, national and global levels of debate.  It may take a long
time for this process to transform the relationship between forests and people,
longer in some places than in others, but PNG does have time on its side,
because the forests are still present in abundance, and the people cannot make
rapid and drastic changes to large portions of the landscape, even if they wish
to do so.
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Annexes
Data used for figures
Data used for Figure 2.2  Distribution of PNG forest types
Forest type % of land area
Lowland forest on plains and fans   6.5
Low altitude forests on uplands up to 1000m 45.9
Lower montane forest from 1000m to 3000m 13.6
Montane forest above 3000 m   1.5
Dry seasonal forest   3.1
Woodland   0.3
Mangrove   1.5
Non forest land 27.7
Source: Hammermaster and Saunders 1995
Data used for Figure 2.4   Change in PNG’s ‘adjusted forest area’, 1975-1996
Forest Area Km
2
%
Total Forest area in 1996 266,050 87
Logged over forest left to regenerate 8,751 3
Cleared for other land use (without logging) 11,332 4
Logged then cleared for other land use 4,210 1
Logged over forest “left to regenerate” but not done so yet 14,991 5
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System
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Western 4,694.6 (34.9) 175.4 (9.5) 108.2 (17.0) 4,447.5 (38.5)
Gulf 1,258.6 (9.4) 86.0 (4.7) 10.5 (1.7) 1,170.4 (10.1)
Central 682.6 (5.1) 193.9 (10.5) 25.7 (4.1) 522.6 (4.5)
Milne Bay 336.7  (2.5) 102.2 (5.5) 29.1 (4.6) 251.4 (2.2)
Oro 569.8  (4.2) 124.2 (6.7) 37.4 (5.8) 452.3 (3.9)
S. Highlands 403.8  (3.0) 2.3 (0.1) 40.8 (6.4) 375.4 (3.3)
Enga 474.2 (3.5) – 19.1  (3.0) 460.3 (4.0)
W. Highlands 62.6 (0.5) – 8.8 (1.4) 56.4 (0.5)
Chimbu 142.4 (1.1) – 26.4 (4.2) 128.5 (1.1)
E. Highlands 90.1  (0.7) 7.4 (0.4) 11.3 (1.7) 82.2 (0.7)
Morobe 321.7  (2.4) 67.4 (3.6) 20.7  (3.3) 265.0 (2.3)
Madang 611.7 (4.5) 78.3  (4.2) 66.0  (10.4) 525.0 (4.5)
East Sepik 618.7 (4.6) 23.1  (1.2) 46.0 (7.3) 568.6 (4.9)
West Sepik 1,572.1 (11.7) 93.7  (5.0) 124.6 (19.7) 1,407.4 (12.2)
Manus 101.3 (0.8) 14.8  (0.8) 45.0  (7.1) 62.8 (0.5)
New Ireland 332.0  (2.5) 197.0  (10.7) 1.8 (0.3) 170.9 (1.5)
E.N. Britain 227.8  (1.7) 150.9  (8.2) 7.9  (1.3) 96.0 (0.8)
W.N. Britain 708.2 (5.3) 530.9  (28.7) 4.9 (0.8) 259.5 (2.2)
N. Solomons 244.8 (1.8) –  – 244.8  (2.1)
TOTAL 13,453.5 (100.0) 1,847.3 (100.0) 634.0 (100.0) 11,547.1 (100.0)
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System
Data used for Figure 2.5  (a) Transformation of PNG’s ‘potential production forest’, 1975-1996
Province                              Total                    Logged               Cleared but                    Total
                                       area in 1975             (some cleared)               not logged               area in 1996
‘000ha         (%)          ‘000ha         (%)          ‘000ha         (%)           ‘000ha        (%)
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Commodity      1987      1995      1997
  volume     value volume    value volume    value
Logs (‘000 m
3
) 1450.0 103.0 2512.5 436.7 2375.9 409.3
Coffee (‘000 tonnes) 64.8 134.7 55.1 214.5 58.8 324.0
Cocoa (‘000 tonnes) 34.4 56.2 30.6 47.7 36.7 69.0
Copra (‘000 tonnes) 84.1 15.2 64.2 27.4 90.3 47.2
Palm oil (‘000 tonnes) 97.3 23.9 186.6 142.2 274.9 207.1
Rubber (‘000 tonnes) 3.7 3.1 2.7 4.0 4.4 6.5
Copper (‘000 tonnes) 209.7 281.9 215.7 754.5  77.8 259.8
Gold (tonnes) 34.6 422.9 55.2 840.1 44.3 718.7
Crude oil (million barrels) — — 37.0 827.7 28.0 852.2
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, December 1997
Data used for figure 3.1 Commodity export volumes and values
(in millions of kina), 1987, 1995 and 1997
Western 1,046.7 (6.5) 48.3 (5.1) 47.5 (9.5) 971.4 (6.5)
Gulf 1,175. (7.3) 16.0 (1.7) 7.4 (1.5 1,159.7 (7.7)
Central 1,251.3 (7.7) 44.1 (4.6) 13.5  (2.7) 1,205.4 (8.0)
Milne Bay 522.0 (3.2) 20.2 (2.1) 14.0 (2.8) 498.9 (3.3)
Oro 1,019.9 (6.3) 7.3 (0.8) 13.8 (2.8) 1,006.5 (6.7)
S. Highlands 1,500.8 (9.3) 5.6 (0.6) 86.3 (1.7) 1,442.2 (9.6)
Enga 242.2 (1.5) – 14.8 (3.0) 229.0 (1.5)
W. Highlands 391.2 (2.4) – 87.1 (17.4) 337.0 (2.2)
Chimbu 224.0 (1.4) – 16.0 (3.2) 212.0 (1.4)
E. Highlands 440.3 (2.7) 4.5 (0.5) 11.8 (2.4) 430.7 (2.9)
Morobe 1,733.7 (10.7) 96.9 (10.2) 70.5 (14.1) 1,600.7 (10.6)
Madang 972.0 (6.0) 19.3 (2.0) 30.5 (6.1) 945.0 (6.3)
East Sepik 1,461.1  (9.0) 4.5 (0.5) 17.6 (3.5) 1,448.7 (9.6)
West Sepik 1,495.6 (9.2) 29.9 (3.2) 30.3 (6.1) 1,441.6 (9.6)
Manus 6.3 (0.0) 1.1 (0.1) 1.9 (0.4) 4.4 (0.0)
New Ireland 409.8 (2.5) 186.2 (19.6) 0.4 (0.1) 233.9 (1.6)
E.N. Britain 998.1 (6.2) 162.1 (17.1) 25.7 (5.1) 828.8 (5.5)
W.N. Britain 990.5 (6.1) 302.0 (31.9) 10.0 (2.0) 737.3 (4.9)
N. Solomons 324.4 (2.0) – – 324.4 (2.2)
TOTAL 16,204.8 (100) 948.0 (100.0) 499.2 (100.0) 15,057.8 (100.0)
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System
Data used for Figure 2.5(b) Transformation of PNG’s ‘non-potential production forest’, 1975-1996
Province      Total area in 1975 Logged Cleared but Total area in
(some cleared) not logged 1996
’000 ha     (%) ’000 ha         (%) ’000 ha      (%) ’000 ha     (%)
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Data used for Figure 3.2  Sectoral shares of real GDP,
1987 and 1997
Sector                                                 1987 (%)       1997 (%)
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 30 26
Mining and quarrying 17 15
Petroleum 10
Manufacturing 9 8
Electricity etc. 2 1
Construction 4 5
Commerce 10 9
Transport and storage 5 5
Finance and real estate 2 1
Community and social services 16 13
Import duties 5 5
Source: AusAID 1997
1978    421   11.8 (02.3)    n.a. n.a.
1979    476   20.9 (03.0)    n.a. n.a.
1980    618   30.0 (04.7)    n.a. n.a.
1981    749   31.5 (05.8)    n.a. n.a.
1982 1,063   49.6 (09.1)    n.a. n.a.
1983 1,003   43.2 (06.5)     4.7 (01.1)
1984 1,278   69.9 (08.7)   12.4 (02.6)
1985 1,158   58.4 (06.5)   12.6 (02.3)
1986 1,299   68.0 (07.0)   13.7 (02.5)
1987 1,450 103.0 (09.3)   16.5 (02.5)
1988 1,348   90.5 (07.4)   15.6 (02.3)
1989 1,349   90.0 (08.6)   11.4 (01.4)
1990    990   65.2 (06.2)   12.2 (01.6)
1991 1,062   81.2 (06.2)   17.7 (02.2)
1992 1,601 140.0 (08.0)   25.0 (02.7)
1993 2,375 400.2 (16.3)   70.9 (06.3)
1994 2,944 483.1 (18.1) 131.3 (10.2)
1995 2,513 436.7 (12.8) 127.6 (08.6)
1996 2,607 464.8 (14.0) 150.9 (08.7)
1997 2,376 409.3 (13.4) 143.4 (07.6)
Note:
 
 At the time of writing, average prices have fallen below US$60/m
3
Sources: Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins
Year Export Export % share of Log export % share of
volumes values domestic  taxes non-grant
(’000 m
3
) (K million) export values (K million) revenues
Data used for Figure 4.1  Volume, value, and revenue contribution of
PNG’s log exports, 1978-1997
Policy that works for forests and people:  Papua New Guinea country study414
Data used for Figure 8.3  Estimated range of logging costs in PNG, 1993
Item Low cost High cost
Planning/survey Nil K2.50/m
3
Road construction K10/m
3
K20/m
3
Felling (labour contract) K2/m
3
K5/m
3
Skidding K2/m
3
K5/m
3
Scaling (labour contract) 50t/m
3
K1/m
3
Loading/trucking K2/m
3
K10/m
3
Log dump (sort/stack) K1/m
3
K2/m
3
Shipping (barging) K2/m
3
K7.50/m
3
Shipping (stevedores) 50t/m
3
K1/m
3
Fuel, oil and parts 10% 20%
Administration 10% 10%
TOTAL K22.40/m
3
K66.00/m
3
Source: PNG Forest Management and Planning Project
Data used for Figure 4.3  PNG log exports by country of destination, 1994 and 1997
Country 1994 exports 1997 exports
’000m
3
% $/m
3
’000m
3
% $/m
3
Japan 1,509.8 64.9 165 1,960.2 65.2 120
South Korea 601.0 25.8 137 421.2 14.0 107
Hong Kong 71.3 3.1 209 129.4 4.3 161
China 47.9 2.1 167 104.4 3.5 115
Taiwan 41.0 1.8 135 88.4 2.9 81
Philippines 35.2 1.5 111 196.0 6.5 88
Thailand 10.2 0.4 121 27.8 0.9 113
India 9.4 0.4 220 49.4 1.6 162
Malaysia 29.3 1.0 108
TOTAL 2,325.7 100 158 3,006.2 100 117
Note: Average prices are in US dollars.
Source: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest
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Data used for Figure 8.4  Export tax rates under the old revenue system, 1979-1995
Species 1979-90 1/91-11/93 11/93-3/94 3/94-11/95
Kwila, Pencil Cedar, Planchonella 10% 30% 33% 46%
Calophyllum, Mersawa, Taun, Walnut 10% 20% 23% 36%
Burckella, Canarius, Gluta, Hopea, Terminalia 10% 12% 15% 28%
All other species 10% 9% 13% 26%
Weighted average 10.0% 14.3% 17.3% 31.1%
Note: the weighted average represents the effective subsidy to downstream processors.
Source: PNG Forest Authority.
Data used for Figure 8.5  Comparison of export taxes under the old and new revenue systems
Log price           Log price             Tax under old system             Tax under new system
(USD/m
3
)            (PGK/m
3
) (K) (%) (K) (%)
110 147 45.80 31.2 39.50 26.9
120 160 49.85 31.2 46.89 29.3
130 173 53.90 31.2 54.82 31.7
140 187 58.27 31.2 63.72 34.1
150 200 62.32 31.2 72.06 36.0
160 213 66.36 31.2 80.56 37.8
Note: the average log price in 1996 was K175/m
3
, giving a weighted average tax rate of K56/m
3
 under the new system.
Source: PNG Forest Authority.
Policy that works for forests and people:  Papua New Guinea country study416
Data used for Figure 8.6  Distribution of PNG log export revenues, 1988-1996 (in kina)
INCOME CATEGORY 1988 1990 1992 1993 93-94 1994 1995 1996
Average log price (Kina/m
3
) 71.00 66.00 87.00 169.00 163.00 158.00 160.00 175.00
Income to local landowners: 6.34 6.21 6.73 8.79 8.64 8.51 8.56 21.11
     Royalties 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 9.50
    Other levies & premiums 2.78 2.65 3.17 5.23 5.08 4.95 5.00 11.61
Income to provincial government: 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.00
Income to national government: 8.29 7.79 14.36 26.80 30.78 50.42 51.04 57.59
     Log export tax 7.10 6.60 13.17 25.61 29.59 49.23 49.85 56.09
     Reforestation levies 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
     Royalty withholding tax 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.50
Income to logging contractor: 55.12 50.75 64.66 132.16 122.33 97.82 99.15 96.30
Assessed logging costs 38.23 42.51 47.33 49.50 49.50 50.29 57.79 66.96
Balance to logging contractor: 16.89 8.24 17.33 82.66 72.83 47.53 41.36 29.34
Balance in real 1996 Kina 29.58 12.98 24.51 111.82 98.52 63.28 47.93 29.34
Note: The ‘93-94’ column shows the distribution of log export revenues between the budget of November 1993 and the
mini-budget of March 1994.  The adjoining columns show the distribution during the remaining months of those years.
Source: PNG Forest Authority.
